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HISTORY

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY

HENRY C. SHELDON

PROFESSOR OF HISTORICAL THEOLOGY IN BOSTON UNIVERSITY

IN TWO VOLUMES

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Fourth Period.

1517-1720.

INTRODUCTION.

WE enter now upon an era in the history of Christian doctrine inferior in importance to none since the age of the apostles, — an era from which one might date, without presumption, the second birth of Christianity.

Remarkably fruitful in immediate results, the Reformation was still more fruitful in preparing for remote and permanent acquisitions. It bears comparison with the first century in the work of breaking down barriers. Primitive Christianity, by opening a way through the complex legalism and proud assumptions of Pharisaic Judaism, gained room for a glorious advance in religious thought and life. So the Reformation, in cleaving the fortifications of legality and pretentious infallibility by which the Romish hierarchy sought to perpetuate its spiritual despotism, provided inestimable opportunities of progress. Its work was absolutely indispensable. It bears unmistakably the marks of divine providence. Let hostile criticism say what it may; let it point to foibles in the conduct or to crudities in the dogmas of the Reformers; the fact still remains, that the Reformation purchased for Christianity the noblest opportunities and prospects which it has in the world to-day. If it gave scope for some temporary errors, it secured a chance for vigorous, healthy, and permanent growth. Designedly or undesignedly it placed men in the way of fulfilling their divine calling to freedom and intelligence.

The starting-point of the Reformation can be understood only by recalling the bent of the scholastic system. The more characteristic features of that system, as we have seen, tended to the common result of shadowing the direct relation of the individual to Christ. The views that were entertained of the person of Christ, of the Church, of the sacraments, of the merit of works, and of the saints, all combined to place the individual at a distance from his Redeemer. It mattered little that He was allowed to be the primary fountain of grace. The fountain was made so remote, and so many objects were interposed, that naturally, before the attention could pass beyond the motley throng, it was dissipated and lost. A crowd of rival agencies invaded the solitary eminence which is accorded to Christ in the New Testament. In place of dependence upon the personal Redeemer was put dependence upon the hierarchy and the means which it saw fit to prescribe. In fact, the standard teaching in the centuries preceding the Reformation robbed the individual of his rights as a citizen of the kingdom of Christ, and degraded him to the condition of a mere subject,—a subject slavishly dependent upon the priestly hierarchy. That hierarchy stood over him as his judge, and the sole dispenser to him of the grace of salvation. It pronounced opposition to its decrees among the most damnable of all offences, and magnified the virtue of blind submission. It reckoned all outside of its own circle in a state of religious childhood, incapable of ever reaching their majority in this world, and hindered their approach to the springs of knowledge in the Scriptures, or denied that approach altogether. It put reconciliation with itself in place of reconciliation with God. It appointed to the individual the conditions of pardon, and proclaimed his sins remitted or retained. It emphasized the sacraments as indispensable means of salvation, and yet gave the priest the power, by a perverse exercise of his will, to nullify the sacrament which he assumed to administer. It left the penitent without assurance of

having received the sacramental grace, as he could be certain neither of the valid ordination nor of the honest intention of the priest. In a word, the hierarchy, as judge over the individual, made him come to its tribunal for every grace, and sent him away without proper guaranty of any. This prerogative it could and did exercise quite differently under different circumstances. It could be very stringent or very lax. Just before the Reformation it assumed, to a conspicuous degree, the *rôle* of laxity, — acted the part of a frivolous, unscrupulous judge. Indulgence peddlers, like Tetzel and Samson, represented that the Church is no hard and grudging mistress, but ready to deal out pardon with a lavish hand. An artificial legalism was joined with a shallow estimate of the demerit of sin. But through all this laxity the principle of absolute dependence upon the hierarchy remained the same, and the anathema was ready for any one who should dare to impeach its prerogatives.

As the essence of the Romish perversion consisted in depressing the individual and obscuring his direct relation to Christ, the starting-point of a true counteracting movement must needs be the exaltation of the individual to his proper independence and rights, and the emphasizing of his direct relation to Christ. Such was the starting-point of the Reformation. It began with an assertion of the rights of the individual, his release from arbitrary and unscriptural authority, his relative independence of ecclesiastical machinery, his privilege to come into direct relation to Christ, and to find therein assurance of salvation. Whether Luther fully apprehended it at first or not, his doctrine of justification by faith was a decided step toward the emancipation of the individual from the absolute authority of the hierarchy.

The proper ground for receiving a principle like this had been prepared in numerous minds and hearts by the opening of the sixteenth century. Ever since the closing era of the Crusades there had been a growing pressure against ecclesiastical restraints. The national spirit gathered strength,

and became more and more impatient and bold against the claims of the papacy. The new impulse given to commercial enterprise, the more energetic tone of secular industries, left a narrower sphere to that romantic zeal which responded readily to the calls of the Church. The efforts of the more earnest minds to reform the Church through such attempts as culminated in the councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle, though abortive in their immediate aim, left still their impress. The voices of such heralds of evangelical truth as Wycliffe, Huss, and Savonarola ceased not to reverberate in many hearts. The revival of classic studies and the many discoveries of the age gave a new impulse to freedom of thought, while the spread of mysticism enlarged the number of those who sought satisfaction to their souls rather in personal communion with God by prayer and meditation, than in the round of ceremonial observances.

All these developments served naturally as forerunners of religious freedom. There were many minds who only needed to hear a voice speaking with prophetic energy and confidence the word of religious emancipation, in order to their receiving it with deep conviction and joy. In the profound experiences of the monk of Erfurt, Providence prepared the prophet's voice that was required. The pre-eminently Pauline experience of Luther brought into his soul with midday clearness the idea of justification by faith. As he had proved to the full the death-working power of all attempts to justify one's self by means of works, the thought of justification by simple faith upon Christ came to him like a new gospel, like a message of glad tidings from heaven. The truth thus grasped penetrated to the utmost his deep and enthusiastic nature, and kindled a fire that must needs communicate itself to other hearts.

The Reformation as embodied in Luther began, not with a negative, but with a positive principle, and a positive principle concerning the acts and experiences of the in-

dividual soul. The primary question with Luther was not, How may I reform the Church? but, How may I be saved, and have assurance of my salvation? The work of tearing down was not at all in his thought at first. His starting-point was simply the principle of faith, ascending directly to Christ and grasping His word of promise, as the only and the sufficient way to assurance of salvation. But as this principle was contradicted by the Romish tenets, and still more by the Romish spirit and practice, its vigorous maintenance could not fail to bring about a collision.

Let us observe now the developments which followed. Among the results most immediately flowing from Luther's standpoint was an emphatic qualifying of the mediatorial power of the hierarchy. If the individual can come directly to Christ, and in the exercise of living faith in Him can find assurance of salvation, then he is evidently released from any absolute dependence upon the priest. The priest may or may not intend the sacrament; if only the believer apprehends Christ in the sacrament, he cannot fail of the proper grace. Not so much the act of the priest as his own faith is the vehicle of divine gifts. Romish authority was not slow to perceive this bearing of the Lutheran principle, and so was stirred up to hostile measures.

By the opposition which assailed him, Luther was driven to the still further result of asserting the sole authority of the Scriptures in matters of faith. This was not in his mind at the outset. At the time that he posted his theses (1517), he declared expressly that he was conscious of holding nothing which might not be proved by the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the papal decrees. He gave a deciding voice to the last, as well as to the first. He spoke of the Pope only in terms of respect, and of the abuse of indulgences as something unauthorized by him. But he soon found that papal patronage was by no means clear of the abuse,—that the Pope was jealous of any attempt to mend the affairs of the Church, and was determined

to proscribe the principle which his experience had taught him was the truth of God. Unable to surrender that principle, it only remained for him to deny the infallibility of the Pope. From questioning the authority of the Pope, it was an easy step to questioning the authority of the hierarchy which culminates in the Pope. So Luther came to the conclusion that neither pope nor council can lay claim to infallibility. Submission to them is not, therefore, an essential of membership in the Church of Christ. The only adequate authority of the Church is the Word of God.

The Scriptures having been made the final authority in matters of faith, the next question concerned the proper contents of the Scriptures and their interpretation. In the absence of an infallible pope or conclave, what shall determine the canonical character of doubtful books? What shall give assurance that the right interpretation is made? Here it only remained to make the Bible its own witness. Its testimony, it was said, comes with convincing power to the sincere heart. The Spirit of Christ within responds to His Spirit in the Scriptures. Better than anything else a Christ-consciousness is qualified to discern the divine impress upon a canonical book. The Scripture is also its own best interpreter. If one passage is obscure, another upon the same subject will be found to be clear. Every Christian must look into this treasury for himself, and judge for himself concerning its teaching, not indeed according to unregulated and capricious impulses, but with that chastened and spiritual temper which responds with ready appreciation to the evidences of divine truth. "To know and to judge of doctrine," says Luther, "so pertains to each and every Christian, that he is worthy of anathema who would detract a hair's breadth from this right." (Quoted by Köstlin.) So, in place of the fiat of the ecclesiastical power, was asserted the authority of Scripture as addressed to the individual and interpreted by him. The Reformation as a whole, to be sure, may not

have been consistent upon this point, — may have had its reaction against the full right of private interpretation; but the right was logically involved in the principles of the Reformation, and was more or less distinctly recognized by Luther and others.

The course of the Reformation as it appears in Luther's personal development may be regarded as largely representative of the Reformation in general. Advancement from one step to another may not have been made in precisely the same order in all instances. With Zwingli, for example, the emphatic starting-point was not so much a single doctrine enforced by an intense personal experience as the general principle of the supreme authority of the Scriptures. But whatever the order followed, the Reformation everywhere advanced toward the same list of principles as we have noticed in connection with Luther. Everywhere it assailed the main pillar of spiritual despotism by denying the infallibility of the hierarchy; everywhere it pointed the individual to the Scriptures for instruction, and to direct dependence upon Christ for the reality and the assurance of salvation.

In advancing on to Biblical ground, the Reformation, no doubt, approximated to the standpoint of the early Church. Yet it would not be giving an accurate definition of it to call it simply a restoration of primitive Christianity; at least, if under the name of primitive Christianity we include any considerable interval after the apostolic age. For the theology of the Reformation grasped the idea of justification by faith, distinguished between the visible and the invisible Church, and in general affirmed the purely subjective conditions of salvation with a clearness and emphasis which we seek in vain in much of the Christian literature of the first centuries. This was but a natural result of the different conditions of the two eras. A system wrought out in conscious antagonism to a contrasted system naturally has sharper outlines than one developed

apart from such antagonism. No wonder, then, that the Reformers, confronted as they were by the most elaborate structure of legalism and hierarchical pretension known to history, were enabled to lay hold with clear apprehension upon truths which the early fathers left ill-defined or in part compromised.

What is the natural goal of the Reformation principles? From what has already been said, it is plain that one answer must be, *Universal religious liberty*. Logically carried out, they prohibit all coercion in matters of simple faith. If there is no infallible interpreter of Scripture upon earth, then no one is authorized to set up his interpretation as a standard and to punish dissent therefrom. Each has the right to be his own interpreter, only subject to the limitation that, in publishing or acting upon his interpretations, he is not to violate the common decencies of civilized society. The Reformers, it is true, were not all faithful to this principle. To a lamentable degree they violated religious tolerance both in theory and in practice. The stern demands of self-preservation, fears of religious anarchy, and an intemperate ambition for the victory of their own scheme, obscured to many minds the proper inferences from their own general standpoint. But this is simply saying that individual narrowness, combined with adverse circumstances and influences, prevented the Reformation from speedily realizing its essential ideal. As the centuries have proved, and as the reason of the case dictates, its principles are the natural basis of religious liberty.

As all liberty has its liabilities to abuse, we could not expect an unmixed good from the religious liberty born with the Reformation. And in fact evils have appeared. Protestantism has, without doubt, run into a certain excess of individualism. It has not in general been possessed with an adequate sense of the guilt of a needless schism. Very slight grounds have given rise to new subdivisions, and to-day Protestantism numbers vastly more communions than

there is any rational occasion for. It must be allowed also that the intellectual freedom of Protestantism has often degenerated into license and issued in infidelity. Such facts are naturally so much capital in the hands of opponents. From the days of Bossuet down to the present, they have been industriously paraded. "We have seen," says a recent Ritualistic essay, "and do see, what the so-called emancipation of the intellect has done for Protestants. It has produced all the heresy, and schism, and infidelity of the last three hundred years, from Martin Luther to Joe Smith." But such critics are too headlong in their polemics,—are blind to a whole catalogue of truths. They forget that a valid and worthy faith grows only in connection with the privilege of free investigation; that, to whatever aberrations Protestantism may have given scope, it has vastly increased the aggregate of positive and intelligent faith in Christendom. They forget that a constrained belief is very apt to become a covert unbelief, a temptation to hypocrisy, and so far more disastrous in effect than an open expression of unbelief; that the more cultured portion of the Romish Church was honeycombed with scepticism just before the Reformation, and that the same fact is in no small degree repeated to-day. They forget that a discredited claim to infallible authority is among the most potent instruments to infect with infidelity and to drive into disgust with religion, and in the age of mental alertness upon which we are entering is likely to convert men into sceptics by the thousand and the ten thousand. They forget that a unity which is purchased at the expense of mental enslavement is a calamity, and that no more unity is desirable than can be realized on the basis of freedom and intelligence. The fault of Protestantism is not in its principles. It cannot detract aught from these without trespassing upon the birthright, yea, upon the divine vocation of the individual. The fault is in the imperfect application of its principles.

To expect this fault to be entirely corrected would, no doubt, be utopian ; yet it is reasonable to hope for a great amendment. It is possible that the centrifugal forces of Protestantism may in due time be held in check by factors that make for unity. It is possible that from free discussion, from the interaction of different systems, and from a practical testing of different views by their fruits, there may result a growing clearness and unanimity as to what are the essential elements of an evangelical faith, and what are only subordinate and non-essential elements. Thus an ever-strengthening bond of moral unity may be established, which may prepare for an organic unity of denominations so nearly kindred as to have no real cause of separation. In fact, there are positive and increasing tokens that such a movement is already in progress. Without presumption, we may predict, as the ultimate goal of Protestantism, a far deeper and truer unity than any which the artificial constraints of hierarchical sovereignty can preserve to Romanism.

Fourth Period.

1517-1720.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

THE same movement which emancipated theology from the bonds of scholasticism prepared also for the emancipation of philosophy. Modern philosophy proper, however, was not born till about a century after the dawn of the Reformation. The transition era, which began in the fifteenth century, extended to the early part of the seventeenth. This was a time of ferment and endeavor, but not of any thorough reconstruction of philosophy. The old scholastic Aristotelianism was not dethroned altogether, at least in the Romish Church; but rivals made their appearance here and there. There were champions of Platonism or Neo-Platonism, like Reuchlin, Agrippa of Nettesheim, and others who were influenced by the teachings of Ficinus and Pico. There were advocates of a purified Aristotelianism, or of the philosophy of Aristotle freed from its scholastic coloring. Some of the Reformers might be placed in this category. There were Anti-Aristotelians, like Peter Ramus and Nicolaus Taurellus. There were some who philosophized in a sceptical tone, like Montaigne, Charron, and Sanchez; others, like Paracelsus, Cardanus,

Telesius, Patritius, Bruno, and Campanella, who followed more or less in the wake of Nicolas of Cusa, and whose philosophy was pre-eminently a philosophy of nature. In some instances this natural philosophy was marked by a theosophic vein.

As the main currents of philosophy in the preceding ages might be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, so a review of modern philosophy carries us back to two eminent representatives, Francis Bacon and René Descartes. The same relative rank, to be sure, cannot be assigned to the later as to the earlier philosophers. Bacon and Descartes appear as less towering figures in the modern group, than do Plato and Aristotle in the ancient. Still they are to be accredited with an analogous position, and are of prime importance as representing diverse philosophical tendencies destined to long-continued and powerful influence in the realm of thought. Bacon and Descartes were alike opposed to the over-valuation of the syllogism characteristic of scholasticism. Both saw that it was rather a means of arranging the known, than of discovering the unknown. Both insisted upon analysis, or a sifting process, as the necessary antecedent of trustworthy conclusions. Both made greater thoroughness of method a prime demand. But from this point they diverged. Bacon directed the attention outward. His maxim was: Observe, experiment, carefully examine and arrange the results, and turn them to practical account in life. Observation and induction, according to him, are the pathway to certain knowledge, and knowledge is to be made subservient chiefly to utilitarian ends. Descartes, on the other hand, directed the attention within. His maxim was: Retire into the depths of your own consciousness, examine the contents of your own mind, find out its fundamental intuitions, the ideas which it cherishes with invincible clearness and force, and use them as the basis of all certain knowledge. Intuition and deduction, according to him, are the principal instruments in the dis-

covery of truth. Bacon's philosophy was in the line of empiricism and sensationalism; Descartes's had affinity with idealism.

Bacon (1560-1626) gave a limited range to philosophy; in fact, substantially identified it with natural science. Even such a question as the nature of the soul he regarded as largely beyond its sphere. "Although," he says, "I am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired, even in nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the end it must be bounded by religion, or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion; for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth, but was immediately inspired; so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than by accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the proper subject of philosophy; and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance." (Advancement of Learning.) As respects the truths of revealed religion, he declares emphatically and repeatedly, that philosophy is not to meddle with them. The following statements from the treatise just quoted will serve to illustrate his position. "By the contemplation of nature to induce and to enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate His power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and has been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe. *Da fidei quæ fidei sunt.* For the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: that men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven. . . . To seek heaven and earth in the word of God, whereof it is said, *Heaven and earth shall pass, but my word shall not pass,* is

to seek temporary things amongst eternal; and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living. . . . Sacred theology is grounded only upon the word and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature. . . . The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man; so that as we are to obey His law, though we find a reluctance in our will, so we are to believe His word, though we find a reluctance in our reason. For if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter and not to the author. . . . The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts; the former, in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction therefrom. The former extendeth to the mysteries themselves; but how? by way of illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument. For after the articles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them for our better direction." Thus Bacon made as wide a chasm between theology and philosophy as the most extreme of the nominalist school had done. An obvious motive for his procedure was a desire to secure for philosophy an unrestricted freedom in the realm of nature. In all probability Bacon entertained a genuine respect for the Christian faith. Nevertheless, the limited scope which he allowed to reason in matters of religious belief will appear to many the reverse of a compliment to revealed religion.

No doubt it would be wrong to hold Bacon responsible for Hobbes (1588-1679). The former would have repudiated most emphatically many of the cardinal conclusions of the latter. Still, the system of Bacon was not without a degree of affinity with that of his friend Hobbes. The

two appear related as initial tendency and extreme development. Hobbes pushed on at once to a radical type of sensationalism. His psychology is purely materialistic, affirming that sensation is the basis of all mental activities, and that sensation is nothing but motion in the internal parts of a sentient being caused by the physical impact of external objects. Different psychological terms, such as sensation, memory, imagination, volition, etc., stand simply for these internal motions or vibrations, viewed at different stages or in different relations. Spirit, save as an accident of body, or as a peculiar kind of body, has no existence. To speak of incorporeal substance is to indulge a radical contradiction of terms. Naturally, on this physical theory there is no room for freedom in the sense of self-determination. Every volition is as strictly necessitated as is any event in nature. Man's liberty is as the liberty of water to flow in the channel by which it is confined. (*Leviathan*, and *Philosophical Rudiments*.)

Hobbes did not challenge the truth of revealed religion. On the contrary, he quoted the Bible as authority, and to a degree that is perhaps not paralleled by any other philosophical writer. He refers to the Sacred Scriptures as "the speech of God." He commends an unquestioning acceptance of the mysteries of religion, and says that they have the best effect, when, like pills for the sick, they are swallowed whole. But despite this exterior coloring, his system in its natural tendencies is radically antagonistic to religion. To say nothing of other features, the almost unlimited authority over the opinions and practices of men which he assigns to the earthly sovereign, tends to rob religion of all its nobler sanctions and to relegate it to the miserable rank of a piece of statecraft. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Hobbes puts the sovereign in the place of God. Whatever limitations some of his statements may seem to impose upon the authority of the ruler, they are mostly nullified when compared with other statements.

It matters little that he says that the laws of God must take precedence of those of the sovereign. For the sovereign is made by him the sole interpreter of all laws, sacred as well as secular, and "the word of an interpreter of the Scriptures is the word of God." (Phil. Rud.) It belongs to the magistrate to determine the Scriptural canon, to decide what doctrines are to be acknowledged, what forms of worship are to be tolerated, what external actions are to be reckoned virtuous or vicious. Whatever be his commands, they must be obeyed, unless they involve an affront to God, and the private reason must hesitate to call that an affront which the public reason declares is not. If the sovereign commands the worship of idols, though perhaps a subject of special eminence and influence had better submit to martyrdom than obey, an ordinary subject does well to obey. Commerce with another man's wife, if authorized by the sovereign, is no longer adultery. "By those laws, 'Thou shalt not kill,' 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Honor thy father and mother,' nothing else was commanded but that subjects should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning *meum* and *tuum*, their own and others' right." In fine, there is very little in the system of Hobbes to qualify the force of the following sweeping statement of his: "The civil laws are to all subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine whether they be right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious." (De Corpore Politico.)

Hobbes's theories were too extreme to command much acceptance. They were set forth also in a dogmatic way, and exhibit far more skill of assertion than fulness and cogency of argument. A successor of Bacon more genuine and influential by far was John Locke (1632-1704.) But before reaching Locke it is appropriate to notice a phase of philosophy outside of the main current in England. In opposition to the materialism of Hobbes and his conven-

tional morality, the Cambridge school (in the middle and latter part of the seventeenth century) cultivated an idealistic and spiritual philosophy, and were zealous advocates of immutable morality, of moral distinctions that are subject to no authority, not even to the will of God Himself. They were also profoundly convinced of the rational character of religious truth. Somewhat to the detriment of its own originality, this school quoted largely from Platonism, or Neo-Platonism,—from the latter perhaps more than from the former. Coleridge says they might be called Plotinists rather than Platonists. The more distinguished representatives of the Cambridge Platonists were Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Henry More, and Ralph Cudworth. The names of Culverwell, Worthington, Rust, Patrick, Fowler, and Glanvill might also be added. Of the writings from this group, “The True Intellectual System of the Universe,” by Cudworth, is the most significant. More wrote copiously, but marred his reputation by many extravagant and fanciful notions. John Norris, author of an interesting treatise on the “Theory of the Ideal World,” was at once a disciple of the Cambridge theologians and of Malebranche.

Locke was true to the Baconian emphasis upon experience as the proper source of knowledge. In his noted “Essay on the Human Understanding,” he contends against the doctrine of innate ideas. He compares the mind in its original estate to an empty cabinet and to a sheet of blank paper. In reply to the question how the mind obtains its materials, he says: “To this I answer in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.” Locke here joins reflection with sensation as

a source of ideas, but his general teaching implies that the former must be supplied with certain materials from the latter before it can act. Indeed, he says, "I see no reason to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on." The primary materials of thought, then, according to Locke, all come from without, and in this sense it may be said that there is nothing in the mind which was not previously in the senses.

Locke himself was no advocate of that extreme sensationalism which verges upon or runs into positive materialism. But still there were features in his system in affinity with this type of thought. His general illustrations lie on the side of the supposition of the mind's passivity, and, though he must have regarded the power of reflection as an active power, he did not take great pains to emphasize this view. He showed also little enthusiasm for the doctrine that the soul is immaterial, and declared it conceivable that God could endow a parcel of matter with the power of thought. (Essay, and Letters to the Bishop of Worcester.) Moreover, the definition of liberty, which he gives in his Essay, as simply a power to do what one wills, if it were to be regarded as representing the whole mind of Locke upon the subject, would place him, at this point, in harmony with the demands of materialism. It is not surprising, therefore, that various students of his philosophy, both in England and France, went forward to build upon his foundations a materialistic structure. At the same time, it is to be noticed that one phase of his teaching, namely, that the immediate objects of the mind are not things, but rather ideas of things, served as a basis for idealism. These developments, however, are not to be dwelt upon here, as they belong to the next period.

In the bearing of his philosophy upon questions of religion, Locke appears somewhat in contrast with Bacon. Unlike the latter, he was not willing to allow that faith may be in contradiction to reason. "Faith is nothing," he

remarks, "but a firm assent of the mind; which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it." While he allows that what is improbable on grounds of reason may be made certain by revelation, he will not grant that anything contradictory to reason can be established in this way. "No proposition," he says, "can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever." This emphasis upon the harmony of faith and reason was coupled in Locke with the reverse of a mystical bent. He had little sympathy with the transcendental side of religion. The ethical system of Christianity held the place of chief importance in his estimate. In these features there was a certain affinity between Locke and the deistical school which flourished so extensively in England in the first half of the eighteenth century. Locke's sympathies, however, were with revealed religion, and he was utterly averse to being associated with the deists.

The system of Descartes (1596-1650), as well as that of Bacon, has propagated its influence through a long list of successors. Unlike the English philosopher, Descartes brought philosophy into close relation with theology; indeed, he regarded certain data pertaining to the latter as indispensable to any progress in the former. According to him, the idea of God belongs not at the end of the system, but at the very beginning, or at least within a step or two of the beginning. He says: "I very clearly see that the certitude and truth of all science depends on the knowledge alone of the true God." (Meditation V.) The first step lies in an appeal to self-consciousness, as expressed in the famous maxim, *Cogito, ergo sum*, — "I think, therefore I am." Though I assume to doubt everything, says Descartes, I must allow that there is something that doubts.

Doubting is thinking. Whether I am deceived in the idea that I have a body or not, I am sure that I exist as a thinking being. From this point I can advance securely only by an appeal to the existence of God. A perfect Creator and Ruler is the only adequate guaranty against the supposition that I am the victim of deception in my thoughts and experiences. Now I am certified of the existence of such a Being upon grounds (given in Chap. II. sect. 1) that are entirely conclusive. I have therefore the required basis of scientific certainty. I can trust my faculties, as respects all that they clearly and distinctly apprehend. (See Discourse of Method; Meditations; Principles of Philosophy.)

The overshadowing importance which Descartes assigned to the idea of God in the foundations of philosophy, was not unnaturally supplemented by an emphatic conception of the agency of God, or of His causal efficiency in the world. We find him, accordingly, predicating in strong terms the dependence of the creature. Conservation, he says, is distinguished from creation merely in respect of our mode of thinking. A kindred view appears in his definition of substance. "By substance we can conceive nothing else than a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence. And, in truth, there can be conceived but one substance that is absolutely independent, and that is God. We perceive that all other things can exist only by the help of the concurrence of God. And accordingly, the term *substance* does not apply to God and the creature univocally."

Descartes was careful to avoid collision with the doctrinal standards of his Church (Roman Catholic), and assumed a reverent attitude toward the mysteries of the faith. He says: "If perhaps God reveal to us or to others matters concerning Himself which surpass the natural powers of our mind, such as the mysteries of the incarnation and of the trinity, we will not refuse to believe them, although we may not clearly understand them; nor will we be in any

way surprised to find in the immensity of His nature, or even in what He has created, many things that exceed our comprehension." (Principles of Philosophy, Pt. I.) Nevertheless, his writings did not escape censure. His Meditations, and some other of his productions, were placed in 1663 on the prohibited list at Rome, with the words attached, *Donec corrigantur*.

The stress which he placed upon the divine causality was joined by Descartes with a very emphatic view of the contrast between mind and matter. Herein was supplied a foundation for the doctrine of *occasionalism*. This was distinctly advocated by Geulinx (1625-1669). Body and soul, as he taught, in their radical unlikeliness, cannot be supposed to have any inherent bond of union, any power to operate upon each other. In God alone must be sought the connecting link between them. Malebranche (1638-1715) was very positively committed to the same theory. There is no causal connection, he says, between soul and body. What transpires in the one can be only an occasion, not a cause, of any experience in the other. Going still further, Malebranche declares that there is no relation of causality between one body and another, or between one spirit and another. "No creature is able to act upon another by any efficacy properly its own," — *Nulle créature ne peut agir sur aucune autre par une efficace qui lui soit propre*. (Entretien sur la Métaphysique.) The mind does not stand in causal relation even to its own ideas. It may be able to render attention; but attention is only the occasion of the presence of ideas, not the cause. The cause is the Divine Word, the Universal Reason. In other words, the mind sees all things in God, who is the place of ideas, as space is the place of bodies. From this it would seem to follow that revelation is the only proper warrant for assuming the existence of an external sensible world.

In the limited sphere which he assigns to second causes, Malebranche appears upon the verge of pantheism, — a goal

that was actually reached by his contemporary, Spinoza (1632-1677). Taking up the definition of substance thrown out by Descartes, Spinoza gave it a rigorous application, and drew the conclusion that there is only one substance. "Besides God," he says, "there can be no substance, nor can any be conceived." (*Ethica*, Pars I. Prop. 14.) He affirms that there is in God an infinite fulness of attributes, but he dwells only upon two,—thought and extension. While these express the same substance, they are radically contrasted, and void of all causal relation to each other. Finite things are simply these attributes viewed as differentiated. "Particular things," says Spinoza, "are nothing but affections of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate manner,"—*Res particulares nihil sunt, nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur.* (*Ethica*, I. 25, cor.) The modes of thought are ideas or minds; the modes of extension, bodies. These always correspond to each other. "The order and connection of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things." (*Ethica*, II. 7.) Both are absolutely determined by the divine nature. God works everything from an inner necessity, without free volition, without design. There is no such thing as final cause, save in human imagination. Man is a link in the chain of necessity, and imagines himself to be free only because he is ignorant of the causes of his determinations.

Spinoza, who was excommunicated by his Jewish brethren, did not unqualifiedly commit himself in favor of any particular religion. He seems, however, to have entertained a certain preference for Christianity. His system indeed allowed no place for a divine incarnation in the Christian sense, but he evidently reckoned Christ far above all other teachers as respects His knowledge of the mind of God, and declared that we might call His voice the voice of God, and say "that the wisdom of God, that is, the

wisdom which is more than human, put on humanity in Christ, and that Christ consequently is the way of salvation." (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.) To the Bible Spinoza rendered a qualified assent, regarding it as pre-eminently pedagogical, or accommodated to the needs of practical piety rather than to those of theoretical knowledge. Miracles he utterly disallowed, holding that what is repugnant to the order of nature must of necessity be repugnant to the mind of God. The list of essential religious truths which he laid down is quite similar to that given by Lord Herbert, the patriarch of English deism. As respects the province of government in determining the standard of conduct and religious observance, he approximated to the radical position of Hobbes.

Extreme tendencies were thus manifested in the line both of the Baconian and of the Cartesian philosophy. An attempt at mediation naturally resulted. Leibnitz appears as the first great exponent of such an attempt; but his system may most advantageously be considered in connection with the philosophy of the next period.

These modern philosophies evidently could have exercised but a limited influence upon theology within the period before us. The main types of Protestant theology had already been developed before they made their appearance. Lutheranism throughout the period was hardly touched by them. The philosophy of Leibnitz, as systematized by Wolff, was the first of modern philosophies to displace the modified Aristotelianism which had been embraced in the Reformation era, and to exercise a potent influence within the Lutheran Church. Some of the Reformed theologians, as also some of the Roman Catholic, were influenced to a considerable extent by the philosophy of Descartes. The same philosophy was early brought to the attention of the Cambridge Platonists, and traces of its influence may be seen in their writings, though it was in part opposed by them. Some of the English theolo-

gians, at the end of the period, show not a little affinity with the spirit of Locke's philosophy.

As respects the worth of philosophy, a rather moderate estimate may be said to have been generally prevalent among Protestant theologians. Luther in the heat of his reforming zeal spoke very disparagingly of philosophy, reckoned Aristotle as a near neighbor of the devil, and called him the spoiler of pious doctrine. Luther indeed came to the conclusion to tolerate Aristotle, and credited philosophy with an important place in things natural; but he seems never to have regarded it as of much worth in things spiritual. He denounced the natural reason as the primary fountain of evils, and asserted that faith must rise superior to its dictates. Among those who followed, Daniel Hoffmann of Helmstedt rivalled the extremest utterances of Luther, and is said to have adopted the principle that what is against reason is for God. (Dorner, History of Protestant Theology.) But his position was exceptional. The great body of Lutheran theologians, like Melancthon, were ready to bring philosophy into relation with theology, only holding that its place is entirely subordinate. John Gerhard approved the position of Aquinas, that, while philosophy may offer probable arguments, it is never to be ranked as a full and independent authority in matters of theology, but always held in subordination to the Scriptures. (Loci Theologici, Proœm.) Quenstedt manifested an extra degree of anxiety lest too large a space should be conceded to philosophy, but logically his statements assign to it about the same sphere as that defined by Gerhard. Hollaz drew a distinction between *pure* and *mixed* articles, regarding the latter as falling within the province of philosophy, or the natural reason, but the former as capable of being made known by supernatural revelation alone. We find Quenstedt complaining of the Calvinists as preposterously subjecting the mysteries of the faith to the authority of reason. (Systema Theologicum, De Theol. Prin.) This is by far

too sweeping. Very likely, in the present period, within the Calvinistic or Reformed Church, as a whole, there was more appreciation of philosophy than in the Lutheran. But in the former, as well as in the latter, it was commonly assigned a subordinate place, and there were, moreover, Reformed writers who were not a whit more disposed to laud its utility than was the average Lutheran theologian. Voëtius, for example, declares that human reason is neither the principle by which or through which, nor from which or why, we believe, and that it is not the foundation or law or norm of faith, in accordance with whose prescription we judge. (Select. Disput. Theol., De Rat. Hom. in Rebus Fidei.) Zwingli, while he made the Scriptures the one supreme authority, had quite a high opinion of the wisdom of the ancient philosophers. Bullinger seems to have regarded philosophy as of little service in religion. "Many men," he says, "hope that they can attain to true wisdom by the study of philosophy ; but they are deceived as far as heaven is broad. For philosophy doth falsely judge and faultily teach many things touching God, the works of God, the chief goodness, the end of good and evil, and touching things to be desired or eschewed." (Sermons, Decade I. 5.) Calvin taught that we are not to despise the wisdom of the heathen sages, the admirable displays of sagacity in their works, lest perchance we do despite to God, who is the only fountain of truth. But, at the same time, he held that the natural reason of man is almost blind as respects the nature of God in general, and wholly so as respects His paternal benevolence. "I do not deny," he says, "that some judicious and apposite observations concerning God may be found scattered in the writings of the philosophers ; but they always betray a confused imagination. They never had the smallest idea of the certainty of the divine benevolence toward us." (Institutes, II. 2.) Turretin, while he declares that the Word of God, and not our sense of the possibility or impossibility of a thing, is the norm of faith,

seems to have been unwilling to admit that there is any actual contradiction between reason proper and faith. "The mysteries of faith," he says, "are contrary to corrupt reason and are combated by it; but they are merely above and beyond right reason, and are not taught by it." In agreement with Gerhard, he teaches that theology and philosophy are related as mistress and servant. (*Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ*, *Locus I. qu. 8-13.*) One of the theories of Socinus implies a narrow capacity in merely human philosophy to acquaint men with divine truth, for he argues that specific revelations were the primary and indispensable basis of whatever knowledge of God has come into the world. (*Prælect. Theol.*, II.) The Arminian movement in its spirit and tendency favored, on the whole, an enlarged scope for reason in the field of theology; but the Arminians seem not to have set out with any special theory upon the subject. They were averse to ambitious speculation, and emphasized the dictates of the practical reason. Among English theologians, the Cambridge school, as already noted, assigned an important place to philosophy. They emphasized, indeed, the truth that spiritual enlightenment is radically conditioned upon the right spiritual disposition; but at the same time they regarded the reason as a link between man and God and a medium of divine illumination. "The spirit in man," says Whichcote, "is the candle of the Lord, lighted by God, and lighting man to God. . . . Therefore to speak of natural light, of the use of reason in religion, is to do no disservice at all to grace; for God is acknowledged in both,—in the former as being the groundwork of His creation, in the latter as reviving and restoring it. . . . To go against reason is to go against God." (Quoted by John Tulloch in *Rational Theol. and Christ. Philos. in England in the 17th Century.*) John Goodwin took about the same ground, maintaining that a good use of reason is essential to the best use of faith, and declaring that inconceivable mischief had been wrought by the doctrine that

men must lay aside their reason in matters of religion. (Redemption Redeemed, Preface.) Those who received Locke as a philosophical master must of course have recognized a certain value in philosophy, as serving to illustrate the rational character of the Christian religion.

Petavius, as a representative of the Roman Catholic standpoint of the era, defends the utility of philosophy in the domain of theology. He assigns it, however, to the same subordinate rank to which it was relegated by many Protestant theologians. He says, "Faith ought by all means to take the lead, then reason and disputation to follow." (Theol. Dogmat., Prolegom. cap. 4.) "Nothing," says Pascal, "is so agreeable to reason, as the disclaiming of reason in matters of pure faith; and nothing is so repugnant to reason as the disuse of reason in things that do not concern faith." (Thoughts on Religion, Chap. V.)

SECTION II. — COMMUNIONS, CREEDS, AND AUTHORS.

1. RISE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT PROTESTANT COMMUNIONS. — Though the Reformation received upon every hand a forward impulse from the powerful advocacy of Luther, its origin outside of Germany was in a measure independent of his agency. Simultaneously in different lands there was a quickened perception of Gospel truths. In Switzerland, France, and England, men were already turned toward the path of evangelical reform, when the fearless utterances of the German leader came to their encouragement.

As respects Protestant unity, therefore, the primary demand was not continued fidelity to a common leadership, but rather agreement and friendly alliance between different movements. Unhappily, the attempt to consummate this alliance proved abortive. A dispute broke out between the Germans and the Swiss upon the subject of the eucha-

rist. Attempts at a settlement, like the conference at Marburg in 1529, were unavailing. Luther could not agree with Zwingli, and, in the conviction that the Swiss were of a different spirit from his own, refused their offer of fellowship. So Protestantism appears as a divided stream almost at its fountain-head.

The two great branches into which the Reformation movement developed came to be designated respectively as the *Lutheran* and the *Reformed Church*. Whatever points of kinship these may have had, they early exhibited contrasted features. The Lutheran Church was animated more directly by antagonism to the Jewish element in Romanism, its burdensome and unspiritual legalism; the Reformed was conspicuous for opposition to the pagan element in Romanism. The former was mainly intent upon reforming the inner spirit, and was not in haste to change externals any farther than the new spirit imperatively required; the latter aimed to change externals, as well as the inner spirit, dealt with images in the temper of iconoclasm, abridged the ceremonial, and endeavored in general to get back to apostolic simplicity. In the Lutheran Church there was a leaning to idealism and mysticism; the Reformed, while not without a highly speculative bent, was relatively distinguished by a practical energy, a ready disposition to actualize ideas of Church and society. The Lutheran type dwelt largely upon the subjective condition of salvation, the faith of the individual; the Reformed emphasized the objective condition, the will and power of God. Evangelical freedom was the watchword of Lutheranism, and the New Testament its preferred ground in Holy Writ; the Reformed theologians magnified the conception of divine law, and had much recourse to the Old Testament for principles and illustrations.

The Lutheran Church had its headquarters in Central Germany, and spread to the North through the Scandinavian regions. The Reformed Church had its head-

quarters first at Zurich under Zwingli, then at Geneva under Calvin, and became established, outside of its Swiss home, in various parts of Germany, in France, in Holland, in Scotland, and in America. The *Church of England* has often been regarded as a branch of the Reformed Church; and very prominent facts may be quoted in behalf of this classification. At the time that it received its distinctly Protestant character, it was on terms of intimate fellowship with the Reformed churches on the Continent. Such exponents of the Reformed system of doctrine as Peter Martyr and Martin Bucer were then teaching in its universities. Moreover, it cannot be denied that its authoritative articles of religion show a distinct kinship with the Reformed type of theology. But, on the other hand, the Church of England had its distinct character from the outset. This may be described, in a single sentence, as a conservative bent, — a bias toward patristic authority. In pursuance of this, it retained much of the old liturgy and much of the old form of church government with its episcopal hierarchy, and its representative theologians were distinguished among Protestant writers by their frequent and reverent appeal to the early fathers. It is to be noticed, however, that almost from the outset there was a party in England (the so-called Puritans) to whom these characteristics of the national Church were the reverse of pleasing. The episcopal hierarchy, the ceremonies, and the vestments, were in the highest degree distasteful to them. Believing that the existing order was a compromise with Rome, and regarding the Genevan as the Scriptural model, they wished for a more democratic constitution of the Church, and for apostolic simplicity in worship. In a word, they were *Presbyterians*. Though persecuted by the government, they claimed the sympathy of no inconsiderable portion of the nation, and finally, through their intimate relation with the cause of civil liberty, came to a decided ascendancy during the rule of the Long Parlia-

ment. Among the opponents of the hierarchical constitution of the Church was also a party which went still farther than the Presbyterians. These were the *Independents*, who declared for the autonomy of each individual church or congregation. Their origin has sometimes been traced to Robert Brown. A work published by him in 1582 embodied some of their views on church polity; but there were other and more worthy pioneers, such as Barrowe, Greenwood, and John Robinson, the last a pastor of a church in England, and then of the society in Leyden which sent the Plymouth settlers to New England. The Independents in England were much inferior in numbers to the Presbyterians; but inasmuch as the great leaders, the military chiefs who finally grasped the reins of government, were from their ranks, they came for a time into a certain ascendancy. After the Restoration, both Presbyterians and Independents passed into the rank of proscribed sects. The Toleration Act of 1689 guaranteed to them freedom of worship, but left them under disabilities as respects the holding of civil offices.

Outside of the main current of Protestantism there was a movement, almost from the dawn of the Reformation, in the direction of *Unitarianism*. Among the earlier representatives of this movement were the Anabaptists John Denck, Lewis Hetzer, David Joris, John Campanus, and Melchior Hofmann; Adam Pistorius, from Westphalia; the Spaniard, Michael Servetus; the Italians, Claudius of Savoy, J. Valentine Gentilis, and Gribaldi. Between these there was little or no strict unity of belief or action, and none of them can be regarded as founders of a sect. Unitarianism first acquired the consistency of an organized communion in the last half of the sixteenth century. It may be regarded as having substantially reached this status in Poland between 1563 and 1565, though destined here to receive shape and name some years later from its most powerful leader. Poland and Transylvania in particular

offered a refuge to the Unitarians, whom the great body of Romanists and Protestants alike were unwilling to tolerate. In the latter country two of the prominent leaders were George Blandrata and Francis David. In consequence of a dispute between these men on the propriety of worshipping Christ, Faustus Socinus was called into Transylvania (1578). This learned Italian had received his views in part as a matter of inheritance from his uncle, Lælius Socinus. The latter belonged to a society of liberal thinkers at Vicenza, in the territory of Venice, which had been broken up by the Inquisition. Forced to flee, he took refuge in Protestant countries, residing mainly in Switzerland. Though his views were sufficiently radical, his somewhat modest and negative way of putting them saved him from proscription. Faustus inherited the manuscripts of Lælius, and carried out his theories into bold and dogmatic statement. From Transylvania, Faustus Socinus passed into Poland, in 1579. He was not received with a very cordial welcome. While some of the Unitarians there believed in the simple humanity of Christ, others were Arians or Semi-Arians. By many of them Socinus was regarded as extra radical in some of his views. But, favored by the patronage of persons of distinction and by his superior talents, he overcame all opposition, and in testimony to his ascendancy the Unitarians of Poland and Transylvania came to be known as *Socinians*. For about half a century the sect enjoyed a good degree of prosperity, and their headquarters at Racow became quite a celebrated seat of Socinian learning. But in 1638 persecution broke out, and twenty years later was issued the edict of their banishment from Poland. Some took refuge in Transylvania, where their descendants have maintained themselves down to the present time. Some, finding their way to Holland, became amalgamated with the Remonstrants and the Mennonites. In England Unitarianism had representatives during the major part of the period.

One of the most distinguished of these was John Biddle, who wrote several works near the middle of the seventeenth century. His opinions were much after the Socinian order, but different in some respects. English Unitarianism, however, can hardly be said to have crystallized into a sect till after the middle of the eighteenth century.

The origin of the *Remonstrants*, or *Arminians*, in Holland, was due to a reaction against strict Calvinism. Their founder was James Arminius. He was not, however, the first representative of the reaction in question. Koornheert and others had preceded him in quite a radical attack upon the Genevan doctrine. To obviate Koornheert's objections, some ministers of Delft issued a book in which they advocated an infra-lapsarian scheme in place of the supra-lapsarianism of Calvin and Beza. Arminius was called upon to answer their production. In the course of his investigation he came to entertain serious doubts about the validity of any and every form of the doctrine of unconditional election. He was also led to take liberal ground as respects subscription to creeds, and advocated the propriety of making but few articles obligatory, and these expressed as nearly as possible in Scriptural language. As Professor at Leyden, Arminius came into conflict with his colleague, Gomar, who was an upholder of the most stringent type of predestinarianism. The controversy, once started, continued to rage, and was in no wise slackened by the death of Arminius, in 1609. In consequence of a declaration (containing five articles of faith) issued in 1610, under the title of a Remonstrance, the followers of Arminius acquired the name of Remonstrants. Being condemned by the synod of Dort, in 1619, they were proscribed by the government, to which they were obnoxious on political grounds. After a few years, however, they began to enjoy a measure of toleration. The doctrinal system of Arminius, who is confessed on all hands to have been a man of most exemplary spirit and life, was the Calvinistic

system with no farther modification than necessarily resulted from rejecting the tenet of absolute predestination. A charge of Pelagian affinities can be made against him only on the basis of the most ultra Calvinism, or of an utterly inadequate acquaintance with his writings. His followers, no doubt, made a wider departure from the Calvinistic teaching. Even between Arminius and his immediate successor, Episcopius, quite an interval is noticeable as respects doctrinal bias. Some of the later generations of Arminians showed a certain affiliation with Socinianism. But this fact is not to be taken as indicative of the original essence of Arminianism. That it was no necessary outcome from the teachings of the founder is well evinced by the history of the Wesleyan theology.

The more sober and evangelical elements among the Anabaptists of the Reformation era came to be represented in the *Mennonites* and the *Baptists*. The former derived their name from Menno Simons, and originated in Holland in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. In some points they seem to have anticipated the Quakers. They rejected oaths, and reprobated wars and all kinds of violence. They regarded the Church as the company of the regenerate, and insisted upon strict discipline,—a schism having early occurred in their ranks on this subject. They excluded infants from baptism, and accepted Zwingli's exposition of the eucharist. They held peculiar views respecting Christ's person. On the doctrines of grace, the majority were inclined to the Arminian, as opposed to the Calvinistic type.

In England the Baptists showed a considerable energy in organizing societies in the time of Charles I. Their prior history is not very distinctly outlined. Hunt says: "The English Baptists originated among the Brownists of Amsterdam. The first was John Smyth, who, being convinced of the necessity of adult baptism, and having no one to baptize him, baptized himself." (Religious Thought

in England.) On the other hand, the Baptist historian, Cramp, speaks in general of those who had previously suffered under the name of Anabaptists as being in the proper list of Baptist martyrs. Whether reckoned from the earlier or the later date, the Baptists must be allowed to have had their full share of persecution. Cromwell, however, treated them with consideration, and they were recognized under the Act of Toleration in 1689. The founder of the American Baptists was Roger Williams, who also, in accordance with a charter applied for in 1643, became the founder of a colony in Rhode Island. Though not the first to take advanced ground upon the subject, Williams may still be reckoned among the pioneers of the cause of religious liberty, and in his colony the claims of that liberty were distinctly recognized. In England the early Baptists were Arminians. The rise of the first distinctly Calvinistic society was in 1633. (Cramp.) Those adhering to the original type were called General Baptists, while the Calvinists were styled Particular Baptists. In the American branch the Calvinistic teaching was predominant from the first. The Arminian communion, known as Free-will Baptists, was not organized till near the end of the eighteenth century.

At the middle of the seventeenth century, the era of the Civil War and the Commonwealth, a great variety of religious parties made their appearance in England, such as Ranters, Seekers, Familists, Behmenists, Muggletonians, Fifth Monarchy Men, or Millenarians, etc. Some of these were scarcely so much sects as schools of thought, and all of them were destined to appear rather as significant of the enthusiasms of the times than as sources of permanent influence. With another party the case was different. Though as eccentric in its guise as any of those mentioned, the society of *Quakers* or *Friends* proved its right to continued existence by a strength of conviction and tenacity of purpose which scorn and the fiercest persecution were

alike powerless to destroy. Very likely it acted as an absorbent upon various parties who had broken away from their old moorings. Speaking of an early period in its history, Cunningham says: "Quakerism was rapidly absorbing many of the smaller fanatical sects which had been generated in the high temperature of the times. Fox's divining-rod swallowed up the rods of the less mighty magicians." (International History of the Quakers.) Quakerism was an extreme reaction against formalism,—a reaction carried to the point of exalting the inner light above the text of the Bible itself. It belongs among the manifestations of the spirit of mysticism. After its founder, George Fox, its most noted contributors were Robert Barclay and William Penn, the former its ablest apologist and theologian, the latter its most efficient patron. As the colonizer of Pennsylvania, Penn prepared a favorable theatre for Quakerism in America, where its numbers soon surpassed those of the society in the mother country.

2. CREEDS, AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVE STATEMENTS OF DOCTRINE.

	Writings.	Date.
LUTHERAN.	Luther's two Catechisms	A. D. 1529
	The Augsburg Confession	1530
	The Apology of the Augsburg Confession	1530-1531
	The Articles of Smalcald	Signed in 1537.
	The Formula of Concord	1537
	The Saxon Visitation Articles	1577
REFORMED.	Zwingli's Sixty-seven Articles, Account of the Faith, and Exposition of the Christian Faith	1523-1531
	The Tetrapolitan Confession	1530
	The First Confession of Basle	1534
	The First Helvetic Confession, or Second Confession of Basle	1536
	The Consensus of Zurich	1549
	The Consensus of Geneva	1552
	The Hungarian Confession	1557-1558
	The Gallican Confession	1559
	The Scotch Confession	1560

	Writings.	Date.
REFORMED.	The Belgic Confession	A. D. 1561
	The Heidelberg Catechism	1563
	The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England	1563
	The Second Helvetic Confession	1566
	The Consensus of Sandomir (Polish)	1570
	Bohemian Confessions	1535, 1575
	The Irish Articles	1615
	The Canons of the Synod of Dort	1619
	The Westminster Confession and Catechisms	1647
	The Cambridge Platform (American)	1648
	The Confession of the Waldenses	1655
	The Savoy Declaration	1658
	The Helvetic Consensus Formula	1675
SOCINIAN.	The Cracovian Catechism	1574
	The Racovian Catechism	1605
ARMINIAN.	The [Five] Arminian Articles	1610
	Confession of the Pastors who are called Remonstrants (by Episcopius)	1621
GENERAL BAPTIST.	Declaration of Faith of the English People remaining at Amsterdam	1611
	The London Confession	1660
	The Orthodox Creed (from Baptists of Oxfordshire and vicinity)	1678
PARTICULAR BAPTIST.	The Confession of the Seven Churches of London	1644-1646
	The Confession of Somerset	1656
	A Confession of Faith put forth by the Elders and Brethren, etc.	1688
QUAKER.	Barclay's Fifteen Propositions	1675
ROMAN CATHOLIC.	Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent	1563
	The Profession of the Tridentine Faith	1564
	The Roman Catechism	1566
	The Bull <i>Cum Occasione</i> of Innocent X.	1653
	The Bull <i>Unigenitus</i> of Clement XI.	1713
GREEK.	The Orthodox Confession of Mogilas	1643
	The Confession of Dositheus, or the Eighteen Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem	1672

Among Lutheran Confessions, that submitted at Augsburg to Charles V. and the dignitaries of the Empire, as the first grand declaration of Protestant principles, occupies the

first rank. It has claimed the widest assent, and intrinsically is best fitted to serve as an ecumenical creed. In its moderate tone we may discern the spirit of its author, Melancthon, who also wrote the Apology.

The Smalcald Articles were composed by Luther, as might be judged from their polemical vigor. They were designed to indicate the basis upon which the Protestants would stand if they were to have any part in the general council which was then under consideration.

The Formula of Concord is the most elaborate in its doctrinal statements among the Lutheran creeds. It is also highly significant as reflecting the earnest theological thinking and the heated controversies within the Lutheran Church during the preceding thirty or forty years. But there were many to whom it was not acceptable, and it failed of adoption in Denmark, Holstein, and some other districts. Moreover, though admired by the majority in an age of intense dogmatism, it lacked the simplicity and breadth requisite in a symbol that is to command a permanent suffrage. The composition of the Formula of Concord was the work of six theologians, prominent among whom were Jacob Andreä and Martin Chemnitz.

The Saxon Visitation Articles, designed as a safeguard to strict Lutheranism against the invasion of Calvinistic teachings on the sacraments and on predestination, had only a local acceptance, and are no longer in force even in Saxony.

Among the Reformed Confessions there are five which may be singled out as being of special importance: the Heidelberg Catechism, the Second Helvetic Confession, the Canons of the Synod of Dort, the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and the Westminster Confession.

The Heidelberg Catechism was originally issued as a doctrinal compendium for the Palatinate, one of the seven electoral districts of the German Empire. Its authors were

Zacharias Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus. While it embraces the common tenets of the Reformed faith, it is unique in the standpoint from which it proceeds, its very first questions being concerning the needs and the only comfort of the soul under the burden of its sin and misery. Commended by its warm evangelical spirit, it soon found its way into all the Reformed churches on the Continent, and obtained recognition in Scotland and among the American colonists. Even down to the present day it has enjoyed a large degree of approbation.

The Second Helvetic Confession was composed by Bullinger, the successor of Zwingli at Zurich. Frederic III. of the Palatinate, under whose auspices the Heidelberg Catechism was prepared, was much interested to have it published, and in response to his desire, as well as to the call of the Swiss churches, it was given forth. It was received with much favor, being sanctioned not only by the Protestantism of Switzerland and the Palatinate, but by the Reformed Church in Poland, Hungary, France, and Scotland. Its statement of doctrine is full, and the Scriptures are abundantly quoted in corroboration.

The synod of Dort was convened in opposition to the Arminian movement, and published elaborate decisions on the subject of predestination and the related doctrines. Besides the theologians of Holland, representatives of various countries, such as England, Scotland, the Palatinate, Hesse, and Switzerland, had a place in the synod. In securing its immediate object it was quite successful, but it is generally understood that its ultimate result, especially in the English Church, was to help on the reaction in favor of Arminianism.

The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England were formed by a revision of forty-two articles which had been prepared under the supervision of Cranmer, and published in 1553. They were adopted by the two Houses of Convocation in 1563, and subscription to them was made obligatory

upon religious teachers by act of Parliament in 1571. The Thirty-nine Articles represent the English Church on the side of its connection with the general Protestant movement, whereas the Liturgy reveals more largely its connection with the Ante-Reformation Church. The statement on the subject of predestination is moderate, and admits of some latitude of interpretation. Probably those who framed the statement accepted in general the Reformed doctrine on the subject, but at the same time were not possessed by any such zeal for it as was felt in some other quarters. It was in harmony, therefore, with the original standpoint of the Protestant theology of England, when the ultra Calvinistic articles (the so-called Lambeth Articles of 1595), championed by Archbishop Whitgift and others, were rejected.

The Westminster Assembly was convened by order of Parliament in 1643. It met in the midst of the conflict between the Puritans and the throne, and was designed to prepare an ecclesiastical scheme in harmony with the principles of the former. The Assembly held 1,163 regular sessions between July 1, 1643, and February 22, 1649. On questions of doctrine its members were substantially agreed. On the subject of polity there was a diversity of view, the Episcopalians, the Independents, and the Erastians being in a measure represented. The Presbyterians, however, were in the majority, and finally claimed a complete ascendancy. The Confession was ready for publication in 1547, and was approved by the Parliament the next year, with the exception of some paragraphs relating to church polity. In Scotland it was adopted without modification. In New England, the Cambridge, Boston, and Saybrook synods expressed their general approval of the doctrinal portion. As was naturally dictated by the antecedents and the circumstances of its preparation, the Westminster Confession is a stalwart embodiment of the Calvinistic faith. No other great confession is equally

strong and explicit on the subject of predestination, unless it be the Canons of Dort. To be sure, it does not go at all beyond the Lambeth or the Irish Articles, and indeed must be allowed to have been formed more or less on the model of the latter. But the Lambeth Articles were never authoritatively promulgated, and the Irish Articles (composed probably by Archbishop Usher), though adopted by the convocation of the episcopal clergy of Ireland, were very soon superseded by the Thirty-nine Articles of the English Church.

The Socinians and Arminians did not share largely in the creed-making propensity of the age. The Racovian Catechism claimed the highest authority as an exposition of Socinian beliefs. For an adequate understanding of Arminianism recourse must be had to the writings of its most noted representatives.

The council of Trent (1545-1563) prepared the dogmatic code of modern Romanism. It closed the door against evangelical reform, set up impassable barriers against catholicity, and decided that the mediæval Church should be merged into a specifically Romish Church. The decrees of the council were designed to be an effectual offset to all the characteristic teachings of the Reformation. The attendance was small in the earlier sessions, but at the end two hundred and fifty-five members were present to give their signatures, two thirds of whom, however, were Italians.

The Roman Catechism was prepared in accordance with the directions of the council of Trent, but not till after the adjournment. Owing to this fact, it seems necessary to place it in the second rank of authorities, unless the Pope's approval of its publication be regarded as his positive sanction of its contents. It has occupied, on the whole, quite an important place among Romish standards, though the Jesuits in their controversy with the Dominicans on the subject of freedom and grace were disposed to challenge its authority.

Möhler places also the Profession of the Tridentine Faith, issued by Pius IV., among authorities of the second rank, but from the standpoint of the Vatican Council (1869-1870), it seems necessary to assign to it, as well as to the bulls of Innocent and Clement, unqualified authority. The first of these documents presents a form of assent to the Nicene creed and to the substance of the Trent creed, to be signed by all priests and teachers in Roman Catholic seminaries, colleges, and universities. The bull of Innocent condemns five propositions ascribed to the Jansenists ; that of Clement, one hundred and one sentences in the Moral Reflections of Quesnel.

The most noteworthy confessions of the Greek Church in this period were issued in opposition to an abortive attempt to introduce Protestant teachings. The agent of that attempt was no less a man than Cyril Lucar, who became Patriarch of Constantinople in 1621. During a residence in Switzerland, he had imbibed the Reformed faith, and the confession which he prepared (1629-1633) distinctly asserts the main points of the Calvinistic system of doctrine. Cyril Lucar atoned for his innovating spirit with his life in 1638. Of the opposing confessions, that of Mogilas was the most elaborate. It was adopted in 1643 by a synod of Russian and Greek clergy, and in 1672 by the synod of Jerusalem, which at the same time adopted the Confession of Dositheus, or the Eighteen Decrees.

3. AUTHORS AND WORKS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE.

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
I. LUTHERAN WRITERS.		
Martin Luther	{ Christian Liberty ; Babylonish Captivity of the Christian Church ; The Enslaved Will ; Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, etc. }	A. D. 1546
Philip Melanchthon . .	{ Loci Theologici (Fundamentals of Theology) }	1568

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Andreas Osiander	A. D. 1552
Justus Jonas	1555
Nicolas Armsdorf	1565
Victorin Strigel	1569
Joh. Brenz	{ On the Personal Union of the Two Natures in Christ . . . }	1570
Joachim Westphal		1574
Matthias Flacius	1575
Martin Chemnitz	{ Examination of the Council of Trent; On the Two Natures in Christ }	1586
Tilemann Heshusius		1588
Jacob Andreä	1590
Nicolaus Selnecker	1592
Jacob Heerbrand	1600
Ægidius Hunnius	Saxon Visitation Articles	1603
Leonhard Hutter	1616
Matthias Haffner	1619
Joh. Arndt	True Christianity	1621
Joh. Gerhard	{ Loci Theologici; Catholic Con- fession }	1637
Melchior Nicolai		1650
Joh. Val. Andreä	1654
George Calixtus	{ Disputations on the Principal Subjects of the Christian Reli- gion; Epitome of Theology; Desire and Effort for Eccle- siastical Concord }	1656
Joh. Hülsemann		1661
Joh. F. König	1664
Joh. C. Dannhauer	1666
Joh. Musæus	{ Treatises in Refutation of Her- bert of Cherbury and of Spino- za; On the Use of the Princi- ples of Reason and Philosophy in Theological Controversies . System of the Fundamentals of Theology (Systema Locorum Theol.) }	1681
Abraham Calov		1686
Joh. A. Quenstedt	Didactico-Polemic Theology	1688
J. W. Baier	Compendium of Positive Theology	1695
Phil. J. Spener	1705
David Hollaz	Examen Theologicum	1713
J. G. Arnold	1714
Andreas Hochstetter	1718
A. H. Francke	1727
Christian Thomasius	1728

II. REFORMED WRITERS ON THE CONTINENT.

Ulrich Zwingli	{ Commentary on the True and the False Religion; Sermon on Providence. (See also the Ta- ble of Confessions.) }	1531
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	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
John Calvin	Institutes of the Christian Religion; Commentaries on the Scriptures	A. D. 1564
Simon Grynæus		1541
Martin Bucer		1551
Peter Martyr		1562
Wolfgang Musculus		1563
A. G. Hyperius		1564
Benj. Aretius		1574
Henry Bullinger	Sermons (and Second Helvetic Confession)	1575
Zacharias Ursinus		1583
Girolamo Zanchi	Heidelberg Catechism (assisted by Olevianus)	1590
Antoine de Chandieu	The Nature of God; The Works of God created in the Six Days; Predestination	1591
Franciscus Junius		1602
Theodore Beza	Confession; Summary of Entire Christianity, or Description and Distribution of the Causes of the Salvation of the Elect and the Destruction of the Reprobate; Summary of Doctrine on the Subject of the Sacraments	1605
Joh. Drusius		1616
Joh. Piscator		1625
John Cameron		1625
Joh. Wolleb		1626
J. A. Alsted		1638
Francis Gomar	Commentaries; Theological Disputations and Tracts	1641
Joh. H. Alting		1644
Joh. Maccovius		1644
Friedrich Spanheim		1649
Gerard J. Vossius	Tractatus Theologici	1649
André Rivet		1651
David Blondel		1655
Pierre du Moulin		1658
Louis Cappel		1658
Moïse Amyraut	Treatise on Predestination	1664
Josué La Place (Placæus)		1665
Joh. Hoornbeck	On the Imputation of the First Sin of Adam	1666
Joh. Coccejus	Summary of Doctrine concerning the Covenant and Testament of God; Summary of Theology	1669
Jean Daillé		1670
Samuel Maresius		1673
Lucas Gernler		1675
Gisbertus Voëtius	Select Theological Disputations	1676
Abraham Heidanus		1678
James Alting		1679
Francis Burmann		1679
Francis Turretin	Institute of Elenchical Theology	1687

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Joh. H. Heidegger	{ Helvetic Consensus Formula ; Body of Christian Theology ; Marrow of Christian Theology }	A. D. 1698
Balthasar Becker		1698
Hermann Witsius		1708
Melchior Leydecker		1721
Campegius Vitringa		1722
III. SOCINIAN WRITERS.		
Lælius Socinus		1562
Geo. Schomann	Cracovian Catechism	1591
Faustus Socinus	{ Theological Lectures ; Concern- ing Christ as Saviour ; Dispu- tation on the Invocation of Jesus Christ }	1604
Valentine Schmalz		
Johannes Crell	{ Racovian Catechism (assisted by Joh. Völkel and others) Commentaries ; God and his At- tributes ; Tract on the Holy Spirit ; Reply to the Book of Hugo Grotius on the Satisfac- tion of Christ ; Two Books on the One God the Father }	1633
J. L. Wolzogen	{ Compendium of the Christian Religion }	1658
Jonas Schlichtingius		1664
Andrew Wissowatius		1678
IV. ARMINIAN WRITERS.		
James Arminius	{ Declaration of Opinions on Pre- destination, etc., before the States of Holland ; Theologi- cal Orations and Disputations }	1609
Conrad Vorstius		
Simon Episcopius	Theological Institutes	1622
Janus Uytenbogaert		1643
Hugo Grotius	{ On the Truth of the Christian Religion ; Defence of the Cath- olic Faith respecting the Satis- faction of Christ }	1645
Stephanus Curcellæus		
Philip van Limborch	Institute of the Christian Religion	1659
Jean Le Clerc (Clericus)	{ Christian Theology Disquisitions concerning the In- spiration of the Holy Scriptures }	1712
V. WRITERS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.		
1. <i>Episcopalians.</i>		
Hugh Latimer	Sermons ; Disputation at Oxford	1555
Nicholas Ridley	{ Treatise against the Error of Transubstantiation ; Disputa- tion at Oxford }	1555
John Hooper		
		1555

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Thomas Cranmer	{ Answer to Gardiner (on the Eu- charist) }	A. D. 1556
Thomas Becon		1563
John Jewell	{ Apology of the Church of Eng- land; Treatise on the Sacra- ments }	1571
Matthew Parker		1575
William Whitaker		1595
Richard Hooker	The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity	1600
William Perkins	{ The Order of Predestination in the Mind of God; Treatise on God's Free Grace and Man's Free Will }	1602
John Whitgift		1604
Launcelot Andrewes		1626
Thomas Jackson		1640
John Davenant		1641
William Chillingworth	{ The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation . . . }	1644
William Laud		1645
John Forbes	Historico-Theological Instructions	1648
John Prideaux		1650
John Smith	Select Sermons	1652
James Usher	{ Body of Divinity (by question and answer); Intent and Ex- tent of Christ's Death and Sat- isfaction }	1656
Joseph Hall	{ The Old Religion; Episcopacy by Divine Right; Via Media . }	1656
John Hales	{ Treatise on Schism, and on the Lord's Supper }	1656
Henry Hammond		1660
Bryan Walton		1661
John Bramhall		1663
Jeremy Taylor	{ Treatises on Baptism, Original Sin, Episcopacy, etc. . . . }	1667
John Lightfoot		1675
Isaac Barrow	Sermons	1677
William Outram		1679
Benj. Whichcote	Sermons and Aphorisms	1683
Robert Leighton	Sermons and Theological Lectures	1684
John Pearson	Exposition of the Creed	1686
Henry More	{ Antidote to Atheism; Immortal- ity of the Soul }	1687
Ralph Cudworth	{ The True Intellectual System of the Universe; Immutable Mo- rality; The True Notion of the Lord's Supper }	1688
Edward Pocock		1691
John Tillotson	Sermons	1694
Edward Stillingfleet	{ Irenicum; Rational Account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion }	1699
Simon Patrick		1707

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
William Sherlock	{ Discourse of Divine Providence ; Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity }	A. D. 1707
William Beveridge	1708
John Mill	1708
George Bull	{ Sermons; Apostolic Harmony ; Apology for the "Harmony" ; Defence of the Nicene Faith . . }	1710
John Norris	1711
William Cave	1713
Edward Fowler	1714
Gilbert Burnet	{ Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles }	1715
Robert South	Sermons	1716
Joseph Bingham	Antiquities of the Christian Church	1723
Daniel Whitby	{ Discourses on Election, Repro- bation, etc. }	1726
Samuel Clarke	{ Being and Attributes of God ; Scripture Doctrine of the Trin- ity }	1729
Daniel Waterland	Vindication of Christ's Divinity	1740
<i>2. Scotch Presbyterians.</i>		
John Knox	Scotch Confession	1572
Andrew Melville	1622
Alex. Henderson	Solemn League and Covenant . .	1646
Samuel Rutherford	The Covenant of Life opened, etc.	1661
Robert Baillie	1662
Thomas Halyburton	{ Inquiry into the Principles of Modern Deists; Natural Reli- gion Insufficient }	1712
<i>3. English Presbyterians and Various Classes of Nonconformists.</i>		
Thomas Cartwright	1603
William Twisse	{ Claims of the Grace, Power, and Providence of God }	1646
John Arrowsmith	{ Westminster Catechisms (assist- ed by Dr. Tuckney and others) Saints' Everlasting Rest; Unrea- sonableness of Infidelity; The Reasons of the Christian Reli- gion; Universal Redemption . }	1659
Richard Baxter	1691
Edmund Calamy	1732
John Robinson	1625
John Goodwin	Redemption Redeemed	1665
Philip Nye	1672
John Milton	{ Paradise Lost; Paradise Re- gained; Of Reformation; Of Prelatical Episcopacy; Trea- tise on Christian Doctrine . . }	1675
Thomas Goodwin	1679

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
John Owen	{ Doctrine of Justification by Faith; A Display of Arminianism; The Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance }	A. D. 1683
John Howe	{ The Living Temple; Inquiry concerning the Trinity . . . }	1705
Matthew Henry		1714
John Bunyan	{ Confession; Doctrine of Law and Grace Unfolded }	1688
Robert Barclay	{ An Apology for the True Chris- tian Divinity }	1690
George Fox		1691
William Penn	{ The Sandy Foundation Shaken; The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience }	1718
VI. WRITERS CONNECTED WITH NEW ENGLAND.		
John Davenport		1641
Thomas Hooker		1647
John Cotton	The Covenant of Grace	1652
Richard Mather		1669
Cotton Mather		1728
Roger Williams	{ The Bloody Tenet of Persecu- tion for Cause of Conscience . }	1683
VII. ROMAN CATHOLIC WRITERS.		
Thomas Cajetan		1534
Desiderius Erasmus	The Free Will	1536
Albert Pighius	{ On Man's Free Will and Divine Grace, against Luther, Calvin, and others }	1542
Joh. Eck		1543
Joh. Cochläus		1552
Melchior Canus		1560
Juan Maldonat		1583
Carlo Borromeo		1584
Alphonso Salmeron		1585
Petrus Canisius	Summary of Christian Doctrine	1597
Louis Molina	{ On the Concord of the Free Will with the Gifts of Grace . . . }	1601
Gregory of Valencia	Analysis of the Catholic Faith	1603
Gabriel Vasquez		1604
Francisco Suarez	{ Metaphysical Disputations; On the Concursus of God; On God's Knowledge of Future Contingencies, etc. }	1617
Francis Coster		1619
Robert Bellarmin	{ Disputations on the Controversies of the Christian Faith against the Heretics of this Age . . }	1621
Francis de Sales		1622

	Most Important Works.	Date of Death.
Martin Becanus	A. D. 1624
Adam Tanner	1632
Dionysius Petavius	Theological Dogmas	1652
Laurent Forer	1659
Blaise Pascal	Provincial Letters; Thoughts on Religion	1662
John Bona	1674
Pierre Nicole	Theological and Moral Instructions	1685
Antoine Arnauld	The New Heresy (against Jesuits); The Perpetuity of the Faith of the Catholic Church respecting the Eucharist	1694
Louis de Thomassin	Theological Dogmas	1695
Jacques B. Bossuet	Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church; History of the Variations of Protestantism; Defence of the Declaration of the French Clergy on Ecclesiastical Power	1704
J. B. du Hamel	1706
Richard Simon	Critical History of the Old Testament	1712
Francis S. de la M. Fénelon	Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints on the Inner Life	1715
Pasquier Quesnel	Moral Reflections.	1719
Natalis Alexander	1724

In Luther and Melanchthon the Lutheran Church had a double source of theology. While these two master teachers agreed at the initial stage of the Reformation, they came ultimately to represent quite different dogmatic tendencies. Melanchthon in course of time modified his position on the absolute working of divine grace, and showed an inclination toward Calvinistic views of the Eucharist and of Christology, as opposed to Luther's tenets on these subjects. That this drift of the younger theologian was not allowed to rupture the friendship between him and his powerful associate is probably to be taken rather as an evidence of the strength of that friendship, than of any essential change of view in Luther's mind. It is possible, however, that in his later years he may have been less vehemently attached to some of his most radical theories than at an earlier stage. In the Confessions, greater tribute, on the whole, was paid to

Luther's views than to those of Melanchthon; but the latter left their impress, and remained as a permanent factor in the theology of the Lutheran Church. Indeed, as respects the subject of predestination, the teaching of Melanchthon was destined to receive by far the wider patronage.

Among remaining Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth century, none can claim a higher rank than Martin Chemnitz, a broad-minded theologian, and a disciple in some respects of Melanchthon. An influential position was also held by John Brenz, Jacob Andreä, and Ægidius Hunnius.

The seventeenth century was the great era of Lutheran dogmatism. Many ponderous works, rivalling in the multitude of their distinctions the elaborate productions of the mediæval scholastics, were sent forth. The first place among the Lutheran scholastics of this century is to be given to John Gerhard. While disposed to follow the lines of Lutheran orthodoxy, he followed them as a man of great learning and mental grasp. The most distinguished representative of the more liberal spirit in theology in the same era was George Calixtus. The second place in the same general class is to be assigned to John Musæus. Dorner speaks of him as, next to Calixtus and Gerhard, the greatest theologian of the century. As exponents of the dogmatism and controversial zeal of the times a prominent place belongs to John Quenstedt and Abraham Calov.

The Reformed theology likewise had a double source. Zwingli and Calvin, with all their points of doctrinal affinity, differed to a noticeable degree. Zwingli, a man of keen judgment, with little appreciation of the mystical, was disposed to answer the problems of theology in accordance with the dictates of the practical reason. Calvin, a man of logical temper and speculative faculty, and less remote than Zwingli from mysticism, was inclined to solve theological problems according to the demands of certain fundamental conceptions of God's nature and of the unquestionable authority of His Word. Zwingli's system appears, on the

whole, the more moderate. His theory of original sin was milder than that of Calvin, his doctrine of the sacraments less mystical, his teaching on predestination more liberal as respects the scope of the divine choice unto eternal life, though quite as radical as respects the unconditional character of that choice. The great Confessions of the Reformed Church reflect the Calvinian rather than the Zwinglian type of doctrine. But the latter was destined to a wide patronage. Affinity with several of its distinct features may be seen, not only in Arminianism, but in some of the later developments of communions that primarily adhered quite strictly to the Calvinistic type. An effectual means of perpetuating Calvin's influence was embodied in his famous Institutes. This is no doubt a great work, and, despite some extreme phases, may justly entitle Calvin to be called the ablest apologist of the Reformation which the sixteenth century produced.

Among the theologians who followed Zwingli and Calvin as teachers of the Swiss churches, a foremost place belongs to Henry Bullinger, Theodore Beza, Francis Turretin, and John H. Heidegger.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Holland appears as the most distinguished seat of theological literature in the Reformed Church. The records of her universities present, for this era, a long list of theologians, from which, however, it is difficult to specify names, since many appear as of about equal reputation. Gomar and Voëtius are noted as representatives of a stringent dogmatism, the one against Arminianism, and the other against Cartesianism. Vossius and Vitringa are in high repute as accomplished scholars. Coccejus is remembered as a distinguished founder of the "federal theology." He marked also an era by fostering the Biblical method of theology, as opposed to the scholastic.

After the founder, the most important exponents of Arminianism as a whole were Episcopius, Curcellæus,

and Limborch. These three represent substantially the same system of thought. Grotius, commonly reputed to have been the broadest scholar of the age, made important contributions to Christian apology and soteriology.

A particular controversy, rather than their general importance in theology, gave prominence to such French Protestants as Du Moulin, Amyraut, and Placæus. John Cameron, a forerunner of Amyraut, is given in the table among Continental theologians; for, though a Scotchman by birth, he appears in history as a teacher in France.

After Cranmer, Bishop Jewell and Richard Hooker deserve special mention among the writers of the English Church in the sixteenth century. In the next century an important place was held in the English (or the Irish) Establishment by Archbishop Usher, Bishop Joseph Hall, Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and Bishop George Bull. The talent of Hall and Taylor was indeed more literary than dogmatic, but a measure of doctrinal import pertains to their works. In the same century we have, as distinguished representatives of the broader and more rational spirit in the Church, besides some of the Cambridge Platonists, Chillingworth, John Hales of Eton, Stillingfleet, and Tillotson. Among those who figured in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth, special mention may be made of Sherlock, Burnet, South, and Clarke. Waterland as a writer falls mainly within the bounds of the next period.

A glance at the table will supply the list of the more distinguished representatives of Scotch Presbyterianism. In England the essentials of Presbyterianism were stoutly championed as early as the reign of Elizabeth by Thomas Cartwright. The Westminster divines, with William Twisse at their head, were its stanch representatives at the middle of the seventeenth century. Richard Baxter, a voluminous writer of controversial theology, as well as a distinguished author of practical treatises, can hardly be identified with

any one party. He held a position analogous in some respects to that of Amyraut in France, seeking, without definitely breaking with Calvinism, to soften as much as possible its theoretical asperities. The Independents supplied such able writers as John Owen and John Howe; and we might also add the no less able John Goodwin, if it were proper to regard a man of such independent mind as representing anybody but himself. He occupied a singular position among the sectaries of his age, in resolutely and elaborately assailing the Calvinistic doctrines of unconditional predestination and a limited atonement.

Among Roman Catholic dogmatists of the period, Belarmin claims the first place. A high reputation was also won by Petavius through his elaborate work, combining history and dogma. Suarez acquired considerable fame as a metaphysician. Bossuet was a powerful writer and an effective apologist, but not in the fullest sense a representative dogmatist of his Church.

4. PARTIES AND CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE LARGER COMMUNIONS. — Lutheranism very soon became a battle-field of contending factions. Some of the strifes that arose originated in the partisan zeal and mutual jealousies of the disciples of Luther and Melanchthon respectively. As in the apostolic era, the friendship and general harmony between Peter and Paul could not prevent their disciples from engaging in disputes and contentions, so the close bond between the two Reformers failed to bind their followers into unity of spirit. Admiration for Luther, divorced from his largeness of heart, led not a few to accept him as an oracle, and to denounce at once anything which appeared to disagree with his teaching. Naturally such zealots were poor interpreters even of their own oracle, and sometimes ran into extravagance by not properly qualifying one phase of his teaching by reference to another. Thus abundant material for strife was prepared. Further on, after the Church had settled down upon its

formulas and was bound with the chains of a lifeless orthodoxy, a new source of strife arose from the efforts of more generous spirits to break these chains, and to gain an adequate attention to the demands of practical piety.

The first controversy which falls under our notice is that which sprang from the Antinomian doctrine of John Agricola. Neglecting one part of Luther's teaching, Agricola pushed the contrast between the Law and the Gospel to an extreme, and declared that the former belongs to the external order and is in the province of the magistrate,—that the preacher has nothing to do with it, and should not attempt to make it a means of spiritual nurture. Luther himself took part in refuting Agricola.

Agricola was incited to a declaration of his views by some statements of Melanchthon which seemed to concede too much to good works. A kindred cause gave rise at a later date to a kindred declaration. Melanchthon had spoken of works as necessary, not meaning thereby to inculcate any trust in the merit of works, but to emphasize the idea that justifying faith must be an active faith. One of his disciples, George Major, going a little further in the same direction, declared (1552) that works are necessary to *salvation*, or, in other words, to the *continuance of the justification* which is indeed in the first place received by simple faith. To the zealous Lutherans this seemed a radical denial of the Gospel, and one of them, Nicolas Armsdorf, even went so far in his opposition as to indulge the expression that good works are dangerous to salvation. The controversy upon this point raged for a score of years or more.

The "synergistic" and the "crypto-Calvinistic" controversies (in the third quarter of the century) sprang directly from antagonism to Melanchthon's type of doctrine. The former term is indicative of the view, advocated by Major, Crell, Strigel, and other disciples of Melanchthon, that there resides in man a certain power of co-operating with or resisting the offered grace of God. Of course, all zeal-

ous champions of Luther's teaching challenged this theory. The term crypto-Calvinists was reproachfully applied to the party of Melanchthon on account of their leaning to the Calvinistic theory of the eucharist. In the Reformation era generally difference of view on the eucharist was ready fuel for strife, and the present instance was no exception. Polemic zeal was kindled to a flame. Such weapons of orthodoxy as the prison and exile were freely used. One distinguished crypto-Calvinist, Chancellor Crell, was brought to the executioner's block, ostensibly, indeed, for political offences, but really in satisfaction of controversial rancor.

The discussion of the eucharist naturally led into the field of Christology, inasmuch as Luther had supported his doctrine of the eucharist by predicating the ubiquity of Christ's body. From the consideration of the single property of ubiquity, an advance was naturally made to the question of the communication of divine properties generally to the human nature. It then remained to reconcile the supposition of such communication with the facts of Christ's humiliation, earthly life, and subsequent glorification. Various conclusions were reached by different parties. Some, following Melanchthon, denied the theory of communication; others asserted it in the most radical terms; others still labored to construct an intermediate theory. The Formula of Concord which attempted to settle this, as well as the other matters which had been in dispute, failed of its purpose. The controversy continued into the next century, and indeed did not fully lose its momentum until it had impinged against the horrors of the Thirty Years' War.

Other Lutheran controversies of the sixteenth century need here but a bare mention. Some agitation was caused by the theory of Andrew Osiander, that justification is not simply a forensic act, but an actual impartation of righteousness by an infusion of the divine nature of Christ. On this subject there was little division into parties, Osiander's view being assailed by theologians generally. Scarcely

more assent was commanded by the theory which Matthias Flacius Illyricus embodied in the strange assertion that original sin is the very substance of the fallen man.

The two great controversies inaugurated in the Lutheran Church in the seventeenth century were in consequence of reactions against the rigid and unspiritual temper of the age. The first arose in connection with the attempt of George Calixtus looking toward a union of the different Christian communions on the basis of a common allegiance to the great leading truths of Christianity. Naturally his well-meaning liberality only stirred to a fiercer zeal the self-confident and uncompromising spirit of dogmatism which it opposed. The second controversy sprang from the reformatory movement inaugurated by Spener in the last half of the seventeenth century, and known as Pietism. This movement was of a practical rather than of a theological cast. It made a vigorous protest against resting in mere dogmatical distinctions. Its aim was not so much to change the dogmas, as to transform the lives of the people. It wished to add practice and experience to theory, and to lead men to realize the gracious power of God in their hearts. At first it was very generally reprobated, and not a few theologians regarded its theory of the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit as savoring of wild-fire and excess of enthusiasm. But Pietism was effectively championed and commanded quite a wide influence, especially in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.

Reference should be made to another party in the Lutheran Church, if party it can be called, namely, the mystics. Here belong Caspar Schwenkfeld, Sebastian Frank, Valentine Weigel, and Jacob Boehme, the first two being contemporaries of Luther and Melancthon, the third dying in 1588, and the last in 1624. They were characterized in common by the disposition to rank the inner spirit above the letter of revelation. Schwenkfeld was perhaps the least given to speculative extravagance. His followers

assumed the status of a distinct sect. Frank and Weigel did not stop much short of pantheism. Boehme revelled in visions of divine mysteries, but was far from fulfilling the office of a revelator to the uninitiated. While his numerous writings contain not a few gems of philosophic thought, they contain much that is unintelligible, if not absurd.

In the Reformed Church the more important controversies, like the Arminian in Holland, and the Puritan in England, gave rise to separate communions, and so have already been sufficiently treated for our purpose, under the first topic of the present section. We notice here, therefore, simply the fact that the attempt of the French school of theologians, represented by Amyraut and Placæus, to modify some points of Calvinism, gave rise to quite an agitation, and that one of the main products of the opposition which it called forth was the Helvetic Consensus Formula. This confession was designed to uphold the strict Calvinistic faith, but was not long in force.

Mysticism did not find a very congenial soil in the Reformed Church, and appears there largely as an exotic. The English mystics of the latter part of the seventeenth century, John Pordage and his associates, Thomas Bromley and Jane Leade, drew much of their inspiration from Jacob Boehme, and like him claimed to receive light upon divine mysteries by means of visions. Jane Leade formed the idea of gathering the illuminated and regenerate in the different churches into societies. Some such societies, under the name of Philadelphians, were instituted, but did not flourish to any great extent. On the Continent, the French enthusiast, Jean de Labadie, and Pierre Poiret, were the most noteworthy Reformed mystics. The disciples of Labadie formed a small sect at Amsterdam. Poiret, the friend of Madame Bourignon, and the systematizer of her views, showed considerable genius for speculation, and wrote extensively. Among other novelties, he gave ex-

pression to some very peculiar notions on the subject of Christology. Labadie died in 1674, Poiret in 1719.

In the Roman Catholic Church the most noteworthy parties which had their origin in this period were the Jesuits and the Jansenists. Both won great distinction in the field of theological literature, the Jesuits supplying the greatest dogmatic writers of the Romish Church, such as Bellarmine and Petavius, and the Jansenists boasting authors of such genius and ability as Pascal and Arnauld, Nicole and Quesnel. The great controversy of the era was the one waged between these two parties, and this was but the culmination (with some additional points) of a strife reaching back to the time of the Trent council. Notwithstanding the decisions of that council, there was a party in the Church that continued to cherish the Augustinian doctrines on the subject of grace. Michael Baius, a teacher in the university of Louvain, gave forth such an undiluted Augustinianism that the Pope was incited, in 1567, to condemn seventy-six of his propositions. He seems, however, to have found sympathizers at his own university, as well as in other quarters of the Netherlands; for we find the theologians of Louvain and Douay, as also the Belgic bishops exhibiting a readiness to censure the Jesuits Less and Hamel, who were charged with having gone counter to Augustine. At this juncture fuel was added to the fire by the book of the Spanish Jesuit Molina, published in 1588, under the title, "*Liberi Arbitrii Concordia cum Gratia donis, Divina Præscientia, Providentia, Prædestinatione, et Reprobatione.*" This work took strong ground in behalf of human freedom and ability. The Dominicans, as being largely inclined to the Thomist or Augustinian theology, at once attacked the book of Molina. The Jesuits, on the other hand, though many of them were not in full sympathy with the views of Molina, felt constrained as a body, by the pride of their order, to defend him. A heated strife ensued. The Pope was appealed to, and took the case

under his consideration, but forbore to render a positive decision. In 1640, a new turn was given to the controversy, and the defence of Augustinianism passed into the hands of a new set of champions. The occasion was the publication of the "Augustinus" of Cornelius Jansenius, Bishop of Ypres in the Netherlands. The Jesuits at once assailed this work, and were successful in eliciting a papal condemnation of five of its propositions. On the other hand, zealous friends of Augustinianism undertook its defence. At the same time, resorting to offensive measures, they vigorously attacked the Jesuitical casuistry. As respects outward fortunes, the Jesuits were finally the victorious party, and they were able also to point to the bull *Unigenitus* as an authoritative verdict of the head of the Church decidedly in their favor. The champions of Augustinian doctrines in this struggle, as defenders of the work of Jansenius, were called Jansenists. Their characteristic teachings exhibit, no doubt, a measure of affinity with Protestant standards. In their doctrines of human inability and divine sovereignty, they approached Protestantism of the Calvinistic type. In their opposition to a formal righteousness, in their emphasis upon a proper inner state as a condition of sacramental benefits, and in their stress upon the reading of the Scriptures, they approached Protestantism in general. But they were themselves utterly unwilling to own any affiliation with the Church of the Reformation. They wearied themselves to make out distinctions between their doctrines of grace and those of Calvinism. They hated Protestantism just about as intensely as they did Jesuitism. And in this they were not altogether inconsistent; for while in some respects they approximated to the teachings of the Reformation, they still held views about the outward unity of the Church, and many points in the list of Romish dogmas, utterly alien to the spirit of Protestantism.

A glance at the different phases of this protracted con-

troversy, to say nothing about minor contentions, such as that between the Dominicans and the Franciscans over the immaculate conception of the Virgin, between Gallicans and Ultramontanes respecting papal prerogatives, and between mystics and anti-mystics, cannot fail to convey the impression that Roman Catholicism in this period, with its one Church, was after all not much more homogeneous than Protestantism with its numerous communions.

Mysticism, of which there was a plentiful outcropping in this period, was in part persecuted and in part extolled and canonized by the Romish Church, — persecuted in Molinos, Madame Guion, and Fénelon, extolled in John Bona, and canonized in Carlo Borromeo, Theresa, and Francis de Sales. The distinction may not have been wholly arbitrary. But certainly, apart from adventitious circumstances that worked to his prejudice, there is little reason why Fénelon should not have been approved by the Church that raised Theresa or Francis de Sales to saintship. The recent condemnation of Molinos, on the score of his pronounced quietism, had caused a suspicious attitude toward mysticism. Madame Guion, as holding views kindred with those of Molinos, had been challenged. Fénelon thought her misunderstood and wronged, and undertook her defence. This brought against himself a combination headed by Bossuet. Fénelon was obliged to succumb, and to recant his book on the *Maxims of the Saints*. But though he lost his cause in this respect, he won it in a more extended sense. As Herder has remarked, “His Church indeed canonized him not, but humanity has.”

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. POINTS IN CONTROVERSY BETWEEN ROMANISTS AND PROTESTANTS. — The main points on which Romanism and Protestantism stood in definite contrast with each other

concerned the canon, the standard Biblical text, the place of tradition, the interpretation and use of the Scriptures, and the grounds on which their authority is acknowledged. With respect to the subject of inspiration they were not strictly opposed, and some diversity of view appeared within the bounds of each.

Although quite a number of the mediæval writers had discriminated against the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, and a writer as recent and prominent as Cajetan had expressly decided against admitting them to the canon, the council of Trent found little difficulty in uniting upon the decree to place them without distinction in the list of canonical books. The suggestion of a double list, in which the books that had never been challenged should be ranked first, though favored by some, was unpalatable to the majority. (See Gerhard's quotations from Cajetan and others, *Locus I.* §§ 89-95; Sarpi, *History of the Council of Trent*, Book II., translated by Nathanael Brent.) The result was that the standard Old Testament of the Romish Church contains, besides the Hebrew canon proper, Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch (including the Epistle of Jeremiah), the two Books of Maccabees, and additions to Esther and Daniel.

The anathema was declared against any who should not receive the full list of books (the apocryphal included), as contained in "the old Latin vulgate edition," and this edition was decreed to be authentic in the following terms: "The sacred and holy synod ordains and declares, that the said old and vulgate edition, which, by the lengthened usage of so many ages, has been approved of in the Church, be, in public lectures, disputations, sermons, and expositions, held as authentic; and that no one is to dare or presume to reject it under any pretext whatever." (Session IV.) This decree, according to Sarpi, commanded a very general assent, though a few voices were raised in favor of the idea that no translation ought to be regarded as by any means

on an equality with the original. The authentic character assigned to the Vulgate is not understood, says Bellarmin, to mean that it is free from all mistakes, but only from serious errors, or such as affect faith and morals. Among excuses for preferring it to the original, he alleges that the extant manuscripts of the original are not altogether trustworthy, and that the Latin Church, as it was more orthodox than the Greek, may be presumed to have been more careful than the latter to guard its copies of the Scriptures from corruption. (*De Verbo Dei*, Lib. II. cap. 11.)

The language of the council of Trent implies that the Church is in possession of traditions which are of equal authority with the Scriptures, and that these traditions had their primary source in oral teachings of the apostles, which they received from Christ or the Holy Spirit. After a reference to such traditions, the decree reads as follows: "The synod receives, and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence, all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament, as also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, either by Christ's own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession." Bellarmin distinguishes three classes of traditions, the divine, the apostolic, and the ecclesiastical. The first and second of these, the one resting on the sayings of Christ, and the other on those of the apostles, are declared by him to have the same force as the Gospels and Epistles. (*De Verbo Dei*, Lib. IV. cap. 2.) In harmony with the council of Trent, Bellarmin teaches that in matters of faith an authoritative tradition cannot have its primary source short of the apostles. From this it would seem to follow that the historical must be the one valid test of tradition. But that is by no means the position taken by Bellarmin. He gives indeed a place to historical investigation in his total list of tests; but he allows other grounds of conclusion to be decisive apart from this. "When the Universal

Church," he says, "embraces anything as a dogma of the faith, which is not found in the Divine Word, it is necessary to say that it is derived from apostolic tradition. The reason of this is the following. Inasmuch as the Universal Church cannot err, since it is the pillar and foundation of the truth, certainly what the Church believes to be of the faith is without doubt of the faith; but nothing is of the faith except that which God has revealed through apostles or prophets, or which is evidently deduced from those sources." (Ibid., cap. 9.) Again he remarks: "When the Universal Church holds to anything which no one but God was able to ordain, which, nevertheless, is nowhere found in written form, it is necessary to say that it was handed down from Christ and his apostles." (Ibid.) Now Belarmin elsewhere defines the Church in terms which make it identical with the papal communion. Practically, therefore, on his principles, the authority of tradition is the authority of the papal communion of the present; in other words, the authority of the pope, or at most of the pope and the council. In thus throwing the main stress upon the infallibility and present authority of the Church, Belarmin was true to the shrewdest instincts of Romanism, and chose the securest pathway for escaping the inconveniences of history. Bossuet, with less arbitrariness, but also with less caution, staked the cause of his Church to a larger degree upon historical proofs. "The Catholic Church," he says, "so far from endeavoring to tyrannize over the belief of her members, on the contrary has employed every possible expedient to bind herself, and to deprive herself of the means of introducing innovations. For these ends, not only does she submit to the Sacred Scriptures; but in order to stay or forever banish any arbitrary interpretations,—which cause sometimes the thoughts of men to pass for Scripture,—she ties herself, moreover, to interpret, and understand, whatsoever belongs to faith and morals, according to the interpretation and sense of the holy fathers.

She solemnly professes, that, from the interpretations of these enlightened personages she will on no occasion deviate. She declares in all her councils, as well as in all her professions and instruments of faith, that she does not receive any article of belief which is not exactly conformable to the tradition of each and every preceding century." (Exposition of the Doctrines of the Catholic Church.)

In conformity with these sentiments, Bossuet was much exercised over the statements of Simon, that Augustine in his doctrines of grace was an innovator, and drew the Church of the Occident away from its primitive standpoint upon this subject. Such teaching, he declared (in his *Défense de la Tradition*), was in no way to be reconciled with the integrity of tradition and the doctrinal authority of the Church, — a hazardous ground for an apologist of Romanism to stand upon, for the history of doctrine makes nothing clearer than that Augustine in some of the distinctive points of his teaching went counter, not merely to the great body of preceding Catholic writers, but to every one of them who passed any definite verdict on the same points, and, moreover, that in his new departure he was followed to a very considerable extent by the Latin Church. A safer course would have been to put dogmatic authority in the foreground, and leave history, as best it might, to adjust itself thereto, after the prescription, for example, of Pedro de Soto. "It is an infallible and catholic rule," says this writer, "that whatever things the Roman Church believes, holds, and maintains, that are not contained in the Scriptures, were handed down from the apostles; likewise, that all those observances whose beginning or origin is unknown or cannot be discovered, were beyond all doubt handed down from the apostles." (Quoted by Chemnitz, *Examen Decretorum Concilii Tridentini*.)

The decrees of Trent declare that it belongs to the Church "to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Holy Scriptures," and forbid any one to make interpretations

not agreeable to her mind, even though there should be no design of publishing such interpretations. The organ of the Church, as an infallible interpreter, was understood to be either the council or the pope, or both together. In proving that there is such an infallible organ in the Church, Romanist theologians were wont to emphasize the practical need of such, which arises from the obscurity of the Scriptures.

The unrestricted reading of the Scriptures by the laity was regarded by Romish authorities as utterly inexpedient and dangerous. Translations of the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue were placed by Pius IV. in the prohibited list, and were allowed to be read only under certain limitations; only by those, as Bellarmin explains, who might obtain a permit from the ordinary, — “*qui facultatem ab ordinario obtinuerint.*” Some Romish writers even went so far as to liken the placing of the Scriptures in the hands of the laity to giving that which is holy unto the dogs and casting pearls before swine. (Gerhard, Locus I. § 492.)

Manifestly the whole tendency of Roman Catholic teaching on this subject was to overshadow the authority of Scripture by the authority of the Church; and to a very conspicuous extent its tendency was to make tradition itself to retreat into the background before church authority, or the fiat of the existing ecclesiastical officary. Indeed, in more than one instance it was explicitly declared that the authority of Scripture rests upon the authority of the Church. The Church, it was taught, sits in judgment upon books claiming to be Holy Scripture, and renders a final decision upon their claims. In the approbation of the Church the Scripture has its credentials. “All the authority,” wrote Pighius, “which the Scriptures now have with us depends necessarily upon the authority of the Church.” (Gerhard, Locus I. § 37.) And, according to Cornelius Mussus, Bishop of Bitonto, who acted a conspicuous part at the council of Trent, to get at the authorita-

tive verdict of the Church, it is not necessary to consult the whole list of Catholic fathers, for one pope is to be preferred to a thousand Augustines, Jeromes, and Gregories. (Quoted by Newman in his *Via Media*.) This, to be sure, was an extravagant saying, and not fully warranted by the standpoint of the Romish Church at that time; but it was not without its significance.

On some of the topics enumerated the standards of the Greek Church in this period approached the Romish standpoint. The Orthodox Confession maintains that the articles of faith owe their authority in part to the Scriptures, and in part to ecclesiastical tradition and the teachings of the councils and the fathers. The Confession of Dositheus declares: "We believe the authority of the Catholic Church to be no less than that of Holy Scripture." The same confession also pronounces in favor of the canonical character of the Old Testament Apocrypha. But the Greek Church seems not to have regarded itself as fully committed to this position. Certainly the implication of the Russian Catechism is, that the apocryphal do not stand on a full equality with the other books of the Old Testament.

The Protestants were united in rejecting the apocryphal books from the Old Testament. Among the considerations justifying their exclusion, they urged that they were written after the close of the prophetic era in Jewish history, and so presumably without prophetic inspiration; that they were not written in the proper language of the Old Testament, the Hebrew tongue; that their subject matter is without reference to Christ; that they are not quoted as dogmatic authority in the New Testament; that they were not received as canonical by the Jewish Church to which the custody of the Old Testament oracles was committed; that they were rejected in large part by the primitive Christian Church and by many later writers. (Gerhard.) As for the rest, Protestants acknowledged the same list of Scriptural books as Romanists. Luther, to be sure, was

disposed to deny that the Book of Esther in the Old Testament, and the Epistle of James in the New, are worthy of a place in the canon, and for a time at least doubted the authority of the Apocalypse. But Luther's position herein was exceptional. Protestants generally received without hesitation the full Hebrew canon, and while they did not overlook the fact that a few of the less important books of the New Testament could claim but little on the score of external evidences, were not disposed to challenge the canonical character even of these.

It was the common maxim of Protestantism, that, in respect of doctrinal authority, the preference must be given to the Scriptures in the original languages over any translation.

The Romish theory of tradition was denounced as involving the same trespass against the divine oracles as that which the Pharisees had committed against the law of Moses by their unwarranted and perverse traditions. An office indeed was accredited to tradition. The testimony of the early Church was allowed to have a certain weight on account of her proximity to the inspired teachers of the doctrines and institutions of Christianity. As already observed, many of the Anglican divines laid considerable stress upon the writings of the fathers of the first centuries. The same may be said of Calixtus, who thought that a basis of Christian union might be found in the consensus of the Church in its more incorrupt age. The majority, however, had but a moderate regard for patristic authority. Meanwhile, it was the common verdict of Protestant theologians that nothing which cannot be proved from Scripture is strictly binding, and nothing which is in any wise incongruous with Scripture is to receive any hearing at all. Without much qualification, therefore, we may take as representative of Protestantism on this subject the following statement from the Formula of Concord: "We believe, confess, and teach that the only rule and norm, according

to which all dogmas and all doctors ought to be esteemed and judged, is no other than the prophetic and apostolic writings both of the Old and of the New Testament. But other writings, whether of the fathers or of the moderns, with whatever name they come, are in no wise to be equalled to the Holy Scriptures, but are all to be esteemed inferior to them, so that they be not otherwise received than in the rank of witnesses, to show what doctrine was taught after the apostles' times also, and in what parts of the world that more sound doctrine of the prophets and apostles has been preserved."

Protestant writers were quite unanimous in denying that there is any infallible interpreter of Scripture upon earth. To make the Pope the authoritative interpreter, they claimed, was equivalent to putting him in place of the Bible. "If I should pretend," argues Chillingworth, "that I should submit to the laws of the king of England, but should indeed resolve to obey them in that sense which the king of France should put upon them, whatsoever it were, I presume every understanding man would say, that I did indeed obey the king of France, and not the king of England." So obedience goes to the Pope instead of the Scripture, when the Pope is allowed an absolute right of interpretation. The plea that the common man, says the same writer, cannot understand the Scriptures, and so needs to be directed to an infallible guide, points to no effectual escape from difficulties; for the common man can quite as easily gain a rational conviction of the sense of Scripture, as assure himself that this or that claimant of infallibility is really in possession of what he claims. (The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation.) The Scriptures, it was maintained by Protestant theologians generally, are not obscure on the great essentials. In respect of things necessary to salvation they adequately interpret themselves. Not every one, indeed, may be capable of properly understanding them. The gift of interpreta-

tion is not with the unregenerate; but equally it is not bound to power, or position, or numerical majority; it belongs to the truly pious everywhere. (Melancthon, *Loci*.) The common man ought to read the Scriptures, and he can sufficiently understand them for his practical guidance, if he comes to them with a diligent and spiritual frame of mind. Upon this point the statement of the Westminster Confession was fully representative. "All things in Scripture," says the Confession, "are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them." All this evidently amounts to a claim for the right of private interpretation; not that a man is not morally bound to take counsel of the best expositors accessible to him, but that he is not strictly amenable to any human interpreter, not judicially consigned to the direction of any church official or officials. To be sure, it was sometimes asserted, as, for example, in the Thirty-nine Articles, that the Church has authority in controversies of faith. (Art. XX.) But this authority was understood to be fallible, and indeed the Thirty-nine Articles say as much when they declare that general councils may err, and sometimes have erred. Now, evidently a fallible authority is not qualified to dictate to the individual, in absolute terms, his profession of faith. But practically there was a wide-spread disposition in this period to limit the right of private interpretation, as is plain from the history of religious persecutions. A zeal more ardent than considerate did not know how to reconcile one interest with another, and so ran into inconsistencies. The thinking of many, especially in the Calvinistic communions, was tinged by theocratic notions. They conceived that the Bible was meant to give the law to Church and to society, and that it

was dishonoring to God not to put that law in force. In their zeal and haste to bring it into force, they were not over careful to inquire how far they might proceed without trespassing upon the consciences of their neighbors. So they practically assumed the infallibility which they decried in Romanism, in some instances helping themselves with the lame distinction, that the Church, though not infallible itself, may determine infallible points, as an earthen pitcher may contain gold, and precious rubies, and sapphires, although there is no gold in the matter of the pitcher itself, but only clay. (Tulloch, *Rational Theology in England*.) But, as previously intimated, this development is to be regarded as only a passing episode of Protestantism, belonging to its formative stage. And even in this period there were influential parties within the bounds of Protestantism who were consistent advocates of the rights of private interpretation; such as Calixtus and his school in Germany, the Arminians in Holland, and the liberal school in the English Church represented by Chillingworth, Tillotson, Locke, and others.

The Church was allowed by Protestant writers to be a witness, custodian, and herald of the Scriptures, but they denied that Scripture authority depends upon the Church. The Scriptures, as they taught, depend not upon the Church, but on the contrary the Church depends upon the Scriptures. Their authority is intrinsic, and it is above the prerogative of any earthly power to take from it or to add to it in any degree. "The Word of God," said Luther, "is incomparably above the Church." (*De Captiv. Bab. Eccl.*) It was admitted, indeed, that the testimony of the early Church is a factor in the evidence for the canonical character of the received books of the Bible; but this admission was not designed to imply any authority in the early Church over Scripture, but simply to recognize that it had superior facilities for knowing what books were of apostolic origin. In general, much stress was laid

upon the witness of the Spirit in proof of the divine origin and truth of the Scriptural books. Other evidences were indeed given a place. Luther was disposed to judge of books claiming a place in the canon by their possession or lack of Gospel substance, their relation to the central truths of redemption. Many emphasized the majesty of thought and style which the Scriptures exhibit, and the cogency with which they address the conscience. Calvin, for example, says: "The Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things do of their taste. . . . If we read it with pure eyes and sound minds, we shall immediately perceive the majesty of God, which will subdue our audacious contradictions, and compel us to obey Him. . . . Read Demosthenes or Cicero; read Plato, Aristotle, or any others of that class; I grant that you will be attracted, delighted, and enraptured by them in a surprising manner; but if, after reading them, you turn to the perusal of the sacred volume, whether you are willing or unwilling, it will affect you so powerfully, it will so penetrate your heart, and impress itself so strongly on your mind, that, compared with its energetic influence, the beauties of rhetoricians and philosophers will almost entirely disappear." (Inst., I. 7, 8.) Still, no other evidence for the divinity and truth of the Biblical books was so much emphasized, for the major part of the period, as the *testimonium Spiritus*. This, it was held, is the source, not merely of a human persuasion, but of an infallible faith. Several of the confessions distinctly adduce the same as the decisive ground of assurance respecting the sacred canon. "We know these books," says the French Confession, "to be canonical, and the sure rule of our faith, not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church, as by the testimony and inward illumination of the Holy Spirit, which enables us to distinguish them from other ecclesiastical books upon which, however useful, we

cannot found any articles of faith." (Art. IV.) The Belgic Confession contains essentially the same declaration. (Art. V.) The Confession of the Waldenses emphasizes the *testimonium Spiritus*, together with the internal marks of Scripture, or the excellence and sublimity of its style and contents. The Westminster Confession, after stating that the testimony of the Church may properly move us to reverence the Scriptures, and that the heavenliness of their matter, the sublimity of their style, and the harmony of part with part, clearly evince that they are the Word of God, adds this strong declaration: "Yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." (Chap. I.) Gerhard, and other representative Lutherans, such as Hülsemann, Dannhauer, König, Calov, Quenstedt, and Hollaz, gave a prominent place to the testimony of the Spirit among the attestations of the truth of Scripture. Quenstedt says: "The ultimate reason under which and on account of which with a divine and infallible faith we believe the Word of God to be the Word of God, is the intrinsic power and efficacy itself of the Divine Word and the testimony and sealing of the Holy Spirit speaking in and through the Scripture." Other proofs, he says, of whatever kind, will effect only a human faith and persuasion,—"*fidem tantum humanam et persuasionem efficient.*" (Systema, De Script. Quæst. 9.) Calvin gave the first place to the testimony of the Spirit, and assigned to rational considerations the office of confirming the persuasion wrought by the former.

A current of dissent from this view appeared among the Arminians. Episcopius suggested that one could not be well assured that he had the Holy Spirit, except by his conformity to Scripture already regarded as a divine standard; in other words, that consent to the divinity of the Scriptures, being prior to the guaranty that one has the

witness of the Spirit, cannot be primarily dependent upon that witness. (Inst. Theol., IV. Sect. 1. 5.) Curcellæus likewise regarded the argument from the testimony of the Spirit as decidedly vulnerable; not that he would deny that the agency of the Spirit is an important factor in producing faith in revelation. We may assume, he says, that the Spirit constrains to belief by certain secret suggestions, only we are not to set forth as the ground of belief that definite and indubitable witness which from the nature of the case pertains only to those who already believe. (Relig. Christ. Inst., I. 5.) According to Curcellæus, the principal guaranties of the truth of any writing are two: (1.) convincing evidence that the author was so well informed as to have no need to err on account of ignorance; (2.) convincing evidence that he desired to write the truth. (I. 3. Compare Episcopius, IV. Sect. 1. 2; Limborch, I. 4.) In applying these tests to the Scriptures, naturally much stress was laid upon the evidences of a divine vocation in the writers, such as miracles, prophecy, superhuman excellence of teaching, evident desire to honor God, readiness to record their own or their heroes' faults, willingness to encounter suffering and death for the sake of the truth. Towards the end of the period, there was a manifest tendency in favor of this line of apology, as opposed to laying the principal emphasis upon the *testimonium Spiritus*.

Before leaving this topic, we should notice that there were those among the Protestants who were inclined to assign a subordinate rank to the Scriptures, not indeed in favor of church authority, after the example of the Romanists, but in favor of the revelations of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the individual. This was the case with some of the Anabaptists, as also with the more radical mystics. Here belong also the Quakers. They regarded the Scriptures as the product of inspiration, and so necessarily true; but at the same time they assigned to them a secondary rank. The Spirit, said they, which

gave the Scriptures, is the primary rule; and the revelations of this Spirit in the heart of the believer, though never contradictory to Scriptural teachings, are of immediate authority, and so not subject to the written Word as a standard. This is stated as follows in Barclay's Propositions: "These divine inward revelations, which we make absolutely necessary for the building up of true faith, neither do nor can ever contradict the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or right and sound reason. Yet from hence it will not follow that these divine revelations are to be subjected to the examination, either of the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or of the natural reason of man, as to a more noble and certain rule and touchstone; for this divine revelation and inward illumination is that which is evident and clear of itself, forcing, by its own evidence and clearness, the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving the same thereunto." (Prop. II.)

2. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION.—The strict theory of Scriptural inspiration which the Roman Catholic Church had inherited was met with a measure of dissent in the ranks of the Jesuits. Two members of their society, Hamel and Less, taught that, for a book to be divine and canonical, it is not necessary that all the words, or even all the thoughts, should be inspired; that indeed a canonical book might be purely human as to its authorship, like the Second Book of Maccabees, provided that afterwards it received the divine attestation that it contained nothing untrue. This doctrine was condemned by the theological faculties of Louvain and Douay (in 1588), and also by the Belgic bishops; and some years later the utterances of the Jesuit Jean Adam, implying that the sacred writers had sometimes indulged inexactness of expression, were challenged by the Jansenists. The result of the controversy, according to Alzog, was the gradual adoption of the theory of inspiration which was held by the better ancient exposi-

tors of the Antiochian school, such as Chrysostom. (Kirchengeschichte, II. § 350.) Bellarmin's references to the subject imply that, while God specifically dictated to the prophets their message, he gave to the historical writers only an incentive to their task, and such a measure of assistance in its prosecution as was necessary to secure them from error. (De Verbo Dei, I. 15.)

As represented in Luther, Protestantism started out with the profoundest reverence for Scripture in general, but at the same time without any very precise and technical theory of inspiration. Luther was quite free, not only in passing judgment respecting the canonical character of Scriptural books, but also in allowing room for a human element in those which he regarded as undoubtedly canonical. He noticed a lack of proper arrangement of the passages in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Hosea. He suggested that the prophets may have mingled some wood, hay, and stubble with the more solid and precious materials of their writings. He granted that some parts of Scripture evince a fuller inspiration than others, and thought it no serious thing to allow that there might be a few mistakes in incidental and unimportant items. (Köstlin, Luthers Lehre.)

Luther was not followed by the Lutherans in this freedom of criticism. The tendency among them was toward the theory of the strict verbal inspiration of every part of Scripture. Such was the dominant theory in the seventeenth century. Musæus, to be sure, in one place seemed disposed to question whether inspiration gave the very words of Scripture as well as the subject matter, and Calixtus taught, that, while the leading doctrines were matter of direct revelation, it is not necessary to assume for the remaining parts anything more than a divine assistance. But Calixtus, says Baur, was charged with heresy on this score, and Musæus was constrained to recant his doubts. (Dogmengeschichte.) The language of Gerhard is, to say the least, not far from implying verbal inspiration. Of

the Scripture writers he says: "Deservedly we call them amanuenses of God, hands of Christ, and secretaries and notaries of the Holy Spirit, since they neither spoke nor wrote by their will, but actuated, led, impelled, inspired, and guided by the Holy Spirit. They wrote not as men, but as men of God, that is, as servants of God and peculiar organs of the Holy Spirit." (Locus I. § 18.) Gerhard also expressed himself in favor of the theory that the vowel-points were as ancient as the Hebrew Scriptures, and, while they may often have been omitted in private copies, were assuredly inserted in the public and authentic copies. (Ibid., §§ 334-342.) Quenstedt advocated verbal inspiration in such sweeping terms as these: "The Holy Spirit did not merely inspire the prophets and apostles with respect to the matters and opinions contained in the Holy Scriptures, or the sense of the words, which they might express or embellish in their own phraseology and their own words, but also the very words and each and every expression used by the sacred writers the Holy Spirit individually supplied, inspired, and dictated." Again, he remarks: "Prophets and apostles contributed nothing of their own except tongue and pen." Diversity of style he attributes not to the diverse characteristics of the writers as the immediate cause, but to the accommodation of the Spirit, who was pleased to choose a style akin to that of His organ for the time being. Of course, from this standpoint, he allows no errors in Scripture, geographical, chronological, numerical, historical, or of any sort, at least none which are not to be charged to the mistakes of copyists. He scouts also the notion, that in the style of the New Testament there are any barbarisms or solecisms. Finally, he declares that the Divine Word, even before and apart from legitimate use, has an intrinsic power and efficacy for producing spiritual effects, as though there were a standing nexus between it and the power of God. (Systema, De Scrip. Quæst. 3-6, 16.) This last point was controverted by

Rathmann of Danzig; but on this, as well as on the other points mentioned, Quenstedt appears to have been largely representative of the Lutheranism of his day. Calov's theories were in every way as emphatic, both as respects the inspiration and the efficacy of Scripture. (*Systema Locorum Theol.*, Tom. I. cap. 4.) He maintained also that the Scripture, in respect of the divine power dwelling in it, is not a creature. (Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology*.) Hollaz likewise accepted the dictation theory in all its length and breadth. (*Examen Theol. Proleg.*) In fine, a mechanical theory of inspiration, and a disposition to predicate a kind of magical virtue in the Scriptures, were rife. By a remarkable judgment upon extravagance, an extreme opposition to one phase of deism was avenged by approximation to another, and the effort to exalt written revelation beyond measure ended in putting the second cause in place of the primary,—in banishing the immediate agency of God in favor of the efficiency of a book.

A similar development occurred in the Reformed Church. Zwingli, on the whole, was less bold in dealing with the Scriptures than Luther; his view of inspiration, however, was not so strict but that he was free to allow some inaccuracies in historical matters. Calvin was less free than Luther to criticise the Biblical writers, and probably also less free than Zwingli. He seems to have been inclined to the theory of verbal inspiration. At any rate, he calls the apostles amanuenses of the Holy Spirit (*Inst.*, IV. 8), and imputes diversities of style to the choice of the Spirit. "I grant," he says, "that the diction of some of the prophets is neat and elegant, and even splendid; so that they are not inferior in eloquence to the heathen writers. And by such examples the Holy Spirit has been pleased to show that He was not deficient in eloquence, though elsewhere He has used a rude and homely style." (*Inst.* I. 8.) Turretin affirms that the sacred writers were so inspired both as

respects the subject matter and the words as to be preserved from all error. (Inst., Locus II. quæst. 4.) Voëtius sets forth the theory of verbal inspiration in these unequivocal terms: "It is to be held that the Holy Spirit in an immediate and extraordinary mode dictated all things which were to be written and were written, both the matters and the words, as well those which the writers were before ignorant of or not able to recall, as those which they knew very well, both the historical or particular, and the dogmatic, universal, theoretical, and practical." (Select. Disput., p. 32.) Besides such statements as the above, we have a significant index of the drift in the Reformed Church, in that there was a marked disposition to assert that the vowel-points belonged to the original Hebrew Scriptures. Such was the position taken by the Buxtorfs, at Basle. It was opposed by Louis Cappel, but was given a confessional rank in the Helvetic Consensus Formula. The language of the Formula is as follows: "The Hebrew version of the Old Testament, which we have received and hold to-day, as handed down by the Jewish Church to whom the oracles of God were formerly committed, is inspired (*θεόπνευστος*) both as respects consonants and as respects vowels (either the points themselves, or at least the force of the points), and both as respects matters and as respects words." (Can. II.)

Some of the Arminians taught a less stringent theory. Limborch, indeed, excuses the sacred writers from all errors. They may not, he says, have given an exact and precise narrative of some things that were of little importance, but even in such cases they have not made any untrue statements. (Theol. Christ., I. 4.) Episcopius, on the other hand, argues that it is not incredible that in some insignificant circumstances the Biblical writers may have expressed themselves inaccurately, and maintains that far less harm can come from openly acknowledging an evident inaccuracy, than from an attempt to cover it up by forced

and artificial explanations. (Inst., IV. Sect. 1. 4.) Grotius taught that small discrepancies, so far from weakening the general authority of Scripture, help rather to confirm it, since they forbid the supposition of artifice. (De Ver. Relig. Christ., Lib. III. § 13.) He indicated also his belief that much of the matter of the Bible, at least in the historical books, being sufficiently known by other means, was not delivered by the dictation of the Holy Spirit. Le Clerc likewise was quite free in his comments, especially on the Old Testament history. The Socinians, on the whole, held quite a strong theory of inspiration, but allowed the possibility of error in unessential points. Speaking of the New Testament, Socinus says, that either it contains no discrepancies, or none which are of any moment. (De Sacrae Scrip. Auctor., Cap. I.)

Among English writers, Baxter is noteworthy for his position on this subject. He did not allow that, as a matter of fact, there are any errors in the Bible, but he maintained that there might be, without any essential compromise of Biblical authority. "If we could not," he says, "free the text from every charge that in smaller things is laid upon it, and if we could not prove the writers infallible, and free from all mistakes in their writings, yet might we be sure that the doctrine of Scripture in the main is God's Word, and that the Christian religion is of God." Again, he remarks: "If we could only prove that the Holy Ghost was given to the penmen of Holy Scripture as an infallible guide to them in the matter, and not to enable them to any excellency above others in the method and words, but therein to leave them to their natural and acquired abilities, this would be no diminution of the credit of their testimony, or of the Christian faith." (Unreasonableness of Infidelity. Compare Gilbert Burnet, Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles.)

It is evident from this review that the claims of criticism were, for the most part, ignored in this period, and that

Scripture was treated almost wholly in the spirit of an unqualified dogmatism. No doubt this method had its advantages for the time being, as the Romish doctrine of infallibility has its advantages. But arbitrary assumption always comes at last to a day of reckoning. Extreme dogmatism is the natural forerunner of extreme license. It can hardly be doubted that the mechanical and untenable theory of Scriptural inspiration, which prevailed in the seventeenth century, helped in the ensuing era of reaction to impel rationalistic criticism toward the extreme of its destructive bias.

3. THE BEGINNINGS OF RADICAL CRITICISM. — English deism in this period rather laid a foundation for radical criticism than engaged in a specific prosecution of the same. The writings of Lord Herbert in the first half of the seventeenth century, of Blount in the latter half of that century, of Toland at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, of Shaftesbury in the early part of the eighteenth century, and the first work of Collins at the same time, were not so much occupied with a searching criticism of the Bible, as with commendations of the natural reason, and with insinuations against the truth and utility of anything in the Bible which might not square with the dictates of the natural reason.

The general theory of Hobbes respecting the prerogatives of the sovereign in matters of religion was degrading to the authority of the Scriptures; he indulged, however, in but little criticism, and in none which formally challenged Biblical infallibility. Moses, he says, did not write the Pentateuch; he wrote, nevertheless, all of it which the Pentateuch itself claims was written by him. (*Leviathan.*)

In Spinoza we have undoubtedly an example of the radical critic. His philosophical naturalism left, of course, no place for assuming a supernatural communication to the sacred writers. He allows in the prophets, indeed, an extraordinary faculty; but he makes it something entirely

within the plane of nature, and seems to view it merely as a peculiar subjective capability of a lively grasp, and an animated representation of religious truth. He remarks that statements like this, “‘To the prophets was given the Spirit of God,’ have no other meaning than that the prophets possessed certain special and extraordinary powers, that they were men more than commonly devout, and that they apprehended and knew the mind and purposes of God.” Again, he says: “The prophets were not gifted with any peculiar superiority and understanding, but only with a certain more lively faculty of imagination than the rest of mankind. . . . The gift of prophecy never made a prophet wiser or more learned than it found him.” (*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*.) Spinoza credits Moses with the authorship of a Book of the Law, the substance of which, with some explanatory additions by Ezra, is contained in Deuteronomy. Speaking of the Pentateuch, and the Books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings, he says: “When we regard the argument and connection of these books severally, we readily gather that they were all written by one and the same person, who had the purpose of compiling a system of Jewish antiquities, from the origin of the nation to the first destruction of the city of Jerusalem. The several books are so connected with one another, that from this alone we discover that they comprise the continuous narrative of a single historian. . . . I am led to suspect that Ezra was the man.” As for the Chronicles, they were perhaps not written before the era of the Maccabees. Daniel wrote the latter part of the book bearing his name, but the final composer or compiler of Daniel, as well as of Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah (all these being from a single hand), was later than the age of Judas Maccabæus.

A less radical critic than Spinoza, but from his very different relations probably of greater significance in this era was the French Romanist, Richard Simon. Besides laying considerable stress upon the uncertainties of the

existing text of the Bible, Simon held that the original Old Testament documents, at least the Pentateuch and some others, were modified more or less by later editors. At the same time, he maintained that the editors were no less inspired for their work than the original authors, so that the authority of a sacred book in no wise suffers from the plurality of authorship. One ought not, he said, to admit more additions or modifications than there is clear evidence for, and he accused Spinoza of going to excess. But, on the other hand, he argued that to admit such as cannot easily be explained away, and to claim for them no less than for the original portions the sanction of the Divine Author of Scripture, is the most effectual way to offset the destructive criticism of Spinoza. "On this principle," he says, "an easy response will be made to all the false and pernicious consequences which Spinoza has pretended to draw from these changes and additions, to decry the authority of the divine books, as if these amendments were purely human; whereas, he should have considered that the authors of these changes, having the power to write sacred books, had also the power to amend them. This is why I have made no scruple to bring forward some examples of these changes, and to conclude from them that all the contents of the sacred books were not written by contemporary authors." (*Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament*, Pref.). Various replies were made to Simon, one being by Spanheim; and his theory was regarded both by Roman Catholics and Protestants as of dangerous tendency. His principal work was condemned and narrowly escaped destruction even to its last copy.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE. — Before the time of Descartes, the theologians of the period followed rather in the wake of Thomas Aquinas and the great body of the scholastics, than in that of Anselm, in their attempts to establish the existence of God. The main dependence was placed upon the various *a posteriori* arguments.

Arguments were drawn both from external nature and from the instinctive beliefs of the human soul. Calvin, among others, placed a strong emphasis upon the latter. "We lay it down," he says, "as a position not to be controverted, that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a Deity. For that no one might shelter himself under the pretext of ignorance, God hath given to all some apprehension of his existence, the memory of which He frequently and insensibly renews. . . . All have by nature an innate persuasion of the divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution." (Inst., I. 3.) What Calvin meant by this innate persuasion, is not altogether apparent. It is most probable, however, that he wished to teach simply that in the reason and conscience of man there are certain data which serve as a fixed ground of belief in the divine existence, and which are particularly effective to induce that belief when the quickening agency of the Divine Spirit is superinduced.

Upon this view of the case, it cannot be said that he anticipated the argument which Descartes based upon the innate idea of God. The statement of Calvin is rather akin to the early patristic idea, that man from his very constitution has an impulse toward the recognition of God; whereas, the force of Descartes's argument depends upon the supposition that the idea of God is such as the natural faculties could not have constructed.

In harmony with the position of Calvin, it was the common view that the light of nature is sufficient of itself to assure men of the divine existence. This view was challenged by Faustus Socinus (*Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. II.), and by others of the Socinians, although not by all, as may be judged from the position taken by Wolzogen. (*Compend. Relig. Christ.*) It was opposed also by Matthias Flacius, among the Lutherans.

Descartes's argument embodies two principal considerations: 1. The idea of God which is in the mind is such as the natural faculties could not construct; God alone adequately explains the presence of the idea of God. 2. The idea of God is such as of necessity to involve His real existence, just as the idea of a triangle involves three angles which together equal two right angles,—essentially the same argument as Anselm's. Descartes also argued that our want of consciousness of any power to conserve our own existence is indicative of a power upon which we are dependent. The first two considerations, however, are those which he most frequently emphasizes. Both, in our view, rest upon untenable assumptions; but as they have held quite an important place in doctrinal history, it is proper to quote from Descartes one or two of the passages in which they are most definitely set forth. "By the nature of God," he says, "I understand a substance infinite, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such there be, were created. But these properties are so great and excellent, that, the

more attentively I consider them, the less I feel persuaded that the idea I have of them owes its origin to myself alone. And thus it is absolutely necessary to conclude, from all that I have before said, that God exists: for though the idea of substance be in my mind owing to this, that I myself am a substance, I should not, however, have the idea of an infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, unless it were given me by some substance in reality infinite. And I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, in the same way that I comprehend repose and darkness by the negation of motion and light: since, on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception (notion) of the infinite before that of the finite, that is, the perception of God before that of myself, for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature. . . . God at my creation implanted this idea in me, that it might serve, as it were, for the mark of the workman impressed upon His work." (Meditation III.)

The following passage may serve as an example of Descartes's way of putting the second consideration: "When the mind reviews the different ideas that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them, that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect, and it observes that in this idea there is contained, not only possible and contingent existence, as in the ideas of other things which it clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal. And just as because, for example, the equality of its three angles to two right angles is necessarily comprised in the idea of a triangle, the mind is firmly persuaded that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; so, from its perceiving necessary

and eternal existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of an all-perfect Being, it ought to conclude that this all-perfect Being exists." (The Principles of Philosophy, Part I.)

A measure of assent to Descartes's reasoning appears among contemporary and succeeding writers. Coccejus seems to have agreed with the French philosopher in the conclusion, that the simple idea of God involves His real existence; at least, it is difficult to put any other construction upon the following statement of his: "He who denies that God is, says that the best, the most perfect, the necessary substance which effects all things and is in want of nothing, cannot be, and therefore that the necessary is not necessary, the eternal is not eternal." (Sum. Theol., Cap. VIII.) Cudworth thought that this phase of Descartes's argument was not adapted to convince an opponent, but appears for himself to have credited it with a certain force. To the other phase of the Cartesian argument he subscribed in these definite terms: "We affirm that, if there were no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other." (Intellect. System, Chap. V.) John Norris likewise taught that, if there were no God, we could not have the idea of Him, only objecting to making this idea the medium of revealing God to us. "Whereas," he says, "we see all things in God, so we see God in Himself, and not by any idea distinct from Him, or that is the effect of Him, it being impossible that God should be represented by anything less than Himself." (Theory of the Ideal World.) Stillingfleet also took considerable account of the Cartesian arguments. (Rational Account of the Grounds of Natural and Revealed Religion, Bk. III.)

But quite a proportion of writers ignored the reasoning of Descartes, and some assumed toward it a diapaing tone. Locke, of course, on his philosophical principles,

could not attach much value to such a line of reasoning. He allowed that the idea of a perfect Being might have weight with some, but thought it poor policy to leave more conclusive arguments in the background in favor of this. The list of proofs which he himself submitted is the following: (1.) Man is sure of his own existence. (2.) From nothing, nothing can come. (3.) Something must have existed from all eternity, the source of all power, and hence most powerful. (4.) Man knows that he has knowledge and perception. (5.) The knowing cannot come from the unknowing; hence an eternal intelligent power, or God. Upon the last of these points he remarks: "If it be said there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding, I reply, that then it was impossible that there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and operating blindly, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones." (Essay, Bk. IV. chap. 10.) Samuel Clarke was as little disposed as Locke to be satisfied with the Cartesian arguments; but he adduced one destined to be criticised quite as severely. Having laid down the position, that an attribute must have a substance in which to inhere, he said that we are compelled to think of space as infinite and always. We have then the attributes of a boundless immensity and duration, and must affirm consequently an infinite and eternal substance. (Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.) Evidently such an argument is of little significance, for, even if its validity were granted, it would only prove what the blindest infidelity has commonly admitted, namely, that *something* has existed from eternity.

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. — Probably in this period there was less of disposition, on the average, to indulge extreme statements on the impossibility of knowing God, as to His essence, than was manifested in the patris-

tic and the scholastic era. While some strong expressions, like the declaration of Luther, that the essence of God is *plane incognoscibilis*, were indulged, the majority of Protestant theologians were content to emphasize simply the imperfection of our knowledge of the divine nature. Thus Gerhard says: "We indeed know God, but do not comprehend Him, that is, do not know Him perfectly, because He is infinite." (Locus II. § 90. Compare Calov, Tom. II. cap. 3, 4; Hollaz, Pt. I. cap. 1.) In like manner Limborch remarks: "The nature of God, on account of His infinite majesty, cannot be known perfectly by us in this world, in which we see only through a glass darkly." (Theol. Christ., II. 1.) But in general the great body of theologians in this era differed little from Augustine and the scholastics in their conclusions upon the essence and attributes of God. They asserted the simplicity of the divine nature in the same unqualified terms. John Howe, indeed, seems to have been opposed to the scholastic extreme upon this subject, and it was decidedly criticised by Vorstius; but the scholastic view was thoroughly dominant. The larger communions also conformed closely to the standard which had long been acknowledged respecting the eternity and the omnipresence of God, regarding the former as excluding succession, and understanding by the latter superiority to space relations, or the fact of complete presence in every place without limitation to any.

In some of the smaller communions there was a disposition to criticise the current view of God's eternity. Leading Socinian writers, such as Faustus Socinus and Crell, taught that eternity is only endless time, and that with God as well as with man there is a past, a present, and a future. (Socinus, Prælect. Theol., Cap. VIII.; Crell, Lib. de Deo, Cap. XVIII.) Some of the Arminian theologians were inclined to the same position. Arminius, indeed, was true to the traditional theory in ruling out succession (Disput. IV.), and Limborch declared that he was unable to decide posi-

tively either for or against it (Theol. Christ., II. 5); but Episcopius and Curcellæus criticised it in very positive terms (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 9; Lib. II. cap. 3). To exclude time distinctions, said Curcellæus, is to leave one equally free to affirm, that, in respect of God, the world is yet to be created, and has already been destroyed, and the contrary. No doubt there was some occasion for such strictures in the neglect of the advocates of the old theory to harmonize satisfactorily the idea of God's timelessness with His recognition of the temporal order under which finite things subsist. Curcellæus was disposed to question also the current theory of omnipresence, and suggested that God, instead of being wholly in every place, may be in heaven as to His essence, and everywhere only in respect of power or influence. (Inst., II. 4. Compare Vorstius, Lib. de Deo et Attribut.)

The Socinians were distinguished by their denial of the divine foreknowledge of contingent events. The contingent, said Faustus Socinus, is in its nature unknowable, and consequently to exclude it from the divine foreknowledge is no more derogatory to the knowledge of God, than to exclude from His power that which in the nature of things is impossible is derogatory to His omnipotence. (Prælect. Theol., Cap. VIII. Compare Crell, Lib. de Deo, Cap. XXIV.) This theory was thought to be of special value in reconciling foreknowledge with human freedom. It is noticeable, however, that its defence involved somewhat of a tendency to abridge man's freedom, since it was found difficult to explain the facts of prophecy on this basis, unless it was conceded that God has the prerogative and power to make men act in a specific way. So we find Crell indulging this statement: "Nothing forbids that God in this or that matter should impose upon a man a necessity of willing that which is not base, liberty being left to him in other and the greater number of things."

Among Calvinistic writers, foreknowledge was closely as-

sociated with predestination, or even declared to be founded upon the same. Calvin says that it is not at all necessary to discuss the question whether the mere foreknowledge of God lays necessity upon future events, "since He foresees future events only in consequence of His decree that they should happen." (Inst., Bk. III. chap. 23.) Equivalent language is used by Beza. (Colloq. Mompelg.) Turretin, in explaining how God's foreknowledge is infallible, says, "The reason is, that the foreknowledge of God follows His decree, and as the decree cannot be changed, so neither can His knowledge be subject to mistake." (Inst., Locus III. quæst. 12.) "God foresees from eternity," says Coccejus, "what is to take place, because nothing is to take place without the agency of God. . . . What He sees as hereafter to come to pass, He sees in the decree, by which either He summons events to take place, or by which He has decided to supply to the sinning creature the concursus of the first cause, without which the second is not able to act." (Sum. Theol., Cap. X.) The Arminians, on the other hand, maintained that God does not need to exclude contingency proper, or to rule out alternatives by a positive decree, in order to foreknow an event. The proper opposite of certainty, they said, is uncertainty, and the proper opposite of contingency is necessity. The first two pertain only to the knowing subject, while the last two pertain to the events known. As that which is purely subjective imposes no constraint upon an object, so the certainty of the divine mind in no way interferes with the contingency of an event. Men, indeed, in the use of their own powers, can be entirely certain of a future event only on the ground of necessity, but God's ability to foreknow is not to be judged according to a human standard. He foresees the necessary as coming to pass in a necessary way, and the contingent as occurring contingently. (Curcellæus, II. 6; Limborch, II. 8.) The language of Gerhard implies the same position: "To say that a thing will take place contingently, is to say simply

two things, namely, that it will take place and that it is able not to take place. But these two things are not antagonistic to each other, because, as many things are able to occur which do not occur, so many things occur which are able not to occur; therefore, many things occur contingently. But that which is to occur contingently is truly to occur, and therefore can be foreknown. For everything which is true is capable of being known. Therefore knowledge does not exclude contingency." (Locus II. § 255.) By the contingency of an event Gerhard evidently meant its real contingency, or complete freedom from the category of necessity, and not that species of contingency which some Calvinistic writers affirmed when they described an event as contingent in relation to man, but necessary in relation to God. Cudworth, Clarke, and other eminent Anglican writers, were equally pronounced for the verdict that the divine prescience grasps the contingent in a way which in no wise interferes with its proper contingency. (Intellect. System, Chap. V.; Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.)

In connection with the topic of foreknowledge, considerable discussion was expended upon the question whether a *scientia media* is to be predicated of God. As the phrase suggests, the question was whether a mean is to be affirmed between the two forms of divine knowledge which the scholastics had specified, namely, the *scientia simplicis intelligentiæ*, or God's knowledge of Himself and of what is possible to His omnipotence, and the *scientia visionis*, or the knowledge of that which is actually to occur by His efficiency or permission. The advocates of the *scientia media* maintained that, besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is in God a knowledge of what free agents would do under certain supposable conditions; that is, a knowledge neither of the simply possible, nor of that which is actually to be, but of that which would be under such and such circumstances. This theory was favored by Mo-

lina, Suarez, and other distinguished Jesuits, as helping to reconcile the divine election with human freedom. The Arminian theologians, Curcellæus and Limborch, also accepted it; at least, they imputed such a knowledge to God as the theory affirmed, though not disposed to quarrel with those who thought that this knowledge might properly be included under the old classification. A number of Lutheran theologians favored the theory. Calvinistic writers were commonly opposed to it, though as sturdy an advocate of predestination as Gomar gave it his sanction. (See list of advocates and opponents as given by Quenstedt, *Systema, De Attributis Divinis*, quæst. 7.)

It was commonly maintained that God wills necessarily whatever pertains properly to Himself, while He wills freely that which relates to creatures. Some who were inclined to extreme views of divine sovereignty asserted the Scotist maxim that the will of God is the absolute rule of right. Luther's words are quite as explicit as those of Scotus. He says: "There is no cause or reason which can be prescribed to the will of God as its rule or measure, since nothing is equal or superior to it, but it itself is the rule of all things. . . . Not indeed because He ought to will or to have willed so, is that which He wills right; but, on the contrary, because He so wills, it is bound to be right." (*De Servo Arbitrio*.) "The will of God," says Calvin, "is the highest rule of justice; so that what He wills must be just, for this very reason, because He wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, Because He would. But if you go further, and ask why He so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found." (*Inst.*, III. 23.) Calvin, however, notwithstanding this strong statement, suggests after all that he meant not so much that God's will is absolutely the highest rule of right, as that it is one which we cannot transcend, and must regard as binding our own judgment;

for he adds, "We represent not God as lawless, who is a law to Himself." Beza says, "The will of God is the highest rule of justice." (*Ad Castel. Calum. Responsio.*) Equivalent language is used by Zanchi. (*De Natura Dei*, III. 4.) But not all of the Calvinistic writers were satisfied with this representation. Turretin, after propounding the question whether the will of God is the rule of right, says: "Some stand for the affirmative, maintaining that all moral good and evil depend upon the free will of God, and that nothing is good or just except as God wills. Others, on the contrary, stand for the negative, and acknowledge a certain essential goodness and justice in moral actions antecedent to the will of God, so that those things are not good and just because God wills, but God wills them because they are good and just." Turretin declares for the latter opinion, certain explanations being understood. His view is summed up in this sentence: "The will of God can be called and truly is the rule of righteousness extrinsically and in respect to us, but not indeed intrinsically and in respect of God." (*Inst.*, Locus III. quæst. 18.) This naturally was the position taken by the Arminians. "God can do," says Arminius, "whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with His own that which He cannot do of right. For His will is restricted by the limits of justice." (*Discussion with Francis Junius.*) The same view was emphatically asserted by the Cambridge Platonists. Moral distinctions, according to Cudworth, cannot depend upon mere will, any more than mathematical. "Truth is not factitious; it is a thing which cannot be arbitrarily made, but is. The divine will and omnipotence itself hath no imperium upon the divine understanding; for if God understood only by will, He would not understand at all." (*Immutable Morality; Intellectual System.*) "The reasons of things," said Whichcote, "are eternal; they are not subject to any power." (*Sermons.*) The same position is implied by the statement of Baxter,

that there are certain duties which are founded in the relation of our rational nature to the nature of God, and of which we must say that God wills them because they are good, and not that they are good because He wills them. (Unreasonableness of Infidelity, Pref.) Samuel Clarke defines the basis of moral obligation as follows: "The true ground and foundation of all eternal moral obligation is this, that the same reasons which always and necessarily *do* determine the will of God, ought also constantly to determine the will of all subordinate intelligent beings." (Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God.) Clarke and some others of the English theologians just quoted had the theories of Hobbes in mind as they wrote. In harmony with his political maxims, Hobbes enthroned arbitrary power at the centre of the universe. "God in His natural kingdom," he says, "hath a right to rule, and to punish those who break His laws, from His sole irresistible power. . . . Now if God have the right of sovereignty from His power, it is manifest that the obligation of yielding Him obedience lies on men by reason of their weakness." (Philosophical Rudiments.)

The period, on the whole, was distinguished by a strong emphasis upon the justice of God, and to none of the divine attributes was a more prominent place assigned than to this. A large proportion of Protestant theologians, as they held respecting the atonement the strict satisfaction theory, held also that a *justitia vindicatrix* must be predicated of God, or a justice requiring satisfaction as a condition of remission. Such a view was vehemently opposed by the Socinians. It was also rejected by the Arminians. Among Calvinistic divines it was challenged by Twisse and Rutherford, but Turretin, who approved it, speaks of it as a wellnigh universal opinion in his day. (Inst., Locus III. quæst. 19.)

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

IN the Lutheran and the Reformed Church generally, as well as in the Roman Catholic, the Augustinian theory of the Trinity, or that expressed in the so-called Athanasian creed, was emphatically asserted. Augustine's leading illustration, however, was not acceptable to all. "That speculation of Augustine," says Calvin, "is far from being solid, that the soul is a mirror of the Trinity, because it contains understanding, will, and memory." (Inst., I. 15.) Bossuet, on the other hand, reproduced essentially the Augustinian illustration. (Sermon sur le Mystère de la Trinité.) The principal creeds, as well as the writings of prominent theologians among the Lutherans and the Reformed, disallowed any inequality between the Divine Persons, and declared them to be, in the full sense, of one substance, power, and eternity. Calvin maintained even that the Son is to be called self-existent, implying thereby that generation applies to the Second Person as Son, but not as God, or that the personal relation, not the essence, is to be viewed as derived. He says: "Whoever asserts that the Son owes His essence to the Father, denies Him to be self-existent. But this is contradicted by the Holy Spirit, who gives Him the name of Jehovah." (Inst., I. 13.) Zanchi, on the other hand, did not hesitate to speak of the Father as the fountain of the entire deity in the Son (*De Uno Vero Deo*, Lib. VIII. cap. 1), and the Irish Articles state that the Father begets the person of the Son by the communication of His whole essence. Petavius strongly reprobated Calvin's position on this point. (Theol. Dogmat., Lib. II. cap. 3.) Evidently, however, the subject, as considered by these writers, involved little else than a question of words. So long as it is allowed that the essence in the Son is eternal, unoriginated, and the same as in the Father, the meaning of the Son's generation must

be essentially the same, whether the term *self-existent* be asserted or disallowed.

Among statements designed to reconcile unity of essence with triple personality, we notice that of Gerhard, which indeed only repeats an idea of Augustine. "In created things," he says, "persons and individuals being multiplied, the essences are multiplied in number, because no created essence is self-existent and infinite; but the divine essence is self-existent and infinite, and therefore, on account of its supreme simplicity, perfection, and infinity, is able to be in several persons." (Locus II. § 98. Compare Turretin, Locus III. quæst. 25.)

As an index of the extent to which dogmatism was carried in the Lutheran Church in the seventeenth century, we notice the fact, that eminent theologians declared that salvation is imperilled not merely by denial, but by ignorance of the doctrine of the Trinity. "The necessity of believing this dogma," said Quenstedt, "is so great that not only it cannot be denied, but even unknown by any one, except at cost of salvation." (Systema, De Trin., Sect. I. Thesis 4.) Gerhard used equivalent terms: "Trinitatis non solum negatio, verum etiam ignoratio est damnabilis." (Locus III. § 2.)

The Arminians, while they held to the doctrine of three Divine Persons in the Godhead, diverged from the current teaching upon the subject by an express emphasis upon the subordination of the Son and the Spirit. Arminius was not specially related to this development, and contented himself with denying, in opposition to Calvin's phraseology, the propriety of attributing self-existence to the Son. But Episcopius, Curcellæus, and Limborch were very pronounced in the opinion that a certain pre-eminence must be assigned to the Father over the Son and the Spirit. Episcopius says: "It ought not to seem strange, if to these three Persons one and the same divine nature is attributed, since the Scriptures so evidently attribute to them those

divine perfections which are proper to the divine nature. But I add, it is certain, from these same Scriptures, that to these three Persons divinity and divine perfections are attributed, not collaterally or co-ordinately, but subordinately : so that the Father alone has that divine nature and those divine perfections from Himself, or from no other, but the Son and Spirit from the Father ; and hence the Father is the fountain and source of all the divinity which is in the Son and Spirit. This subordination is to be diligently regarded, for it is of great utility, because by it not only is the foundation of tritheism removed, which equality of rank almost necessarily draws with it ; but also His own glory is preserved in its integrity to the Father." In three respects, as he teaches, a pre-eminence is to be ascribed to the Father, namely, in order, dignity, and power, or right of dominion. He is first in order, as the other Persons are from Him ; first in dignity, as it is more honorable to generate than to be generated, to cause to proceed, than to be caused ; first in power or prerogative, for He has the right to give the Son and to pour out the Holy Spirit, but they have no such right over Him. (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 32.)

Several of the Anglican theologians allowed that a certain subordination is to be predicated of the second and third Persons. This was the case with Cudworth, if it be concluded that he leaned to the theory which he ascribed to the early fathers ; for he declared that their doctrine plainly involved a subordination. Moreover, like Curcæus and Le Clerc, he maintained that the fathers taught, not a numerical unity of essence, but only a unity of species, not identity, but sameness in kind. (Intellect. System, Chap. IV.) Cudworth did not explicitly pronounce for this theory, but from the general tenor of his remarks one can hardly escape the impression that he sympathized with it in a measure. Bishop Bull undertook to prove that the early fathers generally conformed to the orthodox standard on the subject of the Trinity, but that standard, in his view,

must allow that the Son, even in respect of His divinity, is in a degree subordinate to the Father, inasmuch as He is from Him. (*Defensio Fidei Nicænæ.*) Pearson took the same ground, teaching that the Son is equal to the Father in respect of essence, but not in respect of the mode of His subsistence. "The Son is equal," he says, "in respect of His nature, the Father greater in reference to the communication of the Godhead. . . . There is no difference or inequality in the nature or essence, because the same is in both; but the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that essence of Himself, from none; Christ hath the same not of Himself, but from Him." (*Exposition of the Creed, Art. II.*)

Samuel Clarke, in his "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," (1712,) pushed the aspect of subordination far toward the borders of Arianism. His position, as gathered from this work, might be described as a position of indecision between Origen and Arius. According to Clarke, the Scriptures do not definitely determine whether the Son was made from nothing or is of self-existent substance. On Scriptural ground we are not authorized to say that there was a time when He was not, but also we cannot predicate absolute eternity, and can only say that He was before the world was made, and from the beginning. The Scriptures, moreover, have not revealed to us whether the Son derives His being by a natural necessity, or only by a voluntary act of the Father. They ascribe to Him, however, all divine powers and perfections, except self-existence and independence. Of the Holy Spirit the Scriptures speak in higher terms than of any angel or other creature whatever; yet they make the Spirit subordinate to the Son, and nowhere apply to Him the divine name. (*Abstract by Le Clerc.*) No little agitation was caused by Clarke's treatise. It was commonly regarded as decidedly heterodox, though the author by the aid of explanations managed to satisfy the bishops. Among the replies called forth, that of Daniel Waterland is of the

greatest note. Waterland took the ground that the only subordination of the Son pertains not to nature, but only to order and office. He has all the divine perfections. While He is from the Father, and in that sense is not self-existent, He does possess necessary existence, "and self-existence as distinguished from necessary existence is expressive only of the *order* and *manner* in which the perfections are in the Father, not of any distinct perfection." (Second Vindication.)

The Quakers were opposed to the terms in which the doctrine of the Trinity was commonly set forth, and preferred to abide by Scriptural phraseology. They seem not, however, to have disowned the doctrine itself. Penn, after giving a list of rational arguments against the traditional theory, adds: "Mistake me not; we never have disowned a Father, Word, and Spirit, which are One, but men's inventions." (The Sandy Foundation Shaken.)

Among pronounced opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity on the Continent, Servetus obtained a special prominence by reason of his tragic fate. He was burned at the stake in Geneva, in 1553. His theory of the Son, as finally matured, reflected his pantheistic belief. In Christ, as he taught, the eternal Word, which pre-existed in God as an idea or potency, attained a personal existence. The Son has, therefore, a species of divinity in Him, but as person He dates only from the era of the incarnation. (Dorner.)

As previously indicated, the Socinians were the principal exponents in this period of an organized opposition to Trinitarianism. They maintained that the doctrine of three persons possessing a common essence is contradictory to reason, and attempted also to refute it on the basis of Scripture. In this endeavor they were able to employ the same proof-texts as the Arians had used, but on the whole were under greater pressure in their exegesis, inasmuch as they denied the pre-existence of the Son, which the Arians had allowed. They were able, however, to make a show of

meeting the texts which imply pre-existence. Their dealing with the opening of John's Gospel may serve as an example. The beginning which is here mentioned, according to their exposition, dates back only a few years before the time of writing, and denotes the commencement of the Gospel dispensation, while the creation of all things by the Word denotes the initiation of the new spiritual order.

According to the Socinian theory, Christ as to His real nature is simply man. They affirmed, however, that He must be regarded as distinguished in various ways from all others of the race. 1. He was conceived by the Holy Spirit. 2. The Holy Spirit dwelt in Him in peculiar fullness, and indeed may be said to have been joined "by an indissoluble bond to His human nature." (Racovian Catechism.) 3. He was perfectly holy. 4. He acquired special knowledge, before entering on His public ministry, "by ascending into heaven, where He beheld His Father, and that life of happiness which He was to announce to us; where also He heard from the Father all those things which it would behoove Him to teach." (Ibid.) 5. Since His ascension, all power has been given unto Him, as respects the work of salvation, and the government of the intelligent universe. "By His dominion and supreme authority over all things, He is made to resemble, or, indeed, to equal God. . . . Christ has absolute authority over our bodies and our souls, and rules not only over men, but also over angels, good and bad, and over death and hell." (Ibid.) He is possessed of all the knowledge requisite for such a dominion, being acquainted with the thoughts of all men, as well as their deeds. (Socinus, *Christ. Relig. Brevis. Inst.*; Wolszogen, *Compend. Relig. Christ.*) Indeed, Socinianism reversed the Catholic doctrine that a Divine Person descended to the plane of humanity, and taught that a man ascended to the plane of divinity. In consequence of this exalted position, Christ, as the Socinians were very zealous in affirming, is to be addressed in prayer. We are to bring all

our needs, temporal and spiritual, to Him, and are to worship and adore Him. "We are required," says the Catechism, "to acknowledge the Lord Jesus as one who has divine authority over us, and in that sense as God; we are bound, moreover, to put our trust in Him, and pay Him divine honor." Between His worship, however, and that due to God, there is this difference, that we adore and worship God as the first cause of our salvation, but Christ as the second. We direct this honor to God, moreover, as the ultimate object; but to Christ as the intermediate object. To worship Christ, to this extent, is clearly required by the Scriptures. Hence, "it is easily perceived that they who are disinclined to do this are so far not Christians; although in other respects they confess the name of Christ, and declare that they adhere to His doctrine." In the first edition of the Racovian Catechism a still stronger statement was made. Of those who refuse to invoke and adore Christ, it was declared: "They are no Christians, since indeed they have not Christ; for though in words they dare not deny Him, yet in reality they do." Socinus stigmatized the view of such as "that most infamous and detestable opinion." (Lindsey, Historical View.) This feature of the Socinian system was opposed by Francis David in Transylvania. His protests, however, were ineffectual, and only served to bring against himself the rod of persecution.

The Holy Spirit was defined as "a virtue or energy flowing from God to men and communicated to them." (Catechism.) Socinus speaks of the Spirit as *virtus atque efficacia Dei*, and says that a personal character ought no more to be attributed to it than to other properties or effects of God.

John Biddle, the most noteworthy of the pronounced opponents of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity in England in this period, espoused the Socinian view of the Son. While he affirmed the simple humanity of Christ, he still was able to say: "I believe that there is one chief Son of the most high God, or spiritual, heavenly, and perpetual

Lord and King, set over the Church by God, and second cause of all things pertaining to our salvation, and consequently the intermediate object of our faith and worship; and this Son of the most high God is none but *Jesus Christ*, the second Person of the Holy Trinity." (Confession of Faith.) On the nature of the Holy Spirit, Biddle diverged from the Socinian theory, declaring definitely for the proper personality of the Spirit, and regarding Him as the prince of good angels, much as Satan is the prince of the evil. "I believe," he says, "the Holy Spirit to be the chief of all ministering spirits, peculiarly sent out from Heaven to minister on their behalf that shall inherit salvation." (Letter to Sir Henry Vane. Compare his Twelve Arguments.)

John Milton, who was contemporary with Biddle, held a similar view of the Holy Spirit. He says that the Holy Spirit was produced by an act of free will, probably before the foundations of the world were laid, but later than the Son, to whom He is far inferior. (Treatise on Christian Doctrine.) Milton's view of the Son may be characterized as Arian or Semi-Arian. It has been supposed by many that John Locke and Sir Isaac Newton were also ill-affected toward the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. Their writings contain no positive disavowal of this doctrine, but quite plausible evidence may be quoted on the side of the suspicion that it was not favored by them.

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION.

As in all of the preceding centuries of Christian history, it was the common doctrine that the world was created from nothing. John Milton stood wholly apart from the general current in regarding the world as an efflux from God.

Some of the writers who touched upon the relation of creation to conservation fell little short of the Augustinian idea that the latter is nothing less than the former continued. Maresius is quoted as making the very explicit declaration, "*Conservatio est continuata creatio.*" (A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformirten Kirche*, § 44.)

The theory that the work of creation was consummated in six literal days was thoroughly dominant. (Calvin, *Inst.*, I. 14; Turretin, *Locus V. quæst. 5*; Coccejus, *Sum. Theol.*, cap. 15; Gerhard, *Locus V. § 21*; Quenstedt, *De Creatione*, quæst. 6; Calov, *Tom. III. cap. 2, art. 5, qu. 4*; Episcopius, *Lib. IV. sect. 3, cap. 3*; Curcellæus, *Lib. III. cap. 6*; Limborch, *Lib. II. cap. 21*.) A few Roman Catholic writers, as Cajetan and Serry, followed the view advocated by the Alexandrians, and favored by Augustine in some of his references to the subject, namely, that the creation of all things was effected in a single moment; but Petavius writes that in his day this view was almost universally repudiated. (*Theol. Dogmat., De Sex Dierum Opif., Lib. I. cap. 5*.) Those who favored the hypothesis of six literal days did

not imagine that God needed this amount of time. He wrought, as they conceived, not as was possible to His omnipotence, but as His condescension to man's feeble power to contemplate His work dictated. Some, moreover, suggested that only a single moment of each of the successive days was occupied in creating. Thus Limborch says: "We do not believe that God bestowed six whole days upon creation, but that He created in a moment the work of each day; for God needs no time for accomplishing His works." (Lib. II. cap. 21.)

It is noteworthy that even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the pre-Adamite theory found a place. It was advocated by Giordano Bruno and by the Frenchman, Isaac Peyrère. According to the latter, who wrote about 1655, Adam was the head, indeed, of the Jewish race, but prior to his creation the father of the Gentiles had already begun to people the earth with his descendants.

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

The majority of theologians agreed with the scholastic theory that angels are purely spiritual, wholly destitute of bodies save as they may be assumed temporarily for purposes of manifestation. So decided, among others, Turretin, Gomar, Coccejus, Gerhard, Quenstedt, Calov, Hollaz, Perkins, and Usher. On the other hand, Zanchi and Grotius favored the supposition that angels have a corporeal as well as a spiritual nature. (Quoted by Quenstedt.) Bishop Bull said, "We cannot so certainly and positively tell what kind of spirituality that of angels is, whether it be void of all manner of corporeity, as modern divines generally hold, or joined with some certain corporeity, not of the grosser sort, either fleshly, or airy, or fiery, but most subtle and pure." (Sermon XI., Vol. I.) Roman Catholic theologians, such as Petavius, Bossuet, and Nicole, assumed it to be

an indubitable truth that angels have naturally no bodies. The last declared that this was the common teaching of theologians as being required by the language of the Lateran council, which calls angels spiritual creatures and places them in contrast with the corporeal. (Instructions Theol. et Moral.) That angels are ministers to the heirs of salvation was universally taught, but not all theologians were willing to commit themselves to a positive verdict that a special guardian angel is appointed to each believer.

Some of the early Reformers had a vivid conception of the presence and power of Satanic agency in the world. This was especially true of Luther. The world appeared to him like a battle-field, upon which Satan and his hosts were engaged in eager, yet ineffectual, conflict against the rule of God. Calvin also assigned a wide place to Satanic agency. At the same time, he strongly emphasized the idea that Satan is really, though unwillingly, an instrument in the hands of God. "It arises," he says, "from himself and his wickedness, that he opposes God with all his desires and purposes. This depravity stimulates him to attempt those things which he thinks the most opposed to God. But since God holds him tied and bound with the bridle of His power, he executes only those things which are divinely permitted; and thus, whether he will or not, he obeys his Creator, being constrained to fulfil any service to which He impels him." (Inst., I. 14.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — The Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Reformed communions were alike inclined to follow substantially the Augustinian view of the exalted estate and endowments of Adam in Paradise. The Socinians, on the other hand, affirmed but a moderate superiority in the first man above the average

of the race; and some of the Arminians discredited the idea, that, apart from perfect innocence and integrity of nature, he was distinguished by a high degree of perfection. Thus, Limborch affirms that Adam was evidently possessed of limited knowledge, and, while he does not say, with Socinus, that Adam at the start had no positive righteousness, and was just as free to the evil as to the good, he does maintain that he was not eminently strong in righteousness. We must not, he says, extol overmuch the gifts of Adam, — the extent of his knowledge, the righteousness of his will, the prompt inclination of his affections toward the good, — else we shall make it inconceivable how he could have fallen into sin. (Lib. II. cap. 24. Compare Curcelæus, Lib. III. cap. 14; Jeremy Taylor, Of Original Sin.)

While Romanists and the main body of Protestants agreed in ascribing exalted endowments to the unfallen Adam, they differed on the question whether his moral excellence is to be regarded as concreated and natural, or as supernatural, and added in the way of a special gift. Romish theologians, with few exceptions, took the latter position, and taught the doctrine of the *donum superadditum*. This doctrine is implied by the Trent Catechism, which, after speaking of the creation, by God, of the soul and its powers of free will and reason, says, "Then He added the admirable gift of original righteousness." (Pars I. cap. 2, § 19.) Sentences condemning the opposite view were issued by Pius V. and Gregory XIII. (Möhler, Symbolik.) This *donum superadditum*, while capable in theory of being viewed apart from the unfallen man, was regarded by many Romanists as bestowed at the first moment of man's existence. Such was the view preferred by Bellarmine, and (according to Guericke) the majority of modern theologians of his Church have followed him upon this point. In harmony with this distinction, Romanists were disposed to regard the two words *image* and *likeness* as having a different sense, the first denoting the faculties which per-

tain to man as man, the latter the virtues depending upon the *donum superadditum*. Lutheran and Reformed theologians, on the other hand, regarded the two words as essentially synonymous, and indicative in particular of original righteousness, which they declared was the principal part of the divine image in man. Original righteousness, as they taught, must be regarded as belonging to the divine idea of man, and as characterizing him from the very first. "We affirm," said Luther, "that it was truly natural, and pertained to the nature of Adam, to love God, to believe God, to know God." (In Genes., Cap. III.) "Original righteousness in the first man," writes Gerhard, "was not some supernatural gift, but an internal and concreated perfection of the whole man." (Confess. Cath. Compare Turretin, Locus V. quæst. 11.) The Socinians taught that the divine image in man consisted especially in his dominion over the world, or in the powers of his nature upon which that dominion depends. "It is most evident," says Wollzogen, referring to Gen. i. 26, "that the image of God, which is in man, is placed in the reason, so far as through it he is fitted to rule over the whole earth." (Compend. Relig. Chr.) The same view is found with Curcellæus and Limborch. (Lib. III. cap. 8; Lib. II. cap. 24.)

The question whether man is twofold or threefold in nature seems not to have been discussed to any great extent. It may be gathered, however, that the dichotomist theory was predominant. This theory appears to be assumed in the following language of the Second Helvetic Confession: "We say that man consists of two diverse substances, in one person, the immortal soul, and the mortal body." (Cap. VII.) Quenstedt declares very emphatically for the view that the essential constituents of man are simply the rational soul and the body, and adduces as advocates of the trichotomist theory no writers of greater weight in the period than Paracelsus, Schwenkfeld, Weigel, and the Calvinist J. A. Comenius. (Syst., De Hom., quæst. 2.)

It was the common belief that the soul is incorporeal. Some exception, however, was taken to this view. "The soul of man," says Curcellæus, "is spirit, as are the angels, but not pure spirit, or thoroughly incorporeal, for no created thing can be strictly incorporeal." (Inst., III. 7.) Henry More also asserted that certain corporeal characteristics pertain to the soul, that it has dimensions and a centre of its perceptive faculty, which is, so to speak, its eye. (Immortal. Animæ, Lib. III. cap. 2.)

The Socinians denied the natural immortality of man. By this denial, however, they only meant that the body of the first man was of such a constitution that, apart from special provision graciously made by God, it would have been subject to dissolution. That provision Adam, as they allowed, would have enjoyed, if he had not sinned. Those, therefore, who took issue with them on this point, differed from them in little else than phraseology. The only question was whether the term *natural* should be applied to an exemption from death that was dependent upon conditions which might or might not be continued. The natural immortality of the soul was frequently asserted; but evidently, upon the theory of the divine conservation which was largely current, this doctrine could signify only the unconditional purpose of God endlessly to preserve being to every soul that is once created.

In the sixteenth century, creationism, as opposed to traducianism, was the prevalent doctrine among Protestants and Romanists alike. The same doctrine is also contained in the Orthodox Confession of the Eastern Church. (Quæst. XXVIII.) In the seventeenth century the Lutherans generally had come to adopt the traducian theory. Turretin says that in his time the Lutherans held the *ex traduce* theory, while nearly all of the orthodox, that is, the Calvinists, believed in creationism. (Locus V. quæst. 13.) The statement of Gerhard may be taken as representative of the former party. "We leave," he says, "to

the philosophers the inquiry after the mode of propagation, since we have not yet seen it explained in the Scriptures; meanwhile we hold tenaciously the theory of the propagation of souls, nor indeed is this theory to be denied because the mode of the propagation is not clearly revealed." (Locus VIII. § 117. Compare Quenstedt, Syst., De Hom., quæst. 3; Calov, Tom. III. Art. V. cap. 2, qu. 10; Hollaz, Pt. I. cap. 5, qu. 9.) In opposition both to creationism and traducianism, Henry More advocated the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence. (Immortal. Animæ, II. 12.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS.—We notice here the position taken by the different communions on the following topics: (*a.*) The relation of the divine decrees to the fall. (*b.*) The relation of human freedom to the fall. (*c.*) The nature of original sin in the posterity of Adam. (*d.*) The degree of moral ability in the fallen man.

(1.) *Roman Catholic Theories.*—Roman Catholic theologians generally denied that the fall of Adam took place in accordance with any positive decree of God. They maintained that the divine attitude toward the event was that of bare permission, and threw the responsibility wholly upon the human agent, on the ground that he was in every sense free from necessity in his transgression. To be sure, there was a party in the Romish Church which held views respecting the dependence of the unfallen man that might be regarded as throwing the responsibility for the fall upon God. Thomassin, writing in the third quarter of the seventeenth century, says that the Jacobin fathers (Dominicans) for a hundred years had believed that the grace predeterminant, which infallibly applies the will to the good, is necessary even to angels and to men in a state of innocence in order to the doing of good acts and persevering therein; and he adds, that on this view it seems necessary to assume that Adam fell because a grace was withheld which was indispensable to his perseverance. (Mémoires sur la Grace, I. 1.) But this is rather a logical

inference from the position of the Jacobins, than their own conclusion; and, moreover, this party did not represent the general sentiment of their Church upon this point.

The freedom which Roman Catholic writers attributed to man in his primal disobedience they regarded as including the power of alternative choice, or a power to refuse what is actually chosen, and *vice versa*. Indeed, they embraced this in their general definition of freedom, and taught that it is opposed, not only to compulsion, but also to necessity. There was not, to be sure, strict unanimity upon this point. Petavius says, that in his day a few who professed to be Catholics (*pauci quidem, qui se Catholicos profitentur*) taught that free will does not imply the power of alternative choice, or exemption from necessity, but only exemption from compulsion; that consequently a volition is free, though determined; and, in fine, that to will and to will freely are synonymous terms. (*De Sex Dierum Opif.*, Lib. III. cap. 1.) This view he denounces as repugnant to piety, to the Scriptures, and to church authority, all of which require a power of alternative choice. In like manner Bellarmin says: "That freedom from necessity is altogether requisite to free will, nor is it sufficient that there be freedom from coercion, can be demonstrated from the testimony of Scripture, from the definition of the Church, from the tradition of the fathers, from the light of reason." (*De Reparat. Grat.*, Lib. III. cap. 5.) "It is a certain dogma of the faith," says Suarez, "as we judge, that this freedom consists not merely in the faculty of acting voluntarily, or spontaneously, or with inclination, even if it takes place with the perfect knowledge and observation of reason, but that there is given besides in us and in our human acts that condition of freedom which includes the power of acting and not acting, which by theologians is commonly called dominion over one's own action, or indifference in acting." (*Opuscula Theol.*, p. 2.) Petavius and Bellarmin maintain that their position is

involved in the decrees of the council of Trent. (Session VI. chap. 5.) They claim also that the opposite view was clearly condemned by Pius V. and Gregory XIII., when they passed censure upon such propositions as these: "What comes to pass voluntarily, even if it takes place necessarily, comes to pass freely" (taken from Baius); "Violence alone is antagonistic to the natural freedom of man." The three writers quoted above all belonged, it is true, to the order of the Jesuits, but there is no reason to doubt that on this point they represented by far the broader current of thought in the Romish Church in their age.

The Roman Catholic theology of the period acknowledged two elements in original sin as it pertains to the posterity of Adam. Pighius and Catharinus occupied an exceptional position in allowing but a single element, namely, the imputation of guilt. The language of the council of Trent, while not very explicit upon this subject, implies without doubt that there are two elements in original sin, on the one hand a corruption or destitution of nature, and on the other, guilt. "If any one," says the decree, "asserts that the prevarication of Adam injured himself alone, and not his posterity; and that the holiness and justice received of God, which he lost, he lost for himself alone, and not for us also; or that he, being defiled by the sin of disobedience, has only transfused death and pains of the body into the whole human race, but not sin also, which is the death of the soul,—let him be anathema;—whereas he contradicts the apostle who says, 'By one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned.'" (Session V.) There is not here, it is true, a specific mention of guilt, but in a subsequent paragraph it is mentioned, the anathema being pronounced against those who deny that "by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted."

The subject being thus left in outline by the council, theologians were not debarred from choosing, as respects details, from the various opinions of the scholastics. Bellarmin was inclined to follow the view advocated by Duns Scotus and some others, that original sin, so far as it pertains to the moral nature of the fallen man, consists simply in the lack of original righteousness, or of the supernatural gift that was bestowed upon Adam. "The state of man," he says, "after the fall of Adam, differs from the state of the same *in puris naturalibus*, no more than the despoiled differs from the naked; nor is human nature worse, if you except original guilt, nor does it labor under greater ignorance and infirmity, than it would labor under being created *in puris naturalibus*. Accordingly, corruption of nature has flowed, not from the lack of any natural gift, nor from the accession of any evil quality, but solely from the loss through the sin of Adam of the supernatural gift." (De Grat. Prim. Hom., Cap. V.) As respects the guilt of original sin, Bellarmin thought it serious enough to debar every infant dying without baptism from all chance of salvation. On the mode in which original sin is propagated, he preferred to follow Thomas Aquinas, who emphasized the idea that the sin of Adam as being the head of the race was the sin of the race. (De Amiss. Grat., Lib. IV. cap. 12.) Nicole suggested that the explanation of the transmission of original sin may be found in a divine regulation that the soul should have certain inclinations answering to the abnormal impressions of the body deranged by the fall. (Instruct. Theol. et Moral.)

It was the dominant teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, that, while the fall left man with certain remains of moral ability, it nevertheless so crippled him as to render him incapable, apart from grace, to make any real advance toward his own recovery. According to the council of Trent, the free will was not extinguished, but it was so weakened and perverted as by itself to be unable to

work effectually in the direction of salvation. In conformity with this position, the third canon on justification declares: "If any one saith, that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without His help, man can believe, hope, live, or be penitent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be bestowed upon him, let him be anathema." Bellarmin, while teaching that a man without grace may, under favorable circumstances, do a work morally good, a work not to be called sinful, maintains at the same time that he cannot do a meritorious work, or a work coming properly under the category of piety. He lays down these three propositions: "First, a man without the special grace of God cannot will or do aught in those things which pertain to piety and salvation. Second, a man by his own powers is not able to dispose himself to grace, or to do anything on account of which divine grace may be conferred upon him. Third, God cannot be loved by a man, even as the Author of nature and imperfectly, without the aid of grace." (*De Grat. et Lib. Arbit.*, Lib. VI. cap. 4.) Bellarmin, it is true, says, "A man, anterior to all grace, has free will, not only to natural and moral works, but also to works of piety and the supernatural" (*Ibid.*, cap. 15); but evidently he means here, whatever may be thought of the propriety of his language, the free will as a faculty, and does not design to deny that there are in fact such hindrances to the action of the faculty, in relation to things spiritual, as grace alone can overcome. "It is a leading maxim of our religion," says Bossuet, "that free will of itself, unaided by grace, and uninfluenced by the Holy Ghost, can do nothing that conducts to the purchase of eternal happiness." (*Exposition.*) "When the Semi-Pelagians," writes Thomassin, "say that man in his own strength can will and accomplish any beginning of good, and on the score of this attract the grace of God, they deceive themselves in many ways." (*Mémoires*, I. 5.) The above quotations may be

regarded as indicating the more general standpoint of the Romish Church. As original righteousness was regarded as a supernatural gift in Adam, so in the fallen man piety proper, or that which commends one to God as deserving of eternal life, was regarded as primarily dependent upon a supernatural bestowment. Prevenient grace was allowed to be its necessary and invariable condition. At the same time it was claimed that natural ability is adequate for the avoidance of particular sins, and for rendering an obedience to the commandments, which, though not positively meritorious, may be classed among works morally good.

But, as previously indicated, the Roman Catholic Church was not a unit upon this subject. There were those who diverged from the more common standpoint by disparaging in strong terms the natural ability of man. Michael Baius, for example, rivalled the most emphatic utterances of Augustine respecting human inability and corruption. "All the works of unbelievers," he said, "are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices. The free will without the assistance of divine grace, avails only for sinning." (Quoted by Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*.) The Jansenists were inclined to similar declarations. According to Jansenius, the natural man, even when resisting sin, acts under a wrong motive, and so opposes sin to sin. "Not only," he says, "has freedom for doing good perished, but even of abstaining from sin." (Augustinus.) "The will," writes Quesnel, "which is not aided by prevenient grace, has no light except for going astray, no ardor except for casting itself headlong, no strength except for wounding itself; it is capable of every evil, and powerless for every good." (*Reflexions Morales*.) On the other hand, there were those, especially among the Jesuits, who adopted substantially the Semi-Pelagian view of man's moral ability. This was the case with Molina, whatever pains he may have taken to disguise the fact. He says: "God and the free

will are related as two partial causes (*duæ causæ partiales*). . . . Man is able by the powers of nature with only the general co-operation of God (*concurso generali*), to assent to supernatural mysteries proposed and explained to him, as revealed from God, by an act merely natural. . . . Man is able by the sole natural powers of free will and the general co-operation of God to call forth an absolute act purely natural of supreme love to God, which may in no wise suffice for justification, and in like manner an absolute purpose of pleasing God in all things." (Quoted by Gieseler.) The Molinist theories were largely controverted for the time being; but they were not officially condemned, and finally, in the Bull *Unigenitus*, obtained the next thing to an official approbation. The animus of that bull was decidedly anti-Augustinian. It condemned such propositions as these: "The grace of Jesus Christ, the efficacious principle of every kind of good, is necessary to every good work, and apart from it, not only does no good work take place, but none can." "In vain, O Lord, thou commandest, if thou dost not give that which thou commandest." "Faith is the primary grace, and the fountain of all others." "Without grace we can love nothing, except to our condemnation." These propositions were condemned as being, if not positively heretical in every instance, at least ill-sounding, scandalous, and akin to heresy. Evidently the moral effect of the Bull *Unigenitus* was in the direction of committing the Romish Church to a denial of the cardinal points of Augustinianism.

We may sum up on this subject, then, as follows. In the central current of Roman Catholic teaching, the need of prevenient grace was emphasized, but at the same time a wider scope was given to natural ability than was characteristic of the Augustinian theology. In one of the side currents there was a close approximation to Augustinianism; in another, there was an approximation to Semi-Pelagianism, and to the latter a virtual commendation was

given in the last part of the period by the decisions of the Roman pontiff.

(2.) *Lutheran Theories.* — Luther and Melanchthon both in the earlier part of their theological career gave expression to some opinions which formed no permanent part of Lutheranism. Quite naturally, in the fervency of their protest against the Romish doctrine of merit, they were inclined to an exaggerated stress upon divine sovereignty, and indulged some statements which a maturer consideration might dispose them to modify. Melanchthon openly added the modification, and Luther, if he did not in express terms take away anything from his stronger utterances, did not add anything which forbids the conclusion that they reflect in a measure his native vehemence and love of paradox, as well as his sober convictions.

Neither Luther nor Melanchthon, so far as we are aware, said in so many words that the fall of Adam was positively decreed by God. But both used statements which seem necessarily to involve this conclusion. Luther, in his *De Servo Arbitrio*, affirms a relation between the creature and the Creator which leaves nothing whatever contingent upon human determination. "It is especially necessary and healthful," he says, "for the Christian to be aware that God foreknows nothing contingently, but that, with immutable and eternal and infallible will, He foresees, and proposes, and does all things. By this thunderbolt the free will is thrown down and ground to powder. . . . Immutable and infallible is the will of God which governs our mutable will. . . . Free will is plainly a divine name, nor does it befit anything except the Divine Majesty alone, which is able to do and does all things which it pleases, in heaven and in earth." In short, as a modern Lutheran remarks, "Luther undoubtedly, in this writing, teaches predestination under the veil of a conception of the world which brings down creatures to the rank of selfless objects of the unlimited and absolute power of God." (Kahnis,

Dogmatik.) A statement of Melanchthon, made in 1522, in his comments on the Epistle to the Romans, is scarcely less radical in its implications. "It is certain," he says, "that God does all things not permissively, but effectually (*potenter*), to use Augustine's term, so that the betrayal by Judas and the calling of Paul are equally His own work." But it was not long before Melanchthon retreated from this position. In his *Loci* he teaches that sin is contingent, does not occur necessarily, is abhorrent to the will of God, and flows from the wills of the devil and of men, which were so created as to be able not to sin. (*De Causa Peccati et de Conting.*) The same view was expressed by Chemnitz, and it may be stated as the proper Lutheran theory, that the attitude of God toward the fall was that of simple permission. "God did not," says Gerhard, "effect the fall of man in time, nor did He impel man to fall. Neither, therefore, did God from eternity decree the fall of man. God in time permitted man to fall. Therefore God decreed from eternity to permit or not to prevent the fall of man." (*Locus VI. § 51.*) "Let it therefore remain firmly established that God neither decreed nor willed the fall of the first parents, nor impelled them to sin, nor took pleasure in it." (*Locus IX. § 25.* Compare Hollaz, *Pars II. cap. 3.*)

Luther evidently from the standpoint described above logically could not assign to Adam or to any other creature freedom in any other sense than the possession of the simple power of volition. A freedom from positive determination, a power of alternative choice, appears on his premises to be out of the question. But Lutheran theologians in general asserted that freedom in this latter sense pertained to Adam before his transgression. They gave a place to *formal freedom*. At the same time, however, they were disposed, in their definition of the essence of freedom, or freedom in its ideal stage, to return to the Augustinian notion of *real freedom*, in which the liability to sin is excluded, not indeed by coercion, but by the strength of inward holiness. Thus

Gerhard says: "There is the greatest freedom in God, who nevertheless is not able to will evil. There is greater freedom in good angels than there was in man before the fall, while yet they have been confirmed in the good and are unable not to choose the good. The highest freedom consists in not being able to be miserable." (Locus XI. § 28.)

Lutheran theologians recognized two elements in original sin, namely, corruption of nature, and guilt. Calixtus deviated from the standard teaching in denying the latter. Both elements are implied in the statement of the Augsburg Confession: "All men begotten after the common course of nature are born in sin; that is, without the fear of God, without trust in Him, and with fleshly appetite; and this disease or original fault is truly sin, condemning and bringing eternal death now also upon all that are not born again by baptism and the Holy Spirit." (Art. II.) This statement does not make it clear whether the guilt is to be regarded as coming from the direct imputation of the act of Adam, or from the fact of being born with a corrupted nature; in other words, it does not decide between immediate and mediate imputation. Melancthon indicated a preference for mediate imputation, but at the same time was not strongly opposed to including also the immediate. Having defined original sin as a corruption of nature flowing from the transgression of Adam, he says: "On account of which corruption men are born guilty and children of wrath, that is, condemned by God, unless remission is obtained. If any one wishes to add, that men are born guilty by reason of Adam's fall, I do not object." (Loci, De Peccat. Orig.) Gerhard's statement favors mediate imputation; Quenstedt includes also the immediate, and, according to Baur, it was characteristic of the Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century to teach the twofold imputation. (Dogmengeschichte.) As previously stated, Lutheran writers in this century held the traducian theory. In their view, one of the prime recommendations of that

theory is the explanation which it affords of the transmission of original sin. (Gerhard, Locus VIII. §§ 116, 128.)

Matthias Flacius has been referred to as teaching the theory that original sin is the very substance of the fallen man. But it is possible that he did not design just the sense which these words naturally convey to us. "His meaning," says Dorner, "is properly only the twofold idea, that holiness belongs to the very nature of man, that is, to his idea essentially and not merely accidentally, and therefore that sin is to be looked upon, not simply as a superficial power, but as one destructive of that ethical nature." (History of Protestant Theology.) The Formula of Concord condemned the phraseology of Flacius, and taught that, while original sin is infixed in the nature, it is to be called in the language of the schools *accidens* rather than *substantia*.

The Lutheran theology strongly emphasized the moral inability of the fallen man. Even Melancthon, while he taught that a man in connection with the action of divine grace may condition his salvation, was very emphatic in denying that apart from grace he can make the least advance toward his own recovery. He held indeed, as is stated in the Augsburg Confession, that the natural man can work out a sort of civil righteousness. But it was understood that this was not a real righteousness in the sight of God, and, in opposition to Roman Catholic writers, he taught that all works done without grace are sins; that is, as proceeding from wrong or defective motives, they cannot be approved by the divine judgment. "This is a false saying," he writes, "and derogatory to Christ, that men do not sin in doing the precepts of God without grace." (Apologia Confessionis.) Luther, it is needless to say, delighted in the use of the strongest terms in describing man's native corruption and helplessness in things spiritual. His essential teaching, however, judging it by its drift rather than by some extravagant sentences, was none other than that con-

tained in the following decisions of the Formula of Concord: "It is our faith, doctrine, and confession, that the understanding and reason of man in spiritual things are wholly blind, and can understand nothing by their proper powers. . . . We believe, teach, and confess, moreover, that the yet unregenerate will of man is not only averse from God, but has become even hostile to God, so that it only wishes and desires those things, and is delighted with them, which are evil and opposite to the divine will. . . . We believe that by how much it is impossible that a dead body should vivify itself and restore corporal life to itself, even so impossible is it that man, who by reason of sin is spiritually dead, should have any faculty of recalling himself into spiritual life." Strong as are these statements, they represented the central current of Lutheranism in that and in the succeeding era. The writings of Gerhard and Quenstedt contain equally emphatic declarations. The former says: "When the image of God was lost through sin, at the same time moreover that power of choosing the good [which was in the unfallen Adam] was lost, and because man was not only despoiled by sin, but also miserably corrupted, therefore in place of such a liberty there succeeded that unbridled impulse to evil, so that after the fall the will in corrupted and unrenewed men is free only to evil things, because such men, while still corrupted and unrenewed, can do nothing except sin." (Locus XI. § 23.)

(3.) *Reformed Theories.* — Among prominent Reformed theologians Zwingli went the farthest in emphasizing the agency of God in connection with the fall. In his treatise on divine providence he seems to assume that it took place in consequence of coaction, as well as of a positive decree. His teaching here, to use the summary given by Dr. Kahnis, is as follows: "God not only foresaw the first sin, but fore-ordained it, and not only this, but actually brought it to pass though man. God incited the first man to transgress the law. It is for God, who stands above man, no sin when

He makes the angel (Satan), as well as man, a transgressor. 'No law is imposed upon God; therefore He does not sin, while He works that very thing in man which to man is sin, to Himself indeed is not.' God made the first man a transgressor, in order to bring him through unrighteousness to a knowledge of righteousness." (Dogmatik, II. 6.) In thus assuming a causal efficiency in God over the fall, Zwingli occupied an exceptional position; but in assuming a positive decree he was not alone among Reformed theologians. Calvin did the same. Replying to those who taught that God left Adam to a free choice, and simply decreed to treat him according to his deserts, he asks: "If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God's omnipotence, by which He governs all things according to His secret counsel, independent of every person or thing besides?" (Inst., III. 23.) Again he remarks: "It should not be thought absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of His will. . . . It is not probable that man procured his destruction by the mere permission, and without any appointment of God; as though God had not determined what He would choose to be the condition of the principal of His creatures." (Ibid.) Beza took the same position, teaching that the fall did not take place by the bare and inactive permission of God (*nuda et otiosa permissione*), "for since He ordained the end, it is also necessary that He should establish the causes leading to that end." (Sum. Tot. Christ., Cap. III.) "They go utterly wide of the truth," says Gomar, "who affirm simply an inactive permission; or, the governing of the result being conceded, exempt the beginning of sin from ordination." (Prov. Dei.) This statement, if not directly applied to the fall in the connection where it occurs, was evidently designed by Gomar to include that event, which indeed in his scheme of doctrine occupies a purely instrumental place in fulfilling an abso-

lute decree. The views of Twisse were identical with those of Gomar on this point. (*Vindiciæ Gratiae*.) Piscator in much the same terms as Calvin scouts the idea that the fall was exempted from the positive decree and dispensation of God. (*Tract. de Grat. Dei*.) There were others, however, among the Reformed theologians who preferred to speak simply of a permissive decree, or a decree to permit the fall. Bullinger appears to have been averse to going beyond this phraseology, and even used language which suggests that the fall in his view was utterly alien to the divine will and purpose. "What dullard," he says, "is so foolish as to think that that eternal light of God doth draw any brightness of glory at our darkness, or out of the stinking dungeon of our sin and wickedness?" (*Serm. X., Decade III.*) In the Second Helvetic Confession he expresses himself with more reserve, as the requirements of a public confession of faith naturally dictated. (*Cap. VIII.*) The Westminster Confession in the chapter on decrees says: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass." On the other hand, in the chapter on the fall it says of the disobedience of our first parents: "This their sin God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel, to permit, having purposed to order it to His own glory." The meaning evidently is, that God positively decreed that the fall should take place, but not that it should take place by any compulsive agency on His part. Such is the interpretation of a recent theologian, who wrote as a staunch apologist of the Calvinistic faith. "The compilers of our standards," says William Cunningham, "believed as the Reformers did, that God has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, and that of course He had foreordained the fall of Adam, which thus consequently became in a certain sense necessary, — necessary by what is called the necessity of events, or the necessity of immutability. Still, they also believed that man fell *because* he

was left to the freedom of his own will, and because, having freedom, he freely willed to choose sin." (Historical Theology.)

The theory of Zwingli evidently left to Adam in his transgression freedom only in the sense of a faculty of willing, and did not so much as exempt the exercise of this faculty from a positive pressure at the hands of God. Reformed theologians generally, however, affirmed that Adam sinned freely. But it is to be observed that at least a large proportion of them did not include in their notion of freedom the power of alternative choice. Manifestly, this must have been the case with Calvin, Beza, and others, who said that, while Adam was free in his transgression, he fell in accordance with the positive and infallible decree of God. Grant that the decree brought no compulsion to bear, and was followed by no compulsion, it excluded, none the less, the alternative of not falling into sin. Adam in transgressing did the one thing that was possible to him, not indeed the one thing that was possible to his faculty of willing viewed by itself, but the one thing that was possible to it viewed as conditioned by the infallible decree of God. If, then, he was under no constraint, it was because he freely did that which alone was possible for him to do. This may be theoretically conceivable. A man may move freely between barriers which unknown to him shut him up to a particular course. He may of his own accord take precisely the track that is open to him. But even then the serious question remains as to how the honor and consistency of God can be maintained in so laying His decrees about a man as to exclude the alternative of perseverance in righteousness. And this is a question, too, which is pertinent to others than those who spoke in definite terms of a positive decree for the fall. It is pertinent to the Westminster divines. They say, indeed, that the liberty or contingency of second causes is not taken away by the divine decrees. But what is their definition of liberty or contingency? The power of willing,

exemption from compulsion, but not exemption from necessity, not the power equally to choose or to refuse in a given case. So Cunningham interprets, and so their statements when put together seem imperatively to require. Even when speaking of a permissive decree, writers of the Calvinistic school were inclined to mean a decree which fixes the event permitted, or is a ground of its certain occurrence. This is definitely stated by the Cambridge theologian, William Perkins, as follows: "Evil permitted must come to pass. For to permit evil is not to stir up the will, and not to bestow on him that is tempted the act of resisting, but to leave him as it were to himself; and he whose will is not stirred up by God, and to whom the act of resisting is not conferred, however he may have power to withstand, yet can he not actually will to withstand, nor persist forever in that uprightness in which he was created, God denying him strength." (Order of Predestination in the Mind of God. Compare Rivet, *Censura in Confess.*) We may add, that Perkins and many others in their formal definition of freedom opposed it not to necessity but to compulsion. The statement of Perkins is as follows: "Liberty and necessity do not mutually overcome each other, but liberty and compulsion. It is manifest, therefore, that God's decree causeth an immutability to all things, of which, notwithstanding, some in respect of the next causes are necessary, and others contingent." (Ibid. Compare Robert Barnes, *Treatise on Free-Will*; Twisse, *Vindiciæ Grat.*; John Owen, *Display of Arminianism*; Turretin, *Loci VI., X.*; Zanchi, *De Nat. Dei, Lib. III. cap. 2*; Coccejus, *Sum. Theol., Cap. XXVIII.*; Maccovius, *Loci, Cap. XLVI.*; Bucan, *Locus XIV.*)

On the subject of original sin Zwingli occupied wellnigh a solitary position in the Reformed Church, in excluding from it the element of guilt. Having defined sin proper as a transgression of the law, he says: "Whether we wish it or not, we are compelled to admit that original sin, as it

is in the descendants of Adam, is not properly sin, as has already been explained, for it is not a transgression of the law. It is therefore properly a disease and a condition," — *morbus igitur est proprie et conditio*. (Fidei Ratio.) Zwingli indeed does not shun to say that we are by nature children of wrath, but he means by this, not that we are actually adjudged guilty, but, as children of a man sentenced to death, we are naturally without the birthright to immortal life, just as the children of one who is made a slave inherit a condition of slavery. And even this state of deprivation he was disposed to regard as universally cancelled by the benefits of Christ's death. "It is certain," he says, "if in Christ, the second Adam, we are restored to life, as in the first Adam we were delivered to death, that rashly we condemn children born of Christian parents, yea also the children of the heathen." (Ibid.) Among English theologians a very similar view was held by Jeremy Taylor, except that he seems to have taken less account of inherited corruption. In his view, the chief result of Adam's trespass was to deprive the race of heirship to a supernatural destiny. "The sin of Adam," he says, "neither made us heirs of damnation, nor naturally and necessarily vicious. . . . All the economy of the divine goodness, and justice, and truth, is against the idea that infants dying in original sin are sent to hell. Is hell so easy a pain, or are the souls of children of so cheap, so contemptible a price, that God should so easily throw them into hell?" (Works, Vol. II. pp. 535, 536.)

Calvin and the great body of Reformed theologians distinctly included the element of guilt as well as of corruption in original sin. As to whether the guilt is by mediate or immediate imputation, little care was taken to discriminate in the earlier part of the period. Most of the confessions of the sixteenth century are not necessarily interpreted as teaching anything more than mediate imputation. The same may be said of the great majority of Calvin's refer-

ences to the subject, though it is not improbable, as Turretin argues, that he held also to immediate imputation. The following statement seems to imply the latter opinion: "If all men are justly accounted guilty of this rebellion [of Adam], let them not suppose themselves excused by necessity, in which very thing they have a most evident cause of their condemnation." (Inst., II. 5.) Among the creeds of the seventeenth century, the Canons of Dort, the Westminster Confession, and that of the Waldenses, imply the doctrine of immediate imputation. Special attention was called to the subject in the same century by the definite attack of Placæus upon this doctrine, and his decided advocacy of mediate imputation alone. One of the motives for publishing the Helvetic Consensus Formula was to enter a protest against the teaching of Placæus. The Formula inculcates both immediate and mediate imputation, teaching that, prior to any actual transgression, each descendant of Adam is guilty both as having sinned in the loins of Adam and as possessing innate corruption.

The virtual existence of the race in Adam, the legal headship of Adam, the possession of the result of his trespass in a corrupted nature, — these were the grounds which in one quarter or another were urged in explanation of the guilt in original sin. A very large proportion of theologians included the first two of these grounds in their theory. After the rise of the school of Coccejus, the federal notion became more prominent, but nevertheless did not supplant the other. As to the precise mode in which the corruption of nature is transmitted, Reformed theologians in general were not forward to speculate; but some specifications were made. "The cause of the contagion," says Calvin, "is not in the substance of the body or of the soul; but because it was ordained by God that the gifts which He conferred on the first man should by him be preserved or lost both for himself and for all his poster-

ity." (Inst. II. 1.) Voëtius argues that the corruption or defect of nature results because God, as agent or coagent, withholds at the time the soul is produced the gifts necessary to constitute man in his image. (Select. Disput., De Propagat. Peccat. Orig.) "The propagation of sin," says Perkins, "from the parents to the children, is either because the soul is infected by the contagion of the body, as a good ointment by a fustie vessel, or because God in the very moment of creation and infusion of souls into infants doth utterly forsake them." (The Order of the Causes of Salvation and Damnation, chap. 12.)

The standard teachings of the Reformed Church on the subject of man's spiritual inability were so nearly identical with those of the Formula of Concord, that there is very little need of adding anything here to a simple reference to that creed. "Our nature," says Calvin, "is not only destitute of all good, but is so fertile in all evils that it cannot remain inactive. . . . If we allow that men destitute of grace have some motions toward true goodness, though ever so feeble, what answer shall we give to the apostle, who denies that we are sufficient of ourselves to entertain even a good thought?" (Inst., II. 1, 2.) Archbishop Usher likens the natural man to a corpse festering in its corruption (Body of Divinity), and Bishop Beveridge says that it is a thousand times easier for a worm to understand the affairs of men than for the best of men in a natural state to apprehend the things of God. (Private Thoughts.) But no great account is to be taken of instances of rhetorical effervescence like these last. The essence of the Reformed teaching is contained in the statement, that, in consequence of the fall, man is destitute of the supernatural gifts of God, and so wounded in all his natural powers as to be incapable of any good in thought, word, or deed, without the assistance of divine grace.

It should be noticed that in the English Church from the time of James I. a very decided tendency was manifest

toward the Arminian standpoint, as respects the nature and operation of free will. At the close of the seventeenth century this tendency had become largely dominant.

(4.) *Arminian Theories*.—The Arminians taught that the fall was not necessitated or made certainly to occur by any divine decree, either positive or permissive. It was certain to the foreknowledge of God, but only because the divine foreknowledge is able to grasp the purely contingent. “Because God,” says Arminius, “in His infinite wisdom, saw from eternity that man would fall at a certain time, that fall occurred infallibly only in respect to His prescience, not in respect to any act of the divine will, either affirmative or negative.” (Discussion with Junius.) The idea that the fall might properly be termed necessary with regard to God, but contingent with respect to man, was emphatically repudiated. “The necessity or contingency of an event,” says Arminius, “is to be estimated, not from one cause, but from all the causes united together.” (Apology.) “They are deceived,” writes Curcellæus, “who say that man in respect to himself fell freely and contingently, but necessarily and inevitably in respect to the foreknowledge and decree and co-working of God. For these are contradictories, such as cannot be reconciled by reference to diverse aspects.” (Lib. III. cap. 14.)

In the Arminian definition of freedom it is opposed, not merely to compulsion, but also to necessity. It is distinguished furthermore from spontaneity. The desire of happiness, for example, is spontaneous, but it is not free. (Arminius, Examination of the Treatise of William Perkins; Curcellæus, Lib. IV. cap. 3.) The power of alternative choice is the grand essential of freedom. “If you affirm,” says Arminius in reply to Perkins, “that the angels obey God freely, I shall say, with confidence, that it is possible that the angels should not obey God. If, on the other hand, you affirm that they cannot but obey God, I shall thence boldly infer that they do not obey God

freely. For necessity and freedom differ from each other in their entire essence, and in genus." Episcopius says: "It belongs to the perfect definition of freedom, that it be described as an active power, from its intrinsic force and nature so undetermined (*indifferens*), that, all things requisite for acting being at hand, it is able none the less to act or not to act, or to do this or that." (Lib. IV. Sect. III. cap. 6.) "Freedom," says Limborch, "denotes that a thing is able not to be; necessity, that a thing is not able not to be: but to be able not to be, and not to be able not to be, can in no respect be reconciled with each other, but the one being affirmed, the other is denied." (Lib. II. cap. 23.) Thus the Arminians seem to have regarded the power of alternative choice as essential to freedom, even when it is viewed without reference to the adjuncts probation and responsibility, and to have left *real freedom* in the Augustinian sense to be classed under the necessary or the spontaneous.

The Arminian conception of original sin was essentially the same as that of Zwingli. Arminius himself, so far as we are aware, never explicitly denied the element of guilt, and said at most that it is not easy to confute the arguments which oppose the conclusion that infants are under condemnation before committing actual sins. (Apology.) But his immediate followers denounced in strong terms the idea that any guilt pertains to the new-born child, regarding any theory of the imputation of Adam's trespass as unreasonable, incompatible with the moral character of God, more worthy of the caprice of a tyrant than of divine justice and benevolence. They allowed that the fall left man naturally destitute of the birthright to eternal life, and caused a transmission of corruption. But both of these they regarded as rather in the line of natural consequences than of penal inflictions, and as such having a universal remedy in the grace of God vouchsafed through Jesus Christ. Accordingly they taught that no

soul will ever be condemned by God on the simple ground of original sin. "The Remonstrants," writes Episcopius, "decide with confidence, that God neither will, nor justly can, destine to eternal torments any infants who die without actual and individual sins, upon the ground of a sin which is called original, which is said to be contracted by infants by no individual fault of theirs, but by the fault of another person, and which is believed to be theirs for no other reason than that God wills arbitrarily to impute it to them. This opinion is contrary to the divine benevolence, and to right reason; nay, it is uncertain which is greater, its absurdity or its cruelty." (Apology as quoted by Shedd. Compare Inst. Theol., Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 28, 30; Sect. V. cap. 1, 2; Curcellæus, Lib. III. cap. 15-17; Limborch, Lib. III. cap. 2, 3.)

Arminius held substantially the Calvinistic view of the inability of the fallen man in things spiritual, though differing widely on the universality of the divine purpose in providing a remedy for that inability. Speaking of man after the fall, he says: "In this state, the free will of man towards the true good is not only wounded, maimed, infirm, bent, and weakened, but it is also captive, destroyed, and lost. And its powers are not only debilitated and useless, unless they be assisted by grace, but it has no powers whatever except such as are excited by divine grace." (Disputation XI.) "In his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good." (Declaration of Sentiments.) Leading Arminians who followed were disinclined to use such strong expressions, but allowed that man's natural abilities can effect no positive result toward his moral recovery apart from prevenient and co-operating grace. (Episcopius, Apology; Curcellæus, Lib. VI. cap. 12; Limborch, Lib. III. cap. 2.) It may be observed in this connection, that the Quakers also, while recognizing transmitted corruption, denied that any guilt

attaches to a descendant of Adam prior to actual transgression. (Barclay's Propositions.)

(5.) *Socinian Theories*.—On the doctrine of the Socinians, that God does not foreknow a contingent event or decree a sinful act, the fall before its occurrence could have been in the divine mind only a matter of conjecture or probability. The freedom of Adam, in their view, involved the power of alternative choice, this being the proper characteristic of a free and responsible being.

The fall of Adam, according to the Socinians, brought guilt upon no one but himself. As respects corruption, it was only the first step toward the formation of an evil habit. It was far from radically depraving his own nature; and still farther from radically depraving the nature of his posterity. The principle of heredity is not indeed to be entirely discarded. We may grant that the majority of men are born with a proneness to evil, but we go beyond warrant when we say that this is the case with all. This proneness, too, is not to be specially connected with the fall of Adam, but is to be attributed to the continued transgressions of men, by which a habit of sinning has been formed and the nature impregnated with evil tendencies. The only evil necessarily flowing from the first transgression to all the race is the necessity of dying, which comes as a natural consequence from the condition of mortality in which Adam was left by his trespass. (Racovian Catechism, V. 10; Socinus, *Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. IV.) The similarity of the Socinian teaching to the Pelagian is too apparent to need comment.

The scholastic definition of sin as privation or defect, is found with Roman Catholic writers in this period. (Bellarmine, *De Amiss. Grat.*, V. 2; Petavius, *De Deo*, IV. 4; VI. 4.) The same definition appears also with some Protestant writers. (Zanchi, *De Operibus Dei*, Vol. II. Lib. I. cap. 2; Gerhard, *Locus X.* § 4; Norris, *Miscellanies*.) Turretin

says: "Sin, which has the character of a moral disease of the mind, is not only the negation of the good, but the presence of an evil disposition. As therefore, in so far as it is a lack of righteousness which ought to be within, it is properly called privation, so in so far as it infects and corrupts the soul, it is called an evil quality." (Locus IX. quæst. 1.) Limborch scouts the idea that sin is to be called a mere nothing, or a simple privation. "Not indeed a defect, but something positive, is the cause of sin." (Lib. II. cap. 29; Lib. V. cap. 4.)

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE principal developments in Christology in this period were within the bounds of Lutheranism, and concerned the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. This doctrine had its general starting-point in Luther's mystical bent, in accordance with which he held very positive views of the receptivity of the human for the divine. Its specific occasion, however, lay in his theory of the real bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist. Being under pressure to explain how the body of Christ could be at the right hand of God and at the same time in many places upon earth, he taught that the right hand of God implies, not definite locality, but a state of supreme majesty and power, and went on to assert the theory, that in virtue of the union of the two natures ubiquity is imparted to the body of Christ. This was comparatively a new theory. To be sure, a similar conception had been entertained by a few speculative writers, such as Gregory of Nyssa and Erigena, but in general the theory of the ubiquity of Christ's body had been foreign to Christian theology. Luther, as indicated, was in the first instance mainly interested in the bearing of his novel teaching upon the Lord's Supper. But naturally the subject was not allowed to rest there. Other properties besides that of ubiquity must needs come into the account. The extent and the manner of the interchange of the human and the divine characteristics must

needs be discussed. In short, a re-statement of the whole subject of Christology was involved.

Melanchthon rejected the *communicatio idiomatum* in the sense of Luther, that is, as an actual transference of properties from one nature to the other. But Luther's theory found zealous advocates. Brenz and the Swabian theologians carried it out in the most unqualified terms, that is, as respects the communication of divine properties; the communication of human properties to the divine was but little considered. According to Brenz, the incarnation of itself involved a full communication of the divine predicates, so that Christ as man was omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient from the first moment of His conception. Chemnitz, on the other hand, and the Saxon divines wished to modify the *communicatio* as far as this could be done in harmony with the demands of the bodily presence in the eucharist. They taught, accordingly, that no absolute possession of the divine properties pertains to the human nature, and that such properties are only temporarily superinduced by an act of the divine will. The Formula of Concord was designed to satisfy both of these parties, and so naturally did not fully satisfy either, and the controversy was continued. In the later stage of the discussion, the division was between the Tübingen and the Giessen theologians. Both of these schools followed Luther in assuming that the *kenosis*, or emptying of Himself, which is affirmed of Christ in the Scriptures, did not pertain to Him as the Son of God, but consisted rather in the renunciation of prerogatives which from the fact of the incarnation pertained to His human nature. Both said that to Christ as man belonged from the very first omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and the government of the universe. According to the Tübingen theologians, Christ made constantly a secret employment of these divine properties and powers, renouncing not the use, but only the manifest use of them. The Giessen theologians, on the

other hand, taught that Christ renounced the use of them, at least in large part, during the time of His earthly sojourn. The latter view, which seems to have commanded ultimately the larger patronage, was accepted by Gerhard. "The communication of divine properties," he says, "was made in the first moment of the incarnation, but Christ deferred the full use of them till He ascended into heaven and took His place at the right hand of God; thence proceeds the distinction between the state of inanition and exaltation." (Locus IV. § 293. Compare Quenstedt, *De Statibus Christi*, Quæst. I.; Hollaz, *Pars III.* sect. 1, cap. 3, qu. 54.)

Reformed theologians were content to remain on the basis of the Chalcedonian creed, only exhibiting a larger interest in the human nature of Christ than had been shown in general by the preceding expounders of that creed. Approving the maxim, *Finitum non est capax infiniti*, they emphatically repudiated the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. They decided also against the Lutheran view of the kenosis. "Unlike the Lutherans," says A. B. Bruce, "the Reformed theologians applied the category of exinanition to the divine nature of Christ. It was the Son of God who emptied Himself, and He did this in becoming man. The incarnation itself, in the actual form in which it took place, was a kenosis for Him who was in the form of God before He took the form of a servant. But the kenosis or exinanition was only *quasi*, an emptying as to use and manifestation, not as to possession, — a hiding of divine glory and of divine attributes, not a self-denudation with respect to these. The standing phrase for the kenosis was *occultatio*, and the favorite illustration the obscuration of the sun by a dense cloud." (The Humiliation of Christ.)

Roman Catholic theologians were likewise hostile to the Lutheran doctrine of communication. At the same time, leading representatives took the position that to the human

soul of Christ there was imparted the knowledge of all things past or to come, that is, of all in the range of the actual, the full knowledge of the possible being regarded as pertaining to the infinite mind alone. (Bellarmin, *De Christo*, Lib. IV. cap. 1; Petavius, *De Incar. Verbi*, Lib. XI. cap. 3.)

Among peculiar views we note the following:—1. Osiander's, that the Son was ideally man from eternity. 2. Schwenkfeld's, that the flesh of Christ was transformed into the divine substance. 3. Menno's, that the Son of God becoming man took no substance from the Virgin, Christ as Son of Man being simply the pre-existent Son of God made little and abased to a low estate. 4. Weigel's, that Christ besides the body from the Virgin Mary had an invisible and immortal body, derived from the Eternal Virgin, or the Divine Wisdom, through the Holy Spirit. 5. Barclay's, similar to Weigel's view, but set forth under a less mystical and fantastic guise, his idea being that the Son, prior to taking a body from the Virgin, had a spiritual body, which in all the ages of human history was a medium of divine revelation and fellowship. 6. Poiret's, that Christ drew a human nature from the primitive unfallen Adam, and that this human nature took on mortal flesh in Mary, as a white and shining garment takes the tincture of a dark liquid into which it is plunged. The addition of the mortal flesh did not involve an additional body. 7. The theory of Henry More and a number of English writers, such as Edward Fowler, Robert Fleming, J. Hussey, Francis Gastrell, Thomas Bennet, and Thomas Burnet, affirming the pre-existence of Christ's human soul. (Dorner, *Hist. of Doct. of Person of Christ.*)

SECTION II.—THE REDEMPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

1. ROMAN CATHOLIC THEORIES. — In the Roman Catholic Church the subject of the atonement was left in the same indeterminate state in which it had been inherited from the scholastic era. No new and precise definitions were included in the standards. Theologians were free to select their opinions from any of the great doctors in orthodox repute. It is probable, however, that there was a more general agreement with Thomas Aquinas than with any other single authority. Bellarmin taught in agreement with Aquinas, and in disagreement with the Scotist doctrine of acceptilation, that the sacrifice of Christ was in itself of infinite value. (*De Christo*, Lib. V. cap. 5.)

2. LUTHERAN AND REFORMED THEORIES. — The Lutherans generally approached the subject in the spirit of Anselm, and accepted his view of the serious demands of divine justice, the need and the fact of an infinite satisfaction. At the same time they differed from Anselm in at least two prominent respects: 1. They included Christ's obedience in life, as well as His voluntary death, in the redemptive price. 2. They gave Christ more distinctly and directly the character of a substitute for the sinner, representing Him as offsetting sin not merely by acquiring a merit capable of being imputed to the guilty, but by bearing penalty. Luther transcended all bounds of moderation in setting forth this latter phase, declaring that Christ came so fully into the sinner's place that, in the light of the sin imputed to Him, He might be regarded as the greatest of all criminals. "All the prophets," he says, "saw this in spirit, that Christ would be of all men the greatest robber, homicide, adulterer, thief, doer of sacrilege, blasphemer, etc., that ever was in the world, because, as a victim for the sins of the whole world, He is not now an innocent person and without sins." (*Comm. in Epist. ad*

Galat., Cap. III.) This was exceptional extravagance in terms, but the idea which Luther meant to inculcate, namely, that Christ stood in a most real sense in the sinner's place, was urged by others among the Lutherans. Gerhard says: "As sins were typically imputed to the victim which [in Old Testament times] was offered for sins, so our sins were imputed to Christ, and for them He offered Himself upon the altar of the cross. . . . Although He did not undergo eternal death, nevertheless He truly felt the pains of hell and the judgment of God angry with our sins, which were cast upon Him." (Locus XVI. §§ 43, 44. Compare Quenstedt, *De Statibus Christi*, quæst. 6; *De Redemptione*, *passim*; Hollaz, *Pars III.* sect. 1, cap. 3, qu. 125.)

Gerhard charges against the Reformed doctrine of absolute decrees, that it implies that God can remit sins by His simple will, and that consequently there is no strict need of satisfaction. (Locus XVI. § 36.) But as a matter of fact, the necessity of satisfaction was generally maintained by Reformed theologians. Only a few writers, such as Twisse and Rutherford, were disposed, from the standpoint of God's absolute decrees, to question the necessity of satisfaction. Zwingli has sometimes been reckoned in this category, but some of his statements bear in a different direction. (Compare Zeller, *Das. Theol. System Zwingli's*, and Ritschl, *Hist. of Doct. of Justif. and Reconcil.*) Musculus is quoted by Socinus on the side of the same opinion. (*De Chr. Serv.*, *Pars III.* cap. 1.) Vossius, Whichcote, Tillotson, and William Sherlock were also opposed to the theory of strict necessity, but from a very different standpoint, since they were averse to the dogma of absolute predestination. Other exceptions might perhaps be discovered, but the general drift of teaching in the Reformed Church was in harmony with these statements of the Heidelberg Catechism: "God is indeed merciful, but He is likewise just; wherefore His justice requires that sin,

which is committed against the most high majesty of God, be also punished with extreme, that is, everlasting punishment, both of body and soul. . . . God wills that His justice be satisfied; therefore must we make full satisfaction to the same, either by ourselves or by another. . . . By reason of the justice and truth of God, satisfaction for our sins could be made no otherwise than by the death of the Son of God." Equivalent statements are contained in the Canons of the Synod of Dort. Turretin says, that, while some Reformed theologians, especially before the Socinians promulgated their views, followed Augustine in the opinion that satisfaction by the death of Christ was not strictly necessary, it is safer to affirm that God cannot, in harmony with His justice, forgive sins without satisfaction; and he adds, that this is the common view of the orthodox. (Locus XIV. quæst. 10.)

The same modifications of Anselm's theory were made by the Reformed as by the Lutherans. Piscator, indeed, denied that the active obedience of Christ, as well as His sufferings and death, had a redemptive or atoning value; but in this he was outside of the general current. Calvin was very pronounced for the theory in question, maintaining that the whole obedience of Christ entered into the redemptive price, and that even in respect to His death the most essential feature was the voluntary obedience by which it was consummated. "From the time," he says, "of His assuming the character of a servant, He began to pay the price of our deliverance in order to redeem us. . . . Indeed, His voluntary submission is the principal circumstance even in His death; because the sacrifice, unless freely offered, would have been unavailable to the acquisition of righteousness." (Inst. II. 16. Compare Zanchi, *De Relig. Christ. Fid.*; Gomar, *Disput. XIX.*; Coccejus, *De Fœd. et Test. Dei*, Cap. V.; Witsius, *De Œconom. Fœd. Dei cum Hom.*, Lib. II. cap. 5; Turretin, *Locus XIV. quæst. 13*; Perkins, *Comm. on the Epist. to the Galatians*,

Chap. II.; John Owen, *Doct. of Justif. by Faith.*) "The Spirit of God," says the Helvetic Consensus Formula, "distinctly asserts that Christ by His most holy life satisfied the law and divine justice for us, and locates that price by which we are purchased unto God, not merely in His sufferings, but in His whole life conformed to the law."

As respects Christ's standing in the place of sinners, Dr. Crisp rivalled the extravagant language of Luther; but in this he is to be regarded as representing nobody except himself. Calvinistic writers, however, were generally inclined to a very positive doctrine of substitution, and did not shun to speak of sins being imputed to Christ, and of His enduring the wrath of God. The Heidelberg Catechism says of the Redeemer, "All the time He lived on earth, but especially at the end of His life, He bore in body and soul the wrath of God against the sin of the whole human race." (Quæst. 37.) "He suffered," says the Scotch Confession, "not only the cruel death of the cross, which was accursed by the sentence of God; but also He suffered for a season the wrath of His Father, which sinners had deserved." (Art. IX.) "His death," say the Canons of Dort, "was conjoined with a sense of the wrath and curse of God, which we had deserved by our sins." Calvin writes: "That Christ might restore us again into the favor of the Father, it was meet our guiltiness were abolished by Him; which could not be unless He would suffer that punishment which we were not able to abide." (Comm. on Epist. to Romans, Chap. IV.) "The punishment He suffered," says Perkins, "was in value and measure answerable to all the sins of all the elect, past, present, and to come, the Godhead supporting the manhood, that it might be able to bear and overcome the whole burden of the wrath of God." (Comm. on Epist. to Galatians, Chap. III.) "His death," says John Bunyan, "was not a mere natural death, but a cursed death; even such a one as men do undergo from God for their sins, even such a death as to endure the very pains and torments

of hell." (The Doctrine of the Law and Grace Unfolded.) Archbishop Usher affirms that Christ suffered in His soul the "whole wrath of God due to the sin of man." (Body of Divinity.) "Those who believe," says John Owen, "the imputation of the righteousness of Christ unto believers, do also unanimously profess that the sins of all believers were imputed unto Christ." (Doctrine of Justification.) It should be observed that the more discriminating writers, who spoke of God's wrath being visited upon Christ, used this language with a qualification, not meaning to denote thereby the real attitude of God toward His well-beloved Son, but to denote rather that the Son endured such sufferings as are properly among the effects of the divine wrath against sin.

Among English writers Tillotson expressed himself very much after the style of Grotius. (Serm. XLVII.) There are also passages in the writings of Baxter that lean very distinctly toward the doctrine of Grotius.

3. THEORIES OF HUGO GROTIVS AND THE ARMINIANS.—Hugo Grotius, in his work entitled "Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ," made a significant departure from the standpoint of Anselm, as also from a leading principle of the Lutheran and the Reformed soteriology. His doctrine, known as the governmental theory, starts from the conception that the laws of God, at least many of them, are not an outcome of the divine nature, but rather effects of the divine will. From this it follows that they may be relaxed without contradiction to the divine nature. "Law is not," he says, "an internal something in God, or the very will of God, but a certain effect of His will. But it is most certain that effects of the divine will are mutable." Applying this idea to the punishment of sin, he maintains that, though it may be just to punish the guilty in proportion to their ill-desert, we are not to conclude that it is always unjust to remit punishment, any more than we would conclude that a man is illiberal be-

cause he does not give a thousand talents, though we should call him liberal if he did freely bestow this sum. The law that penalty be visited upon transgression is not strictly natural, but only agreeable to nature. "That every sinner," he says, "should be punished in proportion to his fault, is not strictly and universally necessary, nor properly natural, but quite agreeable to nature. Thence it follows that nothing prevents the law commanding this from being relaxable." God is not in the position of a judge, who is simply a minister of the law and is bound by its provisions. His position is rather that of a ruler of the moral universe, upon whom rests the office of conserving and promoting its best interests.

But while God as ruler may relax the law which affixes penalty to sin, His very position as a wise and perfect ruler is a bar against any relaxation which might imply a light estimate of the claims to obedience. It tends to break down the authority of law when its demands are not strictly asserted. Were God to proclaim a universal amnesty, and at the same time take no pains to declare His abhorrence of sin or His regard for righteousness, He would open the road to license, and endanger the security of moral government. A penal example must go along with the proclamation of amnesty. In the suffering Son of God the most effective example is provided. The sight of a Being of such incomparable dignity paying tribute to a broken law by His passion and death, warns men that the love which offers pardon for past sins in no wise excuses from obligation to future obedience. Thus, while the law is in a sense relaxed, a suitable compensation is secured.

The outcome of Grotius's teaching is evidently remote from the Anselmic doctrine. That emphasized the indispensable need of an atonement to cover past sins and to open up the possibility of any forgiveness, whereas the theory of Grotius made the design of Christ's work not so much the covering of past sins as the preventing of future license,

and contemplated it rather as a requirement of governmental prudence than as a demand of inflexible justice.

Other leading Arminians agreed essentially with Grotius in their conception of penal law as related to the divine nature. "The justice of God," says Episcopius, "does not require that God should wish to punish each and every sinner. But when He wishes to punish, the justice of God requires that He punish none but the deserving, and not beyond desert." (Lib. IV. Sect. II. cap. 29.) "Whatever," says Curcellæus, "God works exterior to Himself, He effects most freely in accordance with the good pleasure of His will, whether He bestows reward upon those who obey His laws, or decrees punishments against rebels. . . . It is to be concluded that neither the compassion by which God remits sins, nor the justice by which He punishes them, are essential properties of His, but only free effects which proceed from His natural goodness and holiness." (Lib. II. cap. 16; Lib. V. cap. 18.) "We confess," says Limborch, "that justice and compassion are essential to God, but contend that the acts and manifestations both of justice and compassion, such as are punishment and remission of sins, are free and subject to the divine choice." (Lib. II. cap. 12.)

At the same time, these writers gave a different turn to their exposition of Christ's redemptive work from that of Grotius, by representing Christ not so much as affording a penal example as making a sacrifice to God. In some of their statements, too, this sacrifice seems to be conceived as paying a tribute not merely to God's governmental prudence, but to His interior regard for justice. Thus Curcellæus writes: "It was not needful for our redemption that Christ should bear the same punishments which we had merited; but there was need only of a sacrifice by which He might render God placated toward us. Therefore He gave Himself to death for us, and this oblation was accepted by the Father, so that because of it He willed

to remit to us all our sins freely and without any payment, provided only we should renounce them for the future, and walk in newness of life." (Lib. V. cap. 9.) "The tempering of justice with compassion," Limborch teaches, "consisted in this, that God, seeing the human race fallen into sin and eternal death, willed to be placated with a propitiatory sacrifice, and apart from that not to receive sinners into favor." (Lib. III. cap. 10.) But the same theologians were careful to state that this sacrifice was not a complete satisfaction for sin, and that the acceptance of it involved a departure from the rigor of justice. God accepted the sacrifice, says Limborch, not because Christ rendered a full equivalent for the punishment due to sinners, but because "He satisfied the divine will, at once compassionate and just, paying all and bearing all which God required for the full expiation of sins." (Ibid.) Indeed the Arminian writers regarded the theory of a strict, plenary satisfaction as open to grave objections. Among other considerations Curcellæus urged against such a theory, that it is contradictory to fact, since Christ did not endure eternal death, which was the penalty due to sin, and that it is also inconsistent with the Scriptural representation of gratuitous remission, and the Scriptural requirement of faith and repentance as conditions of enjoying the purchased benefits. (Lib. V. cap. 19.)

4. SOCINIAN THEORIES.—The view of divine justice advocated by the Arminian writers who have been quoted above was anticipated by the Socinians. With great emphasis and in oft-repeated statements Socinus taught that God is equally free to forgive or to punish sins, and that no satisfaction is needed to facilitate the exercise of His pardoning power. Justice, he says, so far as related to the infliction of punishment upon transgressors, is no interior characteristic of God, and least of all such a characteristic as necessitates universally that penalty be exacted for sin. One might better argue that compassion is an interior char-

acteristic of God, and universally impels to the free remission of all sins. The truth is, that justice in the sense in question, as well as compassion, is no essential property of God, but only an effect of His will. "There is indeed in God a perpetual justice; but this is nothing else than equity and rectitude." God's justice is a bar to His doing any wrong, to His punishing the guiltless, or to His punishing beyond desert, but is no bar at all to His forgiving wherever men are in an attitude to appreciate forgiveness. (Prælect. Theol., Cap. XVI., XVII.; De Christo Servatore, Pars I. cap. 1.) The similarity of this exposition to that of some of the Arminians is quite apparent. But it should be noticed, that, while giving essentially the same definition of divine justice, the Arminians were not a little distinguished from the Socinians in the stress which they placed upon the objective worth of Christ's sufferings and death, or the actual display through them of the claims of God's holy laws.

In the Socinian scheme the principal part of Christ's work as a Saviour is located in two things: (1.) In His fulfilment on earth of the office of an inspired teacher; (2.) In His fulfilment in heaven of the office of the exalted King of men and the dispenser of all spiritual benefits. The death of Christ lying between these two has a significance mainly subordinate to them. (1.) It was a marked testimony to the truth of His teaching. (2.) It was an eminent and inspiring example of patience and fidelity. (3.) It serves by divine appointment as a kind of seal of the new covenant, an open pledge of God's willingness to forgive, and hence is a token of His benevolence, and a means of calling forth the confidence and the love of men. (4.) It was the necessary antecedent of Christ's resurrection and glorification, and so bridged the way to the crowning facts in the redemptive work. The contrast between Christ humiliated and dying, and Christ risen and triumphant, is the best possible means of inspiring salutary courage and hope in men struggling amid the miseries of this life. (Racov. Cat., V. 7, 8; Soci-

nus, Prælect. Theol., Cap. XIX.-XXIV.; De Chr. Serv., Pars I. cap. 2-5; Crell, De Causis Mortis Christi; Ad Lib. Grotii Respons.; Wolzogen, Compend. Relig. Christ.)

The Socinians, it is true, did not shun to speak of the death of Christ as an expiatory sacrifice, as appears from the Racovian Catechism and other writings. But evidently they used the term *expiation* in a different sense from that in which it was employed by the advocates of strict satisfaction, and attached an expiatory office to Christ's death only so far as it may be regarded as supplicating the divine clemency or acting as a positive antidote to sinfulness. Moreover, they taught that the death of Christ was but the commencement of the expiation which He continues to make in heaven as the High Priest of humanity. "The death of Christ," says the Catechism, "was not the whole of His expiatory sacrifice, but a certain commencement of it; for the sacrifice was then offered when Christ entered into heaven." (V. 8.) Socinus says: "The sacrifice and expiatory oblation of Christ for our sins, although it did not take place without the cross and the shedding of blood, was not nevertheless truly consummated in the cross or in shedding of blood, but afterwards in heaven, Christ having entered there." (Epist.) "Christ was not truly a priest, nor perfectly consecrated before He entered into heaven, not to say before He delivered Himself to death." (De Chr. Serv., Pars II. cap. 23.) Thus, according to the Socinian theory, Christ first after His ascension entered in the more emphatic sense upon His office as Saviour.

The objections of Socinus to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction are noteworthy, as being the most cogent considerations which hostile criticism has been able to urge. The more important of them are the following: (1.) The supposition of satisfaction is contrary to the Scriptural account of gratuitous remission, and trenches upon the liberality and compassion of God. (2.) Vicarious satisfaction is in the nature of the case impossible. One may indeed

pay a sum of money for another, for the ownership of money is transferable. But the punishment which God has connected with sin is not a pecuniary fine. It is rather a punishment which takes hold of the person, and is as little capable of being transferred, as personality itself is of being alienated. The law, too, is not that somebody must suffer in case of transgression, but that the identical person who sins must suffer. Moreover, God's Word expressly puts a veto upon transferring punishment of this kind, declaring that the child shall not be put to death for the offence of the father, or the father for the offence of the child. (3.) Christ as a matter of fact did not make a plenary satisfaction by His sufferings. There was no proportion between His pains and those denounced against sinners. He did not endure eternal death; and even if He had, and had been accepted as a substitute, He could have taken the place of only one sinner. This holds true even upon the supposition of His divinity, for only as man could He suffer and pay to God a debt of suffering. (4.) Vicarious obedience is quite as much out of question as vicarious suffering. Christ as man was subject to law and under obligation to obey for Himself, so that it was impossible for Him to acquire merit in behalf of others. As respects His divine nature, if such be imputed to Him, it is as improper to speak of that as obeying and acquiring merit, as it is to represent it as enduring sufferings. And there is besides this consideration, that satisfaction by suffering and imputation of obedience agree ill together, since the one makes the other superfluous. (5.) If satisfaction has been made, men are bound by no further claims. Their acquittal follows without conditions. Obligations to faith and obedience are relaxed. (See in particular *Prælect. Theol.*, Cap. XVII., XVIII.; *De Chr. Serv.*, Pars III. cap. 1-5, Pars IV. cap. 3, 4.)

Socinus evidently, in attacking the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, took the terms in the most literal and exact

sense. This fact must of course be brought into the account in the consideration of his objections. One may hold that the work of Christ had the value of a vicarious satisfaction, and was in effect such, without at the same time maintaining that it was such in all the particulars of a rigid and literal application of the terms. One may hold that He paid a real tribute to divine law, to the honor and security of divine government, to God's interior regard for righteousness, and that in a real sense He stood in the sinner's place, without thinking that guilt was in any wise transferred to Him, or that He was in strictness visited with any punishment. So far as the statements of Socinus bear against a vicarious satisfaction in this sense, the following considerations are pertinent, and have been urged by one writer or another. (1.) The satisfaction made by Christ holds an instrumental place. It was designed to prepare the way for the salvation of men. God was its primary originator. He originated it as the most fitting way of reaching an end dictated by pure benevolence and love. So far, therefore, from excluding grace and compassion, it testifies to them. Moreover, not only in the primary provision of the satisfaction, but in the application of its benefits to the individual, there is an exhibition of grace. The work of satisfaction was a condition of proclaiming a general amnesty, to be enjoyed upon the most indulgent terms that wisdom and righteousness could allow. Now while self-consistency in the Divine Ruler might require that every one meeting the conditions should have the benefits of the amnesty, no one can claim them as a matter of desert or as a right. In every case of their bestowment there is an exhibition of grace. (2.) Sin is indeed a personal matter, and no one but the doer of it can take its ill-desert, and the sufferings of no innocent person can be regarded as strictly cancelling that ill-desert. But this does not prove that one person may not suffer voluntarily for another, and suffer in such a way as to promote right-

eousness and render tribute to justice. The Scriptures do not hesitate to declare that Christ bore our sins in His own body on the tree. Human experience is full of illustrations of a vicarious principle. Universal history teaches that the pains and struggles of holy, self-sacrificing souls are ever being employed to lift the wicked to undeserved emancipation. No one can deny these facts. Everybody must allow that one person can suffer efficaciously for another. Every one also, who has a just view of the historical position of Christ, must allow that, above all beings that have appeared in this world, He was qualified to hold a vicarious or representative position in suffering. For He was not merely an individual among individuals; He was not merely a son of man, but the Son of Man, the head and centre of humanity. The only question then is, whether the suffering may be at the same time a tribute to justice, a homage to holy law, and so of the nature of a satisfaction. And who can refuse to answer this in the affirmative? Who can deny that he who obeys the law as the embodied will of the lawgiver, obeys it with a profound regard for the end contemplated by the lawgiver, and at the expense of extreme personal suffering, renders a great tribute to the law and to him whose mind it expresses? Who can deny, furthermore, that the grandest tribute of this kind which is conceivable is the fitting antecedent and condition of a proclamation of universal amnesty to a race of sinners? Now, just such a tribute was rendered by the obedient and suffering Christ, the divine-human Son of God. In one undivided view we have the spectacle of the sublimest homage to divine rule, the attestation of the ineffable sanctity of the holy laws of God, and the spectacle of the utmost grace to those who have transgressed those laws. The former was needed to go with the latter. In virtue of the work of Christ, God, in harmony with His position as fountain and guardian of the law, can consistently and safely remit sins. He is not left in the position

of an earthly magistrate, who must either execute the law with unsparing rigor, or use his prerogative to pardon in a partial way by showing clemency to only a few, or break down the law by too wide a show of indulgence. Bringing all alike into the presence of that incomparable tribute to righteousness and protest against sin which are seen in Jesus Christ, God is able to offer pardon to all upon equal terms, and to emphasize the claims of righteousness even in the act of indulgence. (3, 4.) In answer to the third and fourth objections of Socinus, we have the consideration that Christ in His life of suffering and obedience is to be viewed in the unity of His person. We are not to make a Nestorian division between the divine and the human. We are to view Him as the God-man. Regarding Him in this light, we cannot properly fail to be filled with a sense of the altogether exceptional worth of His work. The spectacle of a God-man treading the path of obedience and suffering in deference to holy law, and with the design of healing and conserving God's moral order, is more fitted to impress the minds of men and angels with the majestic claims of that law and that order, than the spectacle of a race suffering hopelessly the pains of damnation. The value of such a tribute is essentially independent of the question whether the rendering of it fell within the sphere of duty or not. It was valuable in itself. But as a matter of fact it lay beyond the sphere of personal obligation, in the sense that the incarnation by which it was initiated lay beyond that sphere. Work done in a sphere which is beyond one's obligations to enter may be called a work of extra merit. (5.) The last objection of Socinus has force only against the most crude and commercial theory of satisfaction. From the fact that Christ paid such a tribute as makes it allowable in the sight of wisdom and holiness to depart from the rigor of justice in dealing with past sins, it of course in no wise follows that conditions of faith and future obedience should not be imposed.

Among writers of the Calvinistic school of the period who attempted to answer the objections of Socinus, a foremost place is occupied by Turretin.

Roman Catholic theologians held the patristic and scholastic theory of a real descent of Christ into Hades. As to the effect of His mission there, Petavius says: "I assent to the opinion commonly received and confirmed by the testimony of a number; namely, that Christ in His descent to hell conferred salvation upon those alone who, by the merit of faith and righteousness while they were alive, showed themselves worthy of so great a benefit." (*De Incar. Verb.*, Lib. XIII. cap. 18.) The Lutherans were inclined to follow Luther in the doctrine of a real descent. The Formula of Concord, referring to a dispute which had arisen respecting the mode of the descent, teaches that the fact should be received without curious inquiries as to the mode. (Art. IX.) According to Gerhard, there was both a metaphorical and a real descent of Christ into hell, the one consisting in the pains of His passion and the other in a local appearing in the region of the dead. (*Confess. Cath.*) As respects the object of the descent, the Lutherans emphasized chiefly the general idea of a triumph over Satan and the power of death. Among Reformed theologians there was a tendency to affirm only the metaphorical descent, the language of the apostolic symbol being either understood, as by Zwingli, to be an emphatic assertion of the reality of Christ's death and burial; or, as by Calvin, to be descriptive of the agonies of the passion. (Calvin, *Inst.*, II. 16; Turretin, *Locus XIII.* quæst. 16; Maccovius, *Locus XXV.*; Wolleb, *Compend. Theol.*, Lib. I. cap. 18; Usher, *Body of Divinity*; Barrow, *Sermons on Creed*, XXVIII.) The Heidelberg Catechism, though not very explicit, favors the Calvinian interpretation. (Question 44.) The Thirty-nine Articles, on the other hand, were evidently designed to teach a real descent. (Art. III.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

In the early stages of the Reformation, there was naturally a tendency to revert to the Augustinian stand-point, and to reduce man's part in the appropriation of salvation to the vanishing point. In no way, as the Reformers conceived, could the foundation of the Romish system of legality, ceremonialism, and dependence upon the merit of works be so effectually swept away as by asserting man's natural helplessness and the omnipotence of grace in his moral recovery. In a part of the domain of Protestantism this primitive position was steadily maintained; but there were wide reactions from it in various quarters.

Among the topics falling under the section, the two principal are the divine predestination, as conditioning the appropriation of salvation, and the doctrine of justification. The question of the factors entering into conversion, or regeneration, may fitly be considered in connection with the former topic. In addition to these subjects, we have to consider that of assurance and of Christian perfection.

I. The Roman Catholic Church was far from being a unit upon the subject of predestination. According to Sarpi, very diverse opinions were expressed at the council of Trent, and, taking the period through, some three or four different types of opinion must be distinguished.

By the Jansenist school, or, at least, by some of its representatives, statements were indulged involving the full Augustinian doctrine, that predestination to life is unconditional, that the efficacy of Christ's death was not designed for all, and that there is in strictness no possibility of the salvation of the non-elect. These points are involved with sufficient clearness in such sentences from Quesnel as the following: "All whom God wills to save

through Jesus Christ are infallibly saved." "Grace is the operation of the hand of the omnipotent God, which nothing is able to impede or retard." "Grace is nothing else than the will of the omnipotent God commanding and doing what He commands." There were also outside of the Jansenist school some who made no material modification of the Augustinian teaching.

A second party taught, indeed, an unconditional predestination of some men to eternal life, but differed from the preceding in maintaining that a sufficient grace to secure salvation is given unto those not thus absolutely chosen. At the same time, however, they made the possibility of the salvation of the non-elect a purely theoretical one, since they taught that this *sufficient* grace never becomes actually *efficacious* grace, never brings into the possession of eternal life. Here belongs Pope Adrian VI. Thomasin describes his position as follows: "God does not now give to all the grace which will convert them, but that which is sufficient to convert them if they make their best efforts. He adds, that there is no one who makes always his best efforts, and consequently the grace simply sufficient is in the end always ineffectual, and the efficacious grace is that which is always superabundant." (Mémoire II.) Bellarmin's teaching harmonizes with Adrian's, and embraces the following points: (1.) There is an unconditional election of some to eternal life. "The Scripture teaches that some of the human race have been elected, and that they have been elected to the kingdom of heaven, and elected efficaciously, that they may infallibly attain to the kingdom; and, finally, that they have been elected gratuitously and before all foresight of their works." (2.) "Sufficient aid for salvation, respect being had to time and place, is given mediately or immediately to all." The clause respecting time and place is inserted to denote that there is at least some occasion where this aid is proffered, though it may not be always present. The proposition

thus understood, says Bellarmin, is advocated by nearly all Roman Catholic theologians. (3.) The sufficient grace fails in fact of the end for whose attainment it is sufficient. "All have, in consideration of place and time, aid sufficient to enable them to be converted and then to persevere if they will; but in reality no one is converted and no one perseveres except he who has the special gift of repentance and perseverance, which is not given to all, but to those only to whom God has decided that it should be given." Here reference is made to a distinction previously laid down between *gratia sufficiens* and *gratia efficax*. (4.) "Reprobation comprises two acts, the one negative and the other positive, inasmuch as the reprobate are opposed to the elect both in the way of contradiction and of contrariety (*contradictorie et contrarie*). For in the first place God has not the will to save them; and then He has the will to condemn them; and, indeed, as respects the former act, there is no cause on the part of man, as there is none of predestination. But of the latter there is a cause, namely, the foresight of sin." (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., Lib. I. cap. 11-13; Lib. II. cap. 1-16.) Nicole and Thomassin occupied essentially the same ground.

According to a third view, while some are unconditionally elected to eternal life, there is not merely a theoretical possibility that some not thus elected may be saved, but a genuine probability that some of them will be saved. Such was the theory advocated by Catharinus at the council of Trent. As Sarpi represents, he taught that "God, of His goodness, hath elected some few, whom He will save absolutely, for whom He hath prepared most potent, effectual, and infallible means. The rest He desireth for His part to be saved, and, to that end, hath prepared sufficient means for all, leaving it to their choice to accept them and be saved, or to refuse them and be damned. Amongst these are some who receive them and are saved, though they be not of the number of the elect; of which kind there are

very many. Others refusing to co-operate with God, who wisheth their salvation, are damned."

A fourth view opposed unconditional election, and made foreordination to eternal life dependent upon foresight of grace accepted and improved. Among the Jesuits, Less, Hamel, and the school of Molina, represented this view. As previously noted, a number of sentences from the writings of the first two were censured by the theological faculty of Louvain. The following were among them: "The opinion which says, that those who are saved are not efficaciously elected to glory before the foresight of good works or the application of merit against sin, seems in the highest degree probable. . . . The number of the predestinated is not certain from a foreordination which goes before all foreknowledge of works." (Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*.) Less is also quoted by Thomassin as maintaining, "Rightly does Molina say that it depends upon the free will whether grace is efficacious or inefficacious." (*Mémoire IV. chap. 86.*) Another statement of Molina, carrying the same implication, is as follows: "For men who have not yet reached the dignity of the sons of God, power to become the sons of God is provided, to this extent, that if they strive as far as in them lies, God will be present to them, that they may obtain faith and grace." (Gieseler.) In the principal work of Petavius there are likewise passages which speak with sufficient distinctness for a conditional election. "There is no place at all in Scripture," he says, "by which Augustine or the disciples of Augustine, prove that men are elected and predestinated to salvation and glory, absolutely and without any condition of merits, as a cause, which has not been explained in another sense by the more ancient fathers, or also by a majority of the later Greek and Latin fathers. So no divine authority compels us to accept that opinion; yea, rather it seems to warn away from it, as will be declared in the following chapter." (*De Deo, Lib. X. cap. 1.*) In

the chapter referred to, after citing the rule of Vincen-tius, that, in things not clearly revealed in the Scriptures, the general consensus of the fathers should be followed, he says: "If we wish to observe this rule in the matter under consideration, we doubt not but that is the truer opinion, which assigns to each one his eternal lot in accordance with foresight of merits, so that God elects those to salvation whom He sees will persevere in grace and righteousness received."

As respects official statements, none were made which distinctly and directly renounced unconditional election, but the moral effect of the papal condemnations of propositions from Baius, Jansenius, and Quesnel was evidently adverse to that doctrine. Some of the condemned propositions were genuinely Augustinian. The council of Trent rendered no definite decision. It says, indeed, that Christ died for all, but advocates of absolute predestination, whether consistently or not, have said as much. However, its doctrine of the will in relation to man's moral recovery, as being opposed to the monergistic operation of grace, had more or less of an adverse bearing toward the doctrine of unconditional predestination. In the fifth chapter of the decree on justification it is said: "They who by sins were alienated from God may be disposed, through His quickening and assisting grace, to convert themselves to their own justification, by freely assenting to and co-operating with that said grace: in such sort that, while God touches the heart of man by the illumination of the Holy Ghost, neither is man himself utterly inactive while he receives that inspiration, forasmuch as he is also able to reject it; yet he is not able by his own free will, without the grace of God, to move himself unto justice in His sight."

Among Roman Catholic theologians, who taught an unconditional predestination, various theories were entertained as to the way in which the predestinating decree is accomplished, or divine grace is made infallibly effica-

cious to secure its end. These are enumerated by Thomassin as follows: (1.) The theory based on the *scientia media*. God, inasmuch as He knows what would take place under all supposable conditions, knows to what means the human agent will give consent. He knows this, not because the means is in itself invincible, but because His prescience is infallible. Thus He is able without any violence to the human will to secure its consent to grace. (2.) The theory of physical predetermination, according to which God acts directly upon the will itself and determines it in a particular direction. The advocates of this view maintain that the will remains nevertheless free, for, while the divine action excludes a contrary choice, it does not exclude the power of a contrary choice. (3.) The theory that divine grace has at command an innnumerable multitude and variety of expedients, and that, while the human will may reject the one or the other, it will be sure finally to yield freely to the continued pressure of such as are left in the inexhaustible list. (4.) The theory which affirms, in place of the multitude of means, predicated by the preceding statement, one single means, so absolutely suited to the case to which it is applied that it is certain to prevail over all opposing inclinations and to secure the free assent of the will. (Mémoire I. chap. 18.) Thomassin gives his preference to the third and fourth theories, and finds most fault with the second, which he says began to be prevalent among the Thomists after the council of Trent. Bellarmin condemns the same in strong terms, declaring that it seems to him identical with the error of Calvin, or differing little therefrom. (De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., Lib. I. cap. 12.) Suarez also was opposed to the doctrine of physical determination. (Opuscula.) Bossuet, on the other hand, commented on it very favorably, and maintained that it was in harmony with the demands of free will. (Traité du Libre Arbitre.) Evidently on this whole subject the Roman Catholic Church was much afloat.

Luther, as previously stated, started out with a radical theory of predestination. This too he never modified, save as he gave more room to what might be regarded as opposing considerations, such as the universality of God's design in the atonement, and the possibility of apostasy. One of his statements on the former point is as follows: "That all do not receive Christ is their own fault, because they believe not and indulge their unbelief; meanwhile the sentence of God remains, and the universal promise that God wills all men to be saved." (Quoted by Köstlin.) Luther here speaks from the standpoint of the *revealed* will of God. Besides this, he acknowledged the existence of a *secret* will, infallibly securing the salvation of those selected from the general mass. These diverse wills he confessed himself unable to reconcile. But he was increasingly disposed to emphasize the revealed as compared with the secret will. The modifying aspects in connection with Luther's doctrine are thus stated by Dorner: "There may be noticed as characteristic features in Luther's doctrine of predestination, that it will not renounce the universality of the purpose of divine love, little as he is able to vindicate it, and that he also admits the possibility of apostasy on the part of those who have obtained grace. . . . It is not clear how complete apostasy is possible in case of one chosen to salvation, without the breaking up of Luther's conception of election, and the more logical development of this point is to be found in Calvin, who attributes to all the elect also the gift of perseverance." (Hist. of Prot. Theol.)

The Lutheran Church soon showed a marked tendency to depart from Luther's affirmation of unconditional predestination, and to adopt the position which was ultimately taken by Melancthon upon this subject. This is clearly apparent in the Formula of Concord. In the absence of any counter statements, such language as the following can only be understood as repudiating unconditional pre-

destination: "Christ calls all sinners to Him, and promises to give them rest. And He earnestly wishes that all men may come to Him, and suffer themselves to be cared for and succored. To these He offers Himself in the Word as a Redeemer, and wishes that the Word may be heard, and that their ears may not be hardened, nor the Word be neglected and contemned. And He promises that He will bestow the virtue and operation of the Holy Spirit and divine aid, to the end that we may abide steadfast in the faith and attain eternal life. . . . As to the declaration, 'Many are called, but few are chosen,' it is not to be so understood as if God were unwilling that all should be saved, but the cause of the damnation of the ungodly is that they either do not hear the Word of God at all, but contumaciously condemn it, stop their ears, and harden their hearts, and in this way foreclose to the Spirit of God His ordinary way, so that He cannot accomplish His work in them; or at least, when they have heard the Word, make it of no account, and cast it away." (Art. XI.) In the Saxon Visitation Articles it is declared, that Christ died for all men; that God wills all men to be saved; that some perish by refusing to hear the Gospel, and some by falling from grace; "that all sinners who repent will be received into favor, and none will be excluded, though his sins be red as blood, since the mercy of God is greater than the sins of the whole world, and God hath mercy on all His works."

In the seventeenth century leading Lutheran theologians declared very expressly for the universality of the offers of grace and the conditional character of predestination. "God wills," says Gerhard, "and seriously wills the life of the sinner; yet He wills also the conversion of the sinner through the Holy Spirit and the Word; but if the sinner repels that Word and resists the Holy Spirit, and so is not converted, He wills the just damnation of the sinner. . . . For whom Christ shed His precious blood upon the altar of

the cross, they have not been rejected of God by any absolute decree; for these things directly contradict each other, as is apparent. Now in truth Christ upon the altar of the cross shed His precious blood for all men without exception. Therefore no one of them has been rejected of God by any absolute decree. . . . We say that God in view of the satisfaction offered by Christ and received through faith has made the decree of election. . . . We say that many have been reprobated from eternity, not however from any absolute hatred or decree of God, but because God foresaw that they would abide in their unbelief and impenitence." (Locus VII. §§ 95, 106, 148, 177.) As is indicated by the language of Gerhard, the Lutherans were careful to make the condition of the election to eternal life not the foresight of merit, but rather of faith as the instrument for appropriating unmerited grace. In conformity with this standpoint, Quenstedt lays down these propositions: (1.) "Our election was not made on account of the foreseen merits of men, or in view of our works and obedience, but from the mere grace of God." (2.) "We have been elected to eternal life in consideration of faith foreseen as finally apprehending the merit of Christ." (De Prædestinatione, quæst. 2, 4.) At this point the Lutheran phraseology stands in noticeable contrast with that of the Romanists who also advocated a conditional election.

Where unconditional election is renounced, a monergistic theory of conversion is naturally renounced also. But the Lutherans, while rejecting the former, retained, at least quite generally, the latter. The second article of the Formula of Concord distinctly teaches that man co-operates with God only after his conversion or regeneration has been effected, so that there are but two efficient causes of conversion, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God,—the human will, which Melancthon had included as a third cause, being ruled out. The responsibility for conversion, therefore, seems to be thrown wholly upon God. But this

is out of harmony with the statements of the eleventh article, which attributes the entire failure to receive saving benefits to the perversity of the individual. A modern Lutheran comments on this incongruity as follows: "The proposition that the rejection of salvation has its ground in man, neutralizes not only the conception of predestination, but also the conception of grace contained in the Formula of Concord. This proposition demands, according to invincible logic, that the man who can refuse salvation, be not passive (*willenlos*) in laying hold of the same. For he who can oppose and does not oppose, wills not to oppose. And he who wills not to oppose, just wills to receive." (Kahnis, *Dogmatik*, II. 7.)

As significant definitions of the terms which enter into an account of man's spiritual recovery, we subjoin the following from Hollaz: "Conversion, as transitive, in which the sinner is converted by God, taken in a general sense, includes in its scope illumination, aversion from sin, regeneration, justification, and renovation." Here we have a suggestion of an *ordo salutis* as it was apprehended by this writer. "Regeneration is the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit endows a sinful man with saving faith, in order that, his sins being remitted, he may be made a son of God and an heir of eternal life." (Pars III. sect. 1, cap. 6, 7.)

In the Reformed Church the doctrine of unconditional predestination was championed with an altogether exceptional vigor and interest. Theologians who followed in the trail of Calvin were disposed to make God's predestinating decrees the central sun in the system of Christian doctrine. No entire school besides has shown such an interest in this order of teaching as the school of Calvin.

While Zwingli taught a very radical theory of predestination, the standard was taken from Calvin rather than from him. The main differences were that Zwingli was less cautious in describing the relation of divine agency to sin, and gave a more liberal breadth to the electing

decree, not shunning to include the more virtuous heathen who had never heard the Gospel in this life.

Calvin went beyond Augustine in that he placed a positive decree of God back of the fall. He also gave a more positive cast to the reprobation of the wicked. But save as this latter phase is an outcome of the former, the difference on this point between Augustine and Calvin was not at all material. On the theory of the one as well as of the other, the non-elect are absolutely excluded from any possibility of salvation. The Augustinian scheme is only one degree less arbitrary than that of Calvin. If it does not represent God as foreordaining the fall, it does represent Him as foreordaining that the fall should involve, beyond every chance of rescue, the eternal ruin and damnation of the greater part of the race, who had no responsible part in the fall, except on a notion of responsibility infinitely far-fetched.

According to the teaching of Calvin, the inscrutable decree of God has fixed beyond all contingency the eternal fortune of every human being. Election to eternal life is wholly independent of foreseen merit, faith, or good works. In like manner the decree of reprobation is wholly independent of foreseen demerit, unbelief, or evil works. Everything good in the elect is to be reckoned in the effects, not in the causes of election. The evil in the reprobate, while a matter of guilt to them and a necessary antecedent to their punishment, is not the cause of their final condemnation, for God's irresistible grace, had He been so pleased, could have healed them as well as the elect. These points will be found for the most part in the following quotations from Calvin's Institutes: "Predestination we call the eternal decree of God, by which He has determined in Himself what He would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some and eternal damnation for others.

Every man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these ends, we say he is predestinated either to life or to death." (III. 21.) "In conformity to the clear doctrine of the Scripture, we assert that, by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all determined both whom He would admit to salvation and whom He would condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns the elect, is founded on His gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human merit; but that to those whom He devotes to condemnation, the gate of life is closed by a just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible judgment." (Ibid.) "When God is said to harden or show mercy to whom He pleases, men are taught by this declaration to seek no cause beside His will." (III. 22.) "Whom God passes by He reprobates, and from no other cause than His determination to exclude from the inheritance which He predestines for His children." (III. 23). "That the reprobate obey not the word of God, when made known to them, is justly imputed to the wickedness and depravity of their hearts, provided it be at the same time stated that they are abandoned to this depravity because they have been raised up, by a just and inscrutable judgment of God, to display His glory in their condemnation." (III. 24.)

Equivalent statements might be quoted from Beza. On the subject of reprobation he says: "We ought to distinguish between the purpose of reprobating and the reprobation itself. For God willed that the mystery of the former should be hidden from us, but of the latter and the destruction which depends upon it we have the causes expressed in the Word of God, namely, the corruption, infidelity, and iniquity of the vessels made unto dishonor." (Sum. Tot. Christ.) In other words, while the primary cause of reprobation is God's inscrutable decree, the proximate causes, or the conditions of the execution of the reprobating decree, are the unbelief and wickedness of

the vessels of wrath. As Turretin represents, sin appears rather as the *sine qua non* than as the cause of reprobation. (Locus IV. quæst. 14.) "If sins were the cause of reprobation," says Bucan, "no one would have been elected, since God foresaw that all men are sinners." (Locus XXXVI. Compare Gomar, Disput. de Div. Hom. Prædest.; Zanchi, De Nat. Dei, Lib. V. cap. 2; Piscator, Tract. de Grat. Dei.)

Among Calvinistic creeds the Canons of the Synod of Dort and the Westminster Confession are specially explicit upon the subject of predestination. Both declare that election to life is in no wise based upon foreseen faith, or works, or any good in the creature, and is to be referred solely to the good pleasure of God. The general statement of the subject by the Westminster Confession is as follows: "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished." Statements quite as strong are contained in the Lambeth and the Irish Articles; but neither of these creeds had anything like the same historical importance as the foregoing.

On the Calvinistic theory it follows inevitably that Christ died only for the elect, so far as regards an actual purchase of eternal life or of an opportunity to gain the same. This conclusion was commonly acknowledged. It is clearly implied in this statement of the Westminster Confession: "To all those for whom Christ hath purchased redemption He doth certainly and effectually apply and communicate the same." (Chap. VIII.) The Canons of Dort say: "God willed that Christ through the blood of the cross should efficaciously redeem all those, and those alone, who were elected from eternity to salvation." Gomar writes: "Those for

whom Christ died obtain eternal life. But the elect alone, not the reprobate, obtain eternal life. Therefore Christ died for the elect alone, but not for the reprobate." (Explicat. Epist. ad Galat. Compare Turretin, Locus XIV. quæst. 14; Perkins, Order of Predest. in Mind of God; Witsius, De Œconom. Fœd., Lib. II. cap. 9.) There were, however, a few Calvinistic writers who endeavored to unite a theory of universal atonement with their doctrine of specific election. Conspicuous among these was the French theologian Amyraut. He taught that in virtue of Christ's sacrifice salvation is offered to all; but at the same time he held that it is efficaciously applied only to the elect, and is not appropriated by any save the elect. So his distinctions turn out to be of no special worth, except as they indicate an inner ferment and revolt against the rigors of Calvinism. The universal offer of salvation of which he speaks is as remote from accomplishing anything as the *gratia sufficiens* of Adrian VI. and Bellarmin. Richard Baxter held essentially the same theory as Amyraut. Even so strong a Calvinist as Archbishop Usher contended that Christ died for all, His death being of the nature of a general satisfaction by which men are put into a possibility of salvation. But he robs his statement of all practical bearing by teaching that, while Christ died for all, He does not intercede for all, nor intend to apply the benefits of His death effectually to any but the elect. (Judgment of the true Intent and Extent of Christ's Death and Satisfaction upon the Cross. Compare Davenant, Dissertat. de Morte Christi.)

In the early part of the seventeenth century a measure of prominence was given to the question of the proper order of the predestinating decrees. One party, the supralapsarian, made the manifestation of the divine glory by the exercise of compassion and justice (that is, severity) the primal decree, and assigned the connected decrees respecting creation, the fall, the redemption of the vessels of mercy, and the reprobation of the vessels of wrath, to the

rank of means for executing the first decree. The general tenor of Calvin's teaching favored this theory. Beza is reckoned as an undoubted advocate of the same, as also Gomar and Twisse. But the opposing or infra-lapsarian theory claimed the larger patronage in the seventeenth century. This, as represented by Turretin, gives the decrees in the following order: (1.) The decree to create man. (2.) The decree to permit his fall and the ruin thereby of his posterity. (3.) The decree to elect some of the fallen race to salvation, and to leave others in their native corruption and misery. (4.) The decree to send Christ to be the mediator and surety of the elect, and to obtain for them full salvation. (5.) The decree respecting the efficacious calling, endowing with faith, justification, sanctification, and glorification of the elect. (Locus IV. quæst. 18.)

In harmony with their theory of predestination, Calvinists taught a monergistic theory of conversion. Calvin was very emphatic in declaring that what the human will needs is not assistance, but complete transformation. "The will," he says, "is so bound by the slavery of sin, that it cannot excite itself, much less devote itself to anything good; for such a disposition is the beginning of a conversion to God, which in the Scriptures is attributed solely to divine grace. . . . We rob the Lord, if we arrogate anything to ourselves either in volition or in execution. If God were said to assist the infirmity of our will, then there would be something left to us; but since He is said to produce the will, all the good that is in it is placed without us." (Inst., II. 3.) The Canons of Dort describe regeneration as a radical change which God works in us without any contribution on our part. According to the Westminster Confession, the will in those who receive the effectual calling is determined to the good by the omnipotence of God, and they are entirely passive in relation to the work of grace until quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit. Witsius remarks that some among the Reformed theolo-

gians of his time spoke of preparations for regeneration, such as the breaking up of man's natural contumacy, serious consideration of the law, reflection on one's own sins, and a legal fear of punishments. For his own part, however, he says that he considers that those better meet the demands of accurate thinking who include all such exercises among the fruits of regeneration, rather than among preparations for the same. (*De Œconom. Fœd.*, Lib. III. cap. 6.)

The most fruitful reaction against Calvinistic predestinarianism was that initiated by Arminianism in Holland. Whatever other departures from the current theology of the Reformed Church the Arminians may have made, the starting-point of their divergence was a denial of the doctrine of unconditional predestination. They emphasized in common the following points: (1.) Christ died for all, in the sense that by His death all are placed in a possibility of salvation. (2.) The decrees of election and reprobation are conditioned upon God's foreknowledge of the use which men make of the opportunities of salvation. (3.) Grace, while indispensable to man's moral recovery, is not irresistible in its mode. (4.) Saving grace after once being received may be lost. Upon the last point the Arminians for an interval were undecided, but it became soon a recognized part of their theological system.

An absolute decree of reprobation was regarded by the Arminians as at war with every perfection of God, with His holiness, His justice, His sincerity, His wisdom, and His love. They allowed, indeed, that as a matter of fact there are very great diversities in the moral opportunities of men, but denied that this is indicative of an unconditional predestination, or that any are purposely left without sufficient means to secure their salvation. "Upon none," says Curcellæus, "does God bestow these means with so sparing a hand, but that they can if they use them well attain to salvation." (*Lib. VI. cap. 1.*)

Arminianism exercised an important modifying influence upon the theology of the English Church. Primarily that was, no doubt, of the Calvinistic type. Cranmer and Ridley may have been somewhat reserved upon the subject, but they probably took no exception to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. Latimer in his sermons, it must be allowed, seems to speak from the platform of universal redemption. But down to the time of James II. the great body of English theologians were committed to the Calvinistic system. During his reign the tide began to turn in favor of the Arminian type. Distinguished representatives of the Calvinistic bias still appeared, but the preponderance was speedily on the other side, as may be judged from such names as Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, William Sherlock, Bull, Tillotson, Barrow, Cudworth, etc. How little reverence Cudworth entertained for the imposing doctrine of predestination is apparent from the following: "As for those among Christians, who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind for no other end or design but only this, that He might recreate and delight Himself in their eternal torments, these do but transcribe a copy of their own ill-nature, and then read it in the Deity; the Scripture declaring, on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless, these very persons in the mean time dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves." (*Intellect. Syst.*, Chap. V.) An advocate of universal redemption will not deny that Cudworth had some ground for the indignation which is here expressed, but at the same time he must allow in candor that he was far from justice and truth in respect to the motive which he specified as lying back of the predestinarian scheme in the minds of its upholders.

Among English sects, the Quakers were very pronounced in advocating the universality of God's love and gracious provision. They excelled the general body of the Armin-

ians in the distinctness with which they asserted the possible salvation of those to whom the outward call of the Gospel does not come. In Barclay's sixth proposition we have the statement: "‘Christ has tasted death for every man’: not only for all kinds of men, as some vainly talk, but for every one, of all kinds; the benefit of whose offering is not only extended to such who have the distinct outward knowledge of His death and sufferings, as the same is declared in the Scriptures, but even unto those who are necessarily excluded from the benefit of this knowledge by some inevitable accident."

II. Quite an adequate view of the standard Roman Catholic doctrine of justification may be obtained by consulting simply the council of Trent and Bellarmin; only it must be held in mind that the traditional spirit is a powerful factor in determining whether a better or worse construction is put on ingenious statements of theory, and that formal declarations of doctrine are not the whole of Romanism.

The decisions of the council of Trent upon this subject reveal a polemic intent at every turn. They are exceedingly tortuous. Even were one confident of understanding them in all their bearings, many specifications must be omitted in a brief statement. The following, as we think, are the more essential points: (1.) Justification is not simply absolution, not simply God's act of pardoning or declaring just. It is also the making just by the inner work of grace. It includes both pardon and sanctification. In the language of the council, it "is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace and the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend." (2.) Justification is accomplished on the part of God by justice or charity infused and made inherent. This is the formal cause of justification, the meritorious cause being Jesus Christ in His work of atone-

ment, and the instrumental cause being the sacrament of baptism. (3.) Among the virtues connected with justification, an eminent place belongs to faith. But it is not to be assigned an exclusive place. The statement that we are justified by faith must be understood in the sense of the Catholic Church, "to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation and root of all justification." And even upon this language a qualification must be put, for faith is not an independent foundation or root of justification. Apart from hope and charity it has no justifying efficacy. It always requires something that may co-operate with itself. "If any one saith, that by faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as to mean that nothing else is required to co-operate in order to the obtaining the grace of justification, and that it is not in any way necessary that he be prepared and disposed by the movement of his own will, let him be anathema." (4.) Justification is a process. It receives, indeed, a very definite initiation when the sinner is pardoned and ingrafted into Christ, but it is capable from that point of being progressively increased. (5.) Good works are means of increasing justification, and are not merely fruits and signs of justification already obtained. "If any saith that the justice received is not preserved and also increased before God through good works; but that the said works are merely the fruits and signs of justification obtained, but not a cause of the increase thereof; let him be anathema." (6.) The good works of one who is a member of Jesus Christ are not only *instrumental in obtaining* an increase of justification, but they *merit* the highest benefits, and even eternal life.

Thus in the total representation of the council of Trent a conspicuous place is given to man's part, and much is said that leans to the notion that justification is rather something to be earned than a gratuitous gift. To be sure, its beginning is imputed to the prevenient grace of God,

and it is taught that one must be already a member of Christ before his works are properly meritorious. But even the beginning is described as mainly dependent upon a ceremonial act, namely, baptism, and for the increase one is directed in emphatic terms to his own works. Doubtless, one is at liberty to add that every good work must be wrought in a spirit of utter dependence upon divine grace, and with a sense of its worthlessness save as it is accepted through the divine condescension. But this is an addition which is not naturally dictated by the language of the Trent decrees and canons. No more is it dictated by the traditional spirit of Romanism, which directs rather to man's works of ceremonial observance and ecclesiastical obedience, to an unquestioning fulfilment of the Church *régime*, than to any profound reliance in heart upon divine grace. Moreover, it is to be noticed that the council of Trent cumbered the subject with the same adjuncts which were patronized by the mediæval Church. Instead of directing the attention solely to God as revealed in Jesus Christ, it pointed to the veneration of saints, relics, and images, and to the use of indulgences, as channels through which great benefits might appropriately be expected. At the same time it was compelled, in the face of the enormous scandals which had arisen, to utter some warnings against abuse in these things.

Bellarmin's exposition of the subject of justification is essentially an expansion of that given by the council of Trent. Among noteworthy points is the way in which he subordinates faith to the sacraments. "The Catholic faith," he says, "does not allow the grace of justification to be immediately apprehended by faith alone and applied to men, but wills that the sacraments also be necessarily required to this end, so that if faith exists in any one, though it be of the highest degree, it will not nevertheless justify, unless the sacrament is received in fact or in desire; yea, the sacrament is more requisite than faith. For without the

sacrament in fact or in desire, no one is justified, neither child nor adult; but without faith some are justified, as children, who have no faith of their own by which they may receive justification, and yet they are justified through the sacrament of faith." (De Sacramentis, Lib. I. cap. 22.)

As respects the nature of faith, Bellarmin contends that it is not to be confounded with confidence or trust; that it does not necessarily involve love and other virtues, though it cannot justify apart from them; that it is not conditioned upon knowledge; that it is simply assent of mind to whatever God proposes to us as an object of belief, whether it is understood by us or not. Upon this last phase he remarks: "We assent to God, although He proposes things to our faith which we do not understand. . . . We believe the mysteries of faith which surpass reason; we believe, not understand, and through this faith is contradistinguished from definite knowledge, and is better defined by ignorance than by knowledge." (De Justificatione, Lib. I. cap. 5, 7.) It is hardly necessary to add, that faith, as defined by Bellarmin, falls far short of that fruitful principle which the Reformers had in mind.

Bellarmin maintains that good works are necessary to salvation, not merely as a natural and inevitable concomitant of saving grace, but as a cause of salvation, — "*necessaria non solum ratione præsentiæ, sed etiam ratione efficientiæ, quoniam efficiunt salutem, et sine ipsis sola fides non efficit salutem.*" (De Justif., Lib. IV. cap. 7.) Good works, as he represents, accomplish the second justification, that is, what the council of Trent calls an increase of justification. By the first justification a man is made just from unjust; by the second, he is made more just.

Good works, Bellarmin says, merit eternal life, though it is not to be overlooked that back of the human merit, as the ground of its possibility, lies the merit of Christ. As respects trusting in one's merits, he remarks: "The Catholic Church pursues the middle way, which teaches indeed

that the principal hope and faith ought to be placed in God; nevertheless, that some can be placed in merits." (De Justif., Lib. V. cap. 7.) A little farther on, however, he says, in striking contrast with this: "On account of the uncertainty of one's own righteousness and the hazard of vainglory, it is most safe to repose the entire confidence in the sole compassion and kindness of God." (Ibid.) A most just sentiment! But why struggle so laboriously to find a place for merits in which, after all, one had better decline to take any stock whatever?

In the introduction to the period it was shown how commanding a position the doctrine of justification by faith occupied in the religious and theological development of Luther. It is not necessary to repeat here what was then said, but only to look more narrowly into his conception of that doctrine.

With Luther the doctrine of justification by faith was the watchword of a revolt against the monastic element in Romanism, against its legality, against the painful but superficial method of seeking salvation by bearing the yoke of heaped-up human prescriptions. It was an appeal to the generosity of God in Jesus Christ. It emphasized God's readiness for fellowship, and taught that the soul is to gain its Redeemer by a personal affiance with Him in an act of supreme trust, and not by courtly attitudes and addresses or by the servile performances of one laboring for hire. Luther accordingly was naturally more concerned to attack the Romish theory of the method of justification, than the Romish conception of justification itself. The thesis which he was continually advocating was, not that justification consists merely in gratuitous pardon, but that justification is by faith alone. In fact, Luther was apparently disposed to include more than pardon or judicial absolution in his definition of justification. In the Smalcald Articles, for example, he makes it embrace regeneration as well as remission of sins.

The faith which justifies was in the view of Luther vastly more than giving credence to facts of history. He regarded it as emanating from the inmost spring of man's spiritual being, a matter of the heart as well as of the intellect. He emphasized also its personal bearing. It is faith in a living Redeemer, "a certain confidence which apprehends Christ," — *certa fiducia quæ apprehendit Christum*. (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat., Cap. III.) It unites the soul with Christ as the bride with the bridegroom, and transfers to the one the riches of the other. "Christ is full of grace, life, and salvation; the soul is full of sin, death, and damnation. Now let faith intervene, and it will come to pass that sins, death, and hell are Christ's, but grace, life, and salvation belong to the soul." (*De Libertate Christ.*) Faith moreover is such an active principle that it cannot remain idle. It is not itself properly included in the category of works, but it is the vital principle of works, — "*fides non est opus, sed magistra et vita operum*." (*De Captiv. Bab.*) Love is sure to follow where faith is found, and love does every kind of good work. (*Ibid.*)

Some of Luther's strong expressions read almost like wholesale disparagements of good works. However, it is perfectly clear that what he wished to oppose was, not a high estimate of good works, but trust in them as a ground of justification. The idea he wished to inculcate was, that in the act of seeking grace from God we are not to carry our works into His presence or take any thought about them. Works are not for grace but from grace. They are not a price paid to God, but a free-will offering, given as a spontaneous testimonial of our love to God and our neighbor. When thus relegated to their proper sphere and office, they are valuable beyond estimate. "Apart from the cause of justification, no one can commend good works prescribed by God in a sufficiently lofty strain. Who indeed can proclaim sufficiently the utility and fruit of one work which a Christian does from faith and in

faith? It is more precious than heaven and earth." (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat., Cap. III.)

Protestantism accepted the general theory of justification as outlined by Luther. At the same time, it gave more precise limits to the significance of the term. The more current theory embraced the following points: (1.) Justification is the act of God in pardoning a sinner and receiving him into favor. It is what God does for a man, not what He works in him. It may indeed be regarded as including several aspects, such as the non-imputation of sin, the imputation of righteousness, and adoption. So some writers specified. But in all of its aspects it is a judicial act of God, and is to be distinguished from the work of renovation or sanctification which is wrought in the individual. Sanctification, at least in its initial stage, always goes with justification, but in nature it is a distinct thing. Among Lutheran confessions the Formula of Concord declares that the term justification should be used in this forensic sense. It is used in the same sense by various Reformed confessions, such as the Second Helvetic and the Westminster. Calvin says of justification, "It consists in the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ." (Inst., III. 11.) Turretin remarks, that imputation of righteousness is the foundation and meritorious cause of justification, while absolution and adoption, derived from this imputation, are the two inseparable parts of justification. (Locus XVI. quæst. 4.) John Owen in his treatise on justification says, "It comprises both the non-imputation of sin and the imputation of righteousness, with the privilege of adoption and right unto the heavenly inheritance which are inseparable from it." (2.) Justification is by faith alone. Works are entirely excluded from the ground of justification, and are included only among its fruits and evidences. But while faith alone justifies, the faith which justifies is not alone. It is not a principle which admits of being isolated. The various Christian graces

must coexist with it, and it must serve as a fountain of good works. "After that man is justified by faith," says the Formula of Concord, "then that true and living faith works by love, and good works always follow justifying faith, and are most certainly found together with it, provided only it be a true and living faith. For true faith is never alone, but has always charity and hope in its train." Equivalent statements appear in the Westminster and other confessions. (3.) The office of faith in justification is purely instrumental. It is the instrument by which, according to divine appointment, Christ is apprehended as the soul's righteousness. "We do not mean," says the Belgic Confession, "that faith itself justifies us, for it is only an instrument with which we embrace Christ, our Righteousness." (4.) While the general object of faith is all that is contained in the Word of God, the specific object is the promise of grace through Jesus Christ. Trust in that promise is indeed the characteristic feature of justifying faith. (5.) Blind assent is no part of justifying faith. It is akin to knowledge rather than to ignorance. Where God works faith, He also works enlightenment. Luther may have said some things counter to this specification, but it was distinctly affirmed by Calvin, Turretin, Gerhard, and others.

Outside of this main current of Protestantism there were some deviating opinions which may receive a brief attention. Osiander taught that in justification the sinner is made just by an infusion of the divine nature of Christ, this infusion taking place in a single act, without merit on the part of the recipient, and on the simple ground of his faith. (Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. I.)

Some of the Arminians, instead of making faith the instrument for grasping the righteousness of Christ, said that our faith is graciously and for Christ's sake imputed to us for righteousness. (Limborch, *Lib. VI. cap. 4.*) This, however, was not altogether an innovation. Notwithstanding the trend of teaching among the Lutherans

and the Reformed, some of their early writers had used language affiliating with the same conception. (See Richard Watson, *Institutes*, Pt. II. chap. 23.) Richard Baxter seems to have held the same view. It also appears in the Scripture Catechism of John Biddle.

A number of Anglican theologians near the close of the period showed a disinclination to allow that works are nothing more than fruits and evidences of justifying faith. Prominent among these was Bishop Bull. While he discountenanced trust in the merit of works, he held that good works proceeding from faith enter into the conditions of the new covenant. They are a part of the Gospel requirement, and contribute to the justification of him who performs them. As naturally follows from these premises, Bishop Bull maintained that justification is continuous, and not fully consummated till the end of life. (*Harmonia Apostolica*, etc.) Jeremy Taylor departed no less from the common representation, maintaining that charity and obedience are as truly as faith among the conditions of justification.

In the theory of the Quakers, justification was identified with sanctification, or the inward birth in the heart. "It is this inward birth," says Barclay, "bringing forth righteousness and holiness in us, that doth justify us. . . . Justification is both more properly and frequently in Scripture taken in its proper signification, for making one just, and not merely reputed one such, and is all one with sanctification." (*Apology*.) Good works as necessarily flowing from the new birth may be styled the *sine qua non* of justification, though they are not the cause of its bestowment. The Mennonites also included sanctification in their definition of justification.

III. The Roman Catholic Church remained by the position that assurance of being in a state of grace is an exceptional gift, the great majority of believers being obliged to be satisfied with a simple probability on this subject. (Council

of Trent, Decree on Justification, Chap. IX.; Bellarmin, De Justif., Lib. III. cap. 3.) The Reformers, on the other hand, took strong ground as respects the common privilege of believers to be certified of their salvation. Luther denounced the theory of the Romish Church as one of the principal robberies which had been committed against Christians. "The Pope," he says, "by this infamous dogma, by which he has commanded men to doubt respecting the favor of God toward themselves, has banished God and all the promises from the Church, overthrown the benefits of Christ, and abolished the entire Gospel. Such unwholesome results necessarily follow, because men depend not upon the promising God, but upon their own works and merits." (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat., Cap. IV.) According to Luther, the evidence of our sonship is given in such a way as to effect in us "the consciousness that what our heart testifies is the result of the testimony of the Spirit, and not the imagination of the flesh." (Dorner, Hist. of Prot. Theol.) Calvin also taught that the believer has a veritable assurance, and is not left simply to a moral conjecture respecting his salvation. Commenting on Romans viii. 16, he says, "This certainty proceedeth not from man's brain, but is the testimony of the Spirit of God." (Compare Turretin, Locus IV. quæst. 14.)

It would appear that in the earlier stages of Protestantism theologians were inclined to regard assurance as necessarily implied in justifying faith. "The Reformers," says Cunningham, speaking of assurance, "in general maintained its necessity, and in order, as it were, to secure it in the speediest and most effectual way, usually represented it as necessarily involved in the very nature of the first completed act of saving faith." (Historical Theology, Vol. II.) Many of the later writers renounced this position. Such was the case with the Westminster divines. They contended, indeed, that believers may attain unto "an infallible assurance of faith, founded upon the divine truth of the

promises of salvation, the inward evidences of those graces unto which these promises are made, the testimony of the Spirit of adoption witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God." But they added: "This infallible assurance doth not so belong to the essence of faith but that a true believer may wait long, and conflict with many difficulties before he be a partaker of it." (Chap. XVIII.) Other instances of a relaxation of the primitive Protestant doctrine might be cited. Bishop Joseph Hall, for example, writes: "It is not for every man to mount up this steep hill of assurance; every soul must breathe and pant towards it as he may, even as we would and must to perfection: he is as rare as happy that attains it." (Works, Vol. VI. p. 356.) The Bishop here speaks indeed of the assurance of eternal salvation; but it was the common verdict of Protestants holding, as he did, to an absolute election, that assurance of present involves assurance of eternal salvation. Bishop Bull, while not in favor of an absolute predestination, agreed with Bishop Hall in making assurance an exceptional experience. "A full assurance of salvation," he says, "is that which few of the best of Christians can boast of." (Discourse III., Vol. II.)

IV. It was the common and oft-repeated assertion of Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians, that no one can expect to keep perfectly the law of God in this life, or to be entirely free from inbred sin. This was the dominant theory of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. There was, however, a measure of exception. Arminius regarded the common theory as at least open to question. In his Declaration before the States of Holland he says: "While I never asserted that a believer could perfectly keep the precepts of Christ in this life, I never denied it, but always left it as a matter which has still to be decided." His followers were more decided, and advocated the positive position that it is possible for the Christian in this life to advance to such spiritual maturity as to

be able perfectly to keep the law of God. At the same time they were not concerned to maintain that this standard has often been realized. They held it up as an attainable, though very difficult ideal. (Episcopus, *Responsio ad Quæstiones*, XIX.; Curcellæus, *Lib. VII. cap. 1, 2*; Limborch, *Lib. V. cap. 15.*) The Quakers, on the other hand, not only affirmed the possibility of this perfection, but commended it as an object of practical interest by representing that it often has been attained. "This perfection or freedom from sin," says Barclay, "is possible, because many have attained it, according to the express testimony of Scripture." (Apology.) The same writer affirms that it is probable that one in this life may reach a state where he is free, not only from the act of sinning, but also from the liability. He says, "I will not deny but there may be a state attainable in this life, in which to do righteousness may become so natural to the regenerate soul that in the stability of this condition they cannot sin." (Ibid.)

The Roman Catholic theory of saintship and of superabundant merit implies of course the possibility of an entire freedom from sin. It should be noticed, however, that the Roman Catholic definition of sin was not equally comprehensive with that of Lutherans and Calvinists. The latter maintained that concupiscence in the regenerate, even when not actually yielded to, is of the nature of sin. The former denied this conclusion.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

IN the Roman Catholic communion, the mediæval view of the Church as a definite organism, bound together by a connected hierarchy culminating in the Pope, was everywhere maintained. Membership in the Church thus defined was regarded, to the same extent as in the mediæval theory, necessary to salvation. The Church, or the ecclesiastical state, was looked upon as precisely analogous to the civil state. This appears clearly in the very exact description of Bellarmin. "Our opinion is," he says, "that there is only one Church, not two, and that that one and true Church is a company of men bound together by the profession of the same Christian faith and by communion of the same sacraments, under the government of legitimate pastors, and especially of the Roman pontiff, Christ's only vicar upon earth. From which definition it can easily be inferred what men belong to the Church, and who indeed do not belong to it; for there are three parts of this definition, profession of the true faith, communion of sacraments, and subjection to the legitimate pastor, the Roman pontiff. By reason of the first part, all unbelievers are excluded, both those who never were in the Church, as Jews, Turks, Pagans, and those who have been, but have departed, as heretics and apostates; by reason of the second part, catechumens and the excommunicated are excluded, since the former have not been admitted to the

communion of the sacraments, and the latter have been dismissed therefrom; by reason of the third part, schismatics are excluded, who have faith and sacraments, but are not in subjection to the legitimate pastor, and therefore profess faith and receive sacraments without. But included are all others, though they are reprobate, criminal, and impious. And there is this difference between our opinion and all others, that all others require interior virtues for constituting any one within the Church, and moreover make the true Church invisible: but even if we believe that all virtues are found in the Church, faith, hope, charity, and the rest, nevertheless we do not think that, in order that any one may be called absolutely a part of the true Church concerning which the Scriptures speak, any interior virtue is required, but only an external profession of faith, and a communion of the sacraments, which is perceived by the sense itself. For the Church is a company of men, just as visible and palpable as is the company of the Roman people, or the kingdom of France, or the republic of the Venetians." (De Concil. et Eccl. Militante, Lib. III. cap. 3.)

Along with this resemblance to the civil state, the Church has, according to Bellarmin, full prerogatives over the bodies of men. To be sure, it may not act as the immediate instrument in the infliction of corporal punishments; but it has authority to deliver men over to the civil arm for the express purpose of being corporally punished, and has authority over princes to compel them, under penalty of dethronement, to do what the interests of the Church demand. (De Sum. Pontif., Lib. V. cap. 6.) These two things put together evidently amount to an authority theoretically unrestricted in the visitation of corporal punishments for offences against the Church. As respects the penalties suitable for the incorrigible heretic, Bellarmin contends that it is the common opinion of Catholics that death by burning is entirely legitimate, and that the Church as a matter of fact has burned her-

etics in innumerable instances. (De Membris Eccl. Mil., Lib. III. cap. 21, 22.) Among the prime duties of the State in its relation to the Church, he specifies the obligation to curb liberty of belief. "This liberty," he says, "is ruinous to the Church, for the bond of the Church is the confession of one faith, and therefore dissension in faith is the dissolution of the Church." He adds: "Liberty of belief is most pernicious to those very persons to whom it is granted; for liberty of belief is nothing else than liberty to err, and to err in a matter the most perilous of all." (Ibid., III. 18.)

After the council of Trent there was an increasing tendency to the Ultramontane theory, as opposed to the Gallican which won the ascendancy at the council of Constance. Bellarmin may be taken as a representative of this tendency, to which indeed his order as a whole made important contributions. The only right which he really leaves to the Church over against the Pope is a kind of revolutionary right, to which resort may be made in case of an extreme exigency. He says, that if the Roman pontiff should be suspected of heresy, or should appear to be an incorrigible tyrant, a general council should be assembled, for deposing him if he is found to be an heretic, or for admonishing him if he seems to be incorrigible in his behavior. (De Concil. et Eccl. Mil., Lib. I. cap. 9.) But, on the other hand, he says: "The supreme pontiff is simply and absolutely above the Universal Church, and above the general council, so that he recognizes no judgment in the earth above himself. This is almost a matter of faith. . . . It is certain that the shepherd is so placed over the sheep that in no way can he be judged by them. . . . The supreme pontiff cannot commit either to a council or to any man a coactive judgment over himself, but only an advisory one," — *sed tantum discretivum*. (Ibid., II. 17, 18.) If these statements are to stand, it clearly follows, as was stated above, that only by a kind of violence to the constitution of the

Church, or a revolutionary proceeding, can a pope be judged and deposed from office.

On the infallibility of the Pope, Bellarmin makes the following statements, in which, it will be seen, he anticipated the decisions of the last Vatican council: "The supreme pontiff, when he teaches the whole Church in these matters which pertain to faith, can in no case err. . . . Not only in decrees of faith is the supreme pontiff incapable of erring, but also in precepts of morals which he prescribes to the whole Church, and which are concerned with things necessary to salvation, or with those which are good *per se* or evil *per se*. . . . The Catholic faith teaches, that every virtue is good and every vice is evil; but if the Pope might err in prescribing vices, or in prohibiting virtues, the Church would be bound to believe that vices are good and virtues evil, unless it should be willing to sin against conscience; for in doubtful matters the Church is bound to acquiesce in the judgment of the supreme pontiff, and to do what he prescribes, and to forbear to do what he prohibits. And that it may not perchance sin against conscience, it is bound to believe that to be good which he prescribes, that to be evil which he prohibits. . . . It is probable, and can be piously believed, that the supreme pontiff, not only as pontiff cannot err, but also as a particular person cannot be a heretic by pertinaciously believing contrary to the faith any false thing." (De Summo Pontif., Lib. IV. cap. 3-6.) Among expressions of the opposing or Gallican theory of the papacy, perhaps the most important in this period was that put forth by an assembly of French clergy in 1682, to the effect that the Pope's authority lies under restrictions, and is subordinate to that of a general council. Bossuet was conspicuous in defending this view, and devoted an elaborate work to the purpose. (Defensio Declarationis Cleri Gallicani de Ecclesiastica Potestate.)

The Augsburg Confession gave the essentials of the standard Protestant definition of the Church. "The Church," it

says, "is the congregation of saints, in which the Gospel is rightly taught and the sacraments rightly administered." The same definition, with some limiting clauses, appears in the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. Article XIX. says: "The visible Church of Christ is a congregation of faithful men, in the which the pure Word of God is preached, and the sacraments be duly ministered according to Christ's ordinance, in all those things that of necessity are requisite to the same." Luther seems to have been well satisfied with this order of definition. He remarks: "Where the Word and the sacraments remain as to substance, there is the holy Church, notwithstanding Antichrist may reign there." (Comm. in Epist. ad Galat. Cap. I.) "Wherever," says Calvin, "we find the Word of God purely preached and heard, and the sacraments administered according to the institution of Christ, there, it is not to be doubted, is a church of God." (Inst., IV. 1.) In some instances, besides the two marks of the Church specified in the preceding statements, a third was included, namely, a proper maintenance of discipline. Thus the Belgic Confession says: "The marks by which the true Church is known are these: if the pure doctrine of the Gospel is preached therein; if she maintains the pure administration of the sacraments as instituted by Christ; if church discipline is exercised in punishing sin."

The above are definitions of the visible Church. But Protestants were by no means disposed strictly to identify the Church, even upon earth, with any definite visible organism, and so laid much stress upon the invisible Church. This they regarded as being in the truest sense the Catholic Church, and included in it all true believers, the whole body of the elect of God. "The Catholic or Universal Church," says the Westminster Confession, "which is invisible, consists of the whole number of the elect, that have been, are, or shall be gathered into one, under Christ the head thereof; and is the spouse, the body, the fulness,

of Him that filleth all in all." (Compare Irish Articles; Scotch Confession; Baptist Confession of 1688; Confession of the Waldenses.) According to the prevailing Protestant conception, large portions of the visible Church might be outside of the invisible, but few indeed were the representatives of the invisible Church that could be found outside of the visible, or at least among those who had not been specifically instructed in the truths of the Christian religion. The Quakers, it is true, maintained that, in virtue of the inner light some growing up in heathenism might be within the pale of the true Church. But probably Melancthon did not give much narrower bounds to the invisible Church than were assigned to it by the main current of Protestant sentiment in his own and the following age, when he wrote: "As often as we think of the Church, let us direct our attention to the company of the called which is the visible Church, nor let us dream that there are any elect elsewhere than in this visible company. For God neither wishes to be invoked nor to be acknowledged otherwise than He has revealed Himself. Nor has He revealed Himself elsewhere than in the visible Church, in which alone sounds the voice of the Gospel." (*Loci, De Ecclesia. Compare Quenstedt, De Eccl., quæst. 2.*)

Possibly a somewhat more liberal position might have been taken, had it not been forestalled almost at the beginning of the Reformation by the enthusiasts and agitators who appealed to the direct illumination of the Holy Spirit. Such manifestations naturally led to increased stress upon regularly constituted ecclesiastical authorities as channels of instruction and guidance. The same cause served also as an incentive to a rigorous theory and practice in dealing with heresy, though the principal cause here may well be sought in the natural impulse of men, who have once embraced and established a scheme, to look upon everything opposed thereto as savoring of sacrilegious license. Religious liberty, save as it may receive unusual support from

generous and gifted natures or from favoring circumstances, is not likely to be securely established in a community apart from a long and painful tuition. As previously stated, the logical outcome of the principles of the Reformation was religious tolerance. Some of the early Reformers, too, were at least opposed to punishing heresy with the extreme penalty. "Luther again and again expressed himself very emphatically against visiting the death penalty upon teachers of false doctrine." (Köstlin.) Bellarmin grants that this was his position; at least he blames him for agreeing with the assertion of Huss, that it is not lawful to deliver the incorrigible heretic over to the secular arm, and to allow him to be burned. (De Memb. Eccl. Mil., Lib. III. cap. 21.) In the view of Zwingli, "the magistrate ought only then to use force, when heresy overcome by the Word contends against the truth in a tumultuous way." (Zeller.) But some took more radical ground. The dealing of Calvin with Servetus, and his advice to the Earl of Somerset to repress the Papists and the fanatical sect of Gospellers, indicate at least that he was disposed to place some classes of religionists beyond the pale of tolerance. Beza argued, in the most express terms, that no class of men ought to be visited with heavier punishments than heretics, false prophets, and blasphemers. (Confessio, cap. 5; De Hæreticis a Civili Magistratu Puniendis.) According to Turretin, the most pestilent heretics, such as resist all means of amendment and disturb both Church and State, may be capitally punished. His words are: "Factionous heresiarchs and incorrigible blasphemers, ceasing not to scatter their poison, against prohibitions frequently repeated, and faith given, and disturbing the republic and the Church, we judge can be punished with death." (Locus XVIII. quæst. 34.) Perkins taught that atheists ought to be punished with death, and declared that the greatest tortures which the wit of man can devise are too good for them. (Cases of Conscience, Bk. II. chap. 2.) He says

also, that recusants may properly be compelled to the exercises of religion, and a certain Mr. Cudworth, who completed his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, makes the kindred statement: "The magistrate may and ought to compel obstinate recusants to profess the true religion." The Westminster divines declared, indeed, that God alone is Lord of the conscience; but they understood at the same time that God's Word binds the conscience, and that this Word makes many things concerning faith and worship, as well as general conduct, so clearly known, that he who contradicts them is justly subject to correction by the civil magistrate. (Chap. XX., XXIII.) However, there was another current within the bounds of Protestantism. The number of those who inclined to the liberal maxims which the Prince of Orange advocated and exemplified in the sixteenth century, greatly increased during the seventeenth century. Among the various parties who were friendly to tolerance, whether Arminians, Independents, or the more liberal wing of the Established Church of England, none excelled the Quakers in the definiteness and emphasis with which they advocated religious freedom. In their Confession it is said that "all killing, banishing, fining, imprisoning, and other such things, which men are afflicted with for the alone exercise of their conscience, or difference in worship or opinion, proceedeth from the spirit of Cain, the murderer, and is contrary to the truth." Roger Williams and his Baptist followers were also very pronounced advocates of tolerance.

In its view of the Christian priesthood, Protestantism departed widely from Romanism. Instead of making the congregation an attachment to the hierarchy, a company absolutely reduced to the position of subjects, it declared that all are by right priests, and that he who for the sake of necessary order and convenience is specially commissioned to conduct worship and exercise pastoral care is the servant and representative of the congregation. Luther

early declared very emphatically for this universal priesthood. At the same time he said: "Even if it is true that we are all equally priests, we are not all able, neither ought if we were able, publicly to serve and to teach. . . . What belongs in common to all, no one is able to arrogate particularly to himself, until he is called." (De Lib. Christ.; De Captiv. Bab.) The same idea was brought out by the Second Helvetic Confession in the distinction made between *sacerdotium* and *ministerium*, of which the former alone pertains to all believers.

As respects Church government Protestants generally regarded its form as largely optional. Even in the Church of England, where the hierarchical constitution was retained, such constitution was not regarded as of the essence of the Church. Men like Cranmer, Hooker, and even Whitgift, did not consider episcopacy to be of divine right. The first of the English prelates to advocate such right is said to have been Bancroft. In 1588, as an offset to the Puritan doctrine maintained by Thomas Cartwright and others, that the presbyterian form is prescribed in the New Testament, he set up the claim that episcopacy is the form divinely sanctioned and prescribed. This theory, once started, rapidly won ground, though there were eminent Episcopalians in the next century, such as Usher and Stillingfleet, who adhered to the primitive and more liberal standpoint.

In their sharp antagonism to Romanism, Protestants for the most part denied to the Roman Catholic communion the character of a true Church. They regarded Romanism as the great apostasy, and freely styled the Pope Antichrist. So he is called even in some of the confessions. The weak points in the theory of the primacy were ably exposed by various writers. Some cogent strictures were made by Calvin. He says, for example, supposing a primacy was given to Peter, "how will they prove that its seat was fixed at Rome, so that whoever is bishop of that city must preside over the whole world? By what right do they restrict to

one place this dignity, which was conferred without the mention of any place? Peter, they say, lived and died at Rome. What shall we say of Christ Himself? Was it not at Jerusalem that He exercised the office of a bishop while he lived, and fulfilled the priestly office by His death? The Prince of pastors, the supreme Bishop, the Head of the Church, could not obtain this honor for the place where He lived and died; could then Peter, who was far inferior to Him?" (Inst., IV. 6.)

SECTION II.—THE SACRAMENTS.

1. GENERAL THEORY OF THE SACRAMENTS.—The more important specifications of the council of Trent upon the sacraments in general were the following: (1.) They are seven in number. (2.) They are necessary to justification, so that they must be received, or at least desired. (3.) They contain the grace which they signify, and confer this *ex opere operato*, or through the act performed, upon one not presenting an obstacle. (4.) The intention on the part of the priest of really executing the sacrament is essential to its validity. (5.) The three sacraments, baptism, confirmation, and order, impress an indelible character or sign upon the soul of the recipient. The fourth specification is in these words: "If any one saith, that, in ministers, when they effect and confer the sacraments, there is not required the intention at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." An additional statement bearing on the same point is given by the council in connection with the sacrament of penance, where it is said: "The penitent ought not so to confide in his own personal faith as to think that—even though there be no contrition on his part, or no intention on the part of the priest of acting seriously and absolving truly—he is nevertheless truly and in God's sight absolved, on account of his faith alone. For neither

would faith without penance bestow any remission of sins, nor would he be otherwise than most careless of his own salvation, who, knowing that a priest absolved him but in jest, should not carefully seek for another who would act in earnest." It is to be noticed here, that "acting seriously" and "acting in earnest" are used in describing the proper intention on the part of the priest.

Bellarmin expands on the statement that sacraments are effective *ex opere operato*. This phrase, he says, does not denote that certain subjective states are not essential in adults, but that the efficacy of the sacraments is not due to these states, and that they are involved in the fact that the individual does not interpose obstacles. He states the matter in this wise: "Will, faith, and penitence are necessarily required in the adult candidate, as dispositions on the part of the subject, not as active causes: for faith and penitence do not effect the sacramental grace, nor do they give the efficacy of the sacrament, but they merely remove obstacles, which hinder the sacraments from being able to exercise their own efficacy." (De Sacramentis, Lib. II. cap. 1.) "He cannot properly be said not to present an obstacle who comes to the sacrament without the necessary disposition; otherwise, not only without detestation of sin, but also without faith one could be justified through baptism." (De Pœnitentia, Lib. II. cap. 9.) This must be classed among the more moderate of Roman Catholic views of the subject. In practical as well as theoretical stress upon the right subjective conditions, as affecting the efficacy of the sacraments, the Jansenists were distinguished above all other Romanists.

As respects the intention of the ministering priest, Bellarmin teaches in the most unmistakable terms that it is necessary. The kind of intention that is requisite he describes as the *intentio virtualis*. The *intentio actualis* is not strictly necessary, the *intentio habitualis* does not suffice. The *intentio virtualis* has place where an operation

is continued in virtue of an actual intention which was at one time present but is so no longer. In answer to the objection of Calvin, that dependence upon the intention of the minister destroys certitude, Bellarmin says: "I reply, a man ought not in this world to seek an infallible certitude concerning his own salvation or justification. . . . But a human and moral certitude, in which a man may properly rest, we have from the sacraments, even if they depend upon the intention of another. For since it is most easy to have the intention, there is no cause to doubt that the minister has the intention, unless he reveals its absence by some exterior sign." (De Sacramentis, Lib. I. cap. 27, 28.) It is to be noticed, that Bellarmin does not say that the design to go through the bare externals of the sacramental rite is essential, or all that is essential, to a proper intention. That he included more than this in such an intention is evident from the way in which he replies to Calvin. Nicole, who puts the construction in question upon the Trent canon, (Instructions sur les Sacraments,) contradicts the history of the tenet, as well as the rational demands of the case. A priest can intend to go through the exact formula of a sacrament as a jest or pantomime, whereas to intend to do what the Church does he must seriously design that the sacrament should be a means of grace. The language of the council of Trent about *acting seriously* and *in earnest* cannot properly be regarded as meaning less than this. But while one cannot agree with Nicole's construction of the dogma, he can understand his uneasiness over the same. It is a dogma at once abhorrent in the dependence in which it places souls upon human caprice, and perilous to the Romish fabric, inasmuch as it puts in question the validity of holy orders. Some of the fathers at Trent were not wholly blind to the former phase. One of the bishops argued against the necessity of the inward intention, and pointed his argument by supposing a case where a priest, who, being an infidel and a

formal hypocrite, might despoil a whole congregation of the sacraments, and cause the perdition of children from lack of valid baptism. "The divines," says Sarpi, "did not approve this doctrine, yet were troubled, and knew not how to resolve the reason. But they still maintained that the true intention of the minister was necessary, either actual or virtual, and that without it the sacrament was not of force, notwithstanding any external demonstration." These words show how far was Sarpi's understanding of the dogma, as well as that of the Trent fathers, from Nicole's interpretation.

In place of the seven sacraments of Romanism, Protestantism affirmed but two, though not universally in the first stage of its history. Luther sometimes spoke of three sacraments, baptism, eucharist, and absolution. Melancthon gave the same list, and said that, for his part, he should be pleased to include ministerial ordination. (*Loci, De Sacramentis.*) The Lutherans, however, though continuing to lay considerable stress upon the rite of confession and absolution, did not make it properly a sacrament. "Absolution," says Chemnitz, "is not truly and properly a sacrament in the same way as are baptism and the Lord's supper." (*Examen Decret. Concil. Tridentini, Pars II.*) Gerhard and other distinguished Lutheran writers took the same ground.

Different degrees of stress were laid by different parties upon the necessity of the sacraments; but no Protestant communion went quite as far as the Roman Catholic upon this point, as none expressly excluded all infants dying without baptism from salvation.

With the exception of the Lutherans, Protestants commonly defined sacraments as signs and seals of divine grace. The following statement of the Heidelberg Catechism is representative: "The sacraments are visible holy signs and seals, appointed of God to this end, that by the use thereof He may the more fully declare and seal to us

the promise of the Gospel." By Zwingli the symbolical import of the sacraments, and their use as a common means of confessing discipleship, were emphasized. The Arminians also laid the chief stress upon this order of considerations. Calvin made prominent, in addition, the idea that the sacraments are means of presenting or exhibiting divine benefits and occasions of the invisible operation of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers. At the same time, he denied that they confer grace in their own virtue. We are not, he says, to be led by the extravagant language of the fathers to suppose "there is some secret power annexed and attached to the sacraments, so that they communicate the grace of the Holy Spirit, just as wine is given in the cup; whereas the only office assigned to them by God is to testify and confirm His benevolence toward us; nor do they impart any benefit, unless they are accompanied by the Holy Spirit to open our minds and hearts and render us capable of receiving this testimony." (Inst., IV. 14.) The Westminster Confession asserts the same view in these words: "The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not conferred by any power in them." (Chap. XXVII.) In the Lutheran theory, on the other hand, a sacrament was regarded as something more than a sign, a seal, or an occasion of grace, and was termed an *instrumental cause* or *efficacious medium* of grace. This was quite in harmony with the Lutheran ideas that the Word has intrinsic power, and that the Word is the principal factor in a sacrament. Gerhard accordingly expressly condemns the Calvinian theory as assigning too little efficacy to the sacraments themselves. (Locus XVIII. § 56.) As thus defined, the Lutheran view appears to be not a little in affinity with the Roman Catholic doctrine that the sacrament works *ex opere operato*. But this doctrine was repudiated by Lutherans, as well as by other Protestants. However, the main difference between the Roman Catholic theory, as expounded

by Bellarmin, and the Lutheran, is that the one requires faith, because the lack of it would be an obstacle to the grace of the sacrament, and the other requires faith as the necessary organ or instrument for grasping the offered grace. In addition to this, account must of course be taken of the fact that Bellarmin gives the least ultra of Roman Catholic theories on the subject, and still more of the fact that faith, in the Lutheran sense, is a much profounder principle than it is in the definition of Bellarmin and other Romanists. As respects the requirement of intention in the administrator, the Romish theory was universally repudiated by Protestants.

2. BAPTISM.—The mediæval view of the effect and the necessity of baptism, as defined by leading scholastics, remained in the Romish Church unchanged. It was regarded as cancelling guilt, ameliorating corruption, and, according to the specification of Bellarmin, it supplies the perfect faith in place of the imperfect which may exist prior to its administration. Bellarmin decides that an unbaptized catechumen can be saved in virtue of his purpose to be baptized when the opportunity is offered. But he makes such purpose indispensable. "Whoever is not baptized," he says, "or at least does not desire baptism, is not saved, although it happens from ignorance or impotence." (*De Sacramentis*, Lib. I. cap. 22.) This of course leaves to the unbaptized dying in infancy no opportunity whatever to be saved. This conclusion Bellarmin draws in all its rigor. "The Church," he says, "has always believed that infants perish if they depart from this life without baptism." The ground of their condemnation he states thus: "Although it is no fault of children that they are not baptized, they do not perish nevertheless without fault of their own, for they have original sin." (*De Baptismo*, cap. 4.) Nicole and Bossuet declare, in equally unequivocal terms, that unbaptized infants cannot be saved. The Trent Catechism plainly implies the same conclusion. Thus, according to

the standard Roman Catholic teaching, a large portion of the race are shut out from all possibility of salvation by a decree as arbitrary as the decree of reprobation advocated by ultra predestinarians.

The Lutherans approximated to the Roman Catholics in their stress upon the necessity and the efficacy of baptism. They differed, however, in a measure, upon the former point, since they allowed that unbaptized children of Christian parents might, by the extraordinary grace of God, be saved. To be sure, the Augsburg Confession and the Formula of Concord condemn the Anabaptist theory, that infants should not receive baptism, and are saved without it. But so far as these condemnatory sentences bore upon the latter item, they were taken with a qualification. Representative Lutheran theologians, however reserved they may have been on the fate of heathen children, taught distinctly enough, that children of Christian parents departing without baptism are not necessarily deprived of salvation. (Gerhard, *Confess. Cath.*; *Locus XX.* §§ 237-242; Quenstedt, *De Baptismo*, quæst. 10.) At the same time, they strongly emphasized the duty of parents to make sure of the baptism of their children, and, like the Roman Catholics, authorized its performance by the hands of a layman in case of necessity.

In accordance with their general theory of the efficacy of the sacraments, the Lutherans taught that baptism is an efficacious medium of spiritual benefits. To be sure, in some instances, the gifts of which it is the channel may have been in large part already grasped by the faith of the candidate; but in any case in which it is properly received it is a medium of grace, and seals and confirms whatever may have been conferred previously. To the believing candidate it secures remission of all sins, adoption, and inward renovation. This last, however, is not complete, and is to be carried forward from day to day toward perfection.

Infant children, as well as adults, according to the Lu-

theran theory, receive the spiritual benefits of baptism. This conclusion involved a measure of difficulty for its advocates. The general Lutheran theory strongly emphasized the need of faith as the instrument by which spiritual benefits are received. But can infants exercise faith? Luther showed a certain disposition to answer this question in the affirmative, and sometimes spoke of faith as an actual endowment of the infant. However, in his final view he was inclined to leave this point to the doctors, and to affirm that baptism is efficacious in the case of infants, on the simple ground that God has ordained it for them. (Dorner.) The Lutheran doctors, as it seems, came to the conclusion that there is a real faith in infants in connection with the act of baptism. Quenstedt, for example, says: "Through baptism and in baptism the Holy Spirit awakens in infants a true, saving, living, and actual faith." (De Baptismo, Sect. II. quæst. 8.) "We affirm," says Gerhard, "that the Holy Spirit, in the performance of baptism, by His grace and efficacy works faith, which is not inactive or a naked habit, but by some act, whose mode is inexplicable to us, it puts on Christ, and is made participant of regeneration and salvation." (Confess. Cath., p. 1116. Compare Locus XX. §§ 218-232; Hollaz, Pars III. sect. 2, cap. 3, qu. 17.) It will be observed that the passages quoted speak of faith as wrought in and by baptism, rather than as antecedent to the same. This was characteristic of the thought of the time. Speaking of infant subjects, Dorner says: "The Lutheran theology of the seventeenth century abandoned the standpoint, that faith must be required *before* baptism, considering it rather, in opposition to Baptist teaching, as the effect of baptism, like regeneration." (System of Christ. Doct., § 139.)

In the Reformed Church less stress was in general laid upon the necessity of baptism than in the Lutheran. A token of this appears in the fact that the former discouraged the practice of resorting to lay baptism in case of

emergency, maintaining that the omission of the sacrament in such a case cannot be a source of injury. "If the omission of the sign," says Calvin, "be not occasioned by indolence, or contempt, or negligence, we are safe from all danger. It is far more consistent with piety to show this reverence to the institution of God, not to receive the sacraments from any other hands than those to which the Lord has committed them. When it is impossible to receive them from the Church, the grace of God is not so attached to them but that we may obtain it by faith from the Word of the Lord." (Inst., IV. 15.) "That the contempt of baptism damnable," says Bishop Hall, "is past all doubt; but that the constrained absence thereof should send infants to hell, is a cruel rashness." (Works, Vol. VI. p. 248.)

Those inclined to the Zwinglian conception of the sacraments laid but moderate stress upon the efficacy of baptism, as respects any direct communication of grace, and regarded it as designed rather to testify to existing faith, than to effect an increase. But a more emphatic view prevailed quite generally in the Reformed Church. This appears in some of the creeds. In the Scotch Confession it is said: "We assuredly believe that by baptism we are engrafted into Christ Jesus, to be made partakers of His justice, by which our sins are covered and remitted." In the Thirty-nine Articles baptism is styled a sign of regeneration, an instrument for grafting into the Church, a means of sealing the promises of forgiveness and adoption, of confirming faith and increasing grace by the virtue of prayer unto God. The French Confession says: "Baptism is given as a pledge of our adoption; for by it we are grafted into the body of Christ, so as to be washed and cleansed by His blood, and then renewed in purity of life by His Holy Spirit." In the Confession of the Waldenses an equally strong statement is used: "We believe that Christ has instituted the sacrament of baptism to be a testimony of our adoption, and that therein we are cleansed from our sins

by the blood of Jesus Christ, and renewed in holiness of life." Such statements are to be understood in accordance with the general theory of the Reformed Church, that no sacrament confers grace in its own virtue. It should be noticed, also, that important confessions, like the Zurich Consensus and the Westminster Confession, state that the grace which is properly connected with baptism is not necessarily bestowed at the time of its administration, but may be deferred to a subsequent period (or be withheld altogether, in case the candidate is not among the elect, as is taught by the Zurich Consensus). It was also a part of the Reformed doctrine, that the spiritual benefits which the proper candidate may receive in baptism are not so tied to the sacrament but that they may be obtained prior to its administration.

As respects the baptism of infants, the Reformed theory differed from the Lutheran in two respects: (1.) By the former it was regarded as a right and a privilege; by the latter, as rather a necessity. The Lutherans taught that children of believers should be baptized in order to bring them into the covenant of grace. The Reformed said that children of believers are entitled to baptism as a sign of the covenant, because they are already included in the covenant and are members of Christ's body. "The children of believers," Calvin remarks, "are not baptized, that they may thereby be made the children of God, as if they had before been strangers to the Church; but on the contrary they are received into the Church by a solemn sign, because they already belonged to the body of Christ by virtue of the promise." (Inst., IV. 15.) The Heidelberg Catechism contains an equivalent statement. (2.) The Reformed denied that infants exercise in baptism an actual faith. They allowed however, at least in many cases, an operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul of the infant, and as a fruit of this a seminal faith, or ground of future actual faith. (Beza, Confessio, Cap. IV.; Vossius, Disput. de Sac-

rament. Natura; Turretin, Locus XV. quæst. 14.) The principle referred to above, that the proper grace of baptism may be given at a date subsequent to the administration of the rite, was naturally applied quite largely to the case of infants. There was not, however, a strict unanimity on this point. Archbishop Usher was of the opinion that elect infants who are appointed soon to die are regenerated in baptism, whereas for the rest we cannot be sure of their actual regeneration till they actually believe. Hammond, Tillotson, and some others, took a view of baptismal regeneration which had little to do with inward transformation. (Hunt.) But there were those who used language implying that infants in general are truly regenerated in baptism. Witsius considered it probable that elect infants are ordinarily regenerated before baptism. (Series Exercitationum, XIX.) Henry Dodwell held the eccentric notion that, inasmuch as the soul is naturally mortal, all unchristened infants cease at death to exist, and all adults not baptized by one who has been ordained by a bishop share the same fate; unless perchance they are preserved for the sake of being punished.

The Lutherans and Reformed were agreed in teaching that the efficacy of baptism lasts through life, or is intrinsically suited to this permanence. Instead of affirming, like the Romanists, that, in consequence of its benefits being impaired or lost by sins, resort must be had to other sacraments, especially that of penance, they maintained that by inward repentance one steps back upon the platform of the baptismal grace, so that the efficacy of baptism is made continuously to avail. "Penitence," says Chemnitz, "is nothing else than a return to the promise of grace belonging to baptism." (Examen, Pars II.) "Whenever we have fallen," says Calvin, "we must recur to the remembrance of baptism, and arm our minds with the consideration of it, that we may be always certified and assured of the remission of sins." (Inst., IV. 15.) In the French

Confession it is said: "We hold that, although we are baptized only once, yet the gain that it symbolizes to us reaches over our whole lives and to our death, so that we have a lasting witness that Jesus Christ will always be our justification and sanctification." (Art. XXXV.)

The Socinians made little account of baptism. Socinus denied that it was designed to be of perpetual obligation, and that it is appropriate to one brought up in the Christian faith, though it might be used not inaptly to initiate into Christianity converts from other religions. The Socinians, however, were not inclined to follow him to this extreme of radicalism. In the revised edition of the Racovian Catechism it is said: "The external religious acts, or sacred rites always observed in the Church of Christ, are baptism and the breaking of the sacred bread." (V. 3.) Of the current custom of infant baptism the Catechism speaks in very disparaging terms, but at the same time allows that it is something which charity may tolerate. In the same connection, it is said that immersion is essential to baptism. The common view of the Lutherans and the Reformed, on the other hand, was that immersion is not of the essence of baptism. (Gerhard, *Locus XX.* §§ 94-96; Turretin, *Locus XIX.* quæst. 11; Westminster Confession, Chap. XXVIII.)

The Quakers took the ground that the "one baptism" of the Christian dispensation is purely spiritual, and that water baptism has properly no longer any place in the Church. (Proposition XII.)

In the Baptist Confession of 1688 the following maxims, among others, are laid down: "Those who do actually profess repentance towards God, faith in and obedience to our Lord Jesus, are the only proper subjects of this ordinance." "Immersion, or dipping of the person in water, is necessary to the due administration of this ordinance." It is to be noticed, however, that in the Mennonites we have an example of Baptists, the main body of whom did not insist upon or even practise immersion.

3. THE EUCHARIST.—In the Reformation era scarcely another topic caused so much controversy. To multitudes the denial of transubstantiation was an occasion of imprisonment, tortures, and death. Even under the anti-papal rule of Henry VIII. in England, to deny this doctrine was made the greatest in the catalogue of crimes, and was punishable with death by burning. Protestants began early a series of bitter controversies among themselves on the interpretation of the Eucharist, and as wearisome a theological literature as the earth ever groaned under was called forth.

The council of Trent gave an authoritative sanction to the scholastic doctrine of the eucharist, not only as respects its general outline, but also as respects many of its details. It declared that immediately after the consecration the veritable body of our Lord and His veritable blood, together with His soul and divinity, are under the species of bread and wine; that by force of the words of consecration, the body is under the species of bread, and the blood under the species of wine, but by reason of concomitance each is under both species; that Christ whole and entire is under any part of either species; that the substance of the bread and wine is changed into the substance of body and blood; that the worship of *latria* which is due to the true God is properly rendered to the holy sacrament, and the same is fitly honored by being borne in public processions; that although the use of both species has not been unfrequent from the beginning of the Christian religion, the Church has suitable reasons for approving the custom of communicating under one species; that in the mass, which is a truly propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead, the same victim is offered which was offered on the cross, only in a different manner; that masses in which the priest alone communicates are legitimate.

The best discretion would teach the Romanist to rest the dogma of transubstantiation simply upon the fiat of church

authority. Reasons and explanations never appear here to good advantage. The elaborate exposition and defence, therefore, of Bellarmin, are very little to his credit. The following are some of his statements: "We say most truly that in the sacrament is body, flesh, and blood, and that that flesh is body, not spirit." (De Sac. Eucharist., Lib. I. cap. 2.) "Christ does not have in the eucharist the mode of existence of bodies, but rather of spirits, since He is entire in any part." (Ibid.) "Rightly we shall say, The body of Christ is, is contained, remains, is found, is taken, is received in the eucharist; but not rightly should we say, The body of Christ in the eucharist is extended, occupies place, etc." (Ibid.) "Imagination is not able to conceive of one body in different places, but reason is able to judge, nevertheless, if it is sound, that the imagination is deceived." (Lib. III. cap. 4.) "It is the common opinion of the scholastics and the Church, that the entire Christ exists in the eucharist, with magnitude, and all the accidents, relation to the celestial place excepted, which it has in heaven; . . . and moreover, that the parts and members of the body of Christ do not penetrate each other, but are so distinguished and disposed among themselves that they have both the figure and order suitable to the human body." (III. 5.) "It is not the essence of magnitude to occupy place." (III. 6.) "We do not say that the body of Christ in the eucharist lacks dimensions or form," — *dimensionibus aut facie*. (III. 7.) "Truly if God should remove all the air from this entire hall in which we now are, and should allow no more to enter, we should all retain our dimensions and forms, and nevertheless we should neither continue in space, nor would any one see the form of another." (III. 7.) "It is false that it pertains to the essence of an accident to inhere in a subject." (III. 24.) Thus, according to Bellarmin, that which has magnitude, arrangement of parts, dimensions, and form may, despite the imagination, be thought of as being at the same time

in many different places, though it is not to be said to occupy place.

The standards of the Greek Church in this period affirmed in relation to the eucharist the doctrines of transubstantiation and propitiatory sacrifice. (Orthodox Confession, Quæst. LVI., CVII.; Confession of Dositheus, Decretum XVII.)

Luther, though not without some inclination previously to a different theory, early came to the fixed conclusion that the words of institution must be taken literally, and that accordingly a real bodily presence of Christ in the eucharist must be affirmed. At the same time he repudiated the doctrine of transubstantiation. From these premises was derived the Lutheran tenet which has sometimes been described by the term *consubstantiation*. This tenet, while agreeing with the Roman Catholic teaching respecting the real presence of the body and blood, and the actual receiving of them by all communicants, worthy or unworthy, denied that the essence of the bread and wine is changed. The body and blood, it was taught, are in, with, and under the elements, not substituted for their substance. The Lutheran theory was also distinguished from the Roman Catholic by associating the bodily presence with the actual administration of the rite, as opposed to the idea that it may properly be regarded as continuing as long as one is pleased to preserve the consecrated elements or their species. The Lutherans, moreover, in common with all Protestants, rejected the Romish doctrine of the mass, or propitiatory sacrifice, and condemned as sacrilege the withholding of the cup from the laity.

Luther associated the theory of the Lord's supper with the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. The right hand of God, it was maintained, is everywhere. The ascension of Christ, therefore, to the right hand of God, in no wise prevents His presence in this world. Even in respect of His humanity he is universally present, and so of course

can be present in the eucharist. His being everywhere, however, does not interfere with the divine appointment that His presence should be specially apprehended in the eucharist. Moreover, Christ's body is present in the eucharist in a special manner. We have here to do neither with a local presence (circumscriptive), as of a body whose place is defined by its relation to other bodies, nor with a presence of that highest order by virtue of which God is in all places without limitation to any (repletive), but rather with a presence like that of a spirit in a place (definitive). The body of Christ is indeed present everywhere in the second sense, but it is besides in the eucharist in the third sense. (Köstlin.)

The Lutheran Confessions in general do not refine upon distinctions like the above. In the Formula of Concord, however, the statement is made that it is not after the ordinary mode of a physical presence that the body of Christ is in the eucharist. Uniting this idea with the doctrine of a real partaking of the body, the Formula uses the rather contradictory representation, that the body is truly received by the mouth, but in a spiritual and heavenly manner. It says: "We believe, teach, and confess that the body and blood of Christ are taken with the bread and wine, not only spiritually through faith, but also by the mouth, nevertheless not Capernaitically, but after a spiritual and heavenly manner, by reason of the sacramental union."

In the Reformed Church three different types of teaching had a place, (1.) the Zwinglian, (2.) the Calvinian, (3.) the intermediate, or the modified Calvinian.

Zwingli maintained, in opposition to Luther, that the words of institution are to be taken figuratively. Placing the trope in the copula, he said that Christ's declaration, "This is my body," means simply, This signifies or represents my body. Ecolampadius, who otherwise agreed essentially with Zwingli, placed the trope in the word *body*.

The elements, according to Zwingli, are related to the body and blood of Christ only as symbols. In the eucharistic rite the believer presents a confession of discipleship and loyalty, and receives a token of love and fellowship. He may be said indeed spiritually to eat Christ's body, but "spiritually to eat Christ's body is nothing else than with the spirit and mind to rely upon the compassion and goodness of God through Christ." (*Expositio Chr. Fidei.*) This view was approved by the Arminians and the Socinians. Limborch is very emphatic in asserting the superiority of the Zwinglian to the Calvinian theory. (*Lib. V. cap. 71.*)

Calvin, coming upon the stage after the controversy between the Lutherans and the Swiss had been started, devised a theory in a measure suited to mediate between the two parties. It enabled him to use language nearly as strong as the Lutheran respecting the real presence of Christ in the eucharist, and at the same time agreed with the Swiss tenets that the body of Christ remains in heaven and is not actually in this world at all. His theory in brief was, that the glorified humanity of Christ is a fountain of spiritual virtue or efficacy; that this efficacy is mediated by the Holy Spirit to the believing recipient of the eucharistic elements; that accordingly the body of Christ is present in the eucharist in respect of virtue or efficacy; that the eating of Christ's body is entirely spiritual, by means of faith, the unbelieving having no part in it, and an oral manducation being out of question. The following quotations will serve to illustrate Calvin's position: "The flesh of Christ is like a rich, an inexhaustible fountain, which receives the life flowing from the divinity and conveys it to us. . . . Though it appears incredible for the flesh of Christ, from such an immense local distance, to reach us, so as to become our food, we should remember how much the secret power of the Holy Spirit transcends all our senses, and what folly it is to apply any measure of ours to His immensity. Let our faith receive, therefore, what our understanding is not

able to comprehend, that the Spirit really unites things which are separated by local distance. . . . In the mystery of the supper, under the symbols of bread and wine, Christ is truly exhibited to us, even His body and blood. And the design of this exhibition is, first, that we may be united into one body with Him, and, secondly, that being made partakers of His substance, we may experience His power in the communication of all blessings. . . . Body must be body, spirit must be spirit. . . . They are exceedingly deceived who cannot conceive of any presence of the flesh of Christ in the supper, except it be attached to the bread. For on this principle they leave nothing to the secret operation of the Spirit, which unites us to Christ. They suppose Christ not to be present unless He descends to us; as though we cannot equally enjoy His presence, if He elevates us to Himself." (Inst., IV. 17.)

The view which we have characterized as intermediate between the Zwinglian and the Calvinian differs from the latter by a more moderate or less mystical phraseology, and by less positively associating the spiritual grace which is received in the use of the sacrament with the glorified body of Christ. Among Reformed Confessions, the Heidelberg Catechism, and the French, the Belgic, and the Scotch Confessions, scarcely fall short of the full Calvinian view. The Thirty-nine Articles do not, in explicit terms, come up to the Calvinian theory; they admit of being interpreted in a sense less remote from the Zwinglian doctrine. However, it may be judged from the language of representative theologians, like Hooker, that the Calvinian theory was largely received in the early English Church. Hooker's statements correspond very exactly to those of Calvin. (Eccl. Polity, Bk. V. sect. 67.) There are expressions also in the writings of Cranmer and Jewell which affiliate with the Calvinian phraseology. The Second Helvetic and the Westminster Confessions are rather favorable than otherwise to the intermediate theory or the modified Calvinian. The drift in

the Reformed Church was probably toward the standpoint represented by these Confessions.

4. PENANCE. — The sacrament of penance was also one of the subjects which the council of Trent treated at length, and with minute conformity to the scholastic doctrine. It decreed that this sacrament is, for those who have fallen after baptism, necessary to salvation, and serves them as a second plank after shipwreck; that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are required of the penitent, the last for the purpose of cancelling the temporal penalty which is left after the eternal has been remitted; that venial sins, while they may profitably be confessed, may be omitted without guilt, but each and every mortal sin, together with any circumstances which affect its nature, must be confessed; that bishops and priests alone can absolve; that the sacramental absolution of the priest, given in the terms, *I absolve thee*, is a judicial act, and not a bare ministry of declaring sins to be forgiven to him who confesses; that we can make satisfaction to God by punishments voluntarily undertaken, or by those imposed at the discretion of the priest, or by patient endurance of providential scourgings; that he deserves the anathema who says that the best penance is merely a new life. This last specification is explained by the inveterate bent of the council to condemn as nearly as possible the exact language of the Reformers, and especially of Luther. In many cases some extravagant rhetorical statement, which the great body of Protestants never received without qualification, was seized upon for censure. But occasionally, as in this instance, a poor use was made of the genius for anathematizing.

The complete sacrament of penance, as interpreted by Romanists, was far from being accepted by any party of Protestants. Whatever place Luther gave to confession and absolution, he was remote from the Romish standpoint; for he regarded confession to an ordained minister as rather a matter of propriety than of necessity, and main-

tained that it is by no means required to give a full catalogue of sins, it being sufficient to mention those which specially burden the conscience and respecting which advice is desired. The absolving sentence, spoken in private, he looked upon as essentially the same as that given in the public proclamation of the Gospel, but he considered it of great advantage that an individual application should be given to the promise of remission. The final verdict of the Lutherans, as previously stated, was against styling absolution a sacrament, but it gave nevertheless to the rite essentially the same place as that claimed for it by Luther.

The Reformed Church in general was much less favorable than the Lutheran to private or auricular confession, and was disposed to substitute for it, except in a case calling for a special act of discipline, simply the confession of sins to God in private or in the congregation. "We believe," says the Second Helvetic Confession, "this ingenuous confession, which is made to God alone, either privately between God and the sinner, or openly in the sanctuary, where that general confession of sins is recited, suffices, nor is it necessary to obtaining remission of sins that any one should confess his sins to a priest, by whispering in his ears, that in turn with the imposition of his hands he may hear from him the absolution; for of this thing neither any precept nor example is found in the Holy Scriptures." (Cap. XIV.) The French Confession numbers auricular confession among the devices of Satan. Calvin declares it a pestilent thing. (Inst., III. 4.) Bullinger in his sermons says: "It is enough for us to confess our sins to God, who, because He seeth our hearts, ought therefore most rightly to hear our confessions." Some of the Anglican divines gave a certain place to private confession and absolution, making it, however, a matter of choice. Latimer says, if one cannot be satisfied with the general absolution given in the place of worship,

he is privileged to go to the minister in private. (Serm. XXII.) Hooker remarks of private absolution, that it is no more than a declaration of what God hath done. As respects the practice of private confession, he says that it is neither enforced nor forbidden by the Church of England. (Eccl. Polity, Bk. VI. sect. 4.) Bishop Joseph Hall says: "That there is a lawful, commendable, beneficial use of confession was never denied by us, but to set men upon the rack, and to strain their souls up to a double pin of absolute necessity — both *præcepti et medii* — and of strict particularity, and that by a screw of *Jus Divinum*, is so mere a Roman novelty, that many ingenuous authors of their own have willingly confessed it." (Works, Vol. IX. p. 360.) From the general standpoint of the Reformed Church, the power of the keys was naturally regarded as denoting either the efficacy of the Gospel message in binding and loosing, or the prerogatives of the Church in the administration of discipline.

5. MARRIAGE. — Among the decisions of the council of Trent upon this subject, the more noteworthy were, that, while separation as respects cohabitation may take place for various causes, for no cause, not even that of adultery, can the marriage bond be dissolved; that clerics in sacred orders and regulars, who have solemnly professed chastity, cannot contract a valid marriage; that it is better and more blessed to remain in virginity than to enter into matrimony. These points, if not positively asserted, were sanctioned by pronouncing the anathema against those denying them.

Protestants were content to receive the Romish anathema upon each of these specifications. The equal honor of the married with the celibate state, and the privilege of ministers to live in wedlock, were common maxims among them, and were asserted in some of the Confessions. It was also commonly taught by Protestant writers, that, for the cause of adultery, a divorce as to bond, as well as

to bed, *quoad vinculum* as well as *quoad thorum*, may be granted, so that no impediment shall stand in the way of the innocent party remarrying. (Luther, De Captiv. Bab.; Chemnitz, Examen, Pars II.; Gerhard, Confess. Cath.; Beza, Confessio, Cap. V.; Limborch, Lib. V. cap. 60; Westminster Confession, Chap. XXIV.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. **CHILIASM.** — By all the larger communions chiliasm or millenarianism was decidedly repudiated. It had, however, considerable currency among the Anabaptists. Some of the mystical writers taught kindred views. The English Mede and the French Calvinist, Jurieu, held the early patristic theory. In the days of the Rebellion and the Commonwealth, quite a number of the sectaries were millenarians. Such was the party designated as Fifth Monarchy Men. John Milton believed in a future visible appearing and reign of Christ upon earth,—a reign of a thousand years. Near the close of the period, William Petersen attracted attention as an enthusiastic advocate of the same doctrine. At the same time, a departure from the interpretation of Augustine began to be made by some who, like him, did not believe in the visible reign of Christ on earth. Instead of placing the beginning of the millennium in the past, they located it in the future. Whitby and Vitringa were prominent representatives of this view. (Compare the opinion of the German minister, Schindler, as quoted by Calov, Tom. XII. art. 4, cap. 3, qu. 3.)

2. **CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION.** —The Protestants repudiated the doctrine of Purgatory, though it was more than a decade after his appearance as a reformer before Luther renounced it altogether. For the most part, also, they made no further account of an intermediate state than is necessarily involved in the idea of a general resurrection, or investing of souls with bodies at

the end of the world. Those dying in the Lord were commonly described as passing at once to God, to Christ, to the bliss of heaven, and the wicked were described as descending into hell. Speaking of the change which takes place at death, the Westminster Confession says: "The souls of the righteous being then made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day." (Chap. XXXII.) There were some, however, who acknowledged a state in a fuller sense intermediate. Limborch, for example, says that the souls of the righteous, although in a state of bliss, do not fully triumph in heaven, or enjoy the vision of God, nor do the wicked undergo the proper pains of hell-fire, before the final judgment. (Lib. VI. cap. 10.)

Some of the Anabaptists held the doctrine of the sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection. The same view had considerable currency among the Socinians. The remarks of Crell on the opening of the fifth chapter of Second Corinthians imply an unconscious state of the departed till the day of the resurrection; for he says they have no sense of the lapse of time, and when resurrected it seems to them as if they had but just fallen asleep. The same theory is attributed by Coccejus to Schlichtingius. (De Fœd. et Test. Dei, Cap. XVI.) The Racovian Catechism, in opposing the invocation of saints, says: "It is sufficiently evident, both from reason and the sacred Scriptures, that the dead, while they remain dead, cannot actually live; and therefore can neither know anything, nor hold any charge, nor supplicate anything of God." (V. 1.) Hobbes was also an advocate of the theory of unconsciousness.

As respects the doctrine of Purgatory, the Greek Church differed from the Romish in being less definite. It was

not so positive respecting the geography of Purgatory, and was also unwilling to assert that material fire is used there as an agent of purification. As to the fact, however, that there is a purgatorial period for those who die in sin but not without hope, and that this period may be shortened by the prayers and sacrifices of the Church, the Greek Church, at least as represented by the creeds of the period, was no less positive than the Latin. (Orthodox Confession, Quæst. LXIV.—LXVI.; Confession of Dositheus, Decretum XVIII.) Bellarmin gives quite an elaborate exposition of the Romish theory of Purgatory. As the Scriptural warrant for the doctrine, he quotes 2 Maccabees, xii.; Matt. v. 22, 25, 26; Luke xii. 58, 59, xvi. 9, xxiii. 42; Acts ii. 24 (Vulgate); 1 Cor. iii. 15, xv. 29; Phil. ii. 10. He teaches that Purgatory is in all probability a subterranean region, and says that, although the nature of its fire has not been authoritatively defined by the Church, it is the common opinion that it is material fire.

3. THE RESURRECTION AND FINAL AWARDS. — Nothing worthy of note was brought forward on the subject of the resurrection. A very literal view was commonly entertained. Cudworth was of the opinion that souls have some kind of a body between death and the resurrection, (Intellect. System, Chap. V.,) and Henry More decided that this body is commonly an aerial one, only the most worthy souls being allowed to pass at once into a celestial body. (Immortal. Animæ, Lib. II. cap. 14; Lib. III. cap. 1.)

Exceptions to the doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked were very rare. Some of the Anabaptists, as may be judged from the condemnatory sentence of the Augsburg Confession, taught restorationism, and William Petersen joined it with his millenarianism. The doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked is said to have had some place among the Socinians. None of their writers appear to have been advocates of restorationism. Wissowatius says: "That those who disobey the commands of God and Christ,

after being raised at the last judgment, will be doomed to punishment, and cast into the fire prepared for the devil and his angels, has always been the opinion of this Church." (Note in Racovian Catechism.) Hobbes held the theory of temporary tortures by fire, and final annihilation. At the same time he gave vent to the altogether peculiar conceit, that it is not unlikely that victims for the flames will forever be at hand, since nothing forbids the supposition that the wicked will continue to propagate after the resurrection. (Leviathan.)

As appears from the statements of Bellarmin and Petavius, Roman Catholic theologians held that material fire will be one factor in the endless punishments of hell. (De Sac. Eucharist., Lib. III. cap. 6; De Angelis, Lib. III. cap. 5.) According to Bellarmin, the punishment of unbaptized infants is not simply a painless deprivation, since they have a consciousness of their lack, and suffer somewhat from regrets. (De Amiss. Grat., Lib. VI. cap. 6.) The view of Petavius seems, to say the least, to have been no more lenient to the hapless innocents. (De Deo, Lib. IX. cap. 10.)

Some of the Protestant theologians were of opinion that material fire has a place in the endless punishments of hell. This evidently was the case with John Bunyan; and Turretin and Limborch declare that they find no adequate reason for ruling out the notion of material fire. (Locus XX. quæst. 7; Lib. VI. cap. 13.) Hollaz makes this statement: "Corpora cruciabuntur igni materiali quidem, sed singulari." (Pars III. sect. 1, cap. 12, qu. 27.) Maccovius decided against the theory of literal fire. (Loci, Cap. LXXXIX.) Calvin says: "As no description can equal the severity of the divine vengeance on the reprobate, their anguish and torment are figuratively represented to us under corporeal images; as darkness, weeping, and gnashing of teeth, unextinguishable fire, a worm incessantly gnawing at the heart." (Inst., III. 25.) With equal or still greater

clearness he indicates in his exposition of Matt. xxv. 41, that the fire of future punishment is to be taken in a metaphorical sense. (Comm. in Harmon. Evang.) A large proportion of Protestant writers were non-committal on the subject. We may presume, however, that there were a number who leaned to the view expressed by these words of Whichcote: "Hell's fuel is the guilt of a man's conscience." (Serm. III.) In justification of eternal punishment, we have this from William Sherlock: "We must not ask how long punishment a short sin deserves, but how long the sinner deserves to be punished. And the answer to this is easy, As long as he is a sinner; and therefore an immortal sinner, who can never die and will never cease to be wicked, must always be miserable." (Divine Providence.) As respects the reward of the blessed, much account was still made of the Augustinian conception.

fifth Period.

1720-1885.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS period has been characterized as the period of strife and attempted reconciliation. That it should possess these characteristics cannot be regarded as accidental. The modern era dawned with an unaccomplished task upon its hands, the task of fundamental criticism. The early Christians were indeed ready to give a reason for their faith, but they were not in the best condition for comprehensive and searching criticism, and ere long the practice of deciding doctrinal matters by authority came in to obstruct free investigation. In the mediæval period, while there was much acute reasoning, it was mainly within the bounds of the traditional theology. Scarce a thought was entertained of fundamental Biblical or historical criticism. In the Reformation era the task of criticism was but partially accomplished; dogmatic fixity came too soon for its satisfactory fulfilment. At the same time, the principles of the Reformation were intrinsically too favorable to private judgment and free thought to allow of their being long restrained within narrow bounds. The unfulfilled task of thorough-going criticism must needs be taken up, and the structure of Christian doctrine be tested at every point. Conspiring with this demand for a fuller realization of what was implicitly contained in the Reformation basis, philosophy and science have exercised a quickening and wide-spread influence upon theological thinking by their

extraordinary achievements. In part hostile and in part friendly to the Bible and to the standard creeds, they have ministered at once to activity in attack and to activity in defence. So has resulted the age of criticism and apology, of attack and defence, of strife and attempted reconciliation.

As to the result, we apprehend that it will be agreeable to all fervent and intelligent friendship for Christianity. Those whose faith rests in technicalities may suffer loss; but those who take the larger view, who do not cling so closely to the mole-hill as to lose sight of the mountain, will be likely to be strengthened in the conviction that the grand trend of Biblical truth can never be successfully assailed.

Fifth Period.

1720-1885.

CHAPTER I.

FACTORS IN THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERIOD.

SECTION I. — PHILOSOPHY.

No era in the whole extent of history has been more fruitful in philosophical thinking than that which is included in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Both as respects depth and variety, the speculations of this era will easily stand comparison with those of any preceding age. The result to theology must evidently be important. Such an energetic canvassing of the profoundest problems of the universe must bring new elements into the sphere of doctrinal thought, in the way either of modification or confirmation, or both. As to the fact of influence, there can be no doubt. However, owing to the great complexity of the philosophical movement, it is no easy task to specify with exactness the results of the influence. An attempt at such specification may properly be deferred till after a glance at the different philosophies. In accordance with our plan, we pass in review only the more significant systems, and notice these only so far as is necessary to gain a fair understanding of their spirit and their theological bearings. We begin with the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ (1646-1716), the founder of modern German philosophy, reveals the bent to ideal-

ism so largely characteristic of German speculation. His thinking is everywhere grounded upon the conviction that mind must be regarded as the fundamental verity. In virtue of this general standpoint he was of course opposed to such declarations of Locke as appeared to affiliate with a materialistic sensationalism. He discountenanced the maxim, "There is nothing in the mind which was not previously in the senses"; at least, he essentially modified it by the addition, "except the mind itself." The mind, as he maintained, is not to be likened to a sheet of blank paper. It has a positive constitution, fixed laws of thought. On these laws rests the element of certainty and necessity in our convictions and conclusions. This cannot come from the senses, for they inform only of what is in particular cases, not of what is universally or necessarily. The native constitution of mind, while it does not evolve necessary truths prior to experience of sensations, is yet the real fountain-head of such truths. Among fundamental truths or axioms, that of the "sufficient reason" was especially emphasized by Leibnitz. This implies that back of the existence of any phenomenon, or the validity of any judgment, there must be a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise.

Leibnitz was also dissatisfied with the Cartesian philosophy, and especially with the results to which it had been carried forward by Spinoza. The all-embracing substance and mechanical necessity predicated by the Jewish speculator, left little place for individuality, and no place at all for design. Leibnitz was concerned to give due recognition to both of these principles. In pursuance of this end, he brought out the most distinctive feature of his philosophy, the doctrine of monads. A monad, as he teaches, is a simple substance, without parts, without figure, extension, or divisibility. (*La Monadologie*.) It is the true atom of nature, not an inert or senseless point of matter, but a metaphysical point, a force, a life, a perceptive power.

As monads make up the sum of being, it follows of course that there is nothing lifeless in nature, nothing characterized by that total passivity which Descartes ascribed to matter. The differences found in the different ranks of being are due, not to different kinds of elements, but to different stages of development in the same kind of elements. The monads are the same in essence, but some are much more developed than others. Those which may properly be called souls, have clear perceptions, accompanied with memory. Below these, ranging down through animal life to inorganic nature, are monads whose condition may be likened to one in a state of confusion, — to one in dreamless sleep, or lost to consciousness in a swoon. In the hierarchy of created monads, there is no wide chasm. The ascent from the lowest to the highest is through imperceptible gradations, — an anticipation of the principle of continuity which holds so prominent a place in modern evolutionism. The relation of this system of monads to space is indicated by the fact that space is purely relative; it denotes an order of coexistence, as time denotes an order of succession. Apart from creatures, space and time would exist only in the ideas of God. (*Lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke.*)

As respects each other, monads are independent, or only ideally related in God. There is no interaction. Each develops from within. What then explains their adjustment? How does it come about that perception and motion correspond? The explanation is not a continuous miracle, such as is affirmed by the doctrine of occasionalism, but a primitive miracle, the pre-established harmony by which God, the supreme Monad, has provided for an orderly universe. In virtue of this pre-established harmony, the body, which indeed is but an aggregate of monads, is kept in correspondence with a central monad which may be termed the soul, and all monads are made to work together for the accomplishment of the designs of infinite wisdom. From

these premises there follows evidently the doctrine of philosophical necessity. All events, the volitions of men included, are provided for in the pre-established harmony. Human choices indeed are not mechanically determined; but at the same time they are not left properly contingent; they are always so conditioned by their antecedents as to secure their direction to a given result. As all things are thus constrained to fulfil the divine plan, and as the perfect wisdom and goodness of God are not to be called into question, it is clear that optimism is in the right. Reason must put a veto upon the impressions naturally arising from our view of apparent evils and imperfections, and pronounce the actual world the best possible.

The attitude of Leibnitz toward Christian theology was on the whole decidedly friendly. He accepted the facts and the truths of revelation. In opposition to Bayle he maintained the harmony between reason and faith, and left open a place for mysteries by holding to the validity of the distinction between things above reason and things contrary to reason. (*Essais de Théodicée*.)

CHRISTIAN WOLFF (1679–1754) performed the task of methodizing the philosophical ideas of Leibnitz, which had been given forth, for the most part, in detached treatises. He had a genius for form, as Leibnitz had a genius for ideas. The opinions of his predecessors were in large part retained, but some modifications were made. For example, Wolff declined to speak of all monads as having a perceptive power (*Vorstellungskraft*), considering such a power as pertaining only to souls proper. Body and soul he regarded as different substances, and so infringed upon Leibnitz's view of a graduated development through all nature. But this modification of particular items involved less of a transformation, than the change which was made in the spirit of the Leibnitzian philosophy by putting it under the bonds of an elaborate formalism. Wolff had an ambition to reduce everything to geometrical precision. Under his lead a taste

was begotten for formal demonstrations, a taste which evidently might easily serve as a patron of rationalism.

Germany produced no rival of the Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy till the latter part of the eighteenth century. The grand development which then was commenced received an initial incentive from certain phases of philosophical thinking which had appeared in Great Britain. Our attention must therefore be turned in that direction before we continue our account of the German systems.

BISHOP GEORGE BERKELEY (1684-1753) brought a new factor into English philosophy by his idealistic theories; but at the same time he was not untrue to the empirical bent of that philosophy, inasmuch as he maintained that we must look to experience and not depend upon *a priori* reasoning. Adopting the view of Locke, that the immediate and proper objects of mind are ideas, he declared it a useless and unwarranted supposition that there are any extended material things corresponding to the ideas. It is useless, because it explains nothing; for no one can tell how matter acts on mind. And it is unwarranted, because it is unintelligible. Everything ascribed to bodies — light, color, heat, cold, extension, figure — cannot even in thought be separated from the perceiving mind. It is an obvious truth, says Berkeley, “that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth — in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world — have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit; it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit.” (Principles of Human Knowledge, § 6.) This theory, according to Berkeley, does not imply that we are the victims of delusion. We have to

deal with realities on the idealistic theory, with nature and laws of nature; only, the realities are spiritual, not material or corporeal substances; nature is the complex of ideas or impressions produced by God upon created minds, and the laws of nature are the maxims by which He is guided in producing those impressions. "There is a Mind," he writes, "which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. And from the variety, order and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension." (*Dialogues between Hylas and Philonus*, II.) Berkeley regarded his peculiar teaching as in no wise ministering to scepticism. On the contrary, he maintained that scepticism finds one of its main pillars in the doctrine of matter.

In DAVID HUME (1711-1776) a radical empiricism was joined with an extreme scepticism. He describes ideas as the fainter copies of impressions, under which he includes sensations, passions, and emotions as they originally appear in the mind. Any philosophical term, he teaches, which cannot be referred to a distinct impression, is to be regarded as without foundation.

The scepticism of Hume may be summarized as follows: (1.) He cast doubt upon the existence of an external world. Only perceptions, he said, are present to the mind. We may observe relations among perceptions, but never between perceptions and objects. "It is impossible, therefore, that from the existence of any of the qualities of the former we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular." (*Treatise of Human Nature*.) As respects the idea of material *substance*, what ought to be said is, that there is no such idea; the expression is meaningless. (2.) He questioned the substantial existence of mind. "What we call mind," he says, "is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endued

with a perfect simplicity and identity." The category of substance is no less out of place in connection with mind than in connection with matter. "The question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely unintelligible." (3.) He attacked the validity of the category of causation. Efficiency, he maintained, is something entirely beyond our knowledge; we know nothing about efficiency in connection with the rise of any given event. All we know is, that one thing is after another, or contiguous to another. (*Treatise of Human Nature*, and also *Philosophical Essays*.) Our disposition to predicate the relation of cause and effect is an uncritical bent, due to continued associations. Having many times seen one object connected with another, we find it difficult or impossible to think of it out of relation to that object. (4.) He denied the adequacy of testimony to establish the fact of miracles, mainly on the ground, that, the improbability of a departure from the laws of nature being greater than the improbability of human testimony being false, the latter improbability cannot cancel the former.

From the above it would seem that the attitude of Hume toward religion must have been purely destructive. Yet it was not formally such. Even in his attack on miracles, he assumes to reserve a place for Christian miracles. "The Christian religion," he says, "not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." Here, to be sure, though his language does not differ very widely from that of some of the extravagant champions of orthodoxy, the concession does not wear the appearance of honest intent. The apology is as bad as the attack, —

appears indeed to have been designed to be a covert attack. But we find other concessions to religious ideas which have more of the appearance of candor. Such are the following respecting an intelligent Author of the world: "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine theism and religion. . . . A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in everything; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent Cause or Author." (The Natural History of Religion.)

The scepticism of Hume served as a stimulus to the rise of the opposing Scottish school, whose teaching was at first denominated the Philosophy of Common Sense. THOMAS REID (1710-1796), the founder of this school, laid much stress upon intuitive or necessary beliefs, including here such truths as causation, personal identity, existence of an external world, etc. Such truths, he maintained, while they may not be capable of demonstration, do not need it. They are self-evident, and command the assent of every man of sound understanding who attends to them without prejudice. DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) accepted in the main the principles of Reid. SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788-1856) may be reckoned in the same school, though making some rather important modifications or additions. Of the characteristics of this school Hamilton says: "The Scottish school of philosophy is distinctively characterized by its opposition to all the destructive schemes of speculation;—in particular, to scepticism, or the uncertainty of knowledge; to idealism, or the non-existence of the material world; to fatalism, or the denial of the moral universe." As the last specification of Hamilton indicates, this school has been distinguished by its emphatic advocacy of human freedom. Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton all

contended for freedom in the sense of real self-determination, or a power of alternative choice. Hamilton, it is true, regarded such a power as inexplicable; but none the less he asserted its reality. The friendly alliance of Scotch philosophy with theistic and Christian belief in general, is too well known to require illustration.

Alongside these developments in the philosophy of Great Britain, there was a very pronounced tendency on the part of a few thinkers toward materialism. Hartley, in explaining psychological facts, made much account of nerve vibrations and the laws of association, but seems not definitely to have asserted man's complete materiality. This, however, was done by his admirer, Joseph Priestley, in unmistakable terms. Priestley questioned only man's spirituality, not that of God. Dr. Darwin is credited with denying both. Condillac in France, and the Genevan Bonnet, occupied about the same position as Hartley, while the more extreme phases of materialism were represented by Diderot, La Mettrie, Baron d'Holbach, and Cabanis. In opposition to this development, considerable currency was given in France to the views of the Scotch school, the teachings of Reid and Stewart being disseminated by Royer-Collard and Jouffroy. Cousin also, in his eclectic system, took account of the Scotch philosophy, and sought to unite it with factors drawn from the speculations of Germany.

IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804), incited in particular by Hume's denial of causation, undertook a thorough investigation of the human mind. He wished to determine what conditions and factors enter into knowledge, and how far knowledge in our present estate may extend. The result of his examination appeared in the "Critique of Pure Reason." This was his main work, though other treatises, such as the "Critique of Practical Reason," and the "Critique of the Judgment," enter essentially into a complete view of his system. These works have been fruitful to an extraordinary degree; in fact, a large proportion of all subse-

quent philosophical thinking is a comment on the powerful influence of Kant in the modern intellectual world.

Kant's scrutiny of the instrument of knowledge led him to place very decided limitations both upon empiricism and dogmatism,—both upon the scheme which would derive all the elements of knowledge from experience, and that which would draw out a system of truth from the innate resources of the mind. He emphasized the fact that knowledge is not to be explained by reference merely to sensations, or what is given to our sensibility. Sensations without arrangement are only a confused manifold. Now it cannot be supposed that sensation is that by which sensations are arranged. There must be, therefore, already in the mind means of arrangement, or *a priori* forms. Space is such a mental form. "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. . . . External phenomena become possible only by means of the representation of space." The same is true of time. "Time is not an empirical concept deduced from any experience, for neither coexistence nor succession would enter into our perception, if the representation of time were not given *a priori*." (Transcendental Aesthetic.) Space and time, then, are the two *a priori* forms of intuition. They condition all experience of phenomena. They are subjective, ideal. To say that they are conditions of the existence of things in themselves, is to go entirely beyond warrant. Besides these forms of intuition, there are certain *a priori* concepts or forms of thought, termed categories. Kant enumerates twelve of these, such as unity, plurality, causality, etc. In order that the elements or materials presented to the mind should be truly connected, or become objects of experience, they must come under these forms of thought. So Kant made room for *a priori* factors, as opposed to a wholesale empiricism.

But he was quite as averse to a wholesale dogmatism which cuts loose from experience. While he maintained

that the mind has shaping faculties, he equally maintained that it must have something to shape in order to reach any positive results. The mind must meet objects supplied from without, in order to progress in knowledge of the real, just as the wings of the bird must meet the resistance of the air in order to progress in flight. Reason apart from objects thus supplied may indeed weave together its concepts, but the fabric which is woven can have no claim to the stamp of actuality.

Now there is just one class of objects that are presented to the human mind, namely, phenomena. Of noumena, or things in themselves, of the background behind appearances, if there be any such background, it has no immediate knowledge. And not only has it no immediate knowledge; it finds also no certain ground of inference, at least in the domain of pure reason, the domain of thought and its forms, as distinguished from that of conduct and its laws. The mind here cannot get beyond the ideal or hypothetical. It cannot establish, for example, the substantial and permanent subsistence of the soul, or the existence of God as a necessary and perfect being. This speculative use of reason, however, is not to be regarded as fruitless, even in connection with such truths as those just named. If it cannot prove the objective validity of the notions which it sets forth, it can make them consistent with themselves; it can bring out an ideal that is without a flaw, and which will teach us how to think of the corresponding object, if it should be concluded from other sources that such object exists. Moreover, this speculative use of reason is of utility in assuring us that, if such momentous truths as those referred to cannot be proved in this way, no more can they be disproved. Expressing this conclusion under the guise of his own personal conviction, Kant says: "Whenever I hear that some uncommon genius has demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life, or the existence of God, I am always desirous to read

his book, for I expect that his talent will help me to improve my own insight into these problems. Of one thing I feel quite certain, even without having seen his book, that he has not disproved any single one of those doctrines; not because I imagine that I am myself in possession of irrefragable proofs of them, but because the transcendental critique, by revealing to me the whole apparatus of our pure reason, has completely convinced me that, as reason is insufficient to establish affirmative propositions in this sphere of thought, it is equally, nay, even more powerless to establish the negative on any of these points." (Method of Transcendentalism, Müller's translation.)

To find a true offset to these agnostic conclusions, we must proceed, according to Kant, into the ethical domain, the domain of practical reason, the sphere of conduct and its laws. As we look into our moral nature, we find that it asserts one great all-comprehending law of duty, the formula of which is as follows: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation." This law is no mere inference from experience. It is given *a priori*. It has its seat in the commonest reason, as well as in the most speculative. It may not, indeed, be always formulated in the terms given, but it is none the less acknowledged. Through the moral law we are certified of the most important truths. (1.) We are certified of our freedom. "The moral law, which itself does not require justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize this law as binding on themselves." (2.) We are certified of our immortality. The moral law sets before us a perfect standard, the attainment of which is a condition of the realization of the highest good. This standard we never reach in this life, and can only meet the obligation which it indicates in an endless progress. As conscious, therefore, of that obligation, we must infer an endless life. (3.) We

are certified of the existence of God. Desert is measured by approximation to the standard of the moral law, and impartial reason requires that happiness should be in proportion to desert. Only a Supreme Being who governs by intelligence and will can meet this requirement.

These three postulates of the practical reason are objects of knowledge only in the sense of being practically necessary. They are of the nature of faith, but a faith that is at the same time reason, a thoroughly rational and warranted faith. (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, and Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by T. K. Abbot.)

As respects the religious bearings of Kant's philosophy, it is evident, that, taken in its entirety, it is favorable to theism. It goes to show that speculative reason can in no wise disprove the main truths of theism, while the practical reason demands them. To Christianity as a system of revealed truth, its relation was not so positively friendly. Kant admitted the possibility of revelation, and was profoundly convinced of the need of regeneration. But his appreciation of the Bible was largely confined to its moral code. He commented adversely upon miracles, disparaged the importance of the historical element, and maintained that the true interpretation of Scripture must use it as a means of edification, and draw out, not the sense which is most agreeable to the text, but which is most agreeable to the practical reason. Christ, as he considered, is the moral ideal, and believing on Christ denotes the inner appreciation and choice of this ideal. As respects the work of regeneration, and the formation of a holy character, Kant did not exclude divine assistance therefrom, but his representations direct rather to personal endeavor than to conscious dependence upon divine grace. God is not brought near in his system of thought. He appears mainly as a means of future rewards. Scarce a ray of that ineffable sunlight of divine sympathy and fellowship which shines forth from

the Gospel is reflected from the philosophy of Kant. The principal merit of the great metaphysician in the religious field is the grandeur with which he invests the conception of the moral law.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762–1814), starting from Kant's philosophy, endeavored to make improvements in the interests of unity. He wished to show how the categories might be derived from a single starting-point, and also to overcome the dualism between subject and object which was contained, or supposed to be contained, in Kant's mysterious *things in themselves* (*Dinge an sich*), which were spoken of as a kind of background of phenomena. Fichte assumed as a starting-point an act, action in his view serving as the ground of being. The primitive act from which all development proceeds is that by which the ego posits itself. Next the ego posits a non-ego. This second act explains the impression of an external world. Not an impact from without, not bounds imposed *ab extra*, but bounds imposed by the ego upon itself, give rise to the impression. This act of the ego takes place through the medium of the productive imagination. The unavoidable appearance of externality is accounted for by the fact that the act of self-limitation is one which does not come into consciousness. Thus, while the non-ego is really due to the ego, in consciousness they are related as mutually limiting factors. The positing of bounds is to be regarded as a means to an end; it serves the purpose of development. The proper or ultimate end of the ego is independence of all bounds, an end, however, which it can never fully reach, though it may continually approach thereto.

To understand the full import of this line of thought, it is necessary to determine what Fichte meant by the ego. By the ego whose vocation is to become absolute, but which never completely fulfils this vocation, which is developed through limitation by a non-ego, he evidently meant the empirical ego, or what we understand by our finite person-

ality. But what did he mean by the ego which serves as the starting-point? Did he mean an absolute ego, and regard the empirical ego as the same, only under the form of self-limitation? Did he hold in consequence the pantheistic view that all finite personalities are simply development-forms of the Absolute? According to his own declarations, this would seem to have been his idea from the outset. In his earlier philosophy, however, this point was not particularly dwelt upon. His later philosophy, if not changed as to theoretical basis, did wear a changed aspect, because of the shifting of emphasis from one quarter to another. While in the earlier stage the subordination of the world to the (empirical) ego was the point of principal emphasis, in the later stage there was an increasing emphasis upon the subordination of the individual ego to the Absolute, which now was regarded as the substantial unit of which all individuals are but special manifestations.

It must be allowed that Fichte, especially in his later writings, showed a decided appreciation of the religious element. He rebuked religious indifference in the most emphatic terms. "All irreligion," he says, "remains upon the surface of things and imprisoned in the empty appearance, and just on this account presupposes a lack of power and energy of spirit, and so necessarily betrays a weakness of the head as well as of character; and, on the other hand, religion, as rising above the appearance and pressing into the essence of things, necessarily discloses the happiest use of the powers of the spirit, the greatest profundity and discernment, and, as inseparable therefrom, the greatest strength of character." (*Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben.*) Fichte also decidedly opposed the rationalism which had been the fashion in Germany for a considerable time. In his opinion, by trying to bring everything down to the plane of common sense, by forcing everything into the moulds of a narrow understanding, it had disfigured and

dwarfed the truth. In contrast with the bare morality of Kant, he gave a place to mystical devotion. He appropriated in particular the Johannine standpoint, speaking of John's Gospel as the purest and most genuine record of Christian doctrine, and defining religion as love, — a love of the divine and eternal which induces a radical renunciation of the selfish, the individual, the earthly. Respecting Christ, he maintained that He occupied an entirely exceptional position as a revealer of truth, and that in consequence all ages that are able to understand Him will confess that He is the only-begotten and first-born Son of God, and all men of understanding will continue to bow low before His peculiar glory. (*Anweisung*.) As in the teaching of Kant, so in that of Fichte, the doctrine of immortality received emphatic recognition.

But, on the other hand, there were points in the philosophy of Fichte which were remote from Christian theology, at least in its more catholic phases, — that is, those approved by the great body of Christians, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant. His teaching was not theistic in the Christian sense; for, while he strongly asserted the necessity of believing in the existence of God, he defined God as simply the moral order of the universe. (*Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens; Appellation an das Publicum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus*.) It is true that his later works may have involved somewhat of a modification of this definition, but he seems never to have changed it to the extent of ascribing personality to God. In his "*Bestimmung des Menschen*," he says: "In the idea of personality is included limitation, and I cannot ascribe to Thee one without the other. I will not attempt what is impossible to my finite nature; I will not seek to understand Thy nature in itself." As the whole trend of his philosophy prescribed, Fichte was vigorously opposed to the common doctrine of creation. (*Anweisung*.) His view of Christ was scarcely less remote from the Catholic teaching; for

the exceptional eminence which he ascribed to Christ is found to be only an eminence in historical position, due to the fact that He was fully cognizant of a truth which no mortal had understood before Him, and which all who come after Him receive, as a matter of fact, from Him, whether it be supposed that any of them might be competent to discover it for themselves or not; this was the truth of man's essential unity with God. Christ had a peculiarly clear consciousness of this unity; however, He was not otherwise one with God than it is possible for any pious man to become. (Anweisung.) An atonement in the sense of a satisfaction for sin and a clearing of the way for man's union with God, Fichte regarded as altogether out of the question. As he expresses himself in one place, there is no need of an atonement, since diremption from God is a mere illusion. "Man can never disunite himself from the Godhead; and, in so far as he imagines himself disunited, he is nothing, which therefore cannot sin, but around whose brow there lies merely the oppressive illusion of sin in order to lead him to the true God." (Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters.)

Fichte was a man of intense personality. A reflex of his spirit, and in some measure of his ideas, may be seen in Thomas Carlyle.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING (1775-1854) varied so largely from himself in the course of his philosophical development, that a correct exposition of his teaching must take account of different eras in his life. At least three different stages in his speculations must be distinguished, two of which fell within his early manhood. In the first, while showing some tendencies toward his later standpoint, he agreed in the main with Fichte. In the second, he produced what may be regarded as distinctively his own system of philosophy. Opposing here the subjective idealism of Fichte which made self the only reality, he declared for the equal reality of the not-self, or, in other

words, for making nature co-ordinate with mind. The distinction, as he taught, is in grade rather than in essence. Mind is the same thing as nature, only raised to a higher power. Nature might be called visible spirit, and spirit invisible nature. Monism is the true theory. All things are but manifestations of one essence or reason, forms of the self-revelation of the Absolute. Traced to their ground they are brought to unity. In the Absolute all distinctions are resolved; mind and nature, ideal and real, subject and object, are identical. The task of philosophy is to rise to this undistinguished identity, and to trace the process by which it is differentiated into the actual universe. To accomplish this task one must be in possession of a peculiar gift. As only the man who has a genius for art can be a true artist, so only the man who has a genius for philosophy, who possesses the faculty of "intellectual intuition," can rise to a knowledge of the Absolute. In his final stage, Schelling felt it necessary to substitute the idea of a personal God for the pantheistic conception of an indeterminate Absolute, and also to lift man above the plane of co-ordination with nature. (Watson, Schelling's Transcendental Idealism.) At the same time, however, he gave increasing scope to his bent to mysticism. His thinking at this era was so mixed with theosophic dreams, after the example of such mystics as Jacob Boehme, as seriously to impair its claim to the character of philosophy. The system representing the intermediate stage of his development, his objective pantheism, Philosophy of Identity, or by whatever name it be called, was by far the more significant in point of influence.

Schelling commended his philosophy by a certain wealth of imagination and enthusiasm of feeling. His system had strong poetic affinities. It easily made alliance with the Romantic School in poetry, and was not a little fruitful for such a high priest of nature as Goethe. By this feature it was fitted to render a service to religion. It inculcated

that truth which belongs to all poetic contemplation of the world, — the truth that nature must be viewed as closely linked with spirit. It called attention to the divine immanence, and presented an offset to those ways of thinking which separate too widely between God and His workmanship. Nevertheless, the Philosophy of Identity, as worked out by Schelling, must be regarded as largely alien from Christian thought. It went far astray from the Christian standard in its fundamental tenet. Its doctrine of God runs into the unhealthy maze characteristic of all pantheistic speculation. “It is the doctrine of the All-One, which is now conceived as God and now as the world, and therefore does not lead to any true worship of God, but passes off into that poetical enthusiasm for nature which constitutes the foundation of heathen worship.” (Hagenbach.) In its interpretation of the incarnation it deviates equally with Fichte from the Catholic theory. While allowing to Christ a unique historical position in the illustration of man’s unity with God, it denies to Him any transcendent eminence as respects the fact of such unity. “The incarnation of God,” says Schelling, “is an incarnation from eternity. The man Christ is in manifestation only the culmination, and in so far also again the beginning of the same, for from Him it is to progress in virtue of the fact that all of His disciples shall be members of one and the same body of which He is the head.” (Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums, IX.) In his later teaching Schelling gives a different exposition of the subject. He there asserts that Christ must be regarded, not merely as the teacher or founder of Christianity, but as the content of Christianity, and that any one having the least acquaintance with the New Testament declarations must assign to Him an importance far transcending anything human or earthly. In His pre-incarnate history He was primarily a divine potency in the Father, which first at the end of creation appeared as a Divine Person. (Philo-

sophie der Offenbarung.) In his dislike of the rationalism of the times, the so-called Illuminism, Schelling was from the first at one with Fichte.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770–1831), after working for an interval in harmony with Schelling, proceeded to develop an independent system of philosophy. The ground of his exception to Schelling was not at all in his general conception of the problem to be solved. No less than his ambitious contemporary, Hegel made philosophy to deal with the Absolute, with God. Its task is nothing less than to rise to a knowledge of being at its source, and to trace it in its outgoings, its development into the organism which makes the universe. Thus, in striking contrast with Kant's denial of a metaphysic of the Absolute, he held that it may be thoroughly known. "Philosophy," he says, "has the purpose to know the truth, to know God, for He is the absolute truth, in so far that nothing else, in comparison with God and His explication, is worth one's pains." (*Philosophie der Religion*, Theil III.) So far from withdrawing from knowledge, it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself. "All that God is, He imparts and reveals." (*Logik*, Cap. VIII., translation by Wallace.) He does this of necessity as spirit. "A spirit that is not revealed is not spirit," — ein Geist der nicht offenbar ist, ist nicht Geist. (*Phil. der Relig.*) Spirit is not a blank undistinguished unity; it is a unity of opposed elements; it involves necessarily a process, an unfoldment, a self-revelation, so that the act of self-revelation enters into the very definition of God as spirit. Nor is this self-revelation to be regarded as outside the circle in which human faculties move. It is a revelation to man. To plead man's finitude is illegitimate, for it is not the so-called reason of man in its limitations that knows God, "but the Spirit of God in man; it is, to use the speculative expression which has been employed, the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in man's knowing." (*Vorlesungen über die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes.*)

What Hegel did object to in Schelling was (1.) his too easy assumption of his starting-point, and (2) his failure to explain all the steps in the unfoldment from that starting-point. The starting-point is indeed pure and absolute being, but this needs to be justified by showing that the mind in its regress from the particular and the phenomenal cannot stop short of that ultimate goal which is found in the most indeterminate and universal idea. This preliminary investigation being completed, philosophy is prepared to construct its system, or, in other words, to show how the whole system of things, whether in the realm of mind or of nature, is evolved from the Absolute, which is viewed in the first instance as subsisting in utter indeterminateness. In accomplishing this task, the philosopher is not to resort to any mystical principle of intuition. He must depend rather upon patient, consistent reasoning. Thought, when it runs a complete and normal course, is a reflex of the process by which the universe was constituted. Indeed, the universe is but evolved thought. Being and thought are identical. "Everything is in its own self the same as it is in thought." (*Logik.*) A thinker is only a thought conceived as a subject. The great requisite, therefore, for progress to a complete grasp of the truth, is to keep thought pure, unmixed with ingredients of appetite, will, or egoistic opinions. "When we think, we renounce our selfish and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its course, and if we add anything of our own we think ill." (*Logik.*)

According to Hegel, if we are to think things as they are, we must comprehend in our thoughts a plurality of elements. To isolate an element is to make it abstract or unreal. The concrete alone is real, and the concrete is a unity of contraries. So thought which reflects the nature and order of being must move through a succession of triads, a process of conjoining two opposite notions and uniting them in a third or larger notion, of which they constitute the moments.

As in the Absolute thought and actuality, the ideal and the real, are identical, we have only to follow out the natural order of the evolution of thought to get the whole system of truth or reality. Styling the Absolute, thus conceived, the Idea, Hegel assigns its exposition to three different branches, which together make up philosophy. The three branches, corresponding to the three grand stages in the movement of thought, are (1.) Logic, the science of the Idea in itself; (2.) Philosophy of Nature, the science of the Idea in the reflection of itself; (3.) Philosophy of Mind, the science of the Idea in its return to itself from its self-estrangement in nature.

In the Logic Hegel lays down the starting-point. "Mere being," he says, "makes the beginning," — that is, being which is not specialized by any characteristics, not mediated by any other notion; for, if that were the case, it would not be the beginning. Mere being, having no attribute by which it is set off, is undistinguished from not-being. One may say, that, inasmuch as there is no definite or specified difference between them, they are identical. But, on the other hand, he is equally justified in saying that they are different. The proper conclusion is, that they are but moments in a third notion, becoming, which is the first concrete thought. In like manner, by the successive presentation of contraries and their reconciliation, the evolution of thought is carried forward. More and more definite results are reached. The hierarchy, or ideal world, of thought is completed, and the second grand stage, in which thought is externalized in nature, is entered upon. Nature, passing through its triads of properties, forms, and structures, reaches its culmination in the physical organization of man. From this point begins the return movement, which completes the circle, in that thought comes back to a recognition of its source in the Absolute.

The real bearing of Hegel's philosophy upon Christian theology is not easily defined. Its formal attitude was no

doubt friendly. It assumed, indeed, to give a philosophical statement of the leading truths of the Christian system, to substitute exact terms for the popular and more or less symbolical phraseology in use in the Church. Some of the very dogmas most offensive to rationalism were taken under its special patronage. In his general doctrine of God, Hegel uses some expressions which savor of the ordinary theistic conception, and some which appear decidedly adverse to that conception. He has no objection to speaking of the personality of God. "The Christian God," he says, "is God not known merely, but also self-knowing; He is a personality not merely figured in our minds, but rather absolutely actual." Referring to Spinoza's doctrine, he says: "Though an essential stage in the evolution of the idea, substance is not the same with absolute idea, but the idea under the still limited form of necessity. It is true that God is necessity, or as we may put it, that He is the absolute thing or fact: He is, however, no less the absolute Person. That He is the absolute Person, however, is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza never perceived; and on that side, it falls short of the true notion of God, which forms the content of the religious consciousness in Christianity." (Logik, Cap. VIII.) To have completed his view, Spinoza should have added to the Oriental view of the unity of substance the Occidental principle of individuality. But, on the other hand, Hegel indulges representations that accord rather with a pantheistic than with a theistic theory, representations which seem to extinguish all definite bounds between God and the creature. He says, "Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea," that is, of universal Reason or God. (Logik, Cap. IX.) He also remarks, "The truth [made manifest in the incarnation] is, that there is only one Reason, one Spirit, that the spirit as finite has not true existence." (Phil. der Relig.) Such expressions as these, as well as his general theory of evolution, seem to reduce all finite things to moments in the

process of the Absolute by which it comes to a full self-realization.

The doctrine of the Trinity, Hegel maintains, is fundamental to a true theology or philosophy, and he stigmatizes its opponents as being only *die sinnlichen und die Verstandes-Menschen*. In his view, the very conception of God as Spirit involves a trinitarian distinction. For, God is spirit only as He is the totality of a process, and three stages enter essentially into the completion of the process. "Spirit," he says, "is the divine history, the process of distinguishing and separating self and receiving this back again into self. . . . As totality is God the Spirit, God as merely the Father is not yet the true. He is rather beginning and end. . . . He is the eternal process. . . . He is this life-process (*Lebensverlauf*), the Trinity, wherein the Universal places itself over against itself, and therein remains identical with itself." (Phil. der Relig.) In other words, thought objectifies itself, the Father becomes object to Himself in the Son. In the Spirit, which is love, or consciousness of self in another, the divine subject and object find their unity.

As respects the person of Christ, it of course occasioned no difficulty to Hegel to conceive of a union of the divine and the human in Him. It was a favorite tenet of his, that finite and infinite are not to be set over against each other as mutually exclusive. The infinite includes the finite. To exclude the latter from the former is to limit the former and reduce it to a finite. "The real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the absorption of the finite into itself." As this view applies to the finite in general, it does not necessarily imply any special pre-eminence of the historical Christ. But Hegel, as a matter of fact, declares for such a pre-eminence. In Christ, he says, is brought to view the absolute transfiguration of the finite. No man standing on the ground of the true religion can call Him simply a teacher of man-

kind and a martyr of the truth. He was conscious of His identity with God, and spoke with the inimitable majesty belonging to such a consciousness. Herein he fully realized what other men have only striven after. This is the supreme evidence in his behalf. The spiritual man needs nothing more. He does not require miracles, though it is nothing incredible that spirit, which is itself the great miracle, should be able to reveal a mastery over the forces of nature, and the modern unbelief in miracles rests on a superstitious estimate of the might of nature as opposed to the independence of the spirit. In the death of Christ, God is seen to share the extreme lot of man's finitude. His death is therefore a manifestation of infinite love, an image of the eternal process in which God imparts Himself, as the resurrection is an image of the return to Himself.

Hegel speaks in terms of profound admiration of the Bible, and declares that the familiarity with it characteristic of Protestant lands gives them an unmeasured advantage over Roman Catholic countries. "In the former," he says, "the Bible is the safeguard against all slavery of the spirit," — das Rettungsmittel gegen alle Knechtschaft des Geistes. (Phil. der Relig.) But on the other hand, like Kant, he lays little stress upon the historical element in the Bible, and maintains that it should be interpreted in the interests of edification, — in other words, as suggestive or symbolical of philosophical truths. "The true Christian content of faith," he says, "is to be justified through philosophy, not through history."

On the whole, the bearing of Hegel's philosophy upon Christian theology, notwithstanding its general tone of appreciation and its points of affinity, is rather ambiguous. It appears as a doubtful ally, whether judged by its principles or by its results. It may be, as some have supposed, that if a longer period had been granted to Hegel to perfect his views, he would have brought his philosophy at various

points more definitely into line with Christian truth. As it was, it served naturally as the basis of a mixed development. While some sought to interpret it in harmony with the leading truths of Christian theology, others, the so-called left wing of the Hegelians, regarded it as a chosen instrument for vaporizing that theology out of existence. The names of Strauss, Bruno Bauer, and Feuerbach, indicate to what extremes results were carried on this side.

Alongside the idealistic systems which began with Kant, and culminated in Hegel, a different philosophical development had place, one in which the intellectual element was less dominant. Here belongs the teaching of FRIEDRICH HEINRICH JACOBI (1743-1819), and also that of Schleiermacher. Jacobi's system has sometimes been called the *faith philosophy*. An enemy to all dogmatic systems, like that of Spinoza, having no confidence in formal demonstrations to get at the truth, he maintained that faith, or intuitive belief, is the ground of certitude. The spontaneous conviction of the reality of an external world, which is inseparable from our sense-perceptions, approves the existence of that world to us in the most satisfactory way possible. In like manner we are assured of supersensible realities, of the existence of God. As nature testifies to itself by pressing into our experience, so does God testify to Himself. We have, so to speak, an experience of God, that is, experiences from which rises immediately the conviction of God's being and perfection. To Jacobi the pantheistic conception was exceedingly distasteful. He believed in a God who has intelligence and will, a personal God, who is above men as well as in men. In these points consisted the affinity of his teaching for Christian theology. Toward Christianity as an historical and revealed system he occupied a rather negative position.

FRIEDRICH ERNST DANIEL SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834) in his general philosophy modified the teachings of Kant with the intent to do full justice to the realistic as well as

to the idealistic elements in the same. "With him space, time, and causality are not merely forms of a phenomenal world, existing solely in the consciousness of the percipient subject, but are also forms of the objective real world which confronts him and conditions his knowledge." (Ueberweg.) His conception of the nature of God and of his relation to the world leaned toward a pantheistic theory. In his ethics he sought to give proper scope to the element of individuality, and thus to modify or supplement the uniform code which Kant prescribes for all moral agents. In his religious philosophy he appears in part akin and in part supplementary to Jacobi. Like the latter, he placed much stress upon the religious consciousness, upon the profounder feelings in the soul. The feeling of dependence upon God he regarded in particular as the foundation of all religion. At the same time, he included important factors which Jacobi failed to appropriate, inasmuch as he had a much larger appreciation of the historical element in Christianity, believed that religious life can be properly realized only in fellowship, or through the offices of the Church, and attached immense importance to the person of Christ as the one centre and the perfect bond of that fellowship. As Schleiermacher was still more eminent as a theologian than as a philosopher, we may fittingly reserve his specific views for a mention under the various topics of theology.

A passing reference may be made to the systems of ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER (1788-1860) and EDUARD VON HARTMANN (1842-), though not because of any affinity between their spirit and leading tenets with Christian thought. Both are systems of atheistic monism and pessimism. According to Schopenhauer, the one substantial and fundamental reality is will. Intellect is only an adjunct which will creates for its own purpose. In general, will is unconscious force, but in man it rises to consciousness. The essence of conscious will is unsatisfied striving or misery. The actual world is the worst possible. Lapse into nothing-

ness is the proper goal of human desire, for it is the only cure for unceasing pain. Hartmann in his "Philosophy of the Unconscious" departs from Schopenhauer, by making intellect co-ordinate with will. In the Unconscious, which is the ground of all existence, the two are inseparably conjoined. In man, however, a severance has taken place; opposition to the will is realized, and so consciousness is produced. The struggle between consciousness and will is a source of continual misery. Relief will come only when the race of conscious beings has been so far educated, that by common consent it will elect extinction. (See Francis Bowen, *Modern Philosophy*.)

Among the more recent German philosophies, those of JOHANN FRIEDRICH HERBART (1776-1841) and RUDOLPH HERMANN LOTZE (1817-1882) claim a prominent place. Herbart regarded Kant as more than any other his philosophical master. He shows also considerable affinity with Leibnitz. As opposed to Fichte and Schelling, he sought to sustain the claims of realism, — this term being used here, of course, not in the scholastic, but the current modern sense. The proper materials of philosophy, as he maintained, are given in experience. As thus given, however, they are not satisfactory to reason, inasmuch as they involve contradictory conceptions. The proper task of philosophical thinking is to resolve these contradictions, and in this way to bring settled conviction into the place of scepticism. As respects religion, Herbart regarded it as based mainly upon faith, or the practical reason. While he averred that the design exhibited in nature implies a divine intelligence, he held with Kant that a proper metaphysic of Deity is beyond man's capabilities.

Lotze shows a measure of affinity with Herbart, and a still greater with Leibnitz. Appearing at an era when the idealistic and dogmatic philosophy represented by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had reached its culmination, and at the same time prominent tendencies to materialism had

appeared in scientific circles, his system presents an offset to both phases. As opposed to dogmatic idealism, Lotze asserts a wide place for the empirical method, the process of patient and searching examination into the facts of experience. He maintains that the dictum set forth by Fichte, and followed by others, — namely, that philosophy must first lay hold upon some single principle, and then draw out everything from that, — has been productive of great mischief. Such a dictum would indeed be in place if a man could transfer himself to the centre of the universe, and view everything as it appears to perfect insight from that standpoint. But no man can do this. The feasibility of the attempt is refuted by its representatives. Hegelians disprove the Hegelian method by their radical differences among themselves. The sweeping assumption at the basis of Hegelianism, respecting the identity of being and thought, is untenable. Philosophy, by proceeding with less assumption and more modesty, will reach more trustworthy results.

At the same time Lotze was strongly opposed to materialism, and worked zealously and ably in refutation of the theories of Büchner, Moleschott, and others. Indeed, his opposition to the preceding idealistic philosophies was not so much an opposition to their idealism, as to their dogmatism and one-sidedness. Materialism, he claims, is incompatible with facts. It cannot be harmonized with our unity of consciousness, without which the totality of our inner states would never become an object of our observation. Unity of consciousness requires the affirmation of an immaterial supersensible essence, or soul. (*Mikrokosmos*, Buch II.) In truth souls, or spirits, make up the sum of substantial beings. All the attributes ascribed to matter may be explained by the relations of simple unextended beings.

According to Lotze, all things find their bond of union in God, who is the necessary pre-supposition of a cosmos.

The nature of God, as he asserts very emphatically, includes the feature of personality. God's infinitude, so far from excluding personality, is just the reason why he has personality in the utmost perfection. Self-consciousness is perfect in Him, as He is fully revealed to Himself, whereas in a man there is much that is not revealed to himself. God needs no non-ego to be set over against Him in order to arrive at self-consciousness. In His perfection He has an immediate grasp of Himself. To begin thus with a personal or self-conscious God involves no peculiar difficulties. "When we characterize," says Lotze, "the inner life of the personal God, the stream of His thoughts, His feelings, His will, as eternal and beginningless, as never having been in rest and impelled out of no still-stand into motion, we exact of the imagination no greater task than is required of it by every materialistic or pantheistic view." For every such view must assume an uncaused motion of the substance of the world, or an absolute beginning of motion which seizes hold of a previously existing and inert substance, and the latter view cannot stand any close inspection. (Mikrokosmus, Buch IX. cap. 4.)

A philosophy kindred with that of Lotze in its antagonism to materialism and its emphasis upon the idea of a personal God, and set forth in language of marked clearness and terseness, has recently been presented to the public in the works of Professor BORDEN P. BOWNE.

In both France and England the succession in the line of the sensational philosophy has been pretty well kept up down to the present. In France AUGUSTE COMTE has appeared as a zealous advocate. His fundamental thesis is, that human thinking in all the varied branches of inquiry runs through three stages: the theological, which explains the world and the events in the world by reference to supernatural beings; the metaphysical, which resorts to metaphysical entities or abstractions; the positive, which, recognizing the vanity of seeking any ultimate ground of

things, attempts only to discover their relations of succession and similitude, and in this way to grasp particulars under more general points of view. Positivism, which thus rejects all *a priori* elements, is the perfection of philosophy. It includes six different branches, — mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. The last, which treats of man and society, is not to be understood to include psychology, for this as ordinarily understood is a bogus science, resting on the fiction that the mind has power to observe its own operations.

Comte's scheme of religion is something extraordinary. In the place of God he puts, as the supreme object of public worship, collective humanity, the race of the past, the present, and the future. Even animals, like the faithful dog, to which duties are owed, are included in the aggregate object of devotion. In painting and sculpture the symbol of this supreme being is always to be a woman of the age of thirty with a child in her arms. Private devotion is properly addressed simply to the idea of some woman living or dead. Among historical religions, fetishism claims a large place in Comte's appreciation; he even speaks of the earth as *le Grand Fétiche*. In his scheme, supervision of morals and religion, and education in general, are assigned to the Positivist clergy, over whom presides with unlimited authority the supreme pontiff, who has his residence at Paris. Commenting on this part of the scheme of Comte, J. S. Mill has characterized it as "the completest system of spiritual and temporal despotism which ever yet emanated from a human brain, unless possibly that of Ignatius Loyola." (Autobiography.) Professor Huxley has not inaptly described Comte's religion as "Romanism with Christianity left out." (See Catechism of Positive Religion; also J. S. Mill, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*.)

Among English representatives of sensationalism in the present century a prominent place is occupied by JAMES

MILL, JOHN STUART MILL, ALEXANDER BAIN, and HERBERT SPENCER. While differing on various points, these writers have shown a decided bias toward such characteristic tenets of sensationalism as the following: (1.) Sensation supplies the entire material of knowledge. (2.) Our necessary or intuitive beliefs are explained by the principle of the association of ideas. Much stress is laid upon this point. Hence the name Associational School, which has been applied to this class of writers. (3.) There is no immediate consciousness of self, but only of particular feelings or exercises. We have no authority to affirm that the mind is anything more than a succession of psychical states. (4.) Acts of the will, no less than other events, come under the category of cause and effect; necessitarianism is the true theory. As respects the third of these points, it should be noticed that John Stuart Mill allows that it involves a very considerable paradox. "If we speak of the mind," he says, "as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series." (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.)

Herbert Spencer is distinguished in particular by his combination of the sensational philosophy with a thoroughgoing theory of evolution. He accepts as a necessary postulate the existence of a certain primordial being or force lying back of all phenomena. From the evolution of this, or its progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity, result all varieties physical and mental, all specific forms of existence in the universe. Our necessary beliefs are products of evolution. They have arisen, not merely through such associations of ideas as we personally have formed, but also

through such as our ancestors have made, and the effect of which they have transmitted with cumulative force. Slowly formed and continuously transmitted nervous modifications are the explanation of our moral, as of our other necessary beliefs. Mr. Spencer writes: "Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals, who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations, so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become to us certain faculties of moral intuition." (Letter to Mill, quoted in the *Data of Ethics*.) As in this passage the nerves are made the efficient antecedents of beliefs, so generally, in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, matter is made the antecedent of mind. This gives his system a decided cast of materialism. He says, to be sure, that the controversy between materialism and spiritualism is only a war of words, since we know nothing about the nature of the essence lying back of phenomena. But which, it is to be asked, is first,—which has the primacy, the physical or the mental? According to the whole tenor of Mr. Spencer's teaching, mind stands second, and in a relation of dependence. It is the physical force existing as motion, heat, or light, that gives rise to a feeling, or becomes changed in some inexplicable way into a fact of consciousness. Now, as we are not allowed to postulate a divine intelligence as the antecedent and designing cause of physical properties and laws, physical force is put decidedly into the foreground; mind appears, not co-ordinate, but secondary and resultant; and what is this but the most positive materialism that can well be conceived?

In these later phases of sensational philosophy religion holds a place by sufferance. It has no rights based upon

positive and known truths. Its right is scarcely more than that of conjecture and hope with respect to the unknown. The attitude of John Stuart Mill toward religion was mostly negative. But in some of his later writings he gave attention to the subject, and made some approaches to positive opinions. In his essay on Theism he says: "I think it must be allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence." He allows the reality of the historical Christ, on the ground that, without the pattern before them, the disciples could never have drawn the picture contained in the New Testament, and says that religion cannot be regarded as having made a bad choice in fixing upon Christ "as the ideal representative and guide of humanity." As respects immortality, he claims that science has no proof against it, and that as a matter of hope it is legitimate and philosophically defensible. "The beneficial effect of such a hope," he says, "is far from trifling. It makes life and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater strength, as well as greater solemnity, to all the sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow-creatures and by mankind at large." But, on the other hand, he maintains that intelligent thought cannot accept an Author of nature who is at once omnipotent and good, and that accordingly some form of the dualistic theory is best suited to the religious understanding. The supernatural in general he relegates to the region of hypothesis or hope, such hope at most being admitted as a supplement to the religion of humanity,—by which he means, not the worship of humanity, but the sympathetic dedication of one's self to its welfare.

According to Herbert Spencer, the object of religion is the unknown God, that perfectly inscrutable power which lies back of the phenomenal world. Its field is that vast region of nescience which borders the known. In the recognition of this its proper province lies its reconcilia-

tion with science. "If religion and science," he says, "are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts,—that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." In past history the religious mind has not been content to leave this region of nescience a blank, but has peopled it with various creations of its own. However, it is not to be blamed on this account. Being unable to rise to the true conception, it pursued the course best adapted to progress in satisfying the imagination with various orders of concrete forms. Thus the historical religions have served a useful purpose. Indeed, it is not certain that the impulse to give definiteness of character to the unknown will ever be outgrown. "Very likely there will ever remain a need to give shape to that indefinite sense of an ultimate existence, which forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be under the necessity of contemplating it as *some* mode of being; that is, of representing it to ourselves in *some* form of thought, however vague. And we shall not err in doing this so long as we treat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol, utterly without resemblance to that for which it stands." (First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.)

This certainly is imposing no small trial upon the religious sentiment. Tantalus was not more unfortunate. The mind must needs draw its outline or diagram of the unknown, but it is in duty bound to erase it at once, or at least to write across it the declaration that it represents nothing. How long the religious sentiment could stand this process rigorously carried out, is a question which may well be submitted to serious consideration.

Having now gone over the philosophical development in its main phases, we are prepared to ask about its general result upon theology. This much at least is clear, that it leaves an open field to Christian theism. Only those who confine their view to a fraction of the development, and

imagine that the whole stream of modern thought has gone, or is destined to go, into the channel of their particular anti-theistic philosophy, can adopt a different verdict. The whole stream of modern thought has not gone into any such channel, nor is there the slightest prospect that it will. To say nothing about the impulses and demands of practical religious life, the opposing factors from the domain of philosophy are altogether too strong to be borne in that direction. If some philosophies have been opposed to the theory of a personal God, others (which in rigor and majesty of thought approach nearest to the great theistic systems of the ancient world represented by Plato and Aristotle) insist upon a personal God as the only adequate explanation of known facts. If some of the modern systems have assumed a radically agnostic position, others have assumed the opposite position, that philosophy is a genuine explication of the Absolute, while others still have taken the intermediate ground, that our conceptions of God are of the nature of a rational and warranted faith. The resultant upon this point would seem to be the conclusion, that we are authorized to assume the existence of a personal God, and have the means of a trustworthy, though by no means exhaustive, knowledge of Him. Here the outcome is thoroughly agreeable to Catholic theology. As respects Catholic trinitarianism and Christology, modern philosophy has exhibited a less definite, and perhaps on the whole less friendly attitude. Still some of the most noteworthy philosophies have regarded these orders of doctrines as at least symbolical, if not accurately expressive, of the most important truths, while others have left an open place for them by distinguishing between things above reason and things contrary to reason, of which the former are capable of being approved by revelation. It is worthy of notice, too, how nearly unanimous are the philosophies which have any depth of moral tone in allowing that Christ may properly be taken as the moral ideal.

A specific affiliation between each of the more noted philosophies and contemporary theology is clearly manifest. The system of Wolff exercised a dominant influence upon the dogmatics of Germany in the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century. S. J. Baumgarten appears as a distinguished representative of theological Wolffianism. With him may be associated Carpov, Reinbeck, Reusch, Schubert, and others. The philosophy of Kant, being speedily followed by powerful rivals, did not have an opportunity to maintain an exclusive dominion; but it was influential from the first both with rationalists and moderate supernaturalists, and has not ceased to be a noteworthy factor in theological thinking. Among the earlier representatives of Kant's influence we may mention Tieftrunk, Ammon, J. W. Schmid, Stäudlin, and Bretschneider. Conspicuous among the more recent representatives is Albrecht Ritschl. The philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, especially the last two, claimed disciples who believed that they had found in them means of a more adequate interpretation of religious truth than the world had seen before. For a time Hegelianism threatened to sweep the whole field; but it divided into different schools, and by the middle of the century was numbered with the waning philosophies. Some of the representatives of the more sceptical school have already been mentioned. Among the more orthodox, a leading place is properly assigned to Marheinecke. Jacobi found appreciation with a considerable class of theologians, and was especially valued by the æsthetic school. The wide influence of Schleiermacher is matter of common consent, though, as already stated, much more is to be credited to his theology than to his philosophy proper. In England the system of Locke was the leading philosophical ally of theology throughout the eighteenth century. In the present century Coleridge led the way to a more appreciative consideration of the German systems. A number

of recent writers in England, Scotland, and America have attached quite a high theological value to the philosophy of Hegel. New England transcendentalism was influenced by Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schleiermacher, and Schelling. Much of the incentive, however, came indirectly. "It was through the literature of Germany," says O. B. Frothingham, "that the transcendental philosophy chiefly communicated itself. Goethe, Richter, and Novalis were more persuasive teachers than Kant, Jacobi, or Fichte. To those who could not read German these authors were interpreted by Thomas Carlyle, who took up the cause of German philosophy and literature, and wrote about them with passionate power in the English reviews." (Transcendentalism in New England.)

Though long retaining its preference for mediævalism, the Roman Catholic Church has not escaped the influence of the modern philosophies. Since the time of Kant, the writings of some of her most distinguished authors in Germany, such as Hermes, Günther, Klee, Staudenmaier, and Drey, though asserting more or less of opposition to the philosophical current, have been not a little affected by it. The opinions of the first two in this list fell under ecclesiastical censure.

As in all previous periods, so in this, a uniform estimate of the worth of philosophy in the religious sphere cannot be affirmed. The tendency on the whole has been toward the middle course between extreme valuation and extreme depreciation. Probably the theological world of the present subscribes more generally and intelligently than ever before to the verdict that philosophy and revelation, reason and faith, have harmonious, though different, offices to perform. The following sentences of F. H. Hedge are largely representative: "The cause of reason is the cause of faith. Each is the other's complement. Reason requires the nutriment and impulse furnished by faith. Faith requires the discreet elaboration of reason." (Reason in Religion.)

SECTION II.—COMMUNIONS, CREEDS, AND AUTHORS.

1. NEW COMMUNIONS. — A proper regard for brevity will preclude the mention of all, or even of a majority, of the new communions which have been organized since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Only those made noteworthy by peculiarities or extent of influence command our notice.

Moravians. — While the Moravians who settled on the estates of Count Zinzendorf in Lusatia formed the nucleus of the society which bears their name, it was soon recruited from a great variety of sources. In harmony with this heterogeneous composition little stress was laid upon doctrinal unity. Religious life was exalted above dogma, and the prevailing conception of religious life included a positive and conscious experience of the redeeming power of Christ.

The acceptance of the Augsburg Confession in 1749 was not followed by any close adhesion to the traditional sense of that standard. From the first, Christ crucified was made the centre of Moravian theology. Indeed, the criticism most frequently urged is, that the person of Christ and the office which He fulfilled upon the cross were too exclusively emphasized.

After Zinzendorf, Spangenberg was the most distinguished leader and theologian of the Moravians. His culture and wisdom were employed to good effect in modifying some of the more questionable features which had place under his predecessor.

Moravianism was officially recognized by the government of Saxony in 1749, and in the same year the societies which had been formed in England received the recognition of the English Parliament. It won early an exceptional distinction by zeal and self-sacrifice in mission work.

Methodists. — In its primary Oxford stage Methodism was a form of earnest, ascetic, ritualistic piety. In the period of

transition from this stage, it appeared almost as an offshoot of Moravianism. It was under Moravian tuition that its most distinguished founder, John Wesley, reached a satisfactory religious experience (in 1738); and from the same source he derived some of the outlines of the great work of evangelization which he afterwards undertook. But the period of direct and intimate connection with Moravianism did not much exceed two years. By 1740 Methodism had started upon its course as an independent movement, though not yet as a separate communion, and had given exhibition of most of its characteristic features, doctrinal and practical. Though their work was generally frowned upon by the Established Church, the leaders regarded themselves as loyal servants of that Church, and their efforts at religious reform as within its bounds and for its benefit. But the hindrances that were thrown in their way, and their unwillingness to be impeded in what they considered their providential vocation, naturally worked toward a separation. This first occurred in 1779, in the Calvinistic branch, which was associated with Whitefield, and was under the special patronage of Lady Huntingdon. Of the societies under Wesley, those in the United States of America acquired the status and organization of an independent communion in 1784; those in England, in the course of the twenty years or thereabouts which followed the conference of 1795, at which authority was given the societies, under certain conditions, to administer their own sacraments.

On its theological side, Methodism appears, on the whole, as the advocate and propagandist of Arminianism. To be sure, it had, almost from the very start, its exponents of Calvinistic doctrine; it contributed permanent benefits in the way of religious impulse to various Calvinistic bodies; and it is still represented (most largely in Wales) by distinct communions of the Calvinistic type. But still the Arminian stream, from the standpoint of the present, is to all appearance so much broader, that Methodism wears

mainly the cast of an Arminian movement. It should be noticed, however, that the term Arminian needs to be qualified if it is to stand for Methodist theology. Its sense must not be taken from the latitudinarian Arminians of the English Church at the end of the seventeenth or beginning of the eighteenth century, or from the later Arminians of Holland, or even from the second generation of that school; it must be taken rather from the founder, James Arminius. The spirit and intent of Methodist theology, if not all of its details, find in him a pretty fair exponent. Its aim was to escape the harsher peculiarities of Calvinism, while yet a strong doctrine of grace was maintained. It was shaped by a warm, evangelical piety, and bears the impress at once of a deep sense of dependence upon God, and of an earnest, practical regard for human freedom and responsibility. It embraced very little that was strictly of the nature of a novelty. The fervor of its advocacy gave indeed a new prominence to such doctrines as those of assurance and Christian perfection; but essentially the same doctrines had been taught before, and have found place in other communions since. The doctrinal significance of Methodism lies principally in the fact, that, avoiding both the Pelagian and the Calvinistic extreme, it has fixed upon a practical working theology, exemplified the same on a broad scale, and spread the leaven of its influence through a large part of the theological world.

While Methodism had its early formative stage, in its after history it has been free from what may be called a doctrinal crisis. It has had its stirring episodes, its seasons of spirited polemics, but no era of marked theological transitions. Among the more memorable of its polemical seasons was that inaugurated by the anti-Calvinistic minutes of the conference of 1770. In the ensuing controversy the principal disputants on the Calvinistic side were Richard Hill, Rowland Hill, and Augustus Toplady; on the Arminian side, Walter Sellon, Thomas Olivers, and

John Fletcher. Most of the products of this theological war proved to be of transient import. The writings of Fletcher alone have claimed anything like a classic rank. In his "Checks to Antinomianism" the Biblical and practical supports of the Arminian doctrines of grace are presented with a good degree of skill and cogency.

The "Book of Discipline," embodying the twenty-five articles abridged from the thirty-nine of the Church of England, and in addition some incidental statements of doctrine, is the only doctrinal standard claiming formal authority in the main body of American Methodists. There are catechisms which are recommended for the instruction of the young, but they are not made binding on the individual conscience. In the English or Wesleyan communion, the Sermons of Wesley and his Notes on the New Testament have legally the force of a standard; but with American Methodists, though much deferred to, they are not an authorized standard. Among formal systems of theology, Watson's Institutes have long been regarded as a compendium of Methodist teaching. Recently a new era of productiveness in Methodist theological literature has been inaugurated. The works of W. B. Pope and M. Raymond have been introduced to the public, and other restatements of Methodist doctrine may be expected soon to appear. Among monographs, D. D. Whedon's treatise on "The Freedom of the Will" has enjoyed wide celebrity.

The Freewill Baptists, organized under the leadership of Benjamin Randall about 1780, have entertained theological beliefs quite similar to those of the Methodists. (See Statement of 1834, prepared under the direction of the General Conference.)

Swedenborgians. — Emanuel Swedenborg was born at Stockholm in 1688. After a life of nearly sixty years devoted to the natural sciences, he believed himself called to the office of giving, if not a new revelation, at least a new exposition of revelation, by which its hidden signifi-

cance should be brought to light, and a new dispensation of Christianity inaugurated. He also believed that he was prepared for this task by disclosures of the other world, and by conversations with angels, or translated saints. By such means the inner sense of Scripture was unveiled to him, and he was led to a knowledge of those spiritual verities of which all things outward and sensible are but copies or images.

The blended science and mysticism of Swedenborg's system have naturally commended it to only a limited class of minds. The New Church has not gathered numerous societies. It is probably true, however, as has been claimed, that the influence of its teachings is much wider than the bounds of its communion. The relation of this Church to Swedenborg may be gathered from the following statement of the Rev. James Reed: "The New Church as an outward organization may be defined as a body which believes in a definite spiritual sense within the letter of the Bible, and in a system of doctrine which that higher sense discloses,—Emanuel Swedenborg being its exponent and interpreter." (Swedenborg and the New Church.)

Unitarians. — In England Unitarianism first acquired in the eighteenth century the dimensions and consistency of a religious communion. Anti-trinitarianism, which in the earlier part of the century took the form of Arianism, advanced at the close of the century to the theory of the simple humanity of Christ, and furthermore took issue with the old Socinian theory of the propriety of worshipping Christ under divine titles. At this stage, Unitarianism was prosaic in spirit, with a leaning to materialism and necessitarianism. Its leading exponents were Joseph Priestley, Theophilus Lindsey, and Thomas Belsham. Among the later representatives of English Unitarianism an eminent place is occupied by James Martineau. In him, as in the majority of recent adherents, a more spiritual and ideal

philosophy is apparent than that which was prevalent in Unitarian circles in the age of Priestley.

By far the most conspicuous and noteworthy growth of Unitarianism in this period is that which has taken place in New England. Though the distinct outcropping of this growth did not occur till the present century, its antecedents may be traced back into the two preceding centuries. First came, in the Congregational societies of New England, a relaxation in the terms of church communion. By the action of the Synod of 1662, baptized persons of respectable life and orthodox belief, though not offering special evidence of regeneration, were allowed to have their children baptized, and to enjoy all church privileges except participation in the Lord's supper, — the so-called Half-way Covenant. Later, quite a proportion of the churches removed this exception, and so opened wide the doors to all persons of moral habits. A corrective for these lax principles of administration came with the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century. At the same time there was a revival of dogmatic fervor, and the great themes of grace and retribution claimed a prominent place in pulpit discourses. Naturally those who did not catch the enthusiasms of the awakening were thrown more than ever out of sympathy with the type of religion and theology which it represented. Foreign literature affiliating with their bias was imported.

So a divergence, prophetic of schism, began. "The first stage of the Liberal movement showed Calvinism giving way to Arminianism. In the second, the Calvinism vanished, the doctrines of the Trinity and vicarious atonement slowly followed, reason grew bolder and bolder, and at last the Liberals became Unitarians, and organized themselves as a new sect. They were still sincere Bible men. Reason and Revelation were their equal watchwords. The worth of the Bible to them, it is true, lay largely in its vagueness, its multiplicity of meaning, the room they

thereby got for thinking far and freely without fear. It lay much more largely in this vagueness than they knew." (Wm. C. Gannett, *Life of Ezra S. Gannett*.) As in England, defection from Trinitarianism ran first into Arianism. But the Arian stage was soon outgrown by the great majority. "Probably few who were forty years old at the time of the disclosure in 1815 died other than Arians. Probably there were few under forty then, who did not at least grow doubtful, if not certain, the other way." (Wm. C. Gannett.)

The first church in New England to make an open declaration of Unitarianism was King's Chapel in Boston. This was founded as an Episcopalian church. Previous to the ordination of Mr. Freeman, in 1787, it had so revised the Prayer-Book as to eliminate the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time Unitarianism, in a more disguised form, was gaining a majority in most of the Congregational churches of Boston, and in other places, particularly of Eastern Massachusetts, was making a rapid advance. In consequence of the statements of Belsham, attention was called to the strength of Unitarianism, and in 1815 the controversy between Channing and Samuel Worcester initiated the movement to a separation from the Congregational body.

In the first stage of American Unitarianism, William Ellery Channing was the most representative leader, and the movement reflected largely his appreciation of the New Testament as the oracles of a supernatural religion, and his generous faith in the nobility and perfectibility of human nature. Among others of this era who held similar views, we may mention E. S. Gannett, the two Henry Wares (father and son), and Andrews Norton.

A second stage in American Unitarianism was introduced by the rise of Transcendentalism. As to the nature of this *ism*, "the easiest way of describing it is as the sentimental, mystical, and poetic side of the liberal move-

ment." (J. H. Allen, "Our Liberal Movement in Theology.") It gave a wide province to intuition, and made the inner spiritual sense the chief oracle of religious truth. Ralph Waldo Emerson, A. B. Alcott, and George Ripley were of the Transcendentalist school. In Theodore Parker the principles of the same school were combined with the temper of an iconoclast. "At bottom his system was dogmatism, resting on sentiment." (Allen.) He was a radical in thought, and an extremist in language, and so provoked the criticism, not merely of outsiders, but also of the great majority of contemporary Unitarian theologians. In his representations Christianity appears, not as the perfect or absolute religion, but simply as the best phase which the race has evolved in its progress toward the absolute religion.

Since the rise of Parkerism, Unitarianism on one side has exhibited a growing approximation to extreme rationalism. On another side, if it has lost some of the old points of affinity with evangelical theology, it has gained in respect of others. Among writers most evangelical in tone, we may mention H. W. Bellows and F. H. Hedge. The latter in particular is a thoughtful and quickening writer. A prominent place is also accorded to James Freeman Clarke among the more recent Unitarian authors.

Some others of the recently organized denominations might be ranked as Unitarian in respect to their attitude toward the doctrine of the Trinity, but they differ sufficiently to warrant their distinct name and standing. Here belong the Universalists. E. H. Capen, it is true, represents the Universalists as believing that Christ has the same nature with God, and that He was literally God manifest in the flesh. (Article on Universalism in Schaff-Herzog.) But it is understood that Hosea Ballou came ultimately to entertain the simple humanitarian conception of Christ, and that many of his contemporaries and successors embraced the same. Of those who represented the

rise of the denomination (in the last quarter of the eighteenth century), John Murray was a Sabellian, and Elhanan Winchester a Trinitarian. The earlier Universalists were quite distinguished from the Unitarians, too, in their affiliation with Calvinistic ideas of original sin and the atonement. The "Christians," combined near the beginning of the present century from O'Kelly Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, and starting out with the design of making the Bible the sole standard, as opposed to man-made creeds, have been, at least in part, averse to the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time, they have not been Socinians or humanitarians. "Their prevailing belief is that Jesus Christ existed with the Father before all worlds." (David Millard, in Rupp's Hist. of Relig. Denominations.) The Campbellites, or Disciples, discard rather the name of the Trinity than the doctrine.

We omit under the present topic such important denominations in this country as the Presbyterians, the Protestant Episcopalians, the Dutch Reformed, the German Reformed, and the Lutherans, inasmuch as they appear less as new communions than as branches of old communions transplanted to a new soil. As for the Mormons, they hardly come within the scope of these volumes at all. Their crude materialism, their polytheism, and their polygamy, with its attendant theories about woman's place, would seem to relegate their system to the history of heathen rather than of Christian doctrine.

2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OLDER COMMUNIONS. — The general cast of these developments has already been indicated by the Introduction. They are well described in the characterization of the period as the age of criticism and apology, of attack and defence, of strife and attempted reconciliation.

Lutherans. — The genuine religious inspiration which lay at the basis of Pietism, and which wrought with good effect at the beginning of the eighteenth century, did not ade-

quately pervade the life, or blend with the dogmatic thinking, of the Lutheran Church. On the contrary, Pietism itself suffered a loss of vitality and breadth. So no adequate barriers were offered to formalism and indifference, and the usual resultant of these, unbelief. The products of English deism were imported; French infidelity, under the patronage of Frederick the Great, made its inroads; the rage for exact demonstration, fostered by the Wolffian philosophy, threw probable evidences unduly into the shade; the rising zest for criticism, in its reaction from the wholesale assumption and dogmatism of the preceding age, tended to excess. Such factors co-working upon the prepared soil originated German rationalism.

Only in cases exceptionally extreme, such as those of Bahrdt and Edelmann, did German rationalism run into irreligion, or a tone of scornful opposition to the Bible. Its object was not to overthrow Christianity, but to interpret it in harmony with a more or less radical bias against the supernatural. The more moderate rationalists were content with abridging the supernatural elements in the Christian oracles and religion; the more radical sought to bring everything down to the plane of naturalism.

J. D. Michaelis and J. A. Ernesti are associated with the transition to rationalism, not because, in their own beliefs, they deviated to any considerable extent from orthodoxy, but because their new departure in the use of critical methods was utilized by disciples who were largely given to free-thinking. The man who more than any other may be regarded as the founder of German rationalism was J. S. Semler, Professor in Halle from 1752 to 1791. Before the end of the eighteenth century, a large proportion of Lutheran theologians had reached or passed beyond his standpoint, and in the beginning of the present century the rationalistic school was still dominant. Among representatives of the more radical type are numbered H. E. G. Paulus, H. P. C. Henke, J. F. Röhr, J. C. R. Eckermann,

J. Schulthess, and J. A. L. Wegscheider. Examples of the more moderate class are A. H. Niemeyer and C. G. Bretschneider. C. F. von Ammon may be placed with either class, according to the period of his life which is under consideration. The aversion of J. G. Eichhorn to the supernatural elements in the Biblical narratives would seem to assign him to the more radical class, though in important respects his views of the Bible were quite conservative.

Before the close of the first quarter of the present century, a movement counteractive of the current rationalism had been set on foot. Various factors were united in this. The idealistic philosophies, however questionable their attitude toward orthodox Lutheranism may have been, were certainly on the whole no friends of the common rationalism. The philosophy of Kant, to be sure, was in some respects an ally, but it had also its opposing phases, while in the writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel there was open and repeated denunciation of rationalistic barrenness and superficiality. The profound impulse which the German mind and heart received in connection with the wars of independence served as a practical basis for more thorough and evangelical ways of thinking. Finally, a new leaven was brought into the sphere of theology by the labors of Schleiermacher. In opposition to the rationalistic endeavor to satisfy merely the understanding, he called attention to the basis which religion has in the feelings, and to the paramount importance which must be attached to the person of the Redeemer in satisfying this side of man's nature. His system of doctrine (*Der Christliche Glaube*), published in 1821, marks a new era in modern theology. Rationalism, it is true, was not driven from the field; but thenceforth it held but a portion of the land; it was compelled to face a strong and confident rival, and found occasion to manifest itself under new forms. So, in place of the old type, we have such theories as those of David Strauss and F. C. Baur.

In the list of Lutheran theologians reputed orthodox, or relatively so, we have, for the early part of the period, Francis Buddeus, Lorenz von Mosheim, J. A. Bengel, S. J. Baumgarten, J. G. Carpzov, J. G. Walch, J. G. Reinbeck, J. Carпов, and C. M. Pfaff; for the middle part of the period, S. F. N. Morus, J. C. Doederlein, G. F. Seiler, G. C. Storr, G. C. Knapp, F. V. Reinhard, G. J. Planck, and F. C. Oetinger (who, however, mixed some theosophic peculiarities with the orthodox ingredients of his faith); for the closing part of the period, A. Hahn, H. Olshausen, J. A. C. Hävernicks, F. Lücke, August Neander, C. J. Nitzsch, J. Müller, A. Tholuck, C. Ullmann, A. D. C. Twes-ten, J. A. Dorner, T. A. Liebner, H. Martensen, R. Rothe, J. T. Beck, K. A. Auberlen, H. A. W. Meyer, C. F. Schmid, E. W. C. Sartorius, E. W. Hengstenberg, H. E. F. Guericke, G. Thomasius, J. C. K. von Hofmann, F. Delitzsch, C. E. Luthardt, K. F. A. Kahnis, K. F. Keil, G. F. Oehler, F. A. Philippi, and Bernhard Weiss. The fact that these writers are enumerated in a common class will not of course preclude the judgment that they differed to a very noticeable degree from each other. It is no small interval, for example, which lies between the systems of Rothe and Weiss, on the one hand, and those of Guericke and Philippi, on the other. Still, the former have some claim to be included in the same field of vision with the latter. If not of the strict sect of orthodoxy, they nevertheless exhibit in their spirit and belief an element which associates them with evangelical thought, as opposed to the common rationalism.

Among the outward events of the Lutheran Church, the union effort claims a foremost place in importance. "In 1817, at the third centenary celebration of the Reformation, the king of Prussia, Frederick William III., united the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches in his kingdom under one government and worship, and gave them the name of the Evangelical Church. This example was followed by

most of the countries where the two denominations were represented; viz. Nassau, Bavaria on the Rhine, Baden, Hesse-Cassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, Saxe-Weimar and Hildburgshausen, and Wurtemberg. But Bavaria proper, Austria, and the kingdoms of Saxony and Hanover, never introduced the union." (Schaff, "Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion.") Moreover, in some of the countries where the union was introduced there has been a reaction in favor of strict denominational lines.

In the United States the Lutheran Church has been less subject to theological transitions than in the mother country. It has not been, however, entirely free from them. In the first half of the century a rather loose adhesion was given in general to the Augsburg Confession, and dissent from some of the characteristic tenets of Lutheranism was freely expressed. Recently there has been an extensive movement in favor of a strict adherence to the old Lutheran standards. A prominent representative of the former phase was S. S. Schmucker; of the latter, a leading champion is Chas. P. Krauth.

Reformed Church on the Continent. — The present period has been relatively an era of less productiveness in the Reformed than in the Lutheran Church. In the different countries of the Continent it has experienced similar vicissitudes. Generally there has been a departure from the rigor of earlier standards, and in many instances rationalism has disputed or commanded the field. Among the more extreme developments in this direction is the movement in Holland represented by Kuenen and others. At the same time, there has been an able representation of evangelical tendencies. In Switzerland and Germany we have such names as J. H. A. Ebrard, A. Schweizer, M. Schneckenburger, K. B. Hundeshagen, K. H. Sack, J. P. Lange, and K. R. Hagenbach. In France evangelical Protestantism has found efficient servants in Edmond de Pressensé, and the distinguished layman Guizot. In Hol-

land, La Saussaye and Van Oosterzee hold eminent rank among writers of orthodox tendencies.

In the United States the affiliated branches, the Dutch Reformed and the German Reformed, have been much less invaded by radical notions in theology than the corresponding communions in the mother country. They have adhered quite generally to the early standards, though not without manifestations of a disposition to abate their rigor in some points. The former numbers among its writers Geo. W. Bethune and Tayler Lewis; the latter, John W. Nevin and Philip Schaff.

The Church of England and the Protestant Episcopal Church.—In the first half of the eighteenth century the most noteworthy event in English ecclesiastical history, apart from the initiation of the Methodist revival, was the deistic controversy. The writings of such deists as Collins, Woolston, Chubb, Tindal, Morgan, and Bolingbroke called forth a host of replies. Apologetic treatises became the order of the day, and apparently they accomplished their purpose. Either in virtue of the offset which they presented, or by reason of other forces, such as the religious awakening, deism declined on English soil, so that soon after the middle of the century its writings were generally neglected. It has recently become the fashion to disparage these anti-deistical apologies of the eighteenth century. No doubt, they are defective from the standpoint of the highest theological culture of the present. But this does not prove that they were not able attempts to meet the then existing crisis, or that they are destitute of valid and useful supports of Christian faith. Among the more eminent authors (including some from the Dissenters) who conducted the war against deism were Nathaniel Lardner, Richard Bentley, Edward Chandler, Samuel Chandler, Thomas Sherlock, Zachary Pearce, Richard Smalbrooke, William Law, James Foster, John Conybeare, Bishop Butler, John Chapman, William Warburton, and John Leland.

In the present century, the two opposing movements, the Tractarian or Ritualistic, and the Broad Church, are the most significant events. The former began at Oxford in 1833, under the lead of E. B. Pusey, J. H. Newman, H. Froude, and others. It was of the nature of a reaction, provoked, on the one hand, by the action of the government in throwing open the doors of Parliament to Dissenters and Romanists, and on the other, by the rationalizing or liberal tendencies manifested within the Church. Starting with a special emphasis upon patristic authority, apostolical succession, and the virtue of the sacraments, the Ritualistic movement advanced from one stage to another, until at length many of its adherents declared openly their hatred of Protestantism, their preference for Romish ritual, and for a number of Romish dogmas. As a natural accompaniment of this inner approximation to Rome, a considerable number passed into the Romish communion, including such leading spirits as Newman, Simeon, Wilberforce, Manning, and Faber.

The Broad Church is the extreme opposite of the Ritualists. It repudiates the fundamental basis of the High Church theory, denies the necessity of apostolical succession, narrows the distinction between the ecclesiastical and the secular, exalts the authority of reason at the expense of traditionary standards, and is more or less inclined to abridge the significance of the external evidences of revealed religion. It numbers such adherents as Coleridge, Thomas Arnold, F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Benjamin Jowett, A. P. Stanley, and Matthew Arnold.

The Episcopal Church in the United States settled its constitution in 1789. In 1801, it adopted with few changes the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England. At the outset Low Church tendencies were apparently in the ascendant. Bishop White, a leader in the era of organization, was decidedly remote from the High Church temper and standpoint. In its later history the Episcopal Church

in this country has reflected more or less the movements in the Church of England. The Tractarian wave reached her borders, as has also the Broad Church movement. Recently the High Church party has shown aggressive energy and has scored some victories,—a fact which explains the appearance of a Reformed Episcopal Church among the heirs of apostolic prerogatives.

Presbyterians.—A conservative spirit has in general distinguished the Presbyterian Church in Scotland. In the eighteenth century there was a slight outcropping of free-thinking, in which Professor Simson of Glasgow bore a conspicuous part. Also among the so-called Moderates, under the lead of William Robertson, there was a relaxation of dogmatic zeal. The sermons of this party revealed more interest in ethics than in theological beliefs. However, they took no open exception to the Church standard, the Westminster Confession. The schisms which occurred in this century had their origin principally in different views of polity, and flowed from that bitter fountain in the Scottish Church, the vexing question of patronage. The same is true of the disruption which, in 1843, gave origin to the Free Church. The most influential leader in the disruption, and the most efficient organizer of the Free Church, bore the celebrated name of Thomas Chalmers. Recently in both the Established Church and the Free Church of Scotland, considerable theological activity has been manifested, and works deserving of attention have been given to the public. We may instance, among others, such writers as William Cunningham, Alexander B. Bruce, John Tulloch, and Henry Calderwood.

In the United States, also, the main body of the Presbyterians has exhibited a good degree of dogmatic steadiness. However, there has been sufficient divergence in belief to occasion a notable disruption. One party, known as the Old School, being devoted to the Calvinism of the Westminster divines, and another party, called the New School,

being inclined to the modified Calvinism of the New England theology, a division took place between them in 1837. The two types of theological thought still exist, though a reunion of the two branches was consummated in 1871. A very full and able exhibit of the tenets of the Old School is given in the "Systematic Theology" of Charles Hodge, while the recently published "System of Christian Theology," by Henry B. Smith, is representative, at least to a considerable extent, of the New School.

Congregationalists. — New England has been the principal arena of theological activity in the Congregational body of the present period. In England there has been little of the nature of a doctrinal crisis. Though not bound by any definite standard, the English Congregationalists of the eighteenth century adhered very generally to the principles of their earlier history. Their most noted representatives at that time were Bradbury, Watts, and Doddridge. The latest general declaration of their faith is that of 1833, which, however, was understood not to be authoritative, but simply a *résumé* of beliefs commonly held among them. Recently there has been something of a drift from the old moorings, especially on the subject of eschatology.

With Jonathan Edwards began one of the most noteworthy developments which has taken place in recent times within Calvinistic communions. Whatever may be thought of the soundness of his views, the greatness of his personality is evinced by the energy and persistence with which his mental impress has transmitted itself. Some of the points in which Edwards or his immediate successors are claimed to have made improvements on the older theology are the following: defining of virtue as benevolence, distinguishing between natural and moral necessity, identifying the terms *free* and *voluntary*, asserting that the essence of virtue and vice is independent of their cause, and that freedom is not interfered with by determination *ab extra*, discarding of the debt theory of the atonement in favor

of the governmental view, modification or rejection of the imputation of Adam's sin, and purifying of the conception of regeneration. (See Jonathan Edwards, Jr., *Remarks on the Improvements of Theology by his Father*.) This system of modified Calvinism has received the designation of the New England Theology,—a term of rather indefinite breadth, covering different schools and parties. Some of the representatives of the New England theology have rivalled the extremest of the old Calvinistic dogmatists in certain of their views, while others have approached pretty near the borders of Arminianism. These diversities, however, may be considered more appropriately under the topics to which they relate. Among the distinguished names on the roll of the New England theology are Joseph Bellamy, Samuel Hopkins, Jonathan Edwards, Jr., West of Stockbridge, John Smalley, Samuel Spring, Nathanael Emmons, E. D. Griffin, Timothy Dwight, Leonard Woods, N. W. Taylor, Enoch Pond, and E. A. Park.

One of the great events in the history of New England Congregationalism in the present century has already been sketched in the account given of the rise of Unitarianism. A second is embodied in what is currently termed the New Departure. This movement, which has come to the surface within the last few years, represents the conviction that the old speculative theology has made its outlines too rigid and definite on various points, that a larger margin must be assigned to the merely probable, that theology should be more Christo-centric, and that some concessions must be made to recent Biblical criticism, and some weight attached to the advancing Christian consciousness, as opposed to an exclusive appeal to the letter of revelation. The point in the departure which perhaps has attracted most attention lies in the field of eschatology. While the adherents of the movement are not restorationists, they are disposed to predicate for certain classes opportunities of probation between death and the final judgment. A creed quite accept-

able in its spirit to the New Departure, if not specifically corroborative of the same, has been issued (1884) by the commission appointed under the direction of the National Council of Congregational Churches. It embodies the main points of catholic evangelical belief, is wholly free from the special tenets of Calvinism, at least from any positive and explicit statement of them, and could be subscribed by an Arminian with entire good faith. The peculiarities of Calvinism have indeed still a place among Congregationalists, but, in harmony with the contents of the creed, they are not reckoned among the essentials.

Baptists. — In consequence of the inroads of Arianism, a division occurred among the General or Arminian Baptists of England in the eighteenth century. The orthodox party withdrew in 1770, and formed the New Connection of General Baptists. The Particular or Calvinistic Baptists of the same date were characterized in general by extra rigidity of belief instead of laxity, being under such leaders as John Gill and John Brine, who held to Calvinism in its supralapsarian phase. At the close of the century (the era of William Carey and Robert Hall) the denomination took a new start in religious activity, and in the present century, both in England and in this country, it has advanced rapidly in numbers, influence, and extent of wholesome Christian work. Though not bound by authoritative standards, the Baptists of this order have been quite homogeneous in faith. Taking the period through, they have held in general quite strictly to the Calvinistic system; but, at the same time, it can hardly be denied that in the last few years they have shared more or less in that practical revolt against the sterner features of Calvinism which has spread over so large a portion of the theological world. Among statements of doctrine, the Philadelphia Confession (same as the English Confession of 1688), adopted in 1742, and the New Hampshire Confession, prepared about 1833, have been widely regarded as representative of Baptist beliefs. In the list of

Baptist writers of the period we have, besides those mentioned above, Andrew Fuller, T. J. Conant, H. B. Hackett, A. C. Kendrick, J. A. Broadus, Alvah Hovey, J. L. Dagg, and J. M. Pendleton.

Roman Catholics. — While different schools of theological thought have continued to exist in the Romish Church, on the whole they have been less distinctly and sharply arrayed against each other in the present than in the preceding period. The general tendency has been to unite in emphasizing points decided by councils and popes, and on points not definitely decided to allow that different views may be held without prejudice to the faith. Some outcroppings of liberalism have appeared, as, for example, in the so-called Austrian Aufklärung under Joseph II.; but every such manifestation has been offset by a reactionary movement, and the outcome, as it appears in the Vatican Council of 1869–70, is the triumph of the Romish over the Catholic element, the enthronement of Ultramontaniam. To be sure, the Vatican decrees represented a partisan victory, and their enactment was secured at the expense of an extra amount of management. But once enacted they have commanded the acquiescence, however reluctant, of the great majority of those who were opposed to their adoption. The Old Catholic movement, in which the opposition culminated, and which acquired in 1873 a regular organization, though commanding the adhesion of such eminent men as Döllinger and Reinkens, has not yet secured very extensive suffrage. As their name indicates, the Old Catholics endeavor to go back to the more primitive standpoint of the Church. In the decisions and practice of the Church of the first six centuries they find the norm of doctrine and discipline. Their theology, apart from their attitude toward papal claims, is essentially Roman Catholic, but it is hardly presumption to prophesy that their release from pontifical sovereignty will eventuate in some further modifications of the Romish features of their faith.

Besides the Decrees of the Vatican Council, the present period has added to the confessional documents of the Romish Church the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, by Pius IX., issued in 1854 as an authoritative promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, and the Syllabus of 1864, from the same pontiff. The latter is a specification of eighty errors of the present age.

Among eminent Roman Catholic authors we have the names of Eusebius Amort, Michael Sailer, and Martin Gerbert in the eighteenth century, and J. Perrone, J. A. Möhler, F. A. Staudenmaier, H. Klee, Seb. von Drey, J. X. Dieringer, and J. N. Oischinger in the present century. Prior to the Vatican Council, Döllinger was reckoned as one of the great lights of Roman Catholic literature. His labors, however, were more in the historical than in the dogmatic field. In the same field a high distinction has been won by K. J. Hefele.

Greek Church. — Few noteworthy points in the dogmatic history of the Greek Church are on record for the last two centuries. The conservative temper so long characteristic of this communion has continued to dominate her faith and practice. The most important confessional documents which have been added to her list in this era are the Russian Catechisms of Platon and Philaret. That of the latter is described by Schaff as "the most authoritative doctrinal standard of the orthodox Græco-Russian Church." (Creeds of Christendom.)

SECTION III. — SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

1. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION. — The same general contrast between Romanism and Protestantism which subsisted in the Reformation era upon this theme has continued down to the present. Only to a moderate extent and within a limited circle has the con-

trast been modified. This limited approximation of views is discernible in the fact, that, on the one hand, some Roman Catholic theologians have identified tradition on its subjective side with the consciousness of the Church, and, on the other hand, some Protestant theologians have made the growing Christian consciousness in a measure supplementary to Scripture. Setting forth this subjective side of tradition Möhler defines it as the collective understanding or consciousness of the Church. (Symbolik, § 38.) Staudenmaier speaks of it as the divinely wrought consciousness of the Church. (Dogmatik, Introd.) Newman's theory of development proceeds largely from the same conception, assuming that all conclusions which are reached by the unfolding mind or consciousness of the Church come with authoritative sanctions, however indistinct the datum may have been from which the unfoldment started. Evidently there is somewhat in such a notion of tradition that is akin to the view of those Protestant theologians who go farthest in their stress upon the Christian consciousness as progressively developed in the course of history. Care, nevertheless, should be taken not to predicate too much of a kinship. The Protestant who makes the most of the Christian consciousness does not allow that any one has the office infallibly to interpret and formulate the same. He is also free to affirm that the written Word is the incomparable factor in developing a *normal* Christian consciousness; whereas, the Romanist holds that formal statements of the Church consciousness are binding upon the individual conscience, and, moreover, is free to make the unwritten word the rival of Scripture, tradition in the objective sense the main ground of tradition in the subjective sense. Indeed, the writers Möhler and Staudenmaier, whom we have quoted as defining tradition on its subjective side, lay no small stress upon the objective tradition, or oral teaching, as supplying the content of the former. They could not fail to do this and yet remain in harmony

with the standards of their Church. The decisions of the Vatican Council (1869-70), no less than those of Trent, assume that valid traditions must have their ultimate basis in utterances which have come from the mouth of Christ, or from the apostles by the dictation of the Holy Spirit, and "have been transmitted, as it were, from hand to hand." (Chap. II.)

It should be stated that Newman in his doctrine of development has gone farther than is agreeable to many expositors of Roman Catholic doctrine. In opposition to his picture of change and growth, there are those who prefer, in the spirit of Bossuet, to represent the Church as always teaching the same things, and not merely as containing some obscure substratum of their future production. Such, for example, is the import of Dr. Wiseman's statement: "We believe that no new doctrine can be introduced into the Church, but that every doctrine which we hold has existed and been taught in it, ever since the time of the apostles." (See other quotations in J. B. Mozley's criticism of Newman's *Essay on Development*.) Newman's theory, however, is suited to render good service to Romish apologetics. It meets the case of those who have not the hardihood to overlook or to deny the appearance of a vast change in the teachings of the Church since the first centuries. It ought to appear especially useful to Romanists since the promulgation of the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin and the infallibility of the Pope.

A movement on Protestant soil, which, however, cannot be characterized as a Protestant movement, has made a close approach to the Romish doctrine of tradition. In the scheme of the English Ritualists, tradition is assigned the rank of an authoritative interpreter of Scripture. In one of his earlier works Pusey remarks: "We would take not our own private and individual judgments, but that of the Universal Church, as attested by the Catholic fathers

and ancient bishops." (Letter to the Bishop of Oxford.) In a later work he writes to Newman: "I meant to maintain that the Church of England does hold a divine authority in the Church, to be exercised a certain way, deriving the truth from Holy Scripture, following apostolical tradition, under the guidance of God the Holy Ghost. I fully believe that there is no difference between us in this. The *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, which our own divines have so often inculcated, contains, I believe, the self-same doctrine as laid down in the council of Trent upon tradition." (Eirenicon.)

2. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. — We consider under this topic only the views of those who acknowledge in general the authority of the Bible, leaving the more negative theories for a subsequent discussion.

The theory of strict verbal inspiration which was dominant in the seventeenth century has had its advocates throughout the present period. This theory implies that the Bible is inspired in its every word and infallible in its every statement, except possibly in some instances in which the text has been corrupted by copyists. Substantially this view still appears in the Lutheran dogmatics of S. J. Baumgarten, with a token, however, of departure from the same, since he maintained that, while it is not necessary to concede that there are in fact any mistakes, it would not materially affect the authority of the Bible if it were found to contain some errors in chronological, geographical, or historical minutiae. (Glaubenslehre, 1764, Vol. III. pp. 32–38.) Strict verbal inspiration was asserted by the learned Baptist theologian of the eighteenth century, John Gill. The New England divine, Nathanael Emmons, taught it in these unmistakable terms: "Every sentence and every word in such a book as this was of too much importance to be written by an unassisted pen. Hence it is natural to conclude the Holy Ghost suggested every thought and word to the sacred penmen, all the while they were writ-

ing the Holy Scriptures." Difference of style he explains as resulting from a divine accommodation to the peculiar genius and education of the sacred penmen, such as a parent might employ in dictating a letter for a child. (Systematic Theology, Serm. VII.) The teaching of Leonard Woods, if not so distinctly committed to the same theory, bears in its direction. (Theological Lectures, XIII.) Among recent advocates of plenary verbal inspiration, the Genevan divine, L. Gaussen, has written with most force and vivacity. He says of the Bible, that it contains no error, that all its parts are equally inspired, that its words are in every case what they ought to be. "It is not, as some will have it, a book which God employed men, whom He had previously enlightened, to write under His auspices. No, it is a book which He dictated to them; it is the Word of God; the Spirit of the Lord spake by its authors, and his words were upon their tongues." (Theopneustia, translation by D. D. Scott.) Statements nearly as sweeping are employed by Charles Hodge, who likewise maintains that all the books of Scripture are equally inspired, that inspiration extends to all the contents of these books, and to the words as well as to the general subject matter. (Systematic Theology, Introd., Chap. VI. Compare Prof. Atwater in Bib. Sac., Jan., 1864; Enoch Pond, Lectures on Christian Theology, X.)

The Swedenborgian view also comes under the category of strict verbal inspiration, at least so far as those books are concerned which are properly the Word of the Lord, or contain the spiritual sense. "These," says Edwin Gould, "we believe to be plenarily inspired, every word and syllable contained in them, in the original tongues, having been dictated *viva voce* to the different penmen by whom they were committed to writing, from the mouth of God Himself." (Swedenborg and Modern Biblical Criticism.) The other books (including in the Old Testament Ruth, 1 and 2 Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Proverbs, Ecclesi-

astes, the Song of Solomon, and Job, and in the New Testament the Book of Acts and the Epistles) were written "by a lower and mediate inspiration, or a divine direction and superintendence." (Ibid.)

A second theory, which has had much currency through the period, while claiming that the Bible as originally given was free from error, affirms that inspiration was not equal in all parts, — that at least in case of the historical books it did not determine the exact language. This may be regarded as the standard Roman Catholic theory of more recent times. It is advocated by Perrone among others. While rejecting the theory of Hamel and Less, he is also averse to the view that all of the Scriptures were dictated to the sacred penmen. Biblical inspiration, as he teaches, included the following elements: "(1.) Incitement or impulse to writing; (2.) illumination of the mind and movement of the will, so that not only does no error proceed from the sacred writer; but (3.) moreover, there is found in him such a choice of the things to be written that he omits nothing, adds nothing to that which God wished to be written by him; (4.) constant and singular assistance in accomplishing the work." (Prælect. Theol., De Sacra Script., Cap. II. Compare Klee, Dogmatik, 1844, Vol. I. pp. 261, 262.) The same theory has been held by various Protestant writers, such as Philip Doddridge, Daniel Wilson, and E. Henderson.

A third theory differs from the foregoing in allowing a somewhat wider scope to human agency. While maintaining that the Bible, taken in its entirety, is a complete ethical and religious standard, it admits that it may contain errors in subsidiary and unimportant matters. This theory has commanded a growing patronage since the middle of the last century, and is now largely prevalent among Protestant theologians. It has been very commonly held by the supernaturalist school of Germany, since the latter part of the eighteenth century, being more than once

implied, where not definitely advocated, by the addition to the assertion of Biblical infallibility of the qualifying clause, *in matters of doctrine*, or *in what concerns religious faith*. It has been favored by Tholuck, Lange, Martensen, Hofmann, and Van Oosterzee; by Warburton and Löwth; by Coleridge, Thomas Arnold, and Alford. It is not to be understood that all included under this specification have held the same total view of the Scriptures. In fact, the elements of this theory have been associated with somewhat diverse conceptions of the co-working of divine and human agency in preparing the sacred oracles. A relatively larger place has been assigned to human agency by some of these writers than by others. Some, as Van Oosterzee, have taught that inspiration extends to the language of Scripture. This, however, by no means identifies their theory with the first in our list. Their idea was, that whatever affects thought must affect more or less the language in which it is clothed. At the same time, they made the person of the writer a co-agent both in the thought and the language, and to such an extent as to condition the result, and blend with it some traces of human fallibility. "Errors and inaccuracies," says Van Oosterzee, "in matters of subordinate importance, are undoubtedly to be found in the Bible." (Christian Dogmatics, Vol. I. sect. 39.) Naturally, a large proportion of those holding the general theory described in this paragraph lay much stress upon the idea that inspiration is dynamical as opposed to mechanical, — that, instead of taking the place of the human faculties, it imparts an extraordinary activity to both mind and heart.

The attitude of the earlier Unitarians of New England toward the Bible, as also of the more conservative of their successors, may be included within the limits of the theory under consideration. They conceded to the Biblical writers, at least those of the New Testament, quite a positive inspiration, and a full doctrinal authority. "We regard the

Scriptures," says Channing, "as the records of God's successive revelations to mankind, and particularly of the last and most perfect revelation of his will by Jesus Christ. Whatever doctrines seem to us to be clearly taught in the Scriptures, we receive without reserve or exception. We do not, however, attach equal importance to all the books in this collection. Our religion, we believe, lies chiefly in the New Testament. The dispensation of Moses, compared with that of Jesus, we consider as adapted to the childhood of the human race, a preparation for a nobler system, and chiefly useful now as serving to confirm and illustrate the Christian Scriptures. Jesus Christ is the only master of Christians, and whatever he taught, either during his personal ministry or by his inspired apostles, we regard as of divine authority, and profess to make the rule of our lives." (Works, Vol. III. pp. 60, 61.) E. S. Gannett writes: "We believe in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as containing the authentic records of God's wonderful and gracious ways; and to these Scriptures we appeal as the decisive authority upon questions of faith and duty. . . . We take our faith from the Bible. Unitarian Christianity is the Christianity of the New Testament." (Discourse at Montreal.) Says Orville Dewey: "The matter is divine, the doctrines true, the history authentic, the miracles real. . . . The seal of a divine and miraculous communication is set upon that Holy Book." This miraculous communication, however, as he elsewhere specifies, applies to the substance rather than to the form of the Scriptures. A distinction is to be made between revelation and the record of revelation. "The thought came pure from the all-revealing Mind; but when it entered the mind of a prophet or apostle, it became a human conception. It could be nothing else, unless the mind, by being inspired, became superhuman. The inspired truth became the subject of human perception, feeling, and imagination; and when it was communicated to the world,

it was clothed with human language; and that perception, feeling, imagination, lent its aid to this communication, as truly as to any writings that were ever penned." (Works, Vol. III.) As regards the Unitarianism generally of the present, or of the immediate past, its views range from a close approximation to the above down to those characteristic of extreme rationalism. Bellows, were it not that his general representation is modified by an occasional dash of bolder criticism, might be placed alongside of those whom we have quoted. "The Bible," he says, "is the Word of God, as the conscience is the voice of God; but the words of the Bible are not the words of God, any more than the decisions of the conscience are the decisions of God. The mind, the will, the spirit of God, whose inspiration informed our consciences without making them infallible, has produced the Bible without making it perfect. He who studies the Holy Book in all its parts will discern a divine communication, a sacred teaching, an unmistakable guidance, running through and shining out of its complete tenor, as a river runs through a broken country, or as an expression of benignity, of law and order, of justice and mercy, runs through the diverse and often contrasted and puzzling effects of external nature." (Restatements of Christian Doctrine, Serm. VI.) He claims for inspiration a supernatural cast. Combating the idea that it is to be identified with genius, he says: "The ordinary popular view of religious inspiration, which makes man the mere tool or pipe of the Almighty, with all its mechanical defects, is truer to the reality of the case than the so-called advanced view, which confounds inspiration with the possession of superior natural insight and purer gifts of mind and heart." (Ibid., Serm. VII.)

A fourth theory may be characterized as the intuitional. This had its principal starting-point in the theology of Schleiermacher. Its distinguishing feature is, that it emphasizes, not the communication of a message to the sacred

writer, but such an education and development of his religious consciousness as prepares him to apprehend and to teach divine truth. Inspiration is thus not so much an extraordinary afflatus as a moulding process, by which its subject is prepared for insight into spiritual verities. Prophets and apostles were men who were qualified by special depth and fulness of religious life for special insight into the mind of the Spirit. Their inspiration differed in degree rather than in quality from that of all true believers. Among those affiliating more or less distinctly with this view we may mention Nitzsch, Twesten, Elwert, Marheinecke, Rothe, and Morell. Inspiration, according to Twesten, differs in grade rather than in species from that spiritual enlightening which is bestowed upon Christians generally. It might be defined as a higher grade of enlightening, -- *höher Grad der Erleuchtung*. (Vorlesungen über Dogmatik.) Marheinecke says: "Inspiration is and can be nothing else than the elevation of the self-consciousness to the purest and clearest God-consciousness." (System der Christlichen Dogmatik, Theil III.) This has an Hegelian sound, but it might have come also from a disciple of Schleiermacher. Rothe manifests special anxiety to exclude everything bearing the semblance of magic from the divine working, and insists that revelation must be regarded as mediated by moral instrumentality, -- *moralische vermittelte*. "The essence," he says, "of divine revelation consists in a purifying, supernaturally wrought by God, as well as an energizing of the God-consciousness in man." (Zur Dogmatik, 1863, pp. 60-64.) While in terms a definition of revelation, this may serve also to indicate Rothe's idea of inspiration; for he makes inspiration the subjective side of revelation. Manifestation and inspiration inseparably united and mediated by an historical process constitute revelation. "Inspiration," says Morell, "does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form

of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favored of God. . . . Inspiration as an internal phenomenon is perfectly consistent with the natural laws of the human mind,—it is a higher potency of a certain form of consciousness, which every man to some degree possesses.” (Philosophy of Religion.) Many writers, who do not adopt the intuitional theory as an adequate account of the subject, still regard it as an important factor in the proper total view.

Morell makes a distinction between revelation and inspiration that is quite in line with the intuitional theory. Revelation, in the narrower sense, denotes the presentation of an intelligible object, and inspiration refers to the reciprocity of the subject, the higher potency of the religious consciousness. W. E. Atwell, while laying more stress than Morell upon the objective element, adopts a similar view of the relation of revelation and inspiration. The latter he confines to the subjective effects of the Spirit’s influence, and regards it as a preparation for the former. (The Pauline Theory of the Inspiration of Holy Scripture.) Ladd introduces the same idea, but is careful to note, that, while logically distinguished, inspiration and revelation must be viewed as in fact coexistent and most intimately connected. As respects revelation, he emphasizes strongly the idea that it is mediated through an historical process centring in the manifested Son of God. (The Doctrine of Sacred Scripture.) Hodge, on the other hand, recurs to the old distinction, set forth by Quenstedt among others, and makes revelation to denote the supernatural communication of truth to the mind, and inspiration the supernatural control of the mind in the act of writing, by means of which the truth is imparted unmixed with error to others. Supposing the materials already at hand, as was largely the

case with the writers of the historical books of the Old Testament, only the gift of inspiration was necessary. (Introduction, Chap. VI.)

On the whole, there has been a decided movement in the scholarly world toward a modified view of the Bible. The most prominent changes may be summarized as follows: (1.) The theory of strict verbal inspiration has held a waning place. More and more the conviction has entered into Christian scholarship that it is untenable. In extensive fields it is substantially obsolete. Kahnis stands as an exponent, not of the scepticism, but of the evangelical sentiment of Germany, when he says: "The old theory of inspiration has now scarcely a representative left. It has fallen, and with right." (Dogmatik, Vol. III. § 6.) But, as he adds, this in no wise indicates that the inspiration itself of the Scriptures can or ought to be surrendered. (2.) In harmony with the above development, the present tendency is to take more account of the personality of the writer than was allowed by the older and stricter theory, more account of his historical environment, more account of his relative place in the organism of revelation. In other words, the present tendency is to take more account of those natural factors by which the supernatural elements in revelation have been conditioned. (3.) The present tendency is to rely less upon detached portions of the Bible, to view it less as a collection of oracles, to look more to the general scope of its teaching, to give a larger recognition to its historical cast, to acknowledge more fully that revelation has been progressive and educative, and consequently is not in all respects an absolute standard save as it comes to its goal and completion in Jesus Christ. (4.) As respects the grounds by which the divine authority of the Bible is approved, the present tendency is to lay great stress upon the cogency with which its ethical standard, taken as a whole, commends itself to the moral consciousness, and upon the firm conviction which springs up

in the hearts of the regenerate, that the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, revealed in its pages, is from God. The evidence of miracle and prophecy, though much assailed in certain quarters, is by no means discarded; but it occupies relatively less place than was accorded to it in the eighteenth century. The broadest theologians of the age still indeed attach a very high importance to miracles. But instead of treating them as mere credentials of a book, they emphasize the fact that they are an integral part of revelation itself, great ethical deeds of God, illustrating His supremacy over nature and especially His bearing towards men. We may say, in general, respecting the tests of the divinity of Scripture, that the subject is referred more largely than in the last century to the inner tribunal. Amid endless details of criticism, the devout disciple of Christ finds in the effectual manner in which the Scriptures address his moral and spiritual consciousness, and satisfy his religious needs, an invincible pledge of their divinity. This is the new and better version of the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* so commonly advocated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The fault of the older dogmatics was, that it attached to this testimonium a too technical sense, made it too largely an address to man from without. It is indeed the testimony of the Divine Spirit which gives the pledge; but it is at the same time the testimony of the human spirit. It is the voice of man's clarified reason, conscience, and affection. The Divine Spirit speaks in and through these. Their existence denotes His presence; the pious mind cannot forbear to acknowledge in them tokens of His gracious working.

3. RADICAL CRITICISM. — A statement of all the shades and varieties of this criticism would be a wearisome and unprofitable task. Only a brief notice of the leading types will engage our attention.

English Deism in the Eighteenth Century. — Natural religion was the shibboleth of this form of scepticism. The

Bible, as the Deists considered, is comparatively useless so far as it agrees with natural religion, and so far as it disagrees it is false and injurious. Different writers of the school went to very different lengths in manifesting their hostility, but in their animus generally there was an unmistakable vein of depreciation and dislike of the Scriptures.

In critical importance the attack of Collins upon prophecy was among the most significant of the deistical works. Woolston's attack upon the New Testament miracles was too manifestly extravagant and fanatical to be of any permanent account. Morgan dealt with the Old Testament in a spirit of great bitterness, as did also Bolingbroke. Chubb and Bolingbroke, who agreed in denying special providence, agreed likewise in regarding much of the New Testament as of the nature of corrupting additions to the simple ethical teaching of Christ. Tindal, in his work, "Christianity as Old as the Creation," labored to show that the common theory of a special positive revelation, contained in the Bible, is contradictory to the divine perfections.

French infidelity in the eighteenth century, as represented by Voltaire, borrowed its premises from English deism. What it added was an excess of wit and irreverence. Voltaire was in no wise distinguished by thoroughness of criticism, and the same may be said of the other French sceptics of the era.

The Beginnings of German Rationalism. — Whether Töllner himself is to be classified as a rationalist or not, the work on inspiration which he published in 1772 no doubt helped on the tendency to break away from old views. He asserted different degrees of inspiration, and gave prominence to the idea that the Bible *contains* rather than *is* the Word of God. His contemporary, Semler, went much farther in the direction of innovation, and fairly inaugurated the rationalistic dealing with the Bible. He excluded from the class of inspired writings Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Ruth, Canticles, and various por-

tions of other Old Testament books; also the Gospel of Mark, the Epistle to Philemon, and the Apocalypse. Moreover, by the scope which he gave to the theory of accommodation,—the theory that Christ and the apostles, using the expedients of popular address, spoke often from the standpoint of current conceptions,—he abridged materially the dogmatic authority of those portions of the Bible to which he attached most weight. Chronologically, Lessing belongs, with Semler, to the beginnings of German rationalism. Whether he belongs there also in respect of belief, is a question not altogether easy to decide. As Dorner remarks, opinion is still divided as to the degree of his alienation from positive Christianity. He was evidently remote from the old Lutheran theory of the Bible. He was interested in the sacred volume chiefly as a compendium of ethics and literature; but, at the same time, he cannot be said to have committed himself definitely to the scheme of simple naturalism. It must also be allowed that he rendered a real service to Biblical science by calling attention to the conception of revelation as a progressive education of the race, though he may be thought to have carried this beyond just bounds.

German Rationalism developed into Naturalism.—Here belong such writers as Paulus, Röhr, and Wegscheider. They start with the presupposition that everything must be explained on the basis of natural law. Paulus goes over the list of the New Testament miracles, and endeavors to show how they may be accounted for without any appeal to the supernatural, and also without any impeachment of the honesty of the writers. The angelic appearances to the shepherds he explains as meteoric phenomena. The healing of the possessed was the natural effect of such an eminent person as Christ engaging the hearty confidence of such patients as the demoniacs. The five thousand were fed, because those who were provided with food were constrained by the example of Christ and His disciples to

share their store with the destitute. Lazarus came forth from the tomb because the loud voice of Jesus roused him from his stupor. The resurrection of Christ also was not a resurrection of the really dead. We cannot tell how much was done toward reviving him by the cool air of the grotto, and by the spices, and how much by the electric currents that accompanied the storm or earthquake. (Das Leben Jesu.) But after all Paulus is not far from recognizing in the New Testament the account of a genuine miracle. The personality of Christ, he allows, appears as something quite unique and unparalleled in history. Wegscheider makes a sweeping denial of miracles, declares the doctrine of immediate supernatural revelation unworthy of God, and reduces the divine agency in man's religious history to the category of providence. (Inst. Theol., §§ 12, 42, 44, 49.)

The School of Æsthetic Rationalism. — The naturalism, or "vulgar rationalism," just described, diluted the religion of the Bible almost into complete insipidity. In the school led by De Wette, the sentimental had a much larger place. These writers addressed themselves to the Scriptures mainly in the character of literary critics; they were interested in them as the classics of religious literature. They were not much more tolerant of the supernatural than the vulgar rationalists, but, in place of detailed and labored attempts to explain everything by natural causes, they made a liberal use of the supposition of legends and myths. In a primitive people, as they held, the poetizing faculty freely and spontaneously exercises itself. There is an irrepressible tendency to clothe doctrines with a symbolical form. The fantasy has full play. Hence, much finds place in the oracles of religion that cannot be taken literally. At the same time, this element is not without a rich significance; it is a manifestation of the feeling (unformulated and incapable of complete formulation) in which lies the essence of religion, and it ministers to the spiritual

edification of those who receive it in the right spirit. In the writings of Matthew Arnold there are prominent points of affinity with this school.

The Mythical Hypothesis of Strauss. — De Wette started from the philosophy of Fries, — a peculiar elaboration from the systems of Kant and Jacobi. Strauss, proceeding from an Hegelian basis, modified and extended, in accordance with its bias, the results of De Wette's criticism. The myth, to which De Wette had allowed a considerable place, he makes the determining factor of the Gospel history in the form in which it has come to us. All accounts of miracles he assigns to the category of pure myths; also in many other narratives the mythic element is, as he concludes, predominant. By a myth is to be understood not so much the intentional fabrication of an individual as the spontaneous expression of what is matter of common consciousness. The individual who first propounds the myth but voices a conviction that has been stirring in the breasts of a people or a society of kindred spirits. The grand occasion of the New Testament myths was the Messianic expectations which had grown from the soil of the Old Testament dispensation. The ideal was in the minds of the early disciples, and the creative working of their thoughts ere long made out a history conformed to the ideal. In the earlier *Leben Jesu* (1835), Strauss made little account of the element of intentional fabrication; in his later work, addressed to the German people (1864), while holding essentially his former position, he felt constrained to give more scope to the idea of an intentional coloring of the facts by some of the authors of the Gospel narratives. In his latest work, "The Old Faith in a New Light," Strauss figures as the exponent of an unbelief which surrenders the name of Christian, and invites mortals hopeless of immortality to worship, as the only object of worship, an impersonal cosmos, that has no hearing for prayer or sympathy for suffering.

The Development Theory of Baur. — In place of a founder of Christianity Baur postulates a struggle of different tendencies. At least, he allows the person of Christ to retreat into the background, and brings into the foreground, as the agencies by which Christianity was developed into its New Testament phase, the opposing schools of Peter and Paul. The legalism of Peter would make of Christianity only a purer Judaism. The broader and more speculative temper of Paul would make of it a new religious philosophy transcending national bounds. Here were antagonisms that needed to be reconciled. The agents of this reconciling work were not wanting. Some of the principal books of the New Testament, such as the Book of Acts, the Epistles ascribed to Peter, and the later of the Epistles bearing the name of Paul, were the products of their efforts. Most of the New Testament writings are to be characterized as *Tendenz-Schriften*; they give a colored representation in the interest either of the Petrine or of the Pauline party, or with the design of covering up their differences. They belong not to the age of the apostles, but are to be assigned to the second century.

Criticism of the Old Testament by Kuenen and Wellhausen. — Their conception of the Old Testament religion admits as little of the supernatural as did the rationalism of Paulus and Wegscheider. The earlier history of Israel is regarded by them as legendary and unreliable. First with the literary prophets is any secure historical basis discovered. Only a few shreds of the so-called Mosaic legislation date back to the age of Moses. The first edition of the Pentateuch (so says Kuenen) was about 750 B. C., the second in the time of Josiah, while the third, adding largely to the preceding, was from the hand of Ezra. The element of prediction in prophecy was simply of the nature of pious anticipation, and in the larger proportion of instances failed of definite fulfilment.

As respects this radical criticism, we consider it entirely

certain that it does not represent the main drift of modern Biblical scholarship. No doubt it has served as a modifying factor. With some it may have increased the disinclination to admit any relaxation of the older and stricter theory, but probably with a larger number it has added somewhat to the demand for a less technical and exact theory of Biblical inspiration and authority. As an extreme, it must submit to a waning suffrage. Superior forces are arrayed against it; for it contradicts both a sober historical sense and the ever-recurring verdict of the spiritual consciousness which is nurtured by the truth of the Scriptural revelation.

CHAPTER II.

THE GODHEAD.

SECTION I.—EXISTENCE, ESSENCE, AND ATTRIBUTES
OF GOD.

1. PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE.—The ontological argument as put either by Anselm or Descartes has claimed but little following in the present period. Those who have given it a place have generally modified or supported it by added considerations. Such was the case with Leibnitz. Anselm's argument, says Leibnitz, omitted an important point, the proof of the *possibility* of the perfect Being. This being once established, as it may be, the demonstration is complete. Among celebrated thinkers Hegel perhaps found as little fault with Anselm as any. He declares the ontological the one conclusive proof, and objects to Anselm's way of presenting this, rather than to the essential content of his argument.

On the other hand, Kant repudiated the ontological argument as entirely inconclusive. The idea of a perfect Being, he maintained, in no wise carries with it a positive guaranty of His real existence. The idea is equally complete whether real existence be affirmed or denied, for existence is not an attribute,—does not increase the intention of the term to which it is applied. The concept of a triangle is not changed or improved by saying the triangle is or exists. The ontological argument makes an unwarranted spring from the subjective to the objective, from the ideal to the real. Lotze, equally with Kant, was of the

opinion that this argument in its scholastic form is invalid. "That the idea," he says, "of the most perfect Being includes also real existence as one of His attributes, that consequently the most perfect Being is necessary, is so evidently bad logic, that, after Kant's incisive refutation, any attempt at defence would be useless." (*Mikrokosmos*, IX. 4.) At the same time, Lotze contends that the idea of a perfect Being involves evidence of His existence. The evidence, however, lies not in a logical deduction, but in the immediate feeling, accompanying the idea, that such an ideal must have reality. "Not out of the perfection of the Perfect as a logical consequence is His real existence inferred, but without the circumlocution of a deduction the impossibility of His non-existence is immediately felt." (*Ibid.*)

In theological circles in recent times but little favor has been accorded to the ontological argument, at least in its historic sense. Dr. Shedd's comments on Anselm's reasoning are quite outside the main current. (*Hist. of Doct.*, Bk. III. chap. 1.) The tendency among theologians is to pass much the same verdict as that of Lotze; namely, that, while invalid in form, it points to a truth of much force, — the truth that the idea of God in man's religious consciousness is accompanied with a spontaneous and immediate conviction of His reality. The comments of Staudenmaier, for example, reach substantially this result. (*Dogmatik*, Vol. II.) Evidently also we may properly include here all those writers who lay the principal stress upon the idea of God as native to the mind, or manifestly provided for in its essential constitution, but at the same time enter into no such attempts at formal demonstration as did Anselm and Descartes. For all such, without doubt, give a place to the immediate impression of an objective reality which goes with the idea of God. (See F. H. Hedge, *Ways of the Spirit*, Essay VI.; Rothe, *Dogmatik*, I. § 4; Twisten, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II. pp. 19-21; Klee, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II. p. 7;

Van Oosterzee, *Dogmatics*, Vol. I. sect. 44; H. Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, 1872, pp. 51-54.)

Kant criticised the cosmological and teleological arguments, as well as the ontological. The cosmological, or that which from limited and contingent existence infers the unconditioned, the necessary first cause, he regarded as cumbered with unproved assumptions; such as the impossibility of an infinite series of contingent causes, the imperative requirement to assume such a series if a necessary first cause is denied, and the perfection of the first cause, supposing the existence of such to be granted. The teleological or design argument he criticised as proving at most a world-fashioner of indefinite greatness, not a creator of the material of the world, not an infinite being, since the world as known to us is finite, and we are only authorized to assume a proportionate cause.

That these criticisms of Kant have had an influence in the theological world cannot be denied. One token of this influence is seen in that class of theologians who have made little account of proofs from external nature, and have appealed to man's consciousness as a moral and religious being. Still, it cannot be said that the lines of proof criticised have been surrendered. The great mass of theologians have continued to attach a high value to them. Nor is this wholly counter to the authority of Kant himself. Whatever speculative defects he apprehended in them, he attached to them, at least to one of them, the teleological, a high practical value. "This proof," he says, "will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the oldest, clearest, and most in conformity with human reason. . . . It reveals aims and intention, where our own observation would not by itself have discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of nature by leading us toward that peculiar unity the principle of which exists outside of nature. This knowledge reacts again upon its cause, namely, the transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief in a Supreme Author to an

irresistible conviction." (Transcendental Dialectic.) What the argument fails of, according to Kant, is apodictic certainty. In fact, little more could be asked of the argument than Kant concedes. Suppose it only legitimates the assumption of a personal Author of cosmic arrangements, and does not in strictness prove His infinity. In connection with the modern idea of the vastness of the universe, its practical result must be to substantiate the conception of an all-sufficient and infinite Being. He who believes in a personal Author and Ruler of nature will not be likely to be troubled with questionings about His proper infinity.

The moral argument, as presented by Kant, and upon which he placed the chief stress, has already been sufficiently characterized in the section on philosophy. The substance of this argument, it is needless to say, is universally recognized in theological thought.

A review of the topic can hardly fail to leave one with the impression that the proofs lying nearest to hand, and most commonly recognized in Christian thought from the first, are still most efficient to work conviction, and are most likely to hold their ground in the future. On the other hand, the more subtile arguments, in whose discovery some adventurous pioneer of speculative thought has taken special delight, are found to accomplish much less than they promise, and, whatever element of truth they may contain, to need extensive modification in order to escape the charge of bad logic. It is an item, too, in favor of the common proofs, such as the teleological, the moral, and the testimony of consciousness, that they look toward the living God, a free, self-conscious, divine Person, and not merely toward some undefined substratum or background of contingent existence. (An appreciative discussion of the evidences from external nature, as well as of that which is supplied by human consciousness, may be found in Ulrici's work entitled "Gott und die Natur.")

2. ESSENCE AND ATTRIBUTES. — On the question whether a proper knowledge of God as to His essential nature is attainable, the period has witnessed the advocacy of two opposite extremes on the part of individuals, and a general union upon a medium view on the part of the great body of theistic writers. The agnostic extreme had a starting-point in Kant's philosophy. The justice of styling Kant a radical agnostic may be called in question. While one side of his philosophy bears in that direction, another side leads up to the conclusion, that our knowledge of God as personal and moral, if not knowledge in the strictest sense, is at least a rational and warranted faith. Now assuredly a *rational faith* is a *long distance* from mere imagination, as well as from downright nescience. Kant stood upon a different plane from that of Herbert Spencer, with his picture of the religious man chalking out an outline of Deity, and then immediately erasing it as the phantom of his vain imagination. (See the section on Philosophy.) Still, the Kantian criticism naturally was utilized in favor of agnostic views. The other extreme found, not a starting-point only, but its culmination, in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel, with whom it was a fundamental thesis that man is capable of comprehending the Absolute, and that this order of knowledge is the indispensable condition of philosophy. Cousin was drawing from this source when he taught that the human mind, in virtue of the fact that reason in it is the divine reason, has an immediate cognition of the Infinite.

Partly through the influence of Kant, but more largely by way of reaction from the philosophies of the Absolute, with their daring assumptions to have found out God to perfection, Sir William Hamilton and H. L. Mansel were led to advocate theories savoring of radical agnosticism. With some difference in the choice of terms, the two presented essentially the same views. Both start from a special definition of God. "To conceive the Deity as He is,"

says Mansel, "we must conceive Him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation,—that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence, which it had not from all eternity." (The Limits of Religious Thought, Lecture II.) Having thus set forth the philosophical conception of God, Mansel proceeds to enumerate the difficulties which it involves. The Absolute and the Infinite, he says, cannot as such be a cause. For the cause exists only in relation to the effect. But the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. If it be said that the Absolute was first alone and afterwards became a cause, this contradicts the idea of the Infinite, as implying that God was not from the first all that it was possible for Him to be. Again, the Absolute as cause cannot be necessitated, for this implies relation; neither can it be voluntary, for this implies consciousness, which is only conceivable as a relation. From these considerations it follows necessarily that the ideas of creation and personality are inconsistent with that of the Absolute and Infinite.

This seems to leave the field to scepticism. But no, says Mansel; the lesson is not scepticism, but humility and faith. We are taught not to attempt a speculative knowledge of God as He is in Himself, and to be "content with those regulative ideas of the Deity which are sufficient to guide our practice; which tell us not what God is in Himself, but how He wills that we should think of Him." We must locate the difficulty, not in the divine object of our thought, but in the imperfection of our faculties. "It is our duty to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot

reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds." Mansel concedes a bare possibility that there may be some correspondence between our thought of God and His actual nature. "We cannot say that our conception of the divine nature exactly resembles that nature in its absolute existence; for we know not what that absolute existence is. But, for the same reason, we are equally unable to say that it does not resemble it; for if we know not the Absolute and Infinite at all, we cannot say how far it is or is not capable of likeness or unlikeness to the relative and finite [a point that Herbert Spencer should have recognized]. We must remain content with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as He is, we know not, and we have no need to know."

Hamilton also draws from his criticism a lesson respecting the weakness (not the deceitfulness) of human reason and the necessity of supplementing its office by another principle. "We are thus taught," he says, "the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to think aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned, beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." (Philosophy of the Conditioned.)

Though offered in the interest of Christian apology, the reasoning of Mansel and Hamilton has generally been regarded as more like a foe than a friend in the camp. The criticism most commonly and justly passed upon it is, that

it sets up a gratuitous and mistaken definition of God. The proper definition of God as the Absolute and Infinite does not make Him a Being who is apart from all relations and limitations, but one who is subject only to such as are imposed by His will or by His essential perfection. (See Calderwood, *Philosophy of the Infinite*, *passim*; Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, Pt. I. chap. 4, § 3. Compare J. S. Mill, *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*.)

In opposition to agnosticism in its various phases there has been a very general agreement among theologians in more recent times in asserting a real, though limited, knowledge of God. (Staudenmaier, II. 150, 174; Klee, I. 23, II. 30-35; Dieringer, § 14; Twesten, II. 4; Dorner, § 16; Martensen, § 45; Rothe, I. § 7; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 4, § 1; Hedge, *Reason in Religion*.) Expressing this conclusion under a figure, Klee pithily remarks, "As infinite, God is seen and not seen by us, as we see and do not see the ocean and the heavens."

In harmony with this position, there has been a tendency to modify the extreme doctrine so largely current in the preceding periods respecting the simplicity of the divine essence. It has been recognized that to make the divine attributes, as did Schleiermacher, simply designations of our subjective modifications, to deny that they have any foundation in interior distinctions of the Godhead, is equivalent to denying a proper knowledge of God. Accordingly, we find such writers as Dorner, Rothe, Kahnis, and Hodge expressly charging the older dogmatics with having pressed the notion of the divine simplicity too far, and many others in their discussion of the attributes implying the same standpoint. While it is taught that the material notion of composition must be kept far from our thought of God, it is equally taught that God is no blank identity, and that such a conception is remote from the true idea of spirit. "The attributes," says H. B. Smith,

“express real distinctions in God so far as this: that no one of them can be resolved into any other, and also so far as this, that all of them cannot be resolved into one idea or one fact about God, except the fact or idea that God is the most perfect Being.” (System of Theol., Divis. I. chap. 2.) “We teach,” says Martensen, “that the attributes are objective determinations in the revelation of God, and also have their root in the interior of His essence.” (Dogmatik, § 46. Compare Van Oosterzee, Vol. I. sect. 47.)

Respecting individual attributes, there are not many changes of view that need to be noted. The theory that God in His own proper mode of subsistence is above the category of time, has generally maintained its place. Richard Watson, indeed, was inclined to make the divine eternity equivalent to time without beginning or end. But Methodist theologians have not generally followed him in this, preferring the theory of John Wesley respecting the timelessness of God. The period, however, has brought its modification, even if the old view has not been dislodged. Various theologians have apprehended the necessity of bringing temporal events under a truer recognition of God than seems to have been secured by the earlier dogmatics. They have argued that events gain actuality in succession, and accordingly, if God knows them as they are, He must recognize the fact of succession, the fact that one is before another in temporal order, that one has already transpired and another has not. This is not contrary to the proper notion of His absoluteness; it is no limitation pertaining to the essential mode of His subsistence. He was free to create or not to create a temporal order, but having created it, He must recognize His own work. “If a world exists,” says Dorner, “a positive relation of God to space and time is given with logical necessity. If time and growth are not to be semblance, there must be a difference really, and therefore also as regards God, between what is now past and what is present, between the present and

the future. God can, for example, no more regard the past of the converted sinner as present, than He can look upon the future of the unconverted man who is about to return to Him as present. If God merely saw the past and the future altogether as present, the immediate consequence would be that God would not see everything as it is; and therefore not truly, for neither the past nor the future is present. . . . There must belong to that divine knowledge which alike eternally comprises everything necessary and possible, and which will be at any time existent, a knowledge also relative to time and the present constitution of the world individually and collectively." (System of Christian Doctrine, §§ 19, 27. Compare Kahnis, Dogmatik, III. § 7; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 6; Pond, Lecture III.; M. Raymond, Systematic Theology, Vol. I. pp. 316, 317.)

Instances of a denial that God's foreknowledge includes the free acts of men have been exceptional. The peculiar view of Adam Clarke, that God *can* know all future events, but does not *choose* to, has been almost universally repudiated in his own communion, as well as in others. Rothe and F. D. McCabe have reasserted the Socinian theory, that the contingent is in the nature of things unknowable, and consequently that it is no disparagement to the divine omniscience to exclude the same from its compass. Martensen also rules out proper foreknowledge of the contingent. (Dogmatik, § 116.) Of Calvinistic theologians, it is in general characteristic to exclude contingency in the sense of strict alternativity, and to make God's foreknowledge of the acts of free agents dependent upon His decrees, which are the ground of their certain futurity. (Edwards, Freedom of Will, Pt. II. sect. 11, 12, Pt. IV. sect. 14; Hopkins, System of Doctrines, Pt. I. chap. 4; L. Woods, Lecture XXXVIII.; Emmons, Systematic Theol., Sermon XXII.; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 8; Cunningham, Hist. Theol., 1870, Vol. II. p. 443; H. B. Smith, System of

Christ. Theol., Pt. II. chap. 6.) Schleiermacher, with his determinism, is naturally found agreeing here with the Calvinistic school. On the other hand, non-Calvinists deny that foreknowledge of the acts of free agents is based upon foreordination. As to the mode of this foreknowledge, they allow that the subject involves profound mystery. The fact is to be accepted as resting on Scriptural data, and clear, practical demands. These require both foreknowledge and proper contingency. Accordingly, whatever difficulty it may involve, the foreknowledge of God must be regarded as intuitive, as independent of a chain of foregoing causes or necessary antecedents, as grasping the remotest event as immediately as the nearest. In this way alone is an open field left to responsible agency. (See Julius Müller's discussion, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Bk. III. Pt. II. chap. 2; Whedon, *The Freedom of the Will*, Pt. II. sect. 3.)

The doctrine of the *scientia media* has been a less prominent subject of debate in the present than in the preceding period. According to the testimony of Perrone, it is commonly accepted among recent Roman Catholic theologians. (*Prælect. Theol., De Deo.*) It accords with the traditions of Calvinists to reject it, and it is repudiated by Dr. Hodge. Van Oosterzee takes exception not so much to the theory as to the place assigned it in Jesuitical theology. It is approved by Dorner, and reckoned by Pope as a part of the creed of anti-predestinarians in general.

The relation of the will of God to the moral standard is a question affording little ground of dispute in more recent times. Those who make that will the highest norm understand at the same time that it must be regarded as expressing the nature of God. Thus Hodge states, "The common doctrine of Christians is, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures"; but he adds, that this will of God is the expression of His infinite perfection, "so that the ultimate

foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God." (Pt. I. chap. 5, § 9.) This form of statement evidently concedes the idea of those who have been averse to making the mere will of God the foundation of right and wrong.

SECTION II. — THE TRINITY.

THE doctrine of the Trinity has by no means been dislodged from the faith and appreciation of the Church by the movement of free thought in the last two centuries. Confidence may have been weakened on the part of not a few as to the legitimacy of some long-standing speculations or definitions; but as to the great fact of a threefold distinction in the Godhead, the original and abiding ground of the threefold revelation in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the mind of the Church is as tenacious as it ever has been. The statement also is warranted, that there is a very extensive concurrence in the Catholic doctrine as outlined in the Nicene creed.

As to the proper grounds of trinitarian belief, some writers emphasize mainly the Scriptural data; others, in addition to the facts of revelation, give a prominent place to the demands of philosophic thought. The latter procedure has been characteristic of the more orthodox Hegelians. "Another God than the triune," says Marheinecke, "neither the Christian nor the theologian can have. . . . The Church doctrine is that of reason and truth itself, and justifies itself as such in every truly scientific understanding of this dogma." (Dogmatik, 1847, pp. 26, 128.) "The doctrine of the Trinity," says John Caird, "is no unintelligible combination of symbols, but a doctrine which may be shown to be the central truth, not only of Christian faith, but of Christian philosophy." (Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1880, p. 75.) Many not of the Hegelian school also regard the trinitarian doctrine as entering

essentially into the philosophical idea of God, an indispensable factor in a well-rounded, stable theistic conception, — the conception of God as personal and creative intelligence and will. “The idea of the essential Trinity,” says Martensen, “is one with the idea of the divine personality, and to think the essential Trinity ontologically means accordingly to think the fundamental form necessary to the personal life of God, means to think those moments in the essence of God without which personality and self-consciousness are unthinkable.” That is to say, personality and self-consciousness require the objectification of self, and again the uniting of self as object with self as subject, and this is nothing less than the trinitarian process. (Dogmatik, § 55.) On like grounds Dorner says: “The absolute divine self-consciousness can only be thought in a trinitarian manner. . . . God is to be thought conscious and personal in the eternal activity of the reproduction of His personality. He is personal in the three Hypostases, as He is personal by their means.” (System of Christian Doctrine, §§ 31 b, 32.) The trinitarian view, he further remarks, supplies the proper safeguard against both the deistic and the pantheistic conception of God’s relation to the world. Equivalent statements are found with Staudenmaier. The advantage derived from the trinitarian standpoint in conceiving God’s relation to the world this author expresses as follows: “The possibility that there should be a world outside of God lies in the trinitarian life of the Godhead, and in truth is grounded in it alone. For only through this, that God as the triune forms for Himself a perfect world (*κόσμος τέλειος*), can He, without Himself becoming world, posit a creation outside of Himself, and stand over this creation, high and exalted, as its Lord, Leader, Conductor, and source of blessing. The divine love, already satisfied in the interior of the Godhead through the trinitarian life, proceeds outward [in creation], not of necessity, but with absolute freedom.” (Dog-

matik, 1844, Vol. III. p. 8.) The relation of the divine love to the demand for a trinitarian life, as suggested in the above, has received emphatic notice from other eminent dogmatists, such as Sartorius, Liebner, and Julius Müller.

The preceding paragraph has already indicated the most current of the philosophical expositions of the trinitarian idea, namely, that which conceives of the trinitarian process as a process of self-objectification and of reunion with self, the first stage expressing the begetting of the Son, the second the procession of the Spirit. (Compare with those cited Twesten, *Vorlesungen*, Vol. II. p. 205; Klee, *Dogmatik*, Vol. II. pp. 102-115.)

A measure of dissent from the Catholic doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son has appeared among those holding firmly to the doctrine of the Trinity as expressive of an essential mode of the divine existence. Adam Clarke was a representative of this dissent. Some of the New England divines have also criticised the theory of eternal generation. Samuel Hopkins, while favoring the theory himself, indicates that there were those in his day who opposed it, and who regarded the term Son as being applied to the Saviour with reference to His incarnate state. "This opinion," he says, "seems to be rather gaining ground and spreading of late." (*System of Doctrines*, Pt. II. chap. 2.) Emmons, in opposition to Hopkins, stigmatized eternal generation as eternal nonsense. Moses Stuart declared the expression a palpable contradiction of language, and said of the doctrine that it was widely disowned in New England. "Nearly all the ministers," he writes, "in New England, since I have been upon the stage, have, so far as I know their sentiments, united in rejecting it, or at least in regarding it as unimportant. Our most distinguished theologians, for forty years past, have openly declared against it." Stuart disliked the doctrine as being contrary, in his estimate, to the proper

equality of the Second with the First Person. The apparent support of the doctrine in Scripture, he said, was due to the fact that Scriptural language proceeds from the standpoint of divine manifestation. The following sentence, though introduced in the connection hypothetically, doubtless expressed his view. "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are words which designate the distinctions of the Godhead as manifested to us in the economy of redemption, and are not intended to mark the eternal relations of the Godhead, *as they are in themselves*." (Letters to Samuel Miller.)

A few theologians of recent times have laid much stress upon the subordination of the Second and Third Persons. Kahnis has equalled in this respect the Arminians Episcopius, Curcellæus, and Limborch. While he holds that the Son and Spirit are Divine Persons, he maintains that their dependence upon the Father necessarily implies a lower rank. In opposition to the Augustinian view, he reckons among false theories, besides Unitarianism, Arianism, modalism, etc., also *co-ordinationism*. (Dogmatik, III. § 8.)

The theory of Schleiermacher was a species of modalism. Naturally, from his agnostic position with respect to the nature of God, he could recognize no other than an economic Trinity. As he taught, God in Himself is the Father, God in the Redeemer the Son, God in the Church the Holy Spirit. In his scheme the fact of absorbing interest in Christ, the fact especially declarative of His pre-eminence, was His God-consciousness. While our God-consciousness is unclear and feeble, Christ's was absolutely clear, constant, and strong. This involved the true being of God in Him, — *ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm*. "To attribute an absolutely strong God-consciousness to Christ, and to affirm a being of God in Him, are one and the same thing." In the sinless humanity of Christ the divine life found a suitable organism by which it might

be received and manifested in personal form. (*Der Christliche Glaube*, §§ 93-96.)

Swedenborgianism also assumes diversities of manifestation or operation, rather than distinctions pertaining to the Godhead as such. There was no Trinity, it teaches, before God appeared in the flesh. The divine by itself, the divine in union with the flesh, and the divine regarded as operative, — these are the three aspects which make up the proper trinitarian view. Commenting on the Athanasian creed, Swedenborg points out how its upholders might have escaped contradiction. "If they had said, that the Father hath the divine essence, the Son the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit the divine essence, but that there are not three divine essences, but that the divine essence is one and indivisible, then that mystery would be explicable; as when by the Father is understood the Divine from which [are all things], by the Son the Divine Human thence, and by the Holy Spirit the proceeding Divine, which three are of one God; or if by the Father the like is understood as by the soul with man, by the Divine Human the like as by the body of that soul, and by the Holy Spirit the like as by the operation which proceeds from both, then are understood three essences, which are of one and the same person, and thus they together make one and an indivisible essence." (*True Christian Religion*, § 172.)

German rationalism in its earlier stages favored the Sabellian or the Arian hypothesis as a substitute for the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Later it gravitated toward the theory of the simple humanity of Christ. (See Wegscheider, *Inst. Theol.*, §§ 92, 93.)

As already indicated, English and American Unitarianism started out on the Arian basis, but ere long tended toward the humanitarian platform. Many of the American Unitarians had come to this point before the death of Channing. Whether the views of Channing finally took the same direction, is a question which has not been very

decisively answered. His published writings indicate a singular reserve upon the subject. He says, indeed, of Christ in one place, "I believe him to be a more than human being" (Works, Vol. IV. p. 140); but the context is such as to leave it undecided whether the superhuman element was located in an original superiority of nature, or was regarded as only the result of extraordinary charisms or gifts; in other words, whether we have in Christ a properly superhuman being, or simply a man enriched far beyond the ordinary human measure with the treasures of God's Spirit. The verdict of his colleague, E. S. Gannett, was that he always believed in the pre-existence of Christ. Some, however, of his later friends suspected the contrary. (Wm. Gannett's Life of E. S. Gannett.) The Arian view has claimed adherents even to the present, but they constitute a very small minority.

While the more radical wing of recent Unitarianism hardly concedes to Christ the character even of the typical man and teacher, there are those who not only concede to Him this character, but bring His manhood into as near a union with proper divinity as can be done without accepting the trinitarian standpoint. This class starts from a point of view quite remote from the deistic, and affiliating to a noticeable degree with that conception of the relation between the divine and the human which has been set forth in the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Here belongs F. H. Hedge. He declares the doctrine of Father, Son, and Spirit to be the distinguishing feature of Christianity, "indispensable to any right and worthy conception of Deity." (Unitarian Affirmations.) Commending the work of the council of Nicæa, he says: "We cannot be too thankful that the Athanasian view in this council prevailed against the Arian, which recognizes no divinity in man." (Reason in Religion.) Again he remarks, relative to the same subject: "The superficial mind is apt to regard these questions, which then agitated the Church and the

world, as simply abstractions, senseless quibbles. But the union of God with man is no quibble; it is a truth of profound significance; and the council of Nicæa, which declared it, is one of the most important assemblies that was ever convened on this earth; it dates a new era in the history of human thought." (Ways of the Spirit, and other Essays.) All this implies evidently that the union of the divine and the human in Christ is a truth of momentous importance, fundamental to a proper conception of Christianity. Still it is not the Catholic doctrine that we have here, but rather such an idea of Christ's person as was advocated by Fichte and by Schelling in his earlier philosophy. The incarnation of God is conceived as a process running through the course of man's religious history. Christ is but the higher instance of that union with God which enters into the proper destiny of man as man. Not as different from man, not as more than man, but as the typical man, with the full-rounded capacity for the divine which belongs to such a man, is He peculiarly the Son of God. His eminence is a relative one. He stands among brethren. "Humanity is the son of God, humanity *in esse* or *in posse*. This is the truth which Jesus represents, which he illustrates by a supreme instance." (Unitarian Affirmations.) James Freeman Clarke likewise commends the early Church for rejecting the Arian doctrine. He also uses strong terms respecting the union of the divine and the human in Christ. Indeed, one of his charges against the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is, that it fails to assign enough of divinity to Christ, since, in virtue of its doctrine of eternal generation, it predicates of Him only a communicated or subordinate divinity, instead of the underrived divinity of the Father. (Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors, Appendix.) He also does not hesitate to speak of Christ as "the God-man, in whom the Divine Spirit and human soul became one in a perfect union." (Ibid., Chap. VIII.) But, notwithstanding such terms, the humanita-

rian standpoint is not essentially transcended. We have here only the most appreciative estimate of Christ of which it is capable. His exaltation above men is due rather to His position and the unique perfection of His human nature than to any transcendence in essence. "The person of Christ is human, but is intimately united and in perfect union with the indwelling God." (Ibid.) It is in virtue of this vital connection with God that Jesus truly manifests Him, so that in His words and acts we contemplate, as it were, God speaking and acting. Substantially the same view is represented by James Martineau. He says: "Christ standing in solitary greatness, and invested with unapproachable sanctity, opens at once the eye of conscience to perceive and know the pure and holy God, the Father that dwelt in Him and made Him so full of truth and grace. Him that rules in heaven we can in no wise believe to be *less perfect* than that which is most divine on earth; of anything *more perfect* than the meek yet majestic Jesus, no heart can ever dream. And, accordingly, ever since He visited our earth with blessing, the soul of Christendom has worshipped a God resembling Him." (Studies of Christianity. See also tributes to Christ by other Unitarian writers, in Daniel Dorchester's "Concessions of Liberalism to Orthodoxy.")

The Holy Spirit is defined by Channing as a "moral, illuminating, and persuasive influence." (Works, Vol. III. p. 94.) Hedge says: "The Holy Spirit is that particular agency of God, direct or indirect, which concerns itself with the moral and religious education of mankind. It is God acting in this particular way, as distinguished from God in nature." (Ways of the Spirit.) Again, in language savoring of Hegelian terminology, he speaks of the Holy Spirit as the ever-proceeding, self-imparting, flowing personality, Godhead in flux. (Unitarian Affirmations.)

CHAPTER III.

CREATION AND CREATURES.

SECTION I. — CREATION OF THE WORLD.

PHILOSOPHIES which have lost the theistic conception have of course failed to find a place for the idea of creation. Materialism, hylozoism, and pantheism must predicate development rather than absolute origination.

In some instances writers understood to represent theism have been disposed to modify the Catholic declaration that the creation of the world was *ex nihilo*. In this category belongs Sir William Hamilton. He contends that we are unable to conceive of the sum total of existence being either increased or diminished; that accordingly creation must be thought as the evolution of divine power, while its opposite, annihilation, would be the return of this power to its original unevolved state. "Creation," he says, "is the existing subsequently in act of what previously existed in power; annihilation, on the contrary, is the subsequent existence in power of what previously existed in act." (Lectures on Metaphysics.) F. H. Hedge indulges a bolder departure from the current representation. "Shall we say," he asks, "that God Himself is the substance of which the worlds are formed? This in some sense I am driven to admit." Instead of representing creation as out of nothing, he would prefer to represent it as out of spirit, the product of God's going forth of Himself. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay VII.) At the same time he repudiates Spinozism, and pantheism generally so far as it obscures the personality and moral

rule of God, and admits it only as affirming a divine life throughout nature. In this sense he indulges the remark, "To pantheism belongs the world of nature; to theism the world of spirits." (Ibid., Essay X.) Martensen, rather explaining than denying the Catholic doctrine, says: "The nothing out of which God creates the world are the eternal possibilities of His will, these sources of all the realities of the world." (Dogmatik, § 61.) The exposition of Samuel Harris amounts to the same thing; but in place of an eternal possibility of will, he speaks of a power eternally potential in the divine plenitude. He says: "Creation is not originating something out of nothing. On the contrary, in creating, the Absolute Being calls into action power eternally potential in His infinite plenitude: and this power, energizing under the limits of space and time, and thus individuating and revealing itself, becomes cognizable as a finite reality or being." (The Philosophical Basis of Theism, 1883, p. 515.) The step from mere potentiality to individuated power surely implies all that was ever meant in any intelligent use of the formula of creation *ex nihilo*.

There have also been some who have been disposed to modify the Catholic theory that creation was the free act of God, an exercise of His absolute sovereignty. Thus Leibnitz in his Theodicy took the ground that God was under necessity to create,—not indeed a metaphysical necessity, but a moral necessity, obliging Him to choose the best among conceivable ends. Rothe maintained that the very conception of God involves that of creation. "God must necessarily create the world because He is essentially love." He taught also that creation must be viewed as a process without beginning or end, notwithstanding the world and everything in it had a beginning. (Dogmatik, I. §§ 37–39.) Hedge says: "Creation must be regarded as a necessary manifestation of the divine nature." The ground of this necessity he finds in the Hegelian conception that the crea-

tive process enters essentially into the self-realization of God as spirit. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay VII.)

The breadth of the distinction allowed between creation and preservation depends largely upon the scope assigned to second causes in nature. While a large proportion of theologians maintain that creation gave a kind of substantial existence to nature, there seems to be an increasing number who favor the theory, that nature but expresses the immediate agency of God,—that it has no sort of independence, and is only the power of God directed according to established rules, according to the comprehensive plan of the cosmos. This view is put by Professor Bowne as follows: “Matter and material things have no ontological, but only a phenomenal existence. Their necessary dependence and lack of all subjectivity make it impossible to view them as capable of other than phenomenal existence. The world view, then, contains the following factors: (1.) The Infinite energizes under the forms of space and time; (2.) the system of energizing according to certain laws and principles, which system appears in thought as the external universe; and (3.) finite spirits, who are in relation to this system, and in whose intuition the system takes on the forms of perception.” (Metaphysics, 1882, p. 466.)

The advance of scientific research has involved of necessity a changed conception of the Mosaic account of creation. The literal view began to meet with opposition before the close of the eighteenth century. Among the theories which have been broached are the following: (1.) The Mosaic account is a philosophical myth. Here belong such rationalists as Eichhorn, Henke, Gabler, and Paulus. (2.) The Mosaic account is an allegory, a view advanced by Herder. As quoted by Van Oosterzee, he calls the first chapter of Genesis a hieroglyph of creation, an optical representation of the beginning of all things, derived from that which is still seen to take place every morning at sunrise. (3.) The

Mosaic account is in essence a history. This is a specification of wide extent, including many varieties of opinion. Some make more account of the rhetorical cast of the mosaic narrative than others. Knapp speaks of it as a series of six pictures, which, like the performance of the painter, have truth for their foundation, but are not to be regarded as exact in all particulars. (Lectures on Christian Theology.) Alexander Winchell says, that, while it is no aimless reverie and conforms admirably to the indications of science, the interpreter must recognize the fact that it comes to us in the style and structure of Oriental poetry. (Reconciliation of Science and Religion.) Newman Smythe discerns in it a mnemonic purpose, indications that "it was arranged on purpose to be remembered." (Old Faiths in New Light.) Tayler Lewis favors the theory that it is the record of a vision, and calls it "an apocalypse of the great past, even as the revelation to John in Patmos is an apocalypse of the great future." (Introduction to Gen. i. in Lange's Comm. Compare Kurtz, *Geschichte des alten Bundes*; also *Bibel und Astronomie*; Dawson, *Archaica*.) In the interpretation of the Mosaic description, some of the writers who belong here resort to the so-called restitution hypothesis. As they teach, only the first verse of Genesis refers to the original creation; the following description applies to the work of restoration, accomplished in six literal days, after an era of disruption; the great geological ages intervening between the original creation and the disruption are passed by as not being relevant to the purpose of the author. This was the theory of Thomas Chalmers. (Nat. Theol., Vol. I. Bk. II. chap. 2. Compare William Buckland, *Geology and Mineralogy*; L. T. Townsend, *Credo*; Enoch Pond, *Lectures on Theol.*) It should be noticed, that some expositors who suppose a chasm between the first and second verses do not decide that the days of the creative week were literal days. Some also connect the primitive disruption with the fall of angels.

Delitzsch entertains this supposition, and sets it forth with theosophic adjuncts. (Bib. Psychol., II. 1.) In any form, the restitution hypothesis is the hypothesis of a minority. A much larger class, if we mistake not, regard the first verse as a general preamble to the following account, and the Mosaic days as indicative of periods of indefinite length.

Respecting the length of time which has elapsed since man's appearance upon the earth, there is a very general feeling among theologians that much of the evidence adduced to prove his extreme antiquity has been discredited, and that results are yet too immature to demand or to justify any very extensive modifications of the received chronology of the race.

SECTION II. — ANGELS.

ROMAN Catholic writers, following the conclusion implied in the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Council, agree in maintaining that angels are pure spirits *omnis corporis expertes*. So Perrone, Staudenmaier, Klee, and Dieringer. Protestant writers render a divided verdict. Some remark, like Kahnis, Van Oosterzee, and Pond, that there is no adequate ground for decision. Others coincide with Martensen, Hofmann, and Hodge in the theory that angels have no bodies. Others, as Ebrard, Kurtz, Delitzsch, Hahn, Emmons, and R. S. Foster, think it probable that they possess ethereal bodies.

According to the Swedenborgian system, angels, whether good or evil, were previously men. "There is not an angel," says Swedenborg, "who had not previously been a man." (True Christian Religion, § 121.)

At the height of German rationalism a very negative position was taken toward the doctrine of angels, especially that of evil angels. The apparent support given by the

New Testament to the notion of demoniacal possession was explained by the theory of accommodation. Some still are inclined to treat the doctrine of a personal devil as a matter for ridicule. But there is a strong counter current in the theological thinking of Germany, as is indicated by the following from Dorner: "Nitzsch, Twesten, Rothe, Julius Müller, Tholuck, Lange, Martensen, as well as Thomasius, Hofmann, Kahnis, Philippi, and Luthardt, avow, not merely that sin is found in humanity, but that a kingdom of evil spirits with a head over them is also to be inculcated. Romang rightly satirizes the fond enlightenment which takes credit to itself for being above this representation." (System of Christian Doctrine, § 85.)

SECTION III. — MAN.

1. MAN'S ORIGINAL NATURE AND CONDITION. — While recent theology has by no means accepted the theory of scientific dogmatism, that the primitive man was a savage of low order and the kin of the brute, it has retrenched somewhat the older theory of Adamic perfection. A tone of greater reserve and moderation in the treatment of this subject is unmistakably apparent on the part of those who have written in the last few decades.

The contrast between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant theory of original righteousness, so sharply drawn in the preceding period, has been in large part retained. Some Protestant writers, however, even among those not inclined to Pelagianism, have manifested the conviction that the Reformation theory of a concreated righteousness or holiness took too little account of the demand for personal agency in the realization of holy character. Such a criticism is involved in the following statement of Martensen: "The true relation to God on the part of the first man could not have been a state of perfection, or, on the

other hand, a mere aptitude; it was rather a living commencement, which included in itself the possibility of an advancing development, and the attainment of man's proper distinction. It is the one-sidedness of the Augustinian dogmatics, that it confounds the ideas of innocence and holiness, attributes to the first man a purity of will and a clearness of knowledge which can be thought only as the goal of a free development." (Dogmatik, § 78. Compare Dorner, System of Christ. Doct., § 41.)

The writers mentioned under a preceding section, as admitting the element of legend or myth into the Bible, find of course that element in the description of Paradise and the life therein. But some who would rule out such an ingredient are also averse to regarding the description as an exact record of veritable history, and consider it rather an allegorical expression of the essential content of the first stage of man's religious history. The large class of writers who hold that the account is literal, allow quite generally that it is adapted to figure more than it states; in other words, that it is history with a symbolical import. Swedenborg regarded it as pure symbolism. In the first ten and a half chapters of Genesis, as he taught, the spiritual sense alone is to be sought, the historical being wanting.

The Roman Catholic Church, abiding by the verdict of scholasticism, holds to the twofold division of human nature. A large proportion of Protestant writers adopt the same view. (See Hodge, Pt. II. chap. 2, § 2; H. B. Smith, Div. I. Pt. III. chap. 1; Pope, Vol. I. p. 423; C. M. Mead, *The Soul Here and Hereafter*.) Soul and spirit, they maintain, are not substantially distinct. "They are one and the same substance under different aspects or relations." But trichotomy also has its advocates, such as Delitzsch, Van Oosterzee, and H. M. Goodwin. The last two of these hold substantially the same theory, the more common form of trichotomy, according to which the soul is the principle of

animal life, the spirit the higher rational and moral principle. Goodwin, however, has this item of advantage, that he brings to notice the fact that the connection of the soul with the spirit gives to the former in man a character distinguishing it from the life-principle in the brute. He defines as follows: "The spirit in man is that part of our nature which corresponds to the Infinite Father of spirits. It is the ego, the personality, the man within the man, from which, as the inmost fountain or heart of our being, thought, affection, volition, and character proceed. It is the seat of moral responsibility, the organ of faith and love, and so of religion or communion with God. It is the highest and divinest part of our nature, the very image of God in which we are created. The soul, or psyche, is that which gives life to the body, as its indwelling or animating principle. It is not a free and self-acting power, like the pneuma, not visible and material, like the body, not a self-conscious intelligence enlightened from within or above, but derives all its knowledge from the senses, and its humanity, by which it is differenced from other animal souls, from the spirit. It is thus a connecting and mediating link between body and spirit, bringing down the spiritual into the sphere and life of the body, and elevating the physical to be the instrument and organ of the spirit." (Christ and Humanity, 1875.) According to Delitzsch, "the soul stands to the spirit in the relation of emanation." It is of the same nature with it, but not of identical substance. The spirit being described as the candle of the Lord, the divine light in man, the soul is denoted by the radiance of that light. (Biblical Psychology, II. sect. 4.) From his standpoint Delitzsch criticises the theory of Göschel, that the soul proceeds from both body and spirit, as assigning a false independence to the body over against the spirit, and as implying such a mixed nature as is quite inconceivable. That modified species of trichotomy, found in the early Church with Tatian and Irenæus, which makes the

Divine Spirit the third element, has also its modern representatives. Thus Schöberlein is quoted by Delitzsch as saying: "The Spirit may be reckoned in man among the actual elements of his being; whereas of natural beings, because the Spirit forms a power which only rules in them, but is incomprehensible to them themselves, it would be said that they only consist of body and soul." (Ibid.)

Exceptions to belief in the soul's incorporeal nature and natural immortality (that is, unconditional destination to endless existence) have still continued to be sporadic. One of the earlier examples of the former among modern theologians was Joseph Priestley. In outspoken terms he advocated the theory that man is purely a material being. More recently, somewhat of the materialistic leaven of the sensational school of scientists has crossed the theological border. But naturally a factor so alien to the drift of Catholic thought has rarely touched any except those already estranged from the heart of Christianity. Advocates of materialism, who are disposed at the same time to retain the doctrine of immortality, find a refuge for the latter, either in the Swedenborgian notion of an ethereal body already existing within our gross and visible organism, or in the less consistent notion of a restoration of personality and identity through a resurrection of the dissolved body. As respects the evidences of immortality, while the various arguments of former times are still employed, there has been a tendency to lay the principal stress upon the attestation of the Christian consciousness. The beginning of a life that is worth being continued, it is contended, carries with itself the most convincing tokens that it will be continued. The true believer, coming in some measure to realize for himself the great fact presented objectively in the person of Christ, namely, the union of man and God, can but feel that his life, like its source, must be eternal. Evidently this is a better argument for the immortality of those who rise into spiritual affinity with God, whose lives

are hid with Christ in God, than it is for that of men universally. So it is not out of accord with this development, if not in consequence of it, that a number make immortality conditioned upon the reception and cultivation of the principle of religious life. Conspicuous examples are Rothe, Weisse, and Edward White. (See Dorner, *System of Christ. Doct.*, §§ 42, 151.) A place is also given, among proofs of immortality, to the Kantian argument, to the consideration of man's perfectibility, and to his instinctive longings. The simplicity of the soul, upon which the adherents of the Wolffian philosophy in the eighteenth century laid much stress, is less valued of late, it being recognized that what has beginning may have an end, and accordingly that simplicity is only so far a proof as it is an indication of the Creator's purpose.

In the Roman Catholic Church creationism holds a well-established place. Dieringer speaks of it as wellnigh a dogma, — “*ein dem Dogma nahe stehender Lehrsatz.*” (*Dogmatik*, § 40.) It is a token, therefore, of considerable courage of opinion, that Klee argued in favor of traducianism, or generationism as he preferred to call it. Among Protestants both creationism and traducianism have continued to hold a place. Emmons was a zealous creationist, and declared the opposing theory “as contrary to philosophy as to Scripture.” (*Systematic Theol.*, *Serm. XXXIX.*) Hodge says that creationism has ever been the doctrine of the Reformed theologians, and in his discussion of the subject on the whole approves their verdict. (*Pt. II. chap. 3, § 3.*) On the other hand, traducianism has continued to claim the support of the larger proportion of Lutheran writers, and has found many advocates in other communions. It was favored by Edwards, and apparently also by Hopkins. It was advocated by Wesley and Watson, and more recently has been commended by Raymond and Pope. The last writer, however, gives a place also to creationism. In this he is in accord with a manifest bent of the more re-

cent theology. Such advocates of traducianism as Kahnis, Thomasius, and H. B. Smith admit that creationism points to a truth that must be recognized, — that divine agency, if not of the strictly creative order, must be regarded as a coefficient in the origin of the individual soul. In the representations of Martensen, Dorner, and Rothe, creationism and traducianism appear as mutually complementary theories.

The theory of pre-existence has been advocated by Julius Müller. He utilizes it in the solution of the problem of original sin, arguing that an inborn sinfulness which makes every one guilty can be rationally accounted for only by tracing it back to an actual sin, and hence to a wrong personal self-decision lying beyond our individual existence in time. (Christ. Doct. of Sin, Bk. IV. chap. 4.) Edward Beecher has made a like use of the theory. (Conflict of Ages.) A preference for the doctrine of pre-existence has also been expressed by F. H. Hedge, though under the impulse of no such practical interest as actuated Müller and Beecher. (Ways of the Spirit, Essay XIV.)

2. THE FALL AND ITS RESULTS. — According to the general verdict of non-Calvinists, God's will and agency had no further connection with the fall than is manifest in providing its possibility by creating free moral agents. The possibility of sin, as they maintain, as well as the possibility of developing a holy character, necessarily goes with finite free agency, at least in its initial stages. What God willed was, not the actualizing of the possibility of sin, but that of the counter possibility, the development of holy character. Exceptions to this general position of non-Calvinists are found chiefly among those who maintain, for the most part in connection with a scheme of restorationism, that a temporary experience of sin is an essential part of the discipline which leads to permanent holiness.

Among Calvinists the attitude of God toward the fall is somewhat diversely represented in the different schools.

The supra-lapsarian school, which makes the fall a means of fulfilling a prior decree, has had but few adherents in the present period. The great body of recent Calvinists have been infra-lapsarians. But, as was seen in the previous period, infra-lapsarianism does not exclude a very positive relation of the divine will to the fall. The members of this school generally subscribe to the formula that God decrees whatsoever comes to pass, and teach that His decrees are the ground of the certain futurity of all events. Accordingly, when they speak of a permissive decree as governing the fall, they do not mean a decree which left the event properly contingent, or liable not to occur under the given circumstances, as well as to occur; on the contrary, they mean a decree *securing* the certainty of the fall as it actually occurred. The qualifying term, "permissive," points therefore simply to the fact that the decree is supposed to have been fulfilled without the positive exercise of divine efficiency. It in no wise limits the bearing of the decree on the certain futurity of the act of apostasy. That the term "permissive" includes at least no larger meaning than this, a number of writers make plain by the declaration, that it lies in the power of God to prevent all sin, without at the same time doing any violence to free moral agency. (Woods, Letters to Dr. Taylor; Hodge, Pt. I. chap. 5, § 13; Pond, Lect. on Theol.)

Edwards himself ruled out the category of efficiency from God's connection with the fall. But one class of his successors, transcending the ordinary Calvinistic phraseology, has taught or implied that God was the efficient cause of Adam's sin. Hopkins was not far from asserting this conclusion. Referring to certain texts, he says: "It appears from these passages of Scripture, that God has foreordained all the moral evil which does take place; and is in such a sense, and so far, the origin and cause of it, that He is said to bring it to pass, by His own agency." Again he makes the significant remark: "The attempt to distinguish

between the sinful volitions or actions of men, as natural and moral actions, and making God the author and cause of them, considered as natural actions, and men the cause and authors of the depravity and sin which is in them, is, it is believed, unintelligible, and has no consistent or real meaning, and gives no satisfaction to the inquiring mind; unless by making this distinction it be meant, that in every sinful action God is not the sinful cause of it, but all He determines and does respecting these is the exercise of holiness." (System of Doctrines, Pt. I. chap. 4.) Emmons, who represents the extreme of Hopkinsianism, used still more explicit language. Discarding various methods of explaining Adam's fall, he says: "As these and all other methods to account for the fall of Adam by the instrumentality of second causes are insufficient to remove the difficulty, it seems necessary to have recourse to the divine agency, and to suppose that God wrought in Adam both to will and to do in his first transgression." (Systematic Theol., Sermon. XXIX.) An equal place for divine efficiency in the first transgression is implied in the following sweeping statement as to the origin of evil: "There is but one true and satisfactory answer to be given to the question which has been agitated for ages, Whence came evil?—and that is, *it came from the great First Cause of all things.*" (Sermon. XLV.) Emmons indeed speaks of the fall as the free act of Adam, but in his terminology "free" means only voluntary, and the human will stands to the divine agency or efficiency in a purely instrumental relation.

Among the critics of the efficiency scheme was the New Haven divine, Timothy Dwight. His view of its tendencies is thus expressed: "The theology of a part of this country appears to me to be verging, insensibly perhaps, to those who are chiefly concerned, but with no very gradual step, towards a pantheism, differing materially in one particular only from that of Spinoza"; that is, it leaves an infinite agent while denying finite agents. (Sermon. XV.)

The opposition of Dwight foreshadowed in a measure the standpoint which has been characteristic of the New Haven school. With this school it became a leading interest to reduce the divine connection with sin to the lowest point consistent with any hold upon the general Calvinistic theory of an all-inclusive providence. Its drift relative to the subject in hand is indicated by such sentences as the following from N. W. Taylor: "It may be true, that it is impossible that God should adopt the best moral system and prevent the perversion of moral agency in any greater degree than He does prevent it; it may be better, that moral agency should in every instance be rightly used, rather than perverted, under the present system; and of course it may be true that the Creator, notwithstanding the actual perversion of moral agency, prefers that every human being should act morally right rather than morally wrong. . . . There is not a word in the language which expresses or implies, or in the remotest manner intimates, that God prefers disobedience to His law to obedience, or sin to holiness, *all things considered*. . . . It cannot be proved that God could give existence to free moral agents and prevent all sin." (Lectures on the Moral Government of God.) Van Oosterzee seems to have written from the same standpoint. He says: "Sin is as little called into being by a divine causality, as it is originally teleologically willed and ordained by God. . . . It is *only* the possibility of sin, and not its reality, which must be regarded as the fruit of God's ordinance. . . . What He has originally willed, and aimed at, was a world not with, but without, sin. Sin is not an inevitable element of the perfected world, but is for that very reason opposed by God, in order that the world should become perfect." (Dogmatics, Sect. LXXI.)

From what has already been said, it is evident that the common declaration of all theological parties, that Adam in his transgression was free and responsible, does not imply

a uniform doctrine. The essentials to freedom and responsibility are differently understood. Non-Calvinists (and opponents of philosophical necessitarianism) agree that freedom, or at least that freedom *conjoined with responsibility*, implies a power under given conditions to vary the result, — the capacity of alternativity, or the power of contrary choice, as it is frequently called. A being who is free and responsible cannot, as they teach, be determined from the start, beyond all proper contingency, to one definite course. It matters not whether the determination is inward or outward; if it excludes alternatives, it excludes the notion of a free and responsible being. Supposing inward determination brought about by the prevailing force of a specific character to be *in itself* consistent with freedom, it still denies the proper notion of a free being, and especially of a responsible being, *unless* the character having this determining force is formed by the person himself in the use of a power of electing between alternatives. While some non-Calvinists admit the supposition in question, others disallow it, and hold that freedom and the power of contrary choice are inseparable ideas. To the former class we may reckon Julius Müller. He distinguishes between formal and real freedom. "What properly constitutes formal freedom," he says, "is the power of resolving and acting otherwise. If the will ultimately possesses the power or ability of determining in a way different from that in which it does determine, the person who thus wills is free." On the other hand, real freedom is identical with a holy necessity. "Man is not really free if his will be turned away from God, and if he be attracted and influenced by evil — which is alien to his nature — as well as by good. He is not really free, indeed, if his will be still undecided, morally indifferent, and unbiased either way. Then only is he in the highest sense free when without hesitation *he wills only what is good*, and carries out in action that inner necessity of his nature which excludes even the

thought of the possibility of evil." As to the relation between formal and real freedom, the one is to be viewed as the necessary antecedent of the other. "Real freedom — the clear decision of man for good, which excludes the possibility of evil — could not be conceived of, at least not as freedom, not as the completest self-assertion and self-realization of man, if it did not spring from formal freedom; this is its essential presupposition and condition. But formal freedom has, in the sphere of morals, no other destination save to pass over into real freedom; the former is the *means* to the realization of the latter as the *end*. . . . When the will has fully and truly chosen, the power of acting otherwise may still be said to exist in a metaphysical sense; but morally, i. e. with reference to the contrast of good and evil, it is entirely done away." (Christian Doctrine of Sin, Bk. III. Pt. I. chap. 1.) On the other hand, Whedon teaches that what Müller terms formal freedom ought not to be regarded as a vanishing factor in freedom, but an essential characteristic always and everywhere. Accordingly, apart from omniscience or revelations thereby, persistence in holy choices on the part of any moral agents is simply a matter of probability, though the probability may be such that faith can rest in it without any real disturbance from doubt.

Among philosophical writers Reid is very pronounced in his emphasis upon the power of contrary choice as entering into freedom. He says: "By the liberty of a moral agent I understand a power over the determinations of his own will." Liberty, as he maintains, is cancelled in any act which is the necessary consequence of something involuntary, whether that something be a state of mind or external circumstances. Respecting the force of motives he says: "I grant that all rational beings are influenced, and ought to be influenced, by motives. But the influence of motives is of a very different nature from that of efficient causes. They are neither causes nor agents. They suppose an effi-

cient cause, and can do nothing without it." (On the Active Powers.) Dugald Stewart contends for self-determination in like manner with Reid. He styles motives the occasions or reasons for acting, as distinguished from the efficient causes of action, and implies that the mind in volition acts creatively. "The argument for necessity," he says, "derives all its force from the maxim, *that every change requires a cause*. But this maxim, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of self-determination." (Works, Vol. VI., Appendix.) Sir William Hamilton, in accordance with his agnostic proclivities, declares both freedom and necessity inconceivable. But while the speculative difficulties are in his view about equal on either side, he accepts freedom on the testimony of the moral consciousness, and seems to approve the definition of it given by Reid and Stewart. (Lectures on Metaphysics, Appendix; Philosophy of the Conditioned.) Kant's treatment of the subject is peculiar, but unmistakably evinces that he conceived of freedom as the most positive self-determination. He says, that if our freedom were no other than that of Leibnitz's *automaton spirituale*, — that is, psychological and comparative, not also transcendental and absolute, — "then it would at bottom be nothing better than the freedom of a turnspit, which, when once it is wound up, accomplishes its motions of itself." But while Kant took high ground on the nature of freedom, he felt obliged also to ascend to high ground, even to a point outside the phenomenal or empirical, in order to find a theatre for its exercise. Everything phenomenal or empirical, coming under the category of time, of before and after, and holding a place in a connected chain, is subject to the law of cause and effect. Only in the sphere of the noumenal or intelligible, where the category of time no longer applies, is that law transcended. Hence, to secure freedom to man, we must predicate this double character of him,

and regard his empirical self and its manifestations as the product of the free determination of the intelligible self. (See both Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason.)

According to a large proportion of modern Calvinists, the free is simply the voluntary, and the power of contrary choice is a figment of the imagination. This was plainly the position of Edwards. In his definition freedom is nothing more than immunity from mechanical constraint. It leaves a man, amid a complex of motives and forces which are independent of any conscious agency or instrumentality of his, to one sole course, without the prerogative to turn aside a hair's breadth. Any specific volition is a link in a chain, and is as absolutely determined by its antecedents, if not in the same way, as is any event in nature. Calling the antecedents motives, this reduces to the statement that the will is and must be always as the strongest motive. That such is the teaching of Edwards will be made obvious by the following extracts from his work on the Freedom of the Will: "Things that are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves by a necessity of consequence. . . . That every act of the will has some cause, and consequently has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive. . . . That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts but by first acting, or be a determining cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of one and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this: that if so, then the *same* cause, the *same* causal influence, *without variation in any respect*, would produce different effects at different times. . . . It is perfectly demonstrable, that, if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is *necessary*; or, in other words, that it is *impossible* but the event should

come to pass. That no future event can be certainly fore-known, whose existence is contingent and without all necessity, may be proved thus: It is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without *evidence*. To suppose otherwise implies a contradiction; because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be *evident* to that understanding: and for a thing to be *evident* to any understanding is the same thing as for that understanding to *see evidence* of it; but no understanding, created or uncreated, can *see evidence* where there is none." The causal nexus, as Edwards implies, must be present to the divine mind. The fact of the foreknowledge of any particular act proves a chain of causes necessitating the occurrence of that act.

In arguing against the self-determination of the will, Edwards makes much account of a supposed *reductio ad absurdum*. If, says he, the will freely determines itself to a particular act, it must be by a choice. But this choice is an act, and the self-determination of the will to this act must also be by a choice, and so on to infinity. This reasoning evidently discards the idea that the creature, not to say God Himself, can act creatively. A volition, it is assumed, must have a determining antecedent which is either voluntary or involuntary. But given such a function as volition, and such an activity as creation, the union of the two gives the creative will or the full power of self-determination. Accordingly, anti-necessitarians present, as the short answer to the difficulty interposed by Edwards, the declaration that a free agent, in willing, acts creatively. The will, as Whedon expresses it, is a complete cause, a pluripotent cause, able under proper conditions to initiate either of several volitions. To ask after something else which may absolutely explain why the will elects in every case as it does, is to deny that it is or can be a complete cause.

The younger Edwards went at least as far as his father in the direction of necessitarianism. He excluded the

power of contrary choice, and asserted a causal relation between motives and volitions. Interpreting his father's position, he says: "President Edwards does not hold that we are mere passive beings, unless this expression mean, that our volitions are the effects of some cause extrinsic to our wills. If this be the meaning of it, he does hold it." To the same effect he remarks: "To say, that we are self-determined or self-moved, because we ourselves determine and move, is as improper and groundless, as to say, that a body is self-moved and self-determined in its motion, because the body itself moves. Extrinsic causality is no more excluded in the one case than in the other." (Dissertation concerning Liberty and Necessity, Chap. II.) To be sure Edwards junior says: "Antecedent certainty of moral actions is all that we mean by moral necessity." (Ibid., Chap. VI.) But by certainty so used he meant something more than the same term denotes with anti-necessitarians. President Day was aware of this. "The younger Edwards," he says, "though he frequently asserts that by moral necessity he means nothing different from the certainty of moral actions, yet shows abundantly that by certainty, as used in this explanation, he intends not merely certainty of knowledge, but a certainty in things themselves, and in their relations. . . . The certainty which he calls moral certainty is, according to him, 'the real and certain *connection* between some moral action and its cause'; not the certain foreknowledge of an action which is, in the absolute sense, contingent. It is *objective*, and not merely subjective certainty." (Examination of Pres. Edwards's Inquiry on the Freedom of the Will, Sect. VIII.) Hopkins says, "What is voluntary is free." The power of contrary choice he repudiated as absurd. Emmons, in maintaining the same position, ruled out the category of permission from God's relation to the creature. "God cannot," he says, "exercise permission towards his rational creatures, because they cannot act without his work-

ing in them both to will and to do. The Deity, therefore, is so far from permitting moral agents to act independently of Himself, that, on the other hand, He puts forth a positive influence to make them act, in every instance of their conduct, just as He pleases. He bends all the moral, as well as all the natural world, to His own views; and makes all His creatures, as well as all His works, answer the ends for which they were created." (Systematic Theol., Sermon. XXIX.) E. D. Griffin, in opposition to the doctrine of self-determining power, says: "We must believe the will is absolutely determined by motives." (Lectures, VIII.) Woods gives full scope to the same conclusion. (Lect. LII., LIV.) E. A. Lawrence of East Windsor and L. H. Atwater of Princeton represent their respective schools as denying the power of contrary choice. (Bib. Sac., Apr., 1863, Jan., 1864. Compare Hodge, Pt. II. chap. 9, § 3.)

On the subject of responsibility these writers generally apply the Edwardean maxim that the states and exercises of the moral agent are good or bad, praiseworthy or blameworthy, in their nature, and irrespective of their cause. Hodge defends this maxim. The opinion of Müller, that a man is only responsible for his acts and their subjective effects in the formation of character, so that acts determined by a character that is not self-formed are out of the range of responsibility, he expressly controverts. Indeed, the discussion of Hodge implies that a rational being absolutely determined to evil by his nature would be fully responsible for his acts, though that evil nature were concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. (Pt. II. chap. 9, § 3.)

Among the later New England theologians there has been a tendency, to a considerable extent, to modify the Edwardean system on the subject of freedom and responsibility. A revised phraseology has been brought in, and much account made of the distinction between certainty and necessity. Dr. Taylor of New Haven taught

that the power of contrary choice must be predicated of a free and responsible being. (See articles by Geo. P. Fisher, *New-Englander*, April and Oct., 1868.) Lyman Beecher advocated the same view. He says: "Choice, without the possibility of other or contrary choice, is the immemorial doctrine of fatalism." (*Views in Theology*.) C. G. Finney of Oberlin criticised the Edwardean theory as denying proper free agency to man and asserted the power of contrary choice in these terms: "I am as conscious of the affirmation that I could will differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation that I cannot affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do." (*Lectures on Systematic Theology*.) Such statements seem to concede all that the zealous Arminian could ask for. But when he is told by the same class of writers, (as he assuredly is by some of its leading representatives,) that it is certain that given antecedents will be followed by given actions as their consequents, that the power to vary the result is a power that is never used, and that divine foreknowledge is dependent upon this invariable but non-necessitated succession of consequents from antecedents, he sees that there is work still to be done to bring them over to his standpoint.

The result of Adam's misuse of freedom, or original sin, follows next in the order of consideration. Roman Catholic theology holds, of course, in accordance with the implication of the Trent decisions, that original sin includes guilt, as well as corruption or lack in the moral nature of Adam's descendants. Accordingly, it was one of the grounds of censure in the theological system of Hermes, that he excluded the element of guilt, and made original sin to consist solely in inborn depravity or concupiscence. (*Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie*.) The stricter Lutherans have also continued to include the element of guilt as well as of depravity. Thomasius, for example,

teaches that, as the guilt of Adam was the guilt of the race, so to be a member of the race is to be a participant of the guilt. (Dogmatik, § 28.) But there have been many exceptions to this theory, in favor of the view that guilt first arises when the individual by a free and conscious act of will adopts the inherited evil bent. Thomasius speaks of this as a very common view since the time of Döderlein. One wing of Calvinism is very tenacious of the doctrine that original sin includes guilt as well as corruption. Another wing holds that the corruption alone is matter of inheritance, or the immediate consequence of Adamic connections, guilt first arising with the sinful choice which that corruption insures, but does not necessitate. "The universality of sin, not necessitated, but made certain, notwithstanding a power to the contrary, is the formula of the creed." (Fisher, *New-Englander*, Aug., 1860.) This is the theory of E. A. Park and many other New England theologians of the present century, and has also found favor with the New School among Presbyterians. Van Oosterzee is very definitely committed to this theory, at least so far as excluding guilt is concerned. Hereditary taint, he says, is something quite distinct from hereditary guilt. The former is to be admitted, the latter denied. (Dogmatics, Sect. LXXV.) Among English Methodists the theory of hereditary guilt has commonly been recognized, as may be judged from the writings of Wesley, Watson, Pope, and Rigg. They give it, however, only a theoretical place, since they regard it as cancelled by the unconditional benefits of the atonement. American Methodists, on the other hand, very generally regard the theory of hereditary guilt in any shape as a factor essentially alien to their system of theology, and lay the whole stress upon the single element of hereditary corruption. Unitarians, and rationalists in other communions, have no interest in the specific questions relating to original sin, since they reduce it to the common notion of heredity, the doctrine

that ancestry is a factor in determining the bent of the individual.

Those who include the element of guilt are not agreed as to the ground on which it is attributable to Adam's posterity. The principal theories are the realistic theory, the theory of federal headship and immediate imputation, the theory of natural headship and mediate imputation, the theory of federal and natural headship and both immediate and mediate imputation. It is not to be understood, of course, that those who hold the second theory deny the natural headship, but only that on this topic the prominent point with them is the federal headship. The first theory has found a staunch advocate in William G. T. Shedd. He argues that it is a well-approved fact that the deepest action of the will lies below consciousness. Having thus got beneath consciousness, and clear of any opposition which it may have to offer, he runs the line back to the primal apostasy as something in which the will of every individual may be supposed to have been deeply implicated. What he considers the true doctrine he thus outlines: "Every child of Adam fell from God in Adam, and together with Adam, and therefore is justly chargeable with all that Adam is chargeable with, and precisely on the same ground, viz. on the ground that his fall was not necessitated, but self-determined. For the will of Adam was not the will of a single isolated individual merely: it was also, and besides this, the will of the human species,—the human will generically." (Theological Essays.) Edwards also advocated a realistic theory, founding it upon the metaphysical notion that in the range of created things identity or oneness depends entirely upon God's sovereign constitution. As He was pleased to constitute Adam and his posterity one, they are in truth one. In the view of Edwards, transgression and depravity precede the imputation of guilt, and are its ground. The theory of immediate imputation, on the ground of the federal headship of

Adam, has been advocated by recent Scotch theologians, and by the Princeton school in this country. (See Chalmers, *Institutes of Theology*; Hodge, *Pt. II. chap. 8, §§ 9-13*; Atwater, *Bib. Sac., Jan., 1864.*) Mediate imputation, on the ground of depravity coming through natural connection with Adam, has been favored by individuals in various communions, — by Woods and Tyler among New England theologians, by Hovey among Baptists, by H. B. Smith among Presbyterians, by Vanema and Stapfer among the Reformed on the Continent. According to Thomasius, mediate and immediate imputation mutually conditioning each other supply the best theory. (*Dogmatik, § 28.*)

As respects the mode in which the corruption of nature is transmitted, no essential advance has been made on the theories of the preceding period. Traducianists affirm the law of descent. Creationists leave the subject a mystery, or affirm a divine constitution that like shall be born of like, — that the primary state of the soul shall be as if it came into being by descent. Emmons, conjoining this notion with his exercise scheme and his doctrine of divine efficiency, brings forward the novel theory that the transmission of moral depravity is explained by the fact that God takes pains to create sinful exercises in the newly born. He says: "In consequence of Adam's first transgression, God now brings his posterity into the world in a state of moral depravity. But how? The answer is easy. When God forms the souls of infants, He forms them with moral powers and makes them men in miniature; He works in them as He does in other men, both to will and to do of His good pleasure; or produces those moral exercises in their hearts in which moral depravity properly and essentially consists. Moral depravity can take place nowhere but in moral agents; and moral agents can never act but only as they are acted upon by a divine operation. It is just as easy, therefore, to account for moral depravity in infancy, as in any other period of life." (*Systematic Theol., Serm. XXIX.*)

As to the degree of moral ability which pertains to man in the estate of original sin, the answer rendered by different schools has already been suggested by the preceding paragraphs. Only the strictest of the Lutherans hold on this subject the Augustinian extreme characteristic of the Lutheran theology in the preceding period. Kahnis declares that extreme untenable. (Dogmatik, III. § 10.) The position of Old School Calvinism is in general the position asserted by the Reformed Confessions of the preceding period. Among the representatives of the New England Theology there has been a very general departure from the older phraseology. An ability to keep the law of God is freely asserted even of the fallen man. This, however, is but one side of the case. The ability which is affirmed is described as a *natural ability*, over against which stands a *moral inability*. The natural ability is the possession of the powers of reason, will, etc., which enter into obedience to divine commands; the moral inability is the disinclination of the natural man to render such obedience. The one makes it proper to say of a man that he *can*; the other makes it certain that left to himself he *will not*. The one is the measure of obligation; the other declares the imperative need of grace. Methodist theologians prefer to speak simply of an inability of men in their natural state to keep the law of God. In their system, however, a natural state is only a theoretical fiction, since they teach that the Divine Spirit meets every man on the threshold of moral agency with a measure of assistance.

The principal theories respecting the nature and origin of sin which have recently been advocated are the following:—(1.) Sin has a positive as well as a negative side, is predicable not merely of acts, but of the nature lying back of the acts,—at least when the corruption of that nature has been induced in the use of personal autonomy,—and it had its origin in the free choice of the creature. This free

choice, according to the non-Calvinist, was properly contingent; according to the Calvinist, its certain futurity was secured by a divine decree. Among those holding this general definition, there is a difference on the question, whether all varieties of sin can be reduced to the single principle of selfishness. Julius Müller answered in the affirmative. Many New England theologians, starting from the Edwardean definition of virtue as benevolence, or love to being in general, have also answered in the affirmative. Hodge, on the other hand, has answered in the negative. So also has Dorner. Pope says that selfishness is rather the first manifestation than the essence of sin. (2.) A theory claiming somewhat of a following in New England differs from the above in confining sin altogether to voluntary exercises. Emmons was a zealous champion of this theory. It was given a place also in the Oberlin theology as represented by Dr. Finney. With Emmons, as has been observed, the conception of sin was further modified by his peculiar theory of divine efficiency. (3.) Sin, according to another theory, is simply negation or privation, and has the ground of its occurrence in the original limitations or imperfection of the creature. Leibnitz held this theory. Moral evil, as he taught, is privation, like darkness or cold. It needs no *causa efficiens*, but only a *causa deficiens*. The free will may indeed be termed the proximate cause of sin, but the primary cause was the imperfection of the creature. God could not bestow all perfections upon the creature without making him God. The creature is necessarily limited, imperfect in knowledge and moral energy, so that sin is made inevitable, if not necessary. (Théodicée.) Hedge agrees with Leibnitz in the negative definition of sin, as well as in the optimism which affirms, not that the world is the best conceivable, but the best possible. The effects of sin, he allows, are positive enough, but claims that this does not disprove the negative character of their source. (Reason in Religion, Bk. I. Essay VII.) "What

causes transgression," he says, "is not a positive, but a negative condition; it is not any one affection of the soul, in itself considered, but the absence of that restraining principle and power without which any affection of the soul may lead to sin. . . . Let the soul receive freely into her dark mansion the sunshine of the Spirit, and sin, which is nothingness and shadow, will flee away." (4.) The teaching of Rothe and some others locates the nature and origin of sin in sensuousness. Man starts with a sensuous nature, which it is his proper vocation to spiritualize. The tendency of the sensuous nature being contrary to this goal, sin becomes an inevitable incident in the process. Schleiermacher's teaching affiliates with this view. He locates sin in the opposition of the lower powers to the God-consciousness. (5.) In the representations of some recent writers, much account is made of the idea that antagonisms and contrasts are essential to development, and that sin therefore is a necessary factor in a progressive moral world. According to this theory, there is no excellence without manifoldness. As in art there must be both light and shade, as in nature both attracting and repelling forces, so in the moral sphere there must be the contrast of good and evil. Human life without such contrasts would be like a Chinese picture or a stagnant pool. Hegel's doctrine of sin may be regarded as a form of this theory. According to Hegel, moral evil is not so much what ought not to be, as what ought not to remain. The human spirit should overcome evil, but it needs for its proper development the trial which evil imposes. (See Julius Müller's criticism of this and other theories, in his *Christian Doctrine of Sin*.)

The relation of sin to the possible aggregate of good is, of course, estimated by theistic writers very much in accordance with their view of the relation of the divine will to the occurrence of sin. Those holding the radical theories of Hopkinsianism will not hesitate to say that whatever

sin exists is a means of the greatest good. Others, occupying a position somewhat less radical respecting the relation of God to the occurrence of sin, will say that it is a *sine qua non* of the greatest good. Others will not say either that sin is a means or a *sine qua non* of the greatest good, but simply that its possibility is unavoidable in the system which aims at the greatest good. Each of these theories has been advocated. The second is still extensively advocated; but, as a relative decline of Calvinism implies, a relative advance of the third may be regarded as characteristic of the age.

CHAPTER IV.

REDEEMER AND REDEMPTION.

SECTION I.—THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

THE views entertained of Christ outside the current of Catholic Christianity have been intimated in large part in the preceding sections. In the section on Philosophy it was remarked that to Kant Christ was pre-eminently the moral ideal, while in the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel He is portrayed as the highest historical realization of the essential union of God and man. To Schleiermacher He was the transcendent example of a perfect God-consciousness, the impersonated divine life, the bond and centre of spiritual fellowship. The older rationalism judged of His human perfection in the spirit of a cold aversion to everything mystical, and of deistic severance between the divine and the human. Recent Unitarianism in one of its manifold phases, affiliating more or less with transcendentalism in its general standpoint, has represented the manhood of Christ so intimately linked with divinity that their union only fails of being a personal one. Among the noted biographers of Christ, Strauss spent most of his effort in proving that we have no real history of Him, and drew the conclusion that we should be less interested in His person than in the ideal of humanity, which he more indeed than any other single individual, but yet only partially, exemplified. Renan, in the least creditable work upon the subject, whether it be considered critically or morally, that ever was issued by a man of learning and reputation, min-

gled unstinted praises of Christ with statements grossly disparaging both to His intellectual and ethical superiority. Schenkel touched the subject with a more reverent hand than either Strauss or Renan. He saw in Christ a pattern of sinless humanity, a pure mirror in which divine verities found a true reflection. But he brought to his consideration of the Gospel narrative the old rationalistic dread of miracles, and ended much like the old rationalism in presenting to us God's legate, instead of the Word made flesh, the perfect union of the divine and the human.

In the Church at large, the present period has witnessed an intensified interest in the subject of Christ's person. One manifestation of this drift is seen in the demand, by a considerable class of theologians, that the subject matter of theology should be treated after the Christo-centric plan. Whatever the result of christological investigation in other respects may have been, a real advance has no doubt been made in the treatment of Christ's human nature. No previous age has equalled the present in an appreciative consideration of Christ's human perfection, or wrought out so rich a literature in behalf of its illustration.

In the endeavor to secure a more satisfactory view of the union of the human and the divine in Christ than was attained by the older dogmatics, much attention has been bestowed of late upon the doctrine of the *kenosis*. Among those who have used the doctrine, in its most radical form, to solve the problem of Christ's person, are Thomasius, Gess, and Ebrard.

Thomasius teaches that without a self-limitation of the divine no true union with the human is possible. The divine self-consciousness is an infinitely larger circle than the human, and their co-existence implies a dualism destructive to personal unity. To gain a basis for unity, there must be a depotentialization of the divine. Such in fact occurred when the Word became flesh. The eternal Logos emptied Himself, not indeed of what is strictly essential to

God, but of the divine mode of being. He put aside the divine glory, the divine self-consciousness, the divine attributes connected with the dominion of the world, such as omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, renouncing not merely their use, but their possession as well. He came entirely within the limits of a human earthly life. "In the totality of His being He became a man." The essential holiness and truth of the divine nature assumed in Him the form of human volition and thought, the absolute love and freedom, the form of human feeling and self-determination. There was no distinction between a divine and a human consciousness in Him, but only a distinction of moments in a single self-consciousness, somewhat as in the regenerate the undivided self-consciousness includes the two moments of the divine and the natural life. Having descended from the divine to the human rank, he returns after the analogy of a human development toward the divine, and in the glorification rises completely to its plane, appearing thenceforth as the omnipotent, omniscient God-man. (Dogmatik, §§ 38-45.)

In the scheme of Thomasius, with its humanized Logos, there seems to be little need of an extra human soul. So Gess inferred. As he represents (in his *Lehre von der Person Christi*), the Logos became the human soul that dwelt in the body derived from the Virgin. Apollinaris was right in refusing to conjoin the Logos with a human soul; but he was radically in error in making the incarnated Logos immutable. He was every way man, with the characteristic mutability of man, able to sin, though in fact sinless. Such a theory seems to involve the conclusion that one of the Divine Persons disappeared for a time from the Trinity. Gess admits this in the fullest terms. The deponentiation of the Logos, as he teaches, affected the life of the Godhead in a fourfold manner: (1.) The Father suspended the communication of divine life to the Son. (2.) The Son ceased to be a joint source for the procession of the

Spirit. (3.) The Son ceased to be the upholding and conserving principle of the world. (4.) In reassuming His glory, the Son entered as man into the Trinity.

This evidently involved nothing less than the overthrow of the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. To avert such a result, Ebrard, Schöberlein, and some other advocates of the kenosis, have brought forward the theory of a double life of the Logos. On the one hand, as they teach, the Logos becomes the man Jesus, emptied of His divine glory, and possessed of a purely human consciousness and will; on the other hand, He retains without interruption His existence and activity in the Trinity. The same ego subsists at once in the eternal and the temporal mode, as infinite and as confined by the narrow bounds of man's estate.

Delitzsch carries the depotentialisation of the Logos as far as Thomasius. (Bib. Psych., V. sect. 1.) A quite emphatic view of the kenosis appears also with Martensen. He teaches that the Logos in Christ must be viewed as limited, as subject to the law of development, so that "as the human nature grows and develops, in the same measure the divine in Him grows, and in the same measure as He becomes aware with His advancing development of His historical significance, He is reminded of His eternal pre-existence and of His going-forth from the Father." (Dogmatik, § 136.)

Dorner criticises the kenotic theories, and in their place advances the idea of a progressive union consummated by an enlarging impartation from the Logos to a growing receptivity in the human nature. (System of Christ. Doct., § 104.) He considers it of importance to regard the union as ethically mediated, the divine indeed taking the initiative, but the human not occupying an attitude of simple passivity. (Compare Rothe, Dogmatik, II. 1, §§ 22, 23.) A theory of Christ's person essentially identical with that of Gess has been advocated in this country. A very clear and pronounced expression of this is found in the treatise of Henry M. Goodwin, entitled "Christ and Humanity." He

affirms that the true doctrine of the incarnation rests upon three postulates: (1.) the essential unity of the divine and the human; (2.) the divine and heavenly humanity of Christ, the truth that the Logos is essentially the archetype of man; (3.) the kenosis, or the self-limitation of the Logos. His view of the kenosis is sufficiently indicated by this comment on the theory of Apollinaris: "The real defect was not in denying a human soul, — which was not needed if it did not act, and, if it did, would destroy or impair the unity of His person; but the radical defect of his system was in allowing the Logos only a partial, and not a perfect humanification, i. e. a real subjection to all the conditions and limitations of our finite humanity." Horace Bushnell contended for substantially the same result, namely, a divine-human Christ endowed with a single rational principle, but expressed himself as comparatively indifferent about the theoretical path to this result.

The doctrine of the kenosis in its radical form evidently implies an extensive modification of the old Lutheran Christology. It is directly counter to the earlier theory, which meant by the kenosis, not a depotentialization of the Logos, but the renunciation by the human nature of the use, or the manifest use, of the divine predicates. It is also at variance, at least as urged by Gess, with the Lutheran doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum*. There being no soul in Christ aside from the Logos, there is no need of a communication, except to the body, that is, of a power to transcend the limitations of space. It is noteworthy that Martensen takes exception to a communication of just this sort, as endangering the individuality of the glorified Christ, and leaning to the theory of an indefinite pantheistic Christ diffused through nature. There are others, however, among recent writers, who are in no wise inclined to renounce this item, which figured so prominently in the older dogmatics.

It is quite manifest that what may be styled a radical doctrine of the kenosis has made progress in different

quarters within the last few decades. But, taking the theological world at large, it is still, if we mistake not, the doctrine of a decided minority.

The doctrine of a pre-existent humanity of Christ, in one or more of its factors, favored by some in the preceding period, has found here and there an advocate in the present. Swedenborg's conception of God as the Infinite Man involved in itself the notion of a kind of pre-existent humanity. Isaac Watts argued for a pre-existent soul of Christ, which was the first-born of all creatures, subsisting in personal union with the Logos. In the incarnation, this soul, bereft of its exalted knowledge, power, and glory, was united with a material body, and made subject to the law of gradual development. (Works, Vol. VI.)

SECTION II. — THE REDEPTIVE WORK OF CHRIST.

IN the treatment of this subject we deal, for the most part, not with new elements, but only with new combinations. All the leading aspects of Christ's redemptive work were brought out in the preceding periods.

Leaving a margin for miscellaneous views, we may include the principal types of teaching in the following classification: (1.) the judicial theory; (2.) the pure governmental; (3.) the modified governmental; (4.) the moral; (5.) the mystical.

The idea of the judicial theory is not simply satisfaction, but rather specific satisfaction. It teaches that Christ's obedience and sufferings were not merely a general condition of the exhibition of forgiving mercy, but a specific satisfaction for all the sins of the elect. Christ fulfilled the claims of the law in their behalf in such a sense that it is no longer an act of grace, but of justice, that they should be released from its penalties. Grace concerns the primary provision of the satisfaction, not its individual application.

Says one of the most eminent representatives of this theory: "It is a matter of justice that the blessings which Christ intended to secure for His people should be actually bestowed upon them. This follows for two reasons: first, they were promised to Him as the reward of His obedience and sufferings. God covenanted with Christ, that, if He fulfilled the conditions imposed, if He made satisfaction for the sins of His people, they should be saved. It follows, secondly, from the nature of the satisfaction. If the claims of justice are satisfied, they cannot be again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfaction rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both cases the persons for whom the satisfaction is made are certainly freed. Their exemption or deliverance is in both cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice." (Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 6, § 3.) From the above statement, that those are *certainly freed* for whom the satisfaction was made, it is an obvious inference that the satisfaction was made only for the elect, unless perchance some are saved who are not of the elect, a conclusion which the advocates of this theory in no wise tolerate. The virtue of Christ's death, it is conceded, is entirely adequate to cover the sins of the non-elect. And on this ground, as Hodge contends, the offer of salvation to all is justified and made consistent. (Pt. III. chap. 8, § 2.) Non-Calvinists, on the other hand, have never been able to see the consistency of urging salvation upon those for whom it was never designed. In their view the divine design and the Gospel offer should have equal breadth, if God is to be presented to the contemplation of men in any worthy light. The judicial theory, with its legal analogies, is naturally coextensive only with the stricter type of Calvinism, which carries out the conception of imputation in all its length and breadth. Professor Atwater has declared it representative of Old School

Presbyterianism. (Bib. Sac., January, 1864. Compare Wm. Cunningham, Hist. Theol., Vol. II.)

The governmental theory takes the subject of atonement from the court, or the sphere of judicial procedure, and transfers it to the sphere of sovereignty, of righteous administration. It views God pre-eminently in His character of moral ruler. In all its forms it denies the assumption of the judicial theory that Christ so fulfilled the obligations of a special class of persons as to render their acquittal, in view of His work, a matter of justice. It teaches, rather, that the work of Christ provided simply the possibility of pardon for any and every man, laid the suitable foundation for a general scheme of amnesty; that, while it is fitting that the benefits of the amnesty should be offered to all, the work of Christ gives no one a title to them in justice.

In its pure form the governmental theory makes the demand for an atonement to lie, not in the essential nature of God, but in the exigencies of moral government. It is a token rather of what good administration requires, than of what essential holiness in itself requires. It may be defined as an expedient whereby the honor and majesty of moral government are sustained in connection with the offer of pardon to the sinner. Such, on the whole, is the theory advocated by Dr. Miley in his work on "The Atonement in Christ." To be sure, he is careful to state that there is a punitive justice in God; but he states also that this is a feeling or impulse the satisfaction of which the divine nature does not necessarily demand. His point of view is well indicated by the following: "God, as a righteous Ruler, must inflict merited penalty upon sin, not, indeed, in the gratification of any mere personal resentment, nor in the satisfaction of any absolute retributive justice, but in the interest of moral government, or find some rectorally compensatory measure for the remission of the penalty. Such a measure there is in the redemptive mediation of Christ." Storr and some others of the Ger-

man supernaturalists of his era held about the same view. The governmental theory has also been advocated by the great body of those representing the New England Theology since the days of Edwards. But how far they have been committed to the theory in the form characterized in the present paragraph, it is not easy to decide. What many of them emphasize is the purely governmental demand for the atonement. This might be natural, even if they admitted a farther demand, since they wished to make prominent the point of departure from the old theory.

The modified governmental theory, as we term it, claims that the atonement is a satisfaction to the ethical nature of God, as well as an expedient for sustaining the honor and majesty of His government. It emphasizes the idea that no chasm should be interposed between the moral laws and the moral nature of God; that what one demands the other demands, and what is agreeable to the one satisfies the other. Watson, on the whole, seems to have stood upon the ground of this theory, and it may be regarded as largely current among Methodist theologians of the present, as also in other quarters, though perhaps under a different terminology from that by which it is here designated. If we mistake not, the teaching of H. B. Smith on the atonement admits of being classified here. The same may be said of many of the more orthodox Lutherans of recent times; for, in opposition to the judicial theory, they make the satisfaction of Christ to be a satisfaction of general, and not of distributive justice, and, in opposition to the Grotian or purely governmental theory, they find a ground for it in the ethical nature of God, and not merely in the demands of administration. (See the views of Dörner, Thomasius, Kahnis, and Schmucker.)

The moral (or moral influence) theory regards the work of Christ not at all as a condition, on the divine side, of man's restoration, whether the condition be located in the nature or the government of God, but simply as the chosen

means of restoration. God in Himself being already reconciled, and being moreover perfectly secure of His moral sovereignty, had no need of a tribute either to His nature or to His law. All that was needed was a restoring agency, such a manifestation of God's desire to bring the alienated race into fellowship with Himself as should influence them most powerfully and wholesomely. Sanctification of man, not satisfaction of God, was the thing demanded. In the humbled, obedient, and suffering Son of God, the restoring agency, the sanctifying influence, was provided. As enlisting the faith and drawing forth the affection of men, Christ becomes directly the power of God unto salvation. Some of the recent German theologians have espoused this theory. It underlies the representations of Töllner, Rothe, and Nitzsch, among others. In this country Horace Bushnell has been its most conspicuous advocate. Our description of the theory has already presented an outline of his view, as contained in his work on "The Vicarious Sacrifice." Love, as he teaches, is the very principle of vicarious sacrifice in God, as well as in man. The cross was in God's heart from eternity. The need of reconciliation pertained wholly to man, and not at all to God. The atoning power of Christ's sacrifice is its power to overcome man's alienation from God, its moral influence. The fulness of its moral influence is due to its wonderful manifestation, not only of God's love, but of all His moral perfections. While Bushnell teaches that there was no need on God's part that the law should be honored, he maintains that the sacrifice of Christ, as a matter of fact, conferred unmeasured honor upon the law. "Everything that we see," he says, "in the incarnate life and the suffering death, is God magnifying the honors of His law by the stress of His own stupendous sacrifice." Again he remarks, "It is obvious enough that, in such a way of obedience, Christ makes a contribution of honor to the law He obeys that will do more to enthrone it in our reverence than all the

desecrations of sin have done to pluck it down,—more than all conceivable punishments, to make it felt, and keep it in respect.” In his estimate, therefore, of the essential worth of Christ’s work, he does not differ from the advocates of the preceding theories. The prominent point of difference is, that he makes that work simply a means of man’s moral recovery, and not also a condition on God’s part of that recovery. In a later work Bushnell modified his former exposition, to the extent of admitting a real propitiation of God. This, however, he describes as a self-propitiation effectuated by making sacrifice for the offender. As we by making cost to ourselves for an enemy overcome our inward reluctance to forgive, so God by entering into sacrifice for sinners becomes in his own feeling fully at peace with Himself in extending grace to them. (Forgiveness and Law.) The moral theory was favored by Coleridge, and has also claimed the recognition of other representatives of the Broad Church in the English Establishment. The teaching of F. D. Maurice is perhaps best defined as a union of the moral and the mystical theories.

According to the mystical theory, the great aim and achievement of the redemptive work was to bring man into vital connection with God. The incarnate Logos acts as the bond of this connection. He becomes in the organism of humanity the new life-centre, whence a divine-human virtue is mediated to all the branches. As has been indicated, this view had a place in patristic thought. Among its modern exponents, Oetinger is mentioned as a prominent example. It enters as a factor into the theory of a number of theologians who do not lay upon it an exclusive stress. In the following words from Delitzsch, for example, it is clearly enough implied: “This appropriation of human nature, through the Logos, and this impropriation of the Logos into the human nature, became the inviolable ground of a new humanity, which has in the God-man the creative principle and the superabundant archetype of its growth.

. . . In Christ a new beginning is established, which bears in itself the most infallible guaranty of completion, and, on account of the superabundant intensity of its power of propagation, suggests the hope of a renewal of the whole of humanity." (Bib. Psych., V. sect. 1, 2.)

The moral theory has been characteristic of recent Unitarian theology. Ellis states as the Unitarian conclusion on the subject of the atonement: "The Scriptures do not lay the emphatic stress of Christ's redeeming work upon his death, alone or apart from His life, character, and doctrine; and His death, as an element of His redeeming work, is made effective for human salvation through its influence on the heart and life of man, not through its vicarious or substituted value with God, nor through its removal of an abstract difficulty in the divine government, which hinders the forgiveness of the penitent without further satisfaction." (A Half-Century of the Unitarian Controversy.) It may be noticed, however, that the testimony of Channing indicates that some of the earlier Unitarians were not quite satisfied to assign to Christ's death simply the place which is indicated in the above,—were inclined to regard it as securing forgiveness otherwise than by moving to repentance and reformation of life. He says, "Many of us are dissatisfied with this explanation, and think that the Scriptures ascribe the remission of sins to Christ's death, with an emphasis so peculiar, that we ought to consider this event as having a special influence in removing punishment, though the Scriptures may not reveal the way in which it contributes to this end." (Works, Vol. III. p. 89.)

The symbolical view was not included in our list of theories, as being of very indefinite range and meaning. It held, however, quite a prominent place in Germany during the transition era in the first part of the century. We quote upon this subject from Hahn: "Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, and the theologians and philosophers who affili-

ated with them and were opposed to the vulgar rationalism, regarded from their different standpoints the reconciling death of Christ as a symbol of the spiritual and moral change whereby the sinner reunites himself with God. So Kant saw therein the symbolical representation of the truth that the new or reformed man must pay the penalty for the old. Similarly Tieftrunk in Halle, and Kroll in Helmstedt. Krug found therein a symbol of the truth that God does not take pleasure in man as he is, (the natural man,) but in him as he should be, (the Christ,) which idea the natural man must believingly follow, if God is to receive him into favor. According to Schleiermacher's related view, redemption and reconciliation, absolutely accomplished in the person of Christ, are accomplished in us only as fellowship and union with Him, so far as God sees us, not each by himself, but only in Him. However, we do not come immediately into this fellowship and union, but only through the medium of the community of which Christ the Saviour is the founder. De Wette considered the death of Jesus an æsthetico-religious symbol of the feeling of submission in which we bow before God. Marheinecke saw therein a symbol of the return of the world to God, in that it dies to itself in order to attain a new and true life." (*Lehrbuch der Christ. Glaubens*, § 103.) For a more specific reference to Hegel's view, see the section on Philosophy.

Among the features of Christ's redeeming work recognized by Swedenborgianism, a prominent place is given to His agency in limiting the power of evil spirits. Speaking of Christ's rebuttal of infernal spirits and their temptations, a Swedenborgian writer says: "Thus He set Himself face to face in battle with our spiritual enemies. And He overthrew them utterly. He drove them back to their own dark realm. He destroyed their predominant influence over human beings, and restored the freedom which they had so nearly subverted." (James Reed.) "That the Lord," says Swedenborg, "while He was in the world,

fought against the hells, and conquered and subjugated them, and thus reduced them under obedience to Him, is evident from many passages in the Word." (True Christian Religion, § 116.)

Nearly all theological parties agree in the verdict, that in the atonement, as accomplished by Christ, are to be included not merely His sufferings and death, but His entire life of holy obedience. But many representatives of the New England Theology have taught that the obedience of Christ, while indispensable to His vocation, was no part of the atonement. Here belong Edwards junior, Hopkins, Emmons, Pond, Fiske, etc. The last, writing as a representative of his school, says: "The old doctrine is, that the atonement consists both in the active and passive obedience. The new doctrine confines the atonement to the latter, and makes it consist wholly in Christ's sufferings." (Bib. Sac., July, 1865.) On the other hand, Dwight and Woods were opposed to attempts to separate between the active and passive obedience of Christ.

The doctrine of Christ's descent into Hades ceased before the end of the eighteenth century to be a topic of much interest among Protestant theologians. Recently the connection of the subject with eschatology has brought it to renewed attention. Much division of opinion exists on the question whether the Scriptures teach a real descent or not. Dörner implies that German exegesis answers the question in the affirmative. "It may be accepted," he says, "as a result of modern exegetical research, that, in harmony with the faith of the ancient Church, Peter really contemplates Christ after His death, probably before His resurrection, as active in the region of the dead, and therefore not in the place of torment, but in the intermediate region." (System of Christ. Doct., § 124.) Van Oosterzee argues for a real descent. (Sect. CIV.) Hodge, in agreement with a large proportion of Reformed theologians of former times, sees in the true doctrine of the descent sim-

ply the fact that Christ continued for a time under the power of death. (Pt. III. chap. 12, § 5.) Altogether wide of the modern drift is the view of Dr. Bartle, that Christ's principal sufferings by which He atoned for sin were in Hades. (The Scriptural Doctrine of Hades.)

Not a few among recent theologians have favored the conclusion that the incarnation was not dependent upon the fact of sin, or the need of redemption. Dorner contends for this conclusion, and supports it with such considerations as the following. If Christianity is the absolute religion, its central feature, the God-man, ought not to be conditioned upon the contingent fact of sin. It is contrary to the pre-eminent glory and importance of Christ's person to make the incarnation merely a means of redemption, and dependent upon the redemptive purpose. Humanity as an organism, and apart from the demand of moral recovery, can find only in the God-man an adequate centre and head. Dorner mentions, among others who have adopted this view, Nitzsch, Martensen, Liebner, Lange, Rothe, Schöberlein, Schmid, and Ebrard. (Hist. of Doct. of the Person of Christ, Div. II., Vol. III.) Among those who have advocated the reverse view are Julius Müller and Thomasius. The Roman Catholic theologian Amort, taking a medium position between the Scotist and the Thomist opinion on the subject, drew the conclusion that Christ would have adopted a form of manifestation, even if man had not sinned, but one of a more glorious order than the common human one in which he did appear. (Werner, Geschichte der katholischen Theologie.)

SECTION III. — APPROPRIATION OF THE BENEFITS OF CHRIST'S WORK.

As was indicated in the corresponding section of the previous period, while there was a current of Augustinianism in the Roman Catholic Church, the opposing cur-

rent, which had long been in existence, gained an added impulse through the action of the Popes in condemning propositions of Baius and Quesnel, and of the council of Trent in teaching a synergistic mode of appropriating grace. However, the Augustinian doctrine of predestination was not formally repudiated, nor has it been to this day. Accordingly, we find such representative writers as Perrone teaching that a Roman Catholic is free to exercise his option between the doctrine of gratuitous predestination, in the sense of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, and the doctrine that predestination is conditioned upon foresight of merit. (*Prælect., De Prov. ac de Prædest.*) It is difficult to determine what amount of suffrage is still rendered to the former view; but it may safely be inferred that it holds a very subordinate place as compared with the counter view, which, indeed, is the only one really in harmony with the Trent synergism. The following from Möhler may be regarded as representative of the general standpoint of modern Romanism on the mode of divine grace and the related doctrine of predestination. "According to Catholic principles, in the holy work of regeneration, when the same is really accomplished, two activities, the human and the divine, meet and intermingle; so that it is a divine-human work. God's holy power precedes arousing, awakening, and quickening, without man's being able to deserve the same, or bring it near, or long for it; but man must allow himself to be aroused, and must freely follow. God offers His help to raise from the fall, but the sinner must agree, and appropriate the same; appropriating it, he is received of the Holy Spirit, and gradually, although it may never be perfectly in this life, through faithful co-operation is raised again to that height from which he fell. God's spirit uses no absolute compulsion, though He be exceedingly urgent in His addresses; His omnipotence sets bounds to itself in human freedom, which it will not break through, because an unrestricted invasion

of the same would involve the destruction of the moral order of the world, which the eternal wisdom has founded upon freedom. With right, therefore, and entirely in harmony with her inmost essence, has the Catholic Church repudiated the Jansenist sentence of Quesnel, that human freedom must yield to the omnipotence of God,—a sentence which has for its immediate consequence the doctrine of an entirely unconditioned predestination of God, and declares concerning those who do not attain to regeneration that they have not cast themselves off, but have been simply cast off by God, since the touching of them by the Spirit of God would also have determined their freedom to faith and holy obedience.” (Symbolik, § 11. Compare Klee, Vol. III. p. 105.)

In the Lutheran Church the Augustinian doctrine of predestination has been generally repudiated. The same may be said of the Reformed Church of Germany since the early part of the present century. As Kahnis remarks, at the time the Union was agitated, it was justly urged by those favoring that project, that, with only vanishing exceptions, Reformed theologians had given up the doctrine of predestination. (Dogmatik, III. § 13.) “The Reformed divines in Germany,” says Schaff, “are not strict Calvinists, especially as regards the doctrine of predestination, but stand in close affinity with the moderate or Melancthonian school of the Lutheran Church.” (Germany, its Universities, Theology, and Religion.) Schleiermacher, it is true, as a representative of the Union Church, taught an absolute predestination. But it was not the old Reformed doctrine on that subject which he advocated. Predestination with him was not the choice of certain men to eternal life, as opposed to others, but the choice of each and every man to an earlier or later entrance into the life of the redeemed. It fixes the progressive development of the divine kingdom, the order of entrance into the same, until the final consummation is reached, when all shall have

entered. (Die Christ. Glaube, §§ 119, 120.) Still less was Rothe's the old Reformed doctrine of predestination. He held, indeed, that the fact that a man becomes here and now a partaker of grace must be referred rather to the divine choice than to human agency. However, he maintained that this, in the divine administration, is made subservient to the widest possible participation in grace. Individuals are introduced in that order most conducive to the final universality of the kingdom of redemption. He taught, moreover, that it is the unfeigned desire of God to save all men, though it is possible that human arbitrariness and obduracy may thwart this desire. So Rothe presents the predestinarian scheme of Schleiermacher without its strict determinism. (Dogmatik, II. 1, §§ 7, 8.) Contrary to the general teaching of Lutheranism, Rothe, Nitzsch, and Martensen give in their adherence to one of the concomitants of the Calvinian doctrine, holding that for the truly converted man there is no absolute falling from grace.

As respects the mode of divine grace, the monergistic theory asserted in the Formula of Concord and championed through the scholastic era may be said to be but a waning factor in the Lutheranism of the present. The Melancthonian type of doctrine comes to the front. "The spirit of Melancthon," says Kahnis, "which the Lutheran orthodoxy had put into bonds, but had not conquered, claimed its rights after the extinction of the Lutheran scholasticism. One may say that the Melancthonian standpoint is the ensign of the truth leading on the doctrinal development which has since found place in this dogma." (Dogmatik, II. § 7.) The position taken by Thomasius sides also with the synergism of Melancthon. As he teaches, only the first impact of grace lies beyond the power of man to avoid. This creates the possibility of repugnance to the old man, and strife against its impulses. On the basis of this possibility a man can ally himself with grace, and advance to repentance and faith; or, refus-

ing to make the alliance, he can extinguish the primary impress of grace. (Dogmatik, § 67^b.)

Reference has already been made to the Calvinistic leanings of the Evangelical School in the Established Church of England. This bent was quite conspicuous in Berridge and Romaine. But it is among the Presbyterians of Scotland and the United States that the peculiarities of Calvinism have been most elaborately defended and advocated in recent times. In saying this, the fact is not ignored that in both of these quarters there has been more or less of a recoil from these peculiarities. Still, representative men, like Cunningham and Hodge, champion them with a courage worthy of the heroic days of Calvinian dogmatism. Both teach, by clear implication, if not in words, that a part, at least, of the race never had any probation except in Adam, if indeed it had a real probation there. This follows, for example, as a necessary conclusion from the doctrine of reprobation which Cunningham ascribes to Calvinists, and which goes of course with his indorsement. He says: "What they hold upon this subject is this,—that God decreed, or purposed, to do from eternity what He actually does in time, in regard to those who perish as well as in regard to those who are saved, and this is, in substance, to withhold from them, or to abstain from communicating to them, those gracious and insuperable influences of His Spirit by which alone faith and regeneration can be produced,—to leave them in their natural state of sin, and then to inflict upon them the punishment which by their sin they have deserved." (Historical Theology, 1870, Vol. II. p. 428.) Evidently the withholding of that *by which alone faith and regeneration can be produced* throws them entirely out of the category of the possible. And what is a probation that is consummated without the possibility of avoiding one fixed result? Even to stocks and stones this much is accorded. The distinction which Hodge makes between common and efficacious grace im-

plies for the non-elect as little possibility of escaping damnation as does Cunningham's definition of reprobation. He says, that, while common grace is sufficient for some things, "it is not sufficient to raise the spiritually dead; to change the heart, and to produce regeneration; and it is not made to produce these effects by the co-operation of the human will." (Pt. III. chap. 14, § 4.) To be sure, the statement here is that common grace *is not* made to produce these effects by the co-operation of the human will,—in itself a less decisive statement than if it were said that common grace *cannot*. But the context shows that this *is not* is meant to be at the same time a *cannot*. For Hodge argues at length that the efficiency which accomplishes regeneration must be ascribed to nothing less than the almighty power of God working irresistibly. He defines efficacious grace as "the almighty power of God." He says, "Regeneration is not merely an act of God, but also an act of His almighty power." Now it is plain that what Hodge ascribes to almighty irresistible power he means to exclude from all possibility of being accomplished by the co-operation of the human will with something less. So we are left to the conclusion that the partakers in merely common grace, the non-elect, are debarred absolutely from the possibility of that regenerate nature the attainment of which is indispensable to eternal life. During their conscious existence they have never come within the bounds of such possibility.

It should be noticed that Hodge uses the term "regeneration" in its narrower sense, expressly distinguishing it from conversion. The former is a resurrection to spiritual life, in which God is sole agent, preparatory to the latter, in which man acts. As before indicated, Old School Presbyterianism combines with its predestinarianism and monergism the doctrine of a limited atonement. The New England Theology taught the doctrine of unconditional predestination no less distinctly than the older type of

Calvinism. But at the same time it relaxed its hold upon some of the customary adjuncts. In place of a limited atonement, it taught that Christ died for all men, interpreting the subject much as it had been by Amyraut and Richard Baxter. On the topic of regeneration it did not render a very uniform verdict, but manifested a tendency to define it in such a way as to find a place in it for the activity of the subject. This was accomplished by taking the term in its broader sense, in which it is equivalent to conversion. Extreme advocates of the exercise scheme, like Emmons, could understand by regeneration only the initiation of a new exercise, the beginning of a new series. Others, like Taylor, who laid some stress upon tendencies and dispositions behind the exercises, but still taught that exercises alone have a moral cast, made regeneration, so far as it is a *moral change*, a work in which the subject participates by a new choice, the change in the background of tendencies and dispositions not being regarded as coming under that category. Others still, like Woods, who recognized a moral character in the dispositions lying back of exercises, located the entire essence of regeneration in the transformation of those dispositions, which then become the source of holy exercises. It is, as they said, a change in the governing inclination, or propensity, or moral taste, or relish, or principle of action. Those who located the essence of regeneration in a new choice, and made man the author of his choices, could evidently speak without inconsistency of a man's regenerating himself. And this was done in very open terms by Professor Finney. "Regeneration," he says, "is synonymous, in the Bible, with a new heart. But sinners are required to make to themselves a new heart." (Lectures on Systematic Theol., 1878, p. 284.) At the same time, he found a place for divine agency, namely, in presenting motives to the will. "The Spirit takes of the things of Christ and shows them to the soul. . . . Regeneration is nothing else than the will being duly influenced

by the truth." As to the position of the New England school at large upon the agency of truth in this work, Daniel Fiske says that most would probably assent to the following statement: "In regenerating men, God in some respects acts directly and immediately on the soul, and in some respects He acts in connection with and by means of the truth. He does not regenerate them by the truth alone, and He does not regenerate them without the truth. His mediate and His immediate influences cannot be distinguished by consciousness, nor can their respective spheres be accurately determined by reason." (Bib. Sac., July, 1865.)

Methodism, true to the example of its founder, has always been a zealous herald of free grace and a general atonement. It teaches that the Gospel call, which is sent out to all men, reveals the inmost heart of God; that He sincerely desires the salvation of each and every man; that none are placed by Him under a decree either of unconditional preterition or of positive reprobation; that sufficient grace is given to every man to counteract the binding power of inherited depravity and to establish the possibility of salvation. It teaches, as respects the mode of grace, a species of synergism, — a synergism, however, in which the initiative is always assigned to God, and man's part is reduced to the rank of a subordinate though necessary factor. It maintains, that, where the result depends on copartnership, the least conceivable factor may condition the result; that, accordingly, to allow a man to condition his own salvation is equivalent neither to making him to achieve or to merit his own salvation. As well might it be said that the beggar merits the portion given to him, and it is no longer a free gift, because he is required to stretch out his hand as a condition of receiving. Regeneration it commonly understands in its broader meaning, distinguishing it from a preliminary awakening to spiritual concern, and regarding it as consummated only with the decisive turning of the heart to

God. It has little sympathy with the postulates of the exercise scheme. While it holds that God regenerates only the willing subject, only the soul that looks to Him with a measure of desire, it teaches that His agency reaches back of specific acts of will, and touches inner tendencies and dispositions. Pope says, "The Word of God is the instrument and power of regeneration." But this cannot be regarded as a representative declaration. Methodism at large, if we mistake not, would sooner subscribe to the guarded statement quoted above from Fiske.

In Methodist theology justification is regarded as, in the order of thought, antecedent to regeneration. In Calvinistic theology the reverse order is commonly adopted. Lutheranism also, at least in large part, has made regeneration antecedent to justification. After Gerhard, Lutheran theologians in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries commonly adopted the following *ordo salutis*: "*Illuminatio, Regeneratio, Conversio, Justificatio*," etc. (Dorner, *System of Christ. Doct.*, § 132 a.)

On the subject of justification in this period there is little need of any reference to Roman Catholic writers. The elaborate decisions and commentaries of the preceding period have left no room for further development. Authors like Möhler and Perrone afford no new material.

Among Protestants there is a very general agreement with the Reformation doctrine respecting the nature of justification. Whether it includes one or more elements, it is understood to be objective rather than subjective, something done for, rather than in, the individual. Calvinistic writers, for the most part, distinguish a plurality of elements. Justification, they say, is not simply pardon. Beyond this, as implying the imputation of Christ's righteousness, it gives a title to eternal life, to all the blessings which the divine administration connects with perfect righteousness. So, for example, Hodge, Edwards, Dwight, Helfenstein, and H. B. Smith. The same representation is

found also with Lutheran writers. (Hahn, *Lehrbuch des Christ. Glaubens*, § 111; Schmucker, *Elements of Popular Theology*, Chap. XI.) Emmons, however, refused to subscribe to this view. He criticised the practice, current, as he states, among Calvinistic divines, of dividing justification into two parts, namely, pardon and a title to eternal life, of which the former is based upon Christ's passive obedience, and the latter upon His active obedience. "Justification," he says, "in a gospel sense, signifies no more nor less than pardon or remission of sin." (*System. Theol.*, Sermon. LVI., LVII.) Very similar are the words of Wesley: "The plain Scriptural notion of justification is pardon, the forgiveness of sins." (Sermon. V.) The same definition is contained in the declaration of Watson, that the language of the New Testament indicates "that justification, the pardon and remission of sins, the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of righteousness, are terms and phrases of the same import." (*Theol. Inst.*, Pt. II. chap. 23.)

Of Methodist theology in general it may be said that it identifies justification with pardon and prefers to reckon adoption, with consequent heirship, among concomitants rather than among the elements of justification. The sense which it attaches to the imputation of Christ's righteousness is thus stated by Wesley: "The meaning is, God justifies the believer for the sake of Christ's righteousness, and not for any righteousness of his own." (Sermon. XX.) In the same connection he explains in what sense he accepts the maxim that faith is imputed for righteousness. "Faith is imputed for righteousness to every believer; namely, faith in the righteousness of Christ; but this is exactly the same thing which has been said before; for by that expression I mean neither more nor less than that we are justified by faith, not by works; or that every believer is forgiven and accepted merely for the sake of what Christ has done and suffered." In other words, the imputation of faith for righteousness denotes, not that God accepts faith as the mer-

itorious ground of justification, but only as the condition which He has fittingly and graciously established. (Compare Watson, Pt. II. chap. 23.) All the parties referred to in this paragraph cordially agree in the maxim, Justification is by faith alone, but the faith which justifies is not alone. It cannot remain isolated, being in its very nature fruitful of holy emotions and good works. Among zealous advocates of imputation none in recent times have gone farther than the so-called Plymouth Brethren. Some of their representative statements push the idea of a borrowed righteousness to the very borders of a theoretical antinomianism.

The period has witnessed a number of exceptions to the common Protestant doctrine of justification. Among those who have departed farthest both from its spirit and its letter are the English Ritualists. These find their oracle on this subject at Rome rather than at Wittenberg, in the doctors of Trent rather than in Paul. Pusey, speaking for the party, says: "There is not one statement in the elaborate chapter on justification in the council of Trent which any of us could fail of receiving." (Eirenicon.)

A number of German writers have been disposed to give to justification a subjective aspect. Here belongs Schleiermacher. He understood by justification, says Baur, not merely the divine activity as expressed in an absolving declaration, but the entire divine activity which establishes the new life in man. (Dogmengeschichte.) Marheinecke taught that pardon presupposes incorporation into Christ, and approved the theory of Osiander that justification is through the inhabitation of Christ. (Dogmatik, pp. 475-486.) Ebrard predicated a subjective side of justification which he likewise connected with the indwelling of Christ. "Justification," he says, "as the act of the Father, is a forensic judicial act; as the act of Christ, it is identical with regeneration, i. e. with the real implantation of Christ in us and of us in Christ." (Quoted by Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 17, § 11.)

F. D. Maurice makes Christ in such a sense the head of all men that His justification was at the same time theirs. Now Christ was justified, declared to be the righteous and well-beloved Son, when God raised Him from the dead. It follows, then, that in the resurrection of Christ all men have their justification, and it is only needed that they should become conscious thereof. "St. Paul," says Maurice, "takes it for granted, that this justification of the Son of God and the Son of Man was his own justification, — his own, not because he was Saul of Tarsus, not because he was a Hebrew of the Hebrews, but because he was a man. . . . If He had justified His Son by raising Him from the dead, — if, in that act, He had justified the race for which Christ had died, — then it was lawful to tell men that they were justified before God, that they were sons of God in the only-begotten Son." (Theological Essays, IX.)

According to Horace Bushnell, to be justified is to be made righteous by entering into effective relations with God. Justification expresses the state of one who is in actual fellowship with the Father of spirits. As one by a momentary act may step into this transforming communion, so justification may be consummated at once. In this it is distinguished from sanctification. "The consciousness," he says, "of the subject in justification is raised in its order, filled with the confidence of right, set free from the bondage of all fears and scruples of legality; but there is a vast realm back of the consciousness, or below it, which remains to be changed or sanctified, and never will be except as a new habit is generated by time, and the better consciousness, descending into the secret roots below, gets a healing into them more and more perfect. In this manner one who is justified at once can be sanctified only in time; and one who is completely justified is only incipiently sanctified." (Forgiveness and Law.) The theory of Mulford, no less than that of Bushnell, includes the actual impartation of righteousness. Justifica-

tion by faith means, he says, righteousness through faith. "It is an actual implanting of righteousness through relation with Him who has taken our nature, and in whom was the fulfilment of righteousness. Faith in a righteous person, in the Christ who is the source of the life of the family and the nation, leads the individual away from himself, and in being for another he finds his real life, and enters into and partakes of a righteousness that is not a mere self-righteousness." (The Republic of God.)

In the scheme of the less thoughtful rationalism, justification denotes divine approbation won by good deeds, by works of righteousness, honesty, and charity. Respecting the futility of this method, few have spoken more incisive words than the following from a Unitarian writer: "Moral works are as valueless as ecclesiastical, when undertaken upon speculation, as means and conditions of salvation. Temperance, chastity, charity, are saving graces when they exist as genuine fruits of the Spirit; they lose that saving quality when adopted as expedients and means to an end. . . . The Mohammedans have a fable, that the soul before it can enter paradise must cross a bridge, narrow as the edge of a sword, over a gulf of fire; and that no one can be saved who does not endure this test. A good illustration this of the doctrine of salvation by works. To attempt to win heaven by this method is like the attempt to cross a gulf of fire on the edge of a sword." (F. H. Hedge, *Reason in Religion*, Bk. II. Essay VI.)

The implication which seems to be involved in some of the early Protestant definitions of justifying faith, that assurance is of its essence, has very commonly been disowned in the present period. The doctrine even of the more positive advocates of assurance is, that it is the normal rather than the necessary concomitant of genuine piety. In some circles it is presented as a high and desirable privilege, to which Christians should aspire; in others it is wellnigh taken for granted that no one living a vital Chris-

tian life will be without it, unless perchance it be in brief seasons of special temptation. The latter position has been quite generally characteristic of Methodism. Wesley laid great stress upon the doctrine of assurance. As to its mode, he affirmed a double witness, the direct witness of the Holy Spirit, and the witness of one's own spirit. Of the former he says that it might be defined in these terms: "The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression on the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given Himself for me; and that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, am reconciled to God." (Serm. X.) He argues that such an assurance, direct from God, is necessary to the development of religious life, inasmuch as it alone can make us truly conscious of God's love to us, and this consciousness must be antecedent to holy emotions. The witness of our own spirits he makes identical with a good conscience, the inward verdict that we possess the fruits of the Spirit. This second witness, as he intimates, might also be regarded as a witness of the Spirit, that is, a mediate as distinguished from an immediate. Watson occupies ground identical with that of Wesley. How far exception has been taken to these distinctions is not easily determined. Watson speaks of the Evangelical School in the English Church as in large part committed to the view that the witness of the Spirit is mediate alone. Thomas Scott is quoted as saying, "The Holy Spirit, by producing in believers the tempers and affections of children, as described in the Scriptures, most manifestly attests their adoption into God's family." With many writers of Calvinistic affinities, this is made the emphatic, if not the exclusive, point of view. Bellamy declares that the mediate witness of the Spirit is the only witness. He says: "Since grace is, in its own nature, perceptible, and specifically different from all counterfeits, there is no need of the immediate witness of the Spirit, in order to a

full assurance. If the Spirit of God does but give us a good degree of grace, and enlighten our minds to understand the Scriptures, and so to know the nature of true grace, we may then perceive that we have grace; and the more grace we have, the more perceptible will it be, and its difference from all counterfeits will be the more plain. And if a believer may know and be certain that he has grace without the immediate witness of the Spirit, then such a witness is altogether needless, and would be of no advantage; and therefore there is no such thing as the immediate witness of the Spirit in this affair." (True Religion Delineated, Discourse I. sect. 5.)

The Roman Catholic position on the subject of assurance, having become fixed long since, does not need to be defined in this connection.

As in the previous period, Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians have been in general averse to all theories of perfectionism. Among Methodists, Christian perfection has always had the place of an acknowledged doctrine, though claiming very different degrees of practical interest and advocacy from different representatives. In the present, while it is advocated by not a few after the manner of John Wesley, many in effect set it forth as rather a possible ideal to be progressively approached, than as the goal lying immediately before every well-instructed Christian, the prize of a present faith and consecration.

Christian perfection in the Wesleyan sense implies freedom from inbred sin, the complete dominance of love over the voluntary exercises, and such a service of God as is competent to powers which indeed have been given a right direction, but which fail of that ideal measure which they would have had if man had not sinned. It is not, therefore, Adamic or angelic perfection. It does not imply objective faultlessness, since it does not secure from mistakes in judgment and consequent mistakes in action. It carries with itself immunity neither from temptation nor from

apostasy. It is simply loving God with all the heart, freedom in underlying appetencies and in conscious activities from anything contrary to love.

The Oberlin theology, quite as distinctly as the Wesleyan, declares for the attainability of Christian perfection, or entire sanctification, in this life. But the difference in the general standpoint of the two involves quite a material difference in conception. The Oberlin scheme confines moral character to choice. It denies the Wesleyan and the common theory of an inbred sin still abiding in the regenerate. The choice of a man, as it represents, is either entirely sinful or entirely holy. Regeneration, as being a change of choice, is a change from the wholly sinful to the entirely holy. "It implies," says Dr. Finney, "an entire present change of moral character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness." All that can be added to regeneration, therefore, is fixity in the holy choice. Accordingly Dr. Finney gives this definition: "Entire sanctification, as I understand the term, is identical with entire and continued obedience to the law of God." Such obedience, he urges very emphatically, is attainable in this life. (Lectures on Systematic Theology.) In the Oberlin, as in the Wesleyan scheme, the standard is taken from the possibilities of a recovered being, and not from those of the unfallen.

CHAPTER V.

THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS.

SECTION I. — THE CHURCH.

THE more liberal of the views respecting the Church which had a place among Protestants in the preceding period have advanced to a general ascendancy. Religious tolerance has become an accepted maxim. The possibility of salvation outside of the visible Church is in general unquestioned. The form of government is largely regarded as a matter of option, or at any rate as lying outside the essence of Christianity. The claim indeed of special divine right for certain forms of church government cannot be said to be obsolete. Even in recent times a voice has occasionally been raised in behalf of the theory that the New Testament authoritatively prescribes the Congregational polity, or the Presbyterian polity. However, in the main, neither Congregationalists nor Presbyterians lay much stress upon this point of view, and they are far from making it an adequate ground for challenging the proper Christian character of communions differently constituted. This procedure is left, for the most part, to the High Church party among Episcopalians. Advanced Ritualists in recent times have been very pronounced in the view that those outside the lines of apostolic succession, outside the Roman, the Greek, and the Anglican communions, must be consigned to the uncovenanted mercies of God, as being wholly destitute of Church offices. On the other hand, the Broad Church, as represented by Whately, Stanley, and

others, repudiates apostolical succession as an essential of a Christian church.

As respects the relation of Church and State, the theory which favors their mutual independence has no doubt made somewhat of an advance in Protestant countries which still have a national establishment. The American model may be credited with a measure of influence. The teaching of Thomas Arnold and Rothe, that the best order of things involves the complete identity of Church and State, is quite outside the current of practical concern, it being recognized that we have no reason to look for conditions in which such identity would not be a calamity to both civil and ecclesiastical interests.

In the Roman Catholic Church the period has witnessed the signal event of the final overthrow of Gallicanism, and the formal establishment of the Ultramontane theory. By the decisions of the Vatican Council of 1869-70 the Pope is raised to the character of an absolute and infallible monarch, without peer, rival, or associate in authority, to whom the council stands only in an advisory relation, having no power to amend his decrees, or even to convene for advisory purposes except as summoned by his mandate. A more explicit assertion of unqualified sovereignty than the following could not well be imagined: "If any shall say that the Roman pontiff has the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread throughout the world, or assert that he possesses merely the principal part, and not all the fulness of this supreme power, . . . let him be anathema."

The Vatican decree of papal infallibility is as follows: "Faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the

salvation of Christian people, the sacred council approving, we teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman pontiff, when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of pastor and doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church."

The statement that infallibility covers matters of faith and morals, gives it a wellnigh universal breadth. If the Pope is pleased to regard any matter of science or history as vitally related to faith or morals, then it falls at once within the scope of his infallibility. Instead of resorting to the tedious processes of reasoning, examination, and investigation, we have only to listen to the oracular voice which comes from the chair of Peter. So obvious is this inference that it was openly proclaimed by a distinguished prelate shortly after the Vatican council had issued its decrees. Cardinal Manning maintained that infallibility extends to all that is opposed to revelation, to all that is scandalous or offensive to pious ears, to all matters which bear upon the proper custody of Catholic belief. "It extends," he said, "to certain truths of natural science, as, for example, the existence of substance; and to truths of the natural reason, such as that the soul is immaterial; that it is 'the form of the body'; and the like. It extends also to certain truths of the supernatural order, which are not revealed; as the authenticity of certain texts or versions of the Holy Scripture. There are truths of mere human history, which therefore are not revealed, without which the deposit of the faith cannot be taught or guarded in its integrity. For in-

stance, that St. Peter was Bishop of Rome; that the council of Trent and the council of the Vatican are ecumenical, that is, legitimately celebrated and confirmed; that Pius IX. is the successor of Peter by legitimate election. . . . That there is an ultimate judge in such matters of history as affect the truths of revelation is a dogma of faith." Speaking of the historical objection to papal infallibility, as based in particular upon the case of Honorius, he said: "The true and conclusive answer to this objection consists, not in detailed refutation of alleged difficulties, but in a principle of faith; namely, that whensoever any doctrine is contained in the divine tradition of the Church, all difficulties from human history are excluded, as Tertullian lays down, by prescription." (The Vatican Council and its Definitions, 1871.) Truly this rivals the short-cut of the sprightly Frenchman, who, when told that the facts were against his theory, replied, So much the worse then for the facts. The only trouble is, that there are other sources of conviction than the arbitrary declarations of authority.

In arguing for the papal autocracy and infallibility, Romish apologists are wont to proceed as though convenience were the standard of truth. No argument figures more extensively than the argument from need. An infallible tribunal is needed, it is said, and therefore there is an infallible tribunal. This capital principle of Romish apologetics is thus succinctly formulated by J. H. Newman: "The absolute need of spiritual supremacy is at present the strongest of arguments in favor of the fact of its supply." (Essay on Development.)

It is noteworthy that, while Perrone calls the churches which have separated from the Roman communion synagogues of Satan, he still provides for the possible salvation of some within their limits by the statement that those bound by invincible ignorance, including all infants duly baptized, belong in soul or spirit to the Catholic fold. (Prælect. Theol., Adv. Heterodoxos.) As Perrone is in

no wise disposed to sin by excess of liberality, it may be concluded that the concession which he makes is very commonly admitted by Romanism in the present.

SECTION II. — THE SACRAMENTS.

1. GENERAL THEORY OF THE SACRAMENTS. — While the rationalistic factor in the Lutheran Church tended toward the Zwinglian conception of the sacraments, conservative Lutheranism has continued to hold substantially the theory indorsed by the leading theologians of the preceding period. Tractarianism laid the Lutheran stress upon the sacraments. It did not, however, place the Lutheran stress upon the preached word. On the contrary, it denounced, at least by the mouth of its more extreme representatives, the disposition of Protestantism to substitute a preaching ministry for a sacrificing priesthood. It represents, therefore, a sacramentarianism more closely allied with the Roman than with the Lutheran. Some representatives of the German Reformed Church, as Ebrard in Germany and Nevin in the United States, have taught a very mystical view of the sacraments, and emphasized their importance as means of imparting the theanthropic life of the Redeemer. In most other quarters of Protestantism the Reformed theory current in the latter part of the preceding period, which regards the sacraments as signs and seals of divine grace, and the occasions of special blessings rather than the instruments of their positive conveyance, is the dominant theory.

Romanism is without new developments upon the general subject of the sacraments. We notice simply that eminent writers confirm the interpretation given to the doctrine of intention in the preceding period. Thus Klee says, that in the intention to do what the Church does there is necessarily included, "not merely the act of the

Church according to its external features, but also the purpose of the Church in this act, — if not the ultimate, at any rate the proximate purpose, — for example, through baptism to make one a member of the Christian fellowship.” (Dogmatik, Vol. III. p. 122.) Perrone gives the following definition: “Intentionis nomine hic venit illa animi deliberatio, qua quis intendit facere rem sacram, quam Christus instituit, aut quæ in Ecclesia fieri consuerit.” (Prælect. Theol., Tract. de Sacramentis in Genere.)

2. BAPTISM. — While laying different degrees of stress upon baptism, Protestants assert at most only a relative necessity for its administration. It is their common verdict, that infant children are not lost in consequence of being deprived of the rite. Isaac Watts’s suggestion, that the children of the wicked are annihilated, was based on other considerations than the indispensable need of baptism. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, deny the salvation of unbaptized infants. Klee, to be sure, thinks that infants who die without baptism may be included in the class who are saved in virtue of a desire for baptism. (Dogmatik, Vol. III. p. 150.) But this is exceptional charity. Dieringer reckons it among manifest errors. He says respecting the opinions of Roman Catholic writers: “Even the theologians who advocate the more rigorous view commonly exempt the same [the unbaptized infants] from positive punishment (*pœna sensus*), while the milder gladly refer to the hidden ways of God, and the many mansions of the Father’s house, wherein, however, they manifestly err when under the mansion prepared for them they understand a place or condition of supernatural blessedness.” (Dogmatik, § 104.) Perrone lays down the following proposition: “Infants departing from this life without baptism do not attain to eternal salvation.” This proposition, he says, is *de fide*, — a part of the established faith. (Prælect. Theol., De Hom.)

The stress which Pietism placed upon adult conversion

naturally tended to disparage the regenerating efficacy of baptism as applied to infants. Rationalism acknowledged no positive transformation through baptism, and saw in it but a ceremony of initiation, and a symbol of spiritual good. Recent Lutheran writers customarily speak of baptism as a rite of regeneration. While some attach to this term the full sense ascribed to it by the theologians of the seventeenth century, others insert important limitations, at least in connection with infant subjects. Thus Martensen says that baptism lays the foundation of regeneration, as Christ laid the foundation of the Church ; but as the Church, virtually instituted before, was actually instituted by the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost, so regeneration, posited in baptism as a germinant possibility, comes to actuality through the impartation of the Spirit. "We can say, therefore, that the baptized is not actually regenerated before he attains his Pentecost,—before the Spirit establishes the new consciousness in him, glorifies the baptismal grace in him." (Dogmatik, § 254.) To similar effect Kahnis says : "What baptism imparts is not regeneration itself, but the power of regeneration (*die Kraft der Wiedergeburt*). The working of this power is conditioned by the soil upon which baptism falls." (Dogmatik, III. § 14.) Marheinecke locates in baptism, as applied to children, rather the pledge of regeneration than its actual realization, which implies self-consciousness and personal activity. (Dogmatik, p. 529.) "With Nitzsch baptism appears in the sense of Calvin, as pledge and seal of entrance into the new life from Christ." (Kahnis.) The review indicates an unfinished attempt at construction. Dorner says : "A clear and definite form of doctrine is still to be framed, at least in respect to infant baptism." (System of Christ. Doct., § 139.) The case of adults, whose regeneration is understood to be conditioned on a faith and repentance, which may or may not be exercised, involves less difficulty for Lutheran writers.

The position of Episcopalians on the subject of baptismal regeneration is well defined by Bishop Burgess. "The Episcopal Church," he says, "thanks God that 'He has been pleased to regenerate this infant with His Holy Spirit, to receive him as His own child by adoption, and to incorporate him into His holy Church.'" As to the import of this language, he says: "By one class it is interpreted as the language of anticipation, of hypothesis, and of charity. In anticipation of the repentance and faith which in adult candidates for baptism are presupposed, and on the hypothesis that the child is indeed represented by the sponsors according to his future character and purposes, and in the charitable trust that he will be all which is promised in his behalf, he is pronounced already regenerate. As the promises, it is said, are necessarily hypothetical, so is the corresponding grace. To a second class this view of the transaction seems too dramatic and unreal, and they say, without hesitation, that every child received into the Church of Christ through this ordinance is made partaker of some measure of divine grace, which is not only pledged but given, and that this may justly and scripturally be termed regenerating grace, though not to the necessary exclusion of every other use of that term, and certainly not as if spiritual regeneration were a change not only begun, but consummated then and there. This is probably, with some shades of variation, the prevailing sentiment. But a third class, the least numerous of the three, ascribe to the sacrament, as the ordinance of Christ, and through His grace, the conveyance of regenerating grace in its fullest extent, and without qualification; so that the baptized child is indeed a new creature." (Bib. Sacra, October, 1863. Compare Mozley, Review of the Baptismal Controversy.)

Wesley admitted in general terms the regeneration of infants in baptism. The teaching of Watson may be described as allied with the second of the views specified by

Bishop Burgess. Methodism in general, however, makes account of infant baptism rather as a means of future benefits than as the instrument of the immediate communication of positive grace. The same is true of a large proportion of Protestants not associated with Lutheranism or Anglicanism. It should be noticed, however, that some of these are free to confess the possibility, or even the probability, that some infants are regenerated at the time of baptism. (Hodge, Pt. III. chap. 20, § 12.) Among the same parties an adult candidate is generally supposed to be already a regenerate person.

On the Baptist theory, baptism is rather the act in which the regenerate disciple confesses Christ, than an instrument used of God for his regeneration.

3. THE EUCHARIST. — The Lutheran view of the real bodily presence has held its place, in the face, however, of quite a large number of exceptions. Storr, Flatt, Reinhard, Knapp, Zachariä, Marheinecke, and others, as Schmucker represents, substituted for it the Calvinistic theory of a virtual presence. Schmucker himself advocates simply a spiritual presence of the Redeemer as the source of special blessings to worthy communicants, and he says that the same view is largely current among American Lutherans. Krauth, on the other hand, champions the old Lutheran theory of the presence of Christ's glorified humanity, and the recent revival of confessional Lutheranism involves of course a corresponding reinstatement of the same.

The English Ritualists are zealous advocates of a real presence. Some have termed their doctrine that of the "real objective presence," and have included under this phrase a view having affinity on one side with the Lutheran, and on the other with the Roman Catholic dogma. Speaking of Pusey and Keble, George Trevor says: "These divines distinctly advocate the coexistence theory invented by Martin Luther. . . . They interpret the body and blood of the eucharist of the glorified humanity, and so of the

whole person of Christ. They call this the 'inward part,' and the bread and wine the outward part, of the sacrament, holding the two to be inseparably united by consecration, each however retaining its proper substance and nature. This is pure Lutheranism, the difference being that Luther limited the presence to the act of communion, and held it to be absolutely inconsistent with sacrifice. The Objectivists, on the other hand, insisting on consecration and oblation, more than communion, refine away the material element into a 'vessel,' a 'garment or veil,' leaving little difference from the Romish 'accidents,' and resulting in a sacrifice almost exactly the same as the mass." (The Catholic Doctrine of the Sacrifice and Participation of the Holy Eucharist, 1876, p. 223.)

In the mystical theory of Ebrard and Nevin the eucharist is viewed chiefly as a medium for the communication by Christ of His divine-human life. E. V. Gerhart thus distinguishes between the theory of Nevin and of Calvin: "While Calvin emphasizes the *absence* of the humanity of Christ from the earth, the *elevation* of the soul to Him by the power of the Holy Ghost, and a real participation of His flesh, by which the believer is mysteriously nourished to eternal life, Dr. Nevin emphasizes the presence of the humanity of Christ in His Church on earth, — that is, of the vivific virtue of the human, hypostatically one with the divine nature, — the *self-communication* of His life in the sacramental transaction, and the participation of the believer in the *entire humanity* of Christ, the soul no less than the flesh and the blood." (Bib. Sac., January, 1863.)

In other quarters of Protestantism what was defined in the preceding period as the modified Calvinian theory is largely current, but yields to some extent to the Zwinglian conception.

The Roman Catholic theory upon this sacrament, having been so minutely defined in the preceding period, has remained unchanged. The same may be said of the remain-

ing sacraments in the Roman list. We notice simply in connection with penance, that Perrone teaches that God has not obligated Himself to accept indulgences for the dead, and that they have therefore only a conditional efficacy as applied to this class. (Prælect. Theol., Tract. de Indulg. Compare Klee, Dogmatik, III. 317.)

CHAPTER VI.

ESCHATOLOGY.

1. MILLENARIANISM.—The millenarian theory, or, to speak more exactly, the theory of the pre-millennial advent, has claimed the assent of more writers of learning and repute in the present than in any preceding period since the ante-Nicene age. It found representatives in the school of Bengel. More recently, it has been favored by Hofmann, Karsten, Delitzsch, Auberlen, Rothe, and Van Oosterzee. It was advocated by John Gill, and has been espoused by such recent writers of Great Britain as Bickersteth, Bonar, Frere, E. B. Elliott, and Cumming. In this country it has been taught by Seiss, Duffield, and D. T. Taylor, and has also many other patrons in various communions, as may be judged from the record of the "Prophetical Conference" of 1868. Still, the weight of theological opinion is against it.

As a specimen of the pre-millennial scheme we quote the following list of specifications from Joseph A. Seiss: "(1.) That Christ Jesus, our adorable Redeemer, is to return to this world in great power and glory, as really and literally as he ascended up from it. (2.) That this advent of the Messiah will occur before the general conversion of the world, while the man of sin still continues his abominations, while the earth is yet full of tyranny, war, infidelity, and blasphemy, and consequently before what is called the millennium. (3.) That this coming of the Lord Jesus will not be to depopulate and annihilate the earth, but to judge, subdue, renew, and bless it. (4.) That in the period of

this coming He will raise the holy from among the dead, transform the living that are waiting for Him, judge them according to their works, receive them up to Himself in the clouds, and establish them in a glorious heavenly kingdom. (5.) That Christ will then also break down and destroy all present systems of government in Church and State, burn up the great centres and powers of wickedness and usurpation, shake the whole earth with terrific visitations for its sins, and subdue it to His own personal and eternal rule. (6.) That during these great and destructive commotions the Jewish race shall be marvellously restored to the land of their fathers, brought to embrace Jesus as their Messiah and King, delivered from their enemies, placed at the head of the nations, and made the agents of unspeakable blessings to the world. (7.) That Christ will then re-establish the throne of His father David, exalt it in heavenly glory, make Mount Zion the seat of His divine empire, and, with the glorified saints associated with Him in His dominion, reign over the house of Jacob and over the world in a visible, sublime, and heavenly Christocracy for the period of 'the thousand years.' (8.) That during this millennial reign, in which mankind are brought under a new dispensation, Satan is to be bound and the world enjoy its long-expected sabbatic rest. (9.) That at the end of this millennial sabbath the last rebellion shall be quashed, the wicked dead, who shall all continue in Hades until that time, shall be raised and judged, and Satan, Death, Hades, and all antagonism to good, delivered over to eternal destruction. (10.) That, under these wonderful administrations, the earth is to be entirely recovered from the effects of the fall, the excellence of God's righteous providence vindicated, the whole curse repealed, death swallowed up, and all the inhabitants of the world thenceforward forever restored to more than the full happiness, purity, and glory which Adam forfeited in Eden." (The Last Times, 7th ed., 1878.)

As to the details of the millennial kingdom, much diversity appears among modern millenarians. "According to one view," says Hodge, "Christ and his risen and glorified saints are to dwell visibly on the earth and reign for a thousand years; according to another, the risen saints are to be in heaven, and not on earth any more than the angels now are; nevertheless, the subjects of the first resurrection, although dwelling in heaven, are to govern the earth; according to another, it is the converted Jewish nation, restored to their own land, who are to be the governors of the world; according to another, the Bible divides men into three classes: the Gentiles, the Jews, and the Church of God. The prophecies relating to the millennium are understood to refer to the relative condition of the Jews and Gentiles in this world, and not to the risen and glorified believers. Another view seems to be, that this earth, changed no more by the fires of the last day than it was by the waters of the deluge, is to be the only heaven of the redeemed. Dr. Cumming and Dr. Seiss say they wish no better heaven than this earth free from the curse and from sin. Still another view is that there are two heavens, one here and one above; two Jerusalems, both to continue forever, the one on earth and the other in heaven; the one made with hands, the other without hands; both glorious and blessed, but the earthly far inferior to the heavenly; they are like concentric circles, one within the other; both endless. Men will continue forever, on earth, living and dying; happy but not perfect, needing regeneration and sanctification; and, when they die, will be translated to the kingdom which is above." (Pt. IV. chap. 4, § 5.) Hodge adds the comment: "It seems, therefore, that the torch of the literalist is an 'ignis fatuus,' leading those who follow it, they know not whither."

2. CONDITION BETWEEN DEATH AND THE RESURRECTION. — A tendency has been manifest in some quarters to give a more emphatic recognition to an intermediate state than

was given by the Reformation theology. Kahnis, Dorner, and Martensen represent this tendency when they teach that it is not to be imagined that death can remove at a stroke faults that are rooted in the nature, and that accordingly even those who die in the faith will be in need of more or less purification. The first of these writers considers that the Church does well not to prohibit those, whose hearts are so prompted, to offer simple prayers of good will for departed friends. (Dogmatik, III. § 16. Compare Newman Smythe, *The Orthodoxy of To-Day.*) This, it is needless to say, implies no disposition to approve the positive teaching of Rome upon the intermediate state.

The doctrine that the intermediate state is a state of slumber has found in recent times but scattered adherents. Archbishop Whately considered that the phraseology of Scripture favors the doctrine. (*A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State.*) Some representatives of the sect of Adventists have advocated the intermediate sleep of the dead, or, in connection with a materialistic conception of human nature, what might be called a temporary annihilation.

Several writers who believe in a general resurrection at the end of the world have felt authorized to assert that in the intermediate state the soul is not without a species of body. So Nitzsch, Martensen, Delitzsch, and Lange.

3. THE RESURRECTION. — The period has witnessed, on the whole, a wide drift from the more literal interpretation of the resurrection. The successive phases through which the teaching on this subject has passed in Germany are thus outlined by Kahnis: "The transition theologians of the eighteenth century united in the view, that between the resurrection body and that lying in the grave there is a greater difference than the orthodox proposition of the identity of the two allows. The body which we bury is only the substratum of the resurrection body. Rationalism

found, in the resurrection of the body, only a popular and figurative expression for the immortality of the soul. Meanwhile, theologians and philosophers who occupied the more positive attitude toward Christianity attained to the conviction, that without a corporeal ground the continued life of the soul is unthinkable, and so a support was rendered to the resurrection of the body. The believing and churchly theologians of the present teach a resurrection of the body, but in the freer manner of the transition era, for which scientific help is provided through a deeper understanding of the relation between body and soul." (Dogmatik, III. § 16.)

The rationalistic theory, as characterized in the preceding paragraph, is simply a denial of a bodily resurrection. It has still an occasional representative. The strict literal theory, which asserts that the entire substance, or at any rate most of the substance, of the body which goes into the grave enters into the resurrection body, has also an occasional representative. Aside from these two extremes there are three or four views of the resurrection which are especially noteworthy.

What is called the germ theory has some advocates. Van Oosterzee gives it favorable notice in these terms: "We may perhaps suppose that an invisible and indestructible germ of the future body dwells already in the present, and that precisely therein is placed the guaranty of the identity of the two,—an identity even amidst the greatest possible difference." (Dogmatics, Sect. CXLIIL.)

Another theory asserts a certain material identity between the resurrection body and that of the present life, on the ground that an elementary substance from the latter enters into the composition of the former. Delitzsch, in his repudiation alike of a full material identity and a merely formal one, seems to espouse this theory. He says: "The true identity lies in the mean, between the former grossly material, and the latter merely formal identity.

Within the world once created, no single atom is ever annihilated. The elementary materials whereof the now corrupted body was composed are therefore still in existence; and the Omniscient knows where they are, and the Omnipotent can collect them together again. But in the meanwhile, together with the world of nature in which they are laid up, they have undergone the process of fire, out of which heaven and earth issue in brighter glorification. From this glorified world, He who at first formed the body of man of the earth of Eden brings together again the elementary materials of our bodies." (Bib. Psych., VII. sect. 1.) Essentially the same theory has had considerable currency in recent times, though perhaps without the reference to purification by fire.

A third theory makes no account whatever of material identity, and regards the resurrection body as identical with the present only as having the same organizing principle. This organizing principle in the era of the resurrection appropriates or is joined with material suited to the demands of a spiritual body. As some represent, this material is taken from the purified earth. Many of the recent theologians of Germany have favored this theory. So Julius Müller, Lange, Nitzsch, Kahnis, Martensen, and Dorner. As early an American writer as Dr. Dwight approved of the same theory (Serm. CLXV.), and in the last few decades it has rapidly won adherents. Hodge, Pond, and H. B. Smith have declared it at least an admissible theory. J. J. S. Perowne and Bishop R. S. Foster have given it their support. Among Protestant scholars at large, it commands probably at present as wide assent as any other theory.

The fourth theory is the Swedenborgian, the theory that the spiritual body is already in existence. As the gross body is laid in the grave, the soul clothed in its spiritual body awakes to life in another sphere. The resurrection accordingly of each individual is at death, is consummated

at least before the expiration of the third day. Essentially the same view has found here and there an advocate outside of the Swedenborgian communion, such as Joseph Priestley, George Bush, and several German writers.

4. FINAL AWARDS. — Through the major part of the eighteenth century the doctrine that death closes probation was thoroughly dominant. But at the end of the century exceptions began to multiply. In the present, they make probably a greater relative aggregate than in any preceding era in Christian history. A considerable number of writers of high reputation, who discard the theory of universal restoration, hold that for certain classes probation extends beyond death. As they maintain, all those who have not had a fair opportunity to decide definitely for or against accepting salvation through Christ, will have these alternatives presented to them in the life to come. So Dorner, Martensen, and Kahnis. Advocacy of the same view is one of the distinctive features of the recent movement among Congregationalists.

The theory of universal restoration, as opposed to the endless punishment of the wicked, has claimed some advocates outside of communions making it a specialty. Schleiermacher held that it made trouble for the Christian consciousness to exclude any from the possibility of blessedness, and quite in harmony with his determinism considered it probable that all will ultimately be restored. Schweizer seems to have been of the opinion that Schleiermacher, in his restorationism, took the proper course to escape the dualism contained in the Reformed theology. (*Die Glaubenslehre der Evangelisch-Reformirten Kirche.*) Olshausen favored restorationism. At the same time, he allowed that it is not so explicitly taught in the Scriptures but that the propriety of making it a subject of public instruction may seriously be questioned. Somewhat of a bias to restorationism has appeared in the liberal wing of the English Church. F. D. Maurice and F. W. Farrar have

indicated a belief, that, while it may be unwarranted positively to assert the recovery of all men, we are not forbidden to hope for such a consummation. In place of endless punishment, a considerable number incline to the theory of Rothe and Edward White, and teach that the incorrigible ultimately undergo annihilation. Meanwhile, a large proportion of theologians hold that there are souls fixed in sinfulness, which will live forever and be forever unblessed. Their position is well represented by the following sentences from Van Oosterzee: "The conception of an everlasting gulf is difficult; but that of an absolutely universal salvation, which causes the history of the kingdom of God to end in a sort of natural process, is in itself not less dangerous, at least for him who believes in the mystery of freedom conferred by the Creator upon the creature. . . . We distrust every mode of regarding the doctrine of salvation which in its foundation and tendency fails to do justice to the seriousness of the conception of an everlasting *Too Late*, and of the holiness of grace which cannot indeed be exhausted, but can just as little be mocked." (Dogmatics, Sect. CXLIX.)

While the theory thrown out by Lessing, and embraced by some of the rationalists, that endless punishment is only a relative lack of blessedness resulting from an inferior development, is generally rejected, not a few regard future retribution as rather the self-inflicted curse of an abused nature, than a positive infliction from the hand of God. In Protestant circles the doctrine of punishment by literal fire may now be said to be obsolete, though in the former part of the period writers as eminent as John Wesley and Jonathan Edwards seem to have given it their approval. Much currency is also given to the idea that endless punishment is not so much a visitation for certain transgressions of the past, as the endless accompaniment of a sinful soul fixed in its sinfulness by its own guilty determination.

Among the Universalists, or the professional advocates of restorationism, the doctrine of future awards has passed through several phases. John Murray, who came to America from England in 1770, denied, not future punishment, but its endless duration. Hosea Ballou, who represents largely the middle era of Universalism in this country, denied all future punishment, and taught that conscious existence in the other world is from the first a blessed existence for every human being. Recent Universalists have generally returned to the earlier standpoint, and admit future punishment, only denying that it is endless. A representative of considerable eminence, however, has recently had the courage to espouse the absurd theory of Ballou.

Modern Unitarians are very largely inclined to restorationism, regarding future punishment as amendatory in its design, and future probation, with its far-reaching opportunities, as likely to ultimate, on the part of all, in the choice of goodness. Thus James Freeman Clarke defines eternal punishment as that which comes to a man from his spiritual nature, in contradistinction from temporal punishment, which comes from his temporal nature and the temporal world, and holds that there is no need to regard it as endless. "To us," he says, "it seems clear, if the parable of the prodigal son is to be taken as the feeling of God towards every sinner, that every sinner must at last be brought back by the mighty power of this redeeming love. The power of the human will to resist God is indeed indefinite; but the power of love is infinite. Sooner or later, then, in the economy of the ages, all sinners must come back, in penitence and shame, to their Father's house." (Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors, Chap. XIV.) On the other hand, F. H. Hedge sees insuperable difficulties in the theory of universal restoration. "The question," he says, "is one of the antinomies of theology, — a question of which affirmative and negative are equally debatable and equally doubtful. It is a question on which sentiment and reason

are divided. Our heart is with Universalists; but reason is shocked by the violence of the hypothesis which Universalism—theological as well as philosophical—seems to necessitate. Theological Universalism supposes a too forcible interference of Almighty Love in the normal processes of the individual soul, bringing the divine into self-collision. Philosophical Universalism assumes an inevitable triumph of self-recovery,—a fatality of goodness in man which seems to be based on no analysis of human nature, which certainly is not warranted by any mundane experience, and whose only voucher, so far as we can see, is a brave hope, which, however honorable to those that cherish it, is of no great use in the critical investigation of this subject.” (Reason in Religion, Bk. II., Essay X.) But while he allows that some souls may pass beyond amendment, Hedge is unwilling to tolerate the theory of conscious endless misery. Lost souls, as he holds, though not extinguished as entities, will be deprived of moral consciousness or life.

Romanism allows no probation proper after death. All who die in mortal sin are consigned to everlasting punishment. Likewise unbaptized infants, dying simply in original sin, attain not to eternal life. As to the nature of their punishment, unanimity is not yet fully reached. As Dieringer reports, theologians most given to mildness make their punishment purely negative, the non-possession of the heavenly estate. Many claim for them a high grade of the natural knowledge of God and His works, and great satisfaction in this knowledge. (Dogmatik, § 142.)

Swedenborg painted the future life largely in colors drawn from the present. Some not of the New Church have thought that it adds interest to the heavenly life to represent its occupations and enjoyments as allied with those of this world. Meanwhile, profound piety, true to its record in the past, looks forward to the enraptured vision of the divine as the crowning felicity of heaven, and cherishes the presentiment that a glory and a blessedness,

which this world has no adequate means to prefigure, are in waiting for the heirs of salvation. The best discretion adopts the language of reserve which Martensen quotes from the Apostle John as the conclusion of his work: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him as He is."

INDEX OF SUBJECT MATTER.

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